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Preface 
This is an interdisciplinary work in industrial relations, 
focusing particularly on union growth. As such, its 
methodological properties derive from four different fields in 
the social sciences; a relatively recent development in 
sociology and social theory, industrial relations and 
economics. Any research in the social sciences requires 
reciprocal processes between the theory and empirical surveys, 
through which a generalised model of certain phenomenon can be 
constructed. When we actually starts an investigation, however, 
we are often dismayed by the fact that theories are rather 
fragmentary whereas empirical data is difficult to obtain. This 
might be particularly so in a social study carried out in a 
historical context. 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation deal with theories and 
3 to 7 the empirical evidence required to test them. A few 
problems concerning the foundations of social theory are 
briefly mentioned in Chapter 1. The point here is to consider a 
micro-foundation for subsequent analysis. This seems 
indispensable to me as it is something that current social 
theory lacks and a straightforward application of the rational 
choice framework also seems somewhat problematic. Following 
this, Chapter 2 provides a survey of theories of union growth 
in developed in sociology, industrial relations and economics. 
My contention here is that no single theory is sufficient to 
understand the social process as a whole. 
The empirical section, whose primary aim is the verification 
of the theories, consists of three parts; Chapter 3 is an 
introduction to the banking industry and its industrial 
relations system, from which information for the empirical 
research is taken. Chapters 4 and 7 provide analyses of short- 
run and long-term union growth in the industry. In these 
chapters, I generally followed a method commonly adopted in 
industrial relations and economics. Chapters 5 and 6 provide an 
historical analysis of union growth. The approach here is 
explicitly historical sociological, in which the research aims 
to attain a generalised understanding of the social processes 
from an empirical context. This, I think, is valuable 
particularly when the nature of causality changes and when 
theory does not have absolute reliability. 
As for the lay-out of the contents, I rather consciously 
followed the example of some works in historical sociology, 
particularly those of Cronin, Shorter and Tilly. I guess 
similar efforts have similar problems, although this work is 
far more limited than theirs in terms of its general 
applicability. I wanted to compensate this with wider 
theoretical implication and more accurate specification of 
causal processes, which I hope is attained. If there is 
something parallel, it may rest in the concern with an 
analytical approach and the generalized understanding of the 
processes through which the present situation is brought about. 
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The quantitative method used here is a basic one, which is 
now a standard tool of social analysis. I think that it is a 
convenient tool with a variety of application for the accurate 
estimation of causal processes, but we should also be aware of 
its limitations. 
Professor Takao Matsumura kindly recommended me to study in 
England, which has provided me with a valuable chance to 
experience another culture. Dr. Mason has acted as my 
supervisor and gave me detailed suggestions. Dr. Waddington, 
whom Professor Bain introduced to me, kindly read the draft and 
gave me useful comment, although it was not his duty to do so. 
Professor Richard Whip at Cardif University also gave me 
precious suggestions and the criticism of the two examiners, 
Dr. Melling and Professor Hyman, was constructive. 
Statistical data and indispensable information derive from 
many sources, including Bifu, Barclays Group Staff Union, 
NatWest Staff Association, Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union, 
Barclays Bank, Lloyds Bank, Midland Bank and the Certification 
Office, and many people have kindly spared their precious time 
for my research. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Waddington 
and Mrs Morgan, who allowed me to use the abundant data at the 
Industrial Relations Research Unit of the Business School at 
Warwick, Professor Heritage, who produced a sociological work 
on a similar theme, and Dr. Booker of the archive of Lloyds 
Bank, who suggested me the files compiled by Mr. Winton. 
Finally, without the generous support of my parents, the 
project would not have been possible. 
Correction 
Because of a mechanical problem, certain Greek letters and 
mathematical notations in notes are incorrectly printed. 
1. Union Growth and the Logic of Social Action 
Since the publication of Union Growth and the Business Cycle by 
Bain and Elsheikh in 1976, the study of union growth has 
attracted considerable attention not only from sociologists, 
social-psychologists and industrial relations specialists but 
also economists in the U. K.. ' A similar tendency can be seen in 
the U. S., where a series of researches stimulated by the work 
of Ashenfelter and Pencavel have been produced. Generalized 
understanding of the nature, or the causal processes of the 
development of trade unions, however, has not yet been 
achieved. 
The field has also a methodological and theoretical 
attraction. The action of joining a trade union had 
traditionally been considered to accompany social rather than 
economic decision processes, an understanding which is usually 
associated with the holistic approach in the social sciences. 
Thus, it has often been assumed that the subjective experience 
of an individual is essentially consistent with certain 
elements in societal symbolic systems or the collective 
constituents, such as language, customary rules, religion, 
economic relationships, art and science and, in some cases, 
research in the subject or subjective meaning has been regarded 
to have little strategic importance in explaining actual 
courses of action. 2 
2 
Despite the obvious importance of such an understanding, it 
has also resulted in a lack in the current social theory, and 
analyses of social phenomena based upon it, of the core to deal 
systematically with social action. Opening a textbook, we find 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber and specific social models, but no 
systematic treatment of the micro foundations of daily actions, 
while the applicability of the rational choice framework in the 
wider fields of the social sciences largely remains 
problematic. 
Thus, a natural approach for this research was by treating 
the processes of union growth explicitly as a consequence of 
the social or rational action of individual employees, to 
reconsider currently prevailing theories in an empirical 
context. This is also to bring the aggregate processes down to 
a level of an individual choice and to pose a simple, but 
essential, question; why do we join ( or not join )a union? 
Such an approach seems to be of particular value in formulating 
our action where theories are immature. 
The first part of this short introductory chapter is devoted 
to considering some general theoretical problems concerning the 
location of rational choice theory within the wider framework 
of social action. As economic studies of social phenomena 
increase, the properties of such a theory have come to be 
discussed. Properly dealt with, the field is extensive and this 
is not the place to develop a detailed critique. Nevertheless, 
it is necessary to draw the attention of the reader to the 
3 
properties of the theory and the aim of the research will then 
be briefly explained in the second section. 
Rational Man and Unions 
Original utility theory was based upon the rational premise 
that individuals aim to maximize their utility, or 
satisfaction, obtainable from different quantities of goods or 
services under the constraint of their budget. His or her 
preference is represented by the cardinal utility function. 
Later development in the theory, by introducing the 
preferences-opportunities model, broadened the concept of 
rationality to signify consistency of choice with preference. 
Sociologists have generally conceived that such a model of homo 
economicus is a 'specific schema, which can be used in a pure 
state in the analysis of some social phenomena relevant to the 
sociologist's area of interest but not to all'. 
3 The problem 
is, in which social phenomena? 
An action to join a union may be classified into two 
Weberian categories of social action; that of Zweckrational and 
Wertrational. The first is the case where the action is taken 
in order to attain certain pecuniary or non-pecuniary ends. One 
may join because one wants a better salary or because of fears 
of redundancy. These cases can be considered to refer to the 
action which is taken for the sake of an immediate increase in 
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utility. The second is the case where such an action is more 
normative than utilitarian. 
Utility theory is a particular specification of purposive 
action, which also corresponds with Pareto's criterion of 
logical action. 4 Economists have considered to different 
degrees that human behaviour is mostly goal-directed, often in 
a fairly consistent manner, be it towards utility, profit, 
social status or national self-interest and that the theory has 
explicit merits in its simplicity and in its applicability for 
predictive purposes. 5 Some sociologists, like Coleman, have 
also thought that the notion can be used to give a precise 
treatment of individual action in social theory, which 
supplements two other reciprocal processes in the field between 
man and his systems. 6 
These cases also relate to the original business-cycle 
models of union growth, which are dealt with in this work, and 
other genres of the quantitative study of union membership. 
There seems to be enough ground to argue that changes in 
economic conditions may provide a chance for such decisions, 
although the assumption of the business-cycle theory that the 
aggregate action occurs in such a regular fashion in relation 
to a certain unit of economic change so that its functional 
form can be specified still seems to be somewhat rough. 
Further caution seems to be required as union services are 
commonly demanded in complex social milieux, in which one may 
choose an adaptive action; one may join because everybody else 
joins. One does not join because his boss does not join or 
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because the results are anyway obtained without paying a 
subscription. All these cases with different objects of utility 
seem to be within the reach of an empirical study. In the past 
decade, some economists have endeavoured to formulate them. The 
first example, for instance, is the case of social custom 
theory which shows that an individual may have a utility 
function that depends upon other people's behaviour. The second 
case, where the individual's utility depends upon other people 
within an unequally distributed power structure, has 
essentially the same property, but has not necessarily been 
treated seriously by economists and advocates of rational 
choice theory. This problem concerning the complexity of the 
objects of utility, or maximands, may lead to specification 
errors of the real causes of action, a danger which is shared 
by the sociological approach that emphasizes the function of 
structural constraints. The last case represents Olson's free 
rider problem.? 
The second is the case where one joins ( or does not join ) 
a union because one thinks that it is good ( bad ) and such a 
choice is more normative in the sense that it derives from a 
belief acquired through pre- or in-market learning and 
experiences; belief or disbelief in trade unionism, in equality 
in the capitalist economy or in the unobstructed function of a 
national labour market. Such attitudes are often thought to 
correlate with one's political socialization, the consequence 
of which is the maintenance of a set of opinions upon the 
desirability of different actions. Whatever persuasion the 
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individual may have, what is common in these cases is that his 
action derives from a socially normative understanding of 
reality, which entirely depending upon the syntactical system, 
possesses a similar structural property. 8 
If there are certain genres of action which are essentially 
consistent with socially maintained norms, how can they be 
treated in the context of the rational choice framework? 
Elster, following Borch, considers that the problem of 
Wertrational action can be solved in terms of lexicographic, or 
more generally, non-Archimedean, preferences; certain goods or 
activities, which cannot induce a change in a preference order 
by changing the quantity of one in relation to others are 
basically non-comparable and therefore, rest outside the 
economic approach, a view which is not shared by Becker. 
9 His 
example is the ethical principle of not to gamble which is 
usually supposed to be directly conditioned by an internalized 
morality originally enforced upon the individual by the 
society. In the same way, it is not difficult to imagine cases 
where changes in quality of union services do not affect the 
choice to join or stay aloof from a union. 
This leads to the third problem. Although in the loosened 
versions of rational choice framework, difference, 
inconsistancy and transformation of preferences are often dealt 
with, crucial theoretical inferences based upon utility theory 
mostly depend upon the assumption of a homogeneous utility 
function, amongst others; preferences are basically similar 
among individuals and most of the observed differences in 
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behaviour can be explained through differences in the 
opportunity set. 
The assumption of homogeneity in economic theory has often 
been pointed out to be problematic at least in a few senses. 
One is a consequent omission from the theory of some important 
aspects of the economy such as the effects of income 
distribution and of other individual characteristics. 
10 There 
are also some logical difficulties; applied to human capital 
theory, for instance, cross-sectional differences in an 
increase in wages are interpreted as a function of human 
capital investment in the form of foregone income. But 'if all 
individuals are alike, why do they not make the same choice? 
"' 
Or consider the cases studied by the dual labour market 
theorists who found that belonging to a certain race or sex 
would systematically reduce the return on certain human capital 
endowments. 12 
From here, sociological epistemology, in which the aggregate 
tendency in subjective inclination and action is explained 
causally by certain social and economic situations, is not very 
far. Being interpreted in the rational choice framework, choice 
can be considered to be essentially consistent with preference, 
which is socially determined and varies between individuals. 
13 
The approach that emphasizes the importance of structural 
constraints has not only been used widely to explain diverse 
social phenomena from union membership, educational attainment, 
and criminal rates to church attendance but has been one of the 
central tenets of critiques of the rational choice approach. 
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We may recall in this context the criticism by Simon of the 
assumptions of homo economicus and his concept of bounded 
rationality. He wrote, 
"the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving 
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the 
problems whose solution is required for objective rational 
behavior in the real world, or even for a reasonable 
approximation to such objective rationality. ... The first 
consequence of the principle of bounded rationality of an actor 
requires him to construct a simplified model of the real 
situation in order to deal with it. He behaves rationally with 
respect to this model, and such behavior is not even 
approximately optimal with respect to the real world, ', 
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which leads to his now famous axiom that man does not maximize 
any function at all, but just satisfies, or finds a course of 
action 'good enough'. 15 Rational choice may not be tenable in 
reality also because, if a role one plays in a certain social 
and psychological setting entails some subset of decision 
premises, most of the premises of rational choice will be 
determined by such factors. In such cases, the action would 
converge with a role-determined action, which is often found in 
sociological epistemology. 16 
The accompanying problem of the rational choice approach is 
that although the realisation of a conscious action takes two 
steps, namely what you think and then, what you do, the theory 
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puts an overwhelming emphasis upon the latter. Probably this is 
a vestige of the conception of homo economicus, whose 
preference does not have much meaning for, or is unfamiliar to, 
the third person. ( Who cares if Mr. Jones prefers an apple to a 
pear! ) Personally held norms or collective consciousness, 
which is to be converted into a preference, which determines 
the subjective desirability of an action, remains predominantly 
in conventional sociologists' or historians' fields. 
Despite all these probable sources of discrepancy of the 
theory from the real causes of action, it can still be argued 
that 'even if rationality often is unimportant, or absent, or 
unstable, there is a hard core of important cases where the 
rational choice model is indispensable and that this model is 
logically prior to alternatives. ' 17 Here, we find the most 
general theoretical implication of this research; does such a 
model provide an adequate foundation for social research? If 
so, to what extent? 
About This Research 
Through the statistical studies of trade unionism in the past 
two decades has emerged a loose consensus that different genres 
of analyses serve specific purposes; short-run analyses are 
mainly carried out by the business-cycle models, structural, or 
compositional, factors are captured by a shift-share analysis 
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and analyses of long-term growth are best served by cross- 
sectional surveys. 
The choice here is rather arbitrary, not only as an analyst 
de facto finds oneself within a certain theoretical and 
methodological strand, but as respective results may be 
supplementary. This research was originally envisaged as a 
historical sociological analysis of union growth in a time- 
series context and as such, comprised of general and specific 
theories, empirical models and close examination of the 
historical processes, through which a generalised understanding 
of the social phenomenon is obtained. 
This methodology may particularly be associated with 
Chapters 2,5 and 6. Specific theories of union growth, which 
are classified into sociological, industrial relations and 
economic approaches, are revised in Chapter 2 and, together 
with the general theoretical implication of utility theory 
which we have just seen, used as hypotheses verified in the 
empirical section. Examination of the empirical processes is 
focused on the banking industry and is carried out in Chapters 
5 and 6, the former covering some twenty five years before and 
during the second world war, -and the latter from 1946 to 1990. 
This demarcation mainly reflects a change in the industrial 
relations system in the industry and thus, availability of the 
data. 
In both chapters, an overview of the institutional structure 
of the industrial relations system is provided first. This is 
necessary because this defines the very field in which 
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statistical models should be estimated; for example, the change 
of many compulsory, free staff associations into trade unions 
during the war means the dependent variable in the analysis 
also has to be changed. Then, models accurately estimate the 
average effects of each employed variable upon union growth 
during the sample period, on the assumption that all other 
values of variables are held constant, and qualitative 
empirical surveys follow specific processes of short-run 
growth. 
Other chapters are rather supplementary and contain what I 
feel is omitted in the main analyses. Chapter 3 provides a 
brief history of the banking industry and its industrial 
relations system, particularly its present situation. In 
Chapter 4, short-run models in a general style are estimated 
and long-term growth in the industry is briefly considered; 
sociological assumptions concerning the effects of historical 
shifts in the patterns of stratification, for instance, are 
more adequately verified in the long-term context. Thus, the 
style of this chapter is closer to the current practice in 
research in industrial relations than historical sociology. 
Chapter 7 deals with a supplementary statistical analyses and 
the last chapter provides a concise summary. 
One problem which is only partially dealt with here is 
consistency between, as occasionally called, mechanical and 
statistical models. Inconsistency can be most probably observed 
between theories which have largely rested upon the results of 
empirical models at an aggregate level and the actual process 
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of unionization; highly significant effects of a price 
inflation variable upon union growth, for instance, may not be 
solely attributable to its immediate effect upon an individual 
actor, and the relative effects of different causal paths have 
not been cautiously considered. 
This can naturally be a theoretical problem because, despite 
the alleged consistency between the theory and empirical 
results obtained through statistical models, actual causality 
may lie somewhere else. Of course, it is not possible to 
disentangle all causal processes, but certain aspects may be 
explored by developing an inter-industrial comparison of short- 
run union growth, which remains for my next project. 
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2. Theories of Union Growth 
Theories of trade unionism generally, and those of union growth 
particularly, have been developed relatively independently in 
the three fields of the social sciences; sociology, industrial 
relations and economics. They have been based upon different 
methodological foundations, sometimes focused upon different 
causalities and often adopted different research techniques. 
The consequence is of some importance, as analysts often limit 
the sphere of their inference according to the theory that they 
depend upon. Nevertheless, it seems-to be worth noting that 
these theories often deal with different aspects of the same 
phenomenon and that the respective results are rather 
complementary than contradictory. 
The aim of this chapter is, first of all, to summarise the 
causal processes of union growth upheld in respective 
traditions by examining their features and limits. This is 
followed by an exposition of recent empirical findings on the 
determinants of union growth, which leads to an attempt to lay 
the foundation of a theory of union growth and an operational 
framework of a subsequent time-series analysis. 
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1. Social Stratification and Union Growth 
The approach of sociologists is sometimes labelled as 
'structural', as differences in attitudes, norms and actions 
between a certain genre of employees and another are often 
thought to be explained by functionally different elements of 
the situation in which they are located, the entity of which 
sociologists and historians often loosely call 'social 
structure'. 1 Although its methodological property can be 
traced back to Durkheim's manifestation of holism in the Rules, 
it was classical sociology of class structure and social 
stratification initially developed by Marx and Weber that the 
modern sociologists in Europe looked to in order to specify 
such situations. 2 
Certain methodological differences persist among the 
sociologists according to their orientation, despite the fact 
that such differences seem to be less conspicuous in the 
attempts to explain union growth than in general social theory. 
The general tendency is summarised by Craib, who wrote that, 
although many modern writers might accept Marx's economic 
analysis of capitalism as being superior to Weber's, they 
nevertheless argue that Marx did not develop an adequate theory 
of social action and they turned to Weber for such a theory. 
3 
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Production Relations and Class Situation 
One of the central premises of a Marxist analysis of trade 
unionism is, according to Crompton, its ability to relate the 
'surface process' of market or work situations of the employees 
to the underlying relations of production. 4 Although Marx left 
the section entitled the classes in Capital unfinished, some 
were reconstituted from his work and others were developed from 
his thought by neo-Marxist sociologists and economists. 
In Marxist theory, 'class' usually denotes a cluster of 
agents who occupy the same position in terms of the 
relationship to the means of production. Two basic categories 
are differentiated in the capitalist economy, namely the 
producers who do not own the means of production and are forced 
to sell their labour power and the non-producers who own and 
control the means of production and the labour power, and can 
legally appropriate the product and surplus labour incorporated 
in the commodity as surplus value. 5 
However, subsequent developments in the capitalist 
economies, such as the increases in joint-stock companies and 
intermediate stratum 'between labour and capital' made the 
analytical and explanatory functions of the property-relations- 
related concept inadequate; if white-collar work is 
'unproductive', or if it does not create surplus value but 
appropriates what has been created somewhere else, how can the 
concept of exploitation be defined? 
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Though early analyses of the so-called service class can be 
found in the work of Austro-Marxism, it was much later that 
sociologists in the tradition of structural and analytical 
Marxism endeavoured to induce a series of overlapping 
dichotomies, according to which social classes are 
categorised. 6 These include Nicos Poulantzas ( the structural 
determination of classes by productive / unproductive labour 
and manual and mental labour distinctions Erik Olin Wright 
( the ownership /non-ownership of the means of production and 
possession /non-possession of the means of production and the 
labour power of others ), Guglielmo Carchedi ( the owner /non- 
owner of the means of production, the producer /non-producer of 
surplus value and labour /capital functions ), later Olin 
Wright ( forms of exploitation based upon the organization 
assets and the possession of skills or credential assets ), 
John Elster ( Endowments and types of market behaviour ) and 
John Roemer ( types of market behaviour ). 7 In more general 
terms, many regard that the social situation of the white- 
collar or middle class workers are characterised by two basic 
features; a lack in property and the functions of both labour 
and capital. 8 
A principal concern of the empirical Marxian sociologists 
has been, then, to apply the concept of the white-collar class 
situation to illuminate the processes of unionisation and union 
behaviour, connecting them to the historically changing 
relations of production. The changing situation is often 
regarded to take the form of 'proletarianisation', a term which 
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is also used by neo-Weberian sociologists-9 Rosemary Crompton 
believes that this process may occur in two ways; 
". .. the 'unproductive' labour force may, in Braverman's 
term, be 'deskilled': that is, 'conception' split off from 
'execution' and work reduced to a series of fragmented, 
repetitive operations. The extent to which the white-collar 
worker carries out the function of capital may be progressively 
reduced, rendering the worker nothing more nor less than 
unproductive labour, " 
and argued that this process of 'double proletarianisation's or 
changes in their class situation, 'has been of considerable 
importance' in the unionization of insurance clerks. 10 
In order to establish the causal process, she pointed out 
three 'tentative' explanations which connect the abstract 
categories constituting the concept of 'double- 
proletarianization' and its actual reflection in the changing 
'market' and 'work' situation in Weberian terms. 
a. The relatively high levels of intrinsic job satisfaction 
that stems from a relatively high level of autonomy. 
b. A 'non-bureaucratic' or, at least, 'administratively 
particularistic' treatment of white-collar workers by employers 
which derives from informal on-the-job training and skill. 
c. A process of 'anticipatory socialization' which occurred 
whereby clerks associated themselves with 'management' rather 
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than 'workers' to get promotion in a hierarchical organization 
structure. 
'Double proletarianization', if it occurs, is to reverse such a 
situation. ll 
The approach seems to have some problems. Many would agree 
that the social theory does provide an understanding of the 
nature of social stratification, which would otherwise remain 
an 'unconscious' sphere of the social reality. Nevertheless, it 
offers little to help understand the actual mechanism by which 
objective class situations are related to the patterns of 
perception, consciousness and action of the people, leaving 
much of it mere speculation. As Weberians would claim, and 
Crompton would perhaps admit, the logic of human 'relationships 
in the stratification system, to which individuals adjust and 
react, is governed by such diverse factors that coarse 
categories on sociological class situations may have little 
power to explain the observable patterns. 12 This constitutes a 
related, but separate, causal entity and modern social 
theory still seems to lack tools to analyse these 
processes. 
Another criticism is a lack of evidence that supports the 
assumed relationship between the proletarianization and union 
growth. Thus, John Heritage wrote, 
"It is amongst the ranks of lower-grade clerical workers that 
one should look for higher levels of unionization in response 
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to mechanization. ... In the case of banking, there is no 
discernible unionization trend associated with mechanization 
and computerization. ... one place to look for unionization 
in respect to blocked promotion prospects is among female 
staff, and, to a lesser extent, among men. Crompton however 
offers no evidence upon this point. ""13 
Crompton and Jones produced 
which they argued that factors 
that reflect the class situati 
be disregarded, even if they 
explanation of the growth 
unionism. l4 
empirical research in 1984, in 
relating to the work situation 
on of non-manual workers cannot 
do not provide a mono-causal 
and. nature of white-collar 
Class Situation and Social Action 
Weber's approach to the analysis of social stratification 
reflects the liberal and pragmatic character of his 
interpretative sociology. He regarded, for example, that 
classes are differentiable when a number of people share a 
'specific causal component of their life chances' which is 
represented by economic interests, such as goods and income, 
and represented under the conditions of the commodity or labour 
markets, thus explicitly insisting on the basic function of the 
market that restricts individuals' fate and materialises 
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potential strata in market economies. 15 Or, in the same way, 
class situation is the 'typical chance for a supply of goods, 
external living conditions, and personal life experiences in so 
far as this chance is determined by the amount and kind of 
power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the 
sake of income in a given economic order., 16 
There seems to be at least three points in this formulation, 
which were of some importance for the later development of neo- 
Weberian social theory. One is an infinite dispiration of class 
situations. 17 The basic categories of all class situations are 
'property' and a 'lack of property', as, where pure market 
conditions prevail, the propertied would naturally transfer 
their property to capital goods, thus enabling them to execute 
the entrepreneurial function. Nevertheless, Weber thought that 
both categories could be differentiated by the 'kind of 
property that is usable for returns' and the 'kind of services 
that can be offered in the market', and it was an existence of 
such differences in the categories that he quoted as one of the 
reasons not to assume an a priori causality between class 
interest and social and collective actions. 18 
This leads to the second point of his attempt to specify, or 
rather suggest, the conditions where the latent causality 
becomes a reality. In general terms, he attributed these to 
'general, cultural conditions', particularly those of 
intellectual sorts, as well as the 'extent of the contrasts 
that have already evolved' and the 'transparency of the 
24 
connections between the causes and the consequences of the 
class situation. ' 
The third point, his consideration of the status situation, 
emerges in relation with this. Just as he stratified class 
situation in terms of market situation, or the production and 
acquisition of goods, he differentiated the status situation in 
terms of a specific social estimation of honour, or 'according 
to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented 
by styles of lives. '19 Just as property would, 'with 
extraordinary regularity', bring about status in the long-term, 
he regards that class and status situations may be interwoven. 
Nevertheless, he also thought that the functions of class and 
status stratifications in a given society were underlain by 
technological and economic situations. Thus, technological 
transformation would push the class situation into the 
foreground whereas a slowing down of the process would lead to 
a consolidation of status structures. 20 
Unlike Klingender, who, in the 1930s, considered that the 
class situation of clerks was similar to that of manual labour 
and that their peculiar behaviour is to be explained by their 
'false' understanding of the real situation, David Lockwood, 
who developed one of the most influential, and now classical, 
neo-Weberfan frameworks, considered that the former is indeed 
different from the latter, which explains the differences in 
the actions of the respective groups of workers. 
21 His 
'Weberian' attempt was, just as Dunlop tried, to specify the 
elements of class situation in the total environment of a 
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worker and to relate them to the actions they take. Behind this 
seems to be a conviction that the subjective meaning of such 
actions must be consistent with the elements of social 
conditions. Hence, although the 'conditions making for 
concerted action among the members of an occupational group and 
these making for class consciousness are not identical', low 
degree of unionization and 'lukewarm' organizational behaviour 
of non-manual trade unions are, at least partly, explained by 
the actual experiences that non-manual workers in a common 
economic position are subject to. 
A novelty which he brought into the class analysis was, as 
Crompton and Gubbay wrote, the introduction of the 'work 
situation' variable into a 'component of life chances' and 
experiences. 
"Under 'class position' will be included the following factors. 
First, 'market situation', that is to say the economic position 
narrowly conceived, consisting of source and size of income, 
degree of job security, and opportunity for upward occupational 
mobility. Secondly, 'work situation', the set of social 
relationships in which the individual is involved at work by 
virtue of his position in the division of labour. And finally, 
'status situation', or the position of the individual in the 
hierarchy of prestige in the society at large. The experience 
originating in these three spheres may be seen as the principal 
determinants of class consciousness. "22 
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So far as the growth of trade unions is concerned, the work 
situation is supposed to have superior causal and explanatory 
functions, although some have argued the case for the 
importance of the market. 23 
Thus, according to Lockwood, an essential factor of white- 
collar unionization was the emergence of bureaucratic internal 
markets, which transformed early paternalistic, particularistic 
relationships between employers and employees into impersonal 
ones, consequently creating the conditions for collective 
interdependence amongst the employees. 'In a word, the system 
is dehumanized'. 24 A blockage of upward mobility by some 
institutional factors, such as reduction in managerial 
functions through administrative rationalization or direct 
recruitment from external markets, would further facilitate the 
process. It is this process of standardisation of working 
conditions, he maintains, that underlay the rapid growth of 
NALGO in local government, and the large scale amalgamations in 
banking was a potent factor in the initial success of the 
B. O. G. after the First World War. C. A. W. U. 's density was low, 
as clerical conditions differed largely firm by firm. 25 
His method is still holistic in that the analysis occurs at 
the level of aggregate patterns of consciousness and action; in 
his model of union growth, the independent variable is the 
entity of class situation and the dependent variable is the 
historical situation and changes in trade unionism. Bain, 
Coates and Ellis claim that sociologists have traditionally 
developed an intervening variable, social imagerv. 26 
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The basic postulates of the proponents of social imagery is 
that the workers' position in the social stratification system 
generates a certain picture or an image of industry and the 
wider society which shapes their attitudes toward trade 
unionism. As Lockwood put it, probably criticizing some Marxist 
approaches, 
". .. the individuals' social consciousness is to a large 
extent influenced by his immediate social context ... and it 
has been stated most clearly by Bott, who writes: 'People do 
have direct experience of distinctions of power and prestige in 
their places of work, among their colleagues, in schools, 
neighbours, and relatives. ' In other words, the ingredients, 
the raw materials, of class ideology are located in the 
individuals' various primary social experiences, rather than in 
his position in a socio-economic category. "27 
The models of the perception of the society might have some 
consistency with the basic Weberian theoretical framework of 
social action. It has often been assumed that images of society 
are one major element in the normative dimension of class and 
have a 'profound effect on orientations to action because they 
are the core of social consciousness. '28 Hence, there is a 
high probability that people who are in a similar situation in 
the class structure tend to develop a certain image of society 
mainly through direct experiences of power and prestige, from 
which different attitudes and specific actions may be derived. 
28 
The early models, which had been developed separately by 
Popitz, Willner and Hoggart in some European countries mainly 
in the 1950s, were given a systematic form by Dahrendorf. 
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These writers confirmed that, by and large, people do have an 
image of society and these differencet images are not randomly 
held. Popitz and Willner extracted two basic different 
patterns, namely 'dichotomy' and 'hierarchy'. 
30 In Goldthorpe 
and Lockwood's words, 
"One 'polar' type of image is that of society as being sharply 
divided into two contending sections, or classes, 
differentiated primarily in terms of the possession or non 
possession of power. ( the 'power', 'conflict' or 'dichotomous' 
model )... Contrasting with this is an image of society as 
comprising an extended hierarchy of relatively 'open' strata 
differentiated primarily in terms of prestige. ( the 
'prestige', 'status' or 'hierarchical' model )" 
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"Further it has been proposed that the social ideology of the 
working class tends to take the form of a power model, whereas 
that of the middle class appropriates the hierarchical 
model. "32 
Perception of the society, or social consciousness in this 
context, is supposed to be explained mainly by the structure of 
work and community situations. 33 
29 
a. Work Situation Variables, 
Involvement in job 
Interaction and identification with workmates 
Interaction and identification with employers 
Chances of upward mobility 
b. Community Variables, 
Interactional status system 
Occupational community 
Occupational differentiation 
The middle class employees, limited to the administrative, 
managerial, technical and professional white-collar group, is 
predisposed to hold a hierarchical model of society because, 
"First, there is ample evidence that middle class employees of 
the kind in question do find their work intrinsically more 
rewarding and more highly involved in their jobs than most 
industrial workers. Secondly, because their working 
relationships usually bring them into close contact with higher 
management and administration as well as with small groups of 
workers of their own rank, they are likely to identify 
themselves with both 'the firm' and their colleagues. Thirdly, 
because of their high job involvement, they are likely to form 
occupational communities and this tendency should be more 
pronounced the more they are geographically mobile and thus the 
more they are dependent on friendships acquired through their 
occupational roles. Fourthly, middle class employees are likely 
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to live in occupationally mixed communities. ... Finally, 
white collar employees are likely to be involved in 
interactional status systems. Whether social visiting, or 
membership of and participation in voluntary associations is 
taken as a measure of communal ( and hence status ) 
interaction, the middle classes rank so much higher than the 
privatised working class that the difference is qualitative. "34 
On the other hand, the social consciousness of lower grade 
clerical employees is thought to be similar to that of factory 
workers and described as a pecuniary model. Slight involvement 
in the highly specialised, repetitive jobs and the lack of 
close primary group ties inside and outside the work situation 
tend to force those employees to be wage-oriented at work and 
consumption-oriented in the community, and no definite feeling 
of social location is likely to be formed. Hence class 
divisions are seen mainly in terms of differences in income and 
material possessions. 
Especially in the early studies, 
"a close interrelationship was seen to prevail between the 
individuals' perception of society, his general value system 
and .... the attitudes he took towards more specific social 
issues. 35 
Hence, as Bain et al. put it, the middle class models, 
especially the prestige model is believed to be inimical to 
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unionism, because those who possess such an ideology are 
assumed to see themselves as individuals capable of progressing 
through society unaided and without protection, and regard 
trade unions as an intervention into a highly personal 
employment relationship. 36 The basic function of trade unions 
for non-manual workers are instrumental, namely they are 
collective instruments for pursuing individual goals and 
normative compliance through belonging to occupational 
communities and unions takes different forms. 
In their early work, such sociologists as Blackburn and 
Prandy also adopted and developed the model in which the 
dependent variables, white-collar union growth and character, 
are explained by the explanatory variables of class situation 
of workers. 37 Blackburn's contribution was to show that, 
between the two dependent variables, there is a functional 
relationship. He regarded that unionization, an 'index of class 
consciousness', was a function of union density and union 
character, which is defined as the 'commitment of an 
organization to the general principles and ideology of trade 
unionism. ' The hypothesis is that for any degree of 
unionization, density and character vary inversely. The early 
crude formulation of measures of union character was refined 
later into an empirically operational one using the multi- 
dimensional scaling. 38 
Some recent literature, notably by Prandy, Stewart and 
Blackburn, shows a theoretical divergence from the traditional 
class analysis per se in that they explicitly introduce an 
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individual-based social action framework. 
39 Their approach, 
which relates the action of joining ( or quitting )a union to 
individual's perception, expectation, satisfaction and 
adaptation, resembles the social psychological approach popular 
in America. Although it did not necessarily enjoy a favourable 
assessment from more traditionally-minded sociologists, theirs 
is a hybrid model 'of the social action and 'stratification' 
approaches in the sense that they regard the cycle of cognition 
and action to be patterned if the experiences of the structure 
of inequalities are shared by workers. 
40 
Despite conceptual betterment, the 'stratification' approach 
has always found critics who brought the causal relations 
between social stratification and union growth under scrutiny - 
in reality, the process is complex and a few analytical 
categories would be far from explaining the pattern. Bain, 
Coates and Ellis, for example, looked through empirical works 
on union growth and concluded that a 'fairly wide range of 
objective, accorded and subjective measures or dimensions of 
their position in the social stratification system has failed 
to reveal a significant relationship between these two 
variables. '41 They made three observations that underlie union 
growth; a sense of relative deprivation, institutionalisation, 
and stratification inconsistency. 
The first point amounts to the argument that, if an action 
to join a union takes place, the extent of the difference 
between an expectation and an actual social and economic 
position in the stratification system has to be perceived. We 
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have just seen that to establish a causal link between a 
certain external situation and social action was the problem 
that Weber endeavoured to elaborate. The second observation, 
which was originally put forward by Kornhauser, implies that 
causal processes of union growth would change their nature over 
a certain period. 42 Thus, they claimed that, during the early 
stages of unions' development, the decision to join a union 
might be a voluntary act and that the stratification factors 
would function. However, 'under certain conditions, unions 
become institutionalized. They are accepted as legitimate 
participants in industrial rule-making. ... Once a practice 
is firmly established, ... conformity tends to become 
obligatory, either through custom ( backed by informal social 
pressure ) or coercion ( backed by legal sanctions ), both of 
which presuppose public recognition of the legitimacy of the 
practice. '43 This observation, at least the latter process, 
now finds a precise formulation in the neo-classical 'social 
custom theory', which will be reviewed in the third section. 
The last point, 'stratification inconsistency', simply 
maintains that different factors that originate in the 
stratification system would have inconsistent causal effects 
upon unionisation. Hence, responsiveness of workers to 
different factors is purely an empirical matter. 
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2. Union Growth and the Business Cycle 
Unlike two other approaches to union growth reviewed in this 
chapter, the title, 'union growth and the business-cycle', does 
not necessarily signify a particular feature of a theory. 
Industrial relations as an academic subject has essentially 
developed as a pragmatic interdisciplinary one. The 'Oxford' 
school, which has been the dominant school in the field in the 
U. K., had started its theoretical work as a critical assessment 
of the concepts of Sidney and Beatrice Webb as well as an 
application of Durkheimian sociology. 44 George Bain and his 
collaborators, who followed the early attempt to theorise the 
processes of union growth from Flanders, drew theoretical 
insights from economists such as Dunlop, Hines, Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel, and Sharp. Nevertheless, they opted for a 
methodologically neutral 'industrial relations' framework, 
rather than a neo-classical one, which they claimed to be 
'compatible not only with economics but also with other 
disciplines upon which the wider studies draw. '45 
A similar tendency may be seen in the United States where 
the publication of 'Wage Determination under Trade Unions' lead 
to the famous controversy over the nature of trade unions 
between John Dunlop and Arthur Ross in the 1940s, which in turn 
lead to an attempt at synthesis by Clarke Kerr, and an attempt 
to apply the Parsonian systems model by Dunlop. 46 In the field 
of study of union growth, two broadly different methods may be 
possible. One is explicitly to adopt a certain theoretical 
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framework, particularly that of economics, sociology or social 
psychology, or industrial relations per se and another is to 
test evidence against plural theoretical hypotheses. 
47 
The 'Oxford' School 
It was Michael Poole who wrote that one of the features of the 
'Oxford' school can be found in a 'dominant focus put upon 
institutions of collective bargaining', which added a 
methodological contour to its ideological orientation as a 
liberal-pluralist school. 48 This, perhaps, is not surprising, 
as there were some influences of American writers such as 
Dunlop and Chemberlain, which brought about a move away from 
the early research field of trade unions to collective 
bargaining and industrial relations theory in the 1950s. 49 
The aim of Hugh Clegg was to show that collective bargaining 
was a 'main, major, foremost or principal' influence on union 
growth, structure and behaviour. 50 He considered that 
collective bargaining has a structure which consists of some 
dimensions. The extent of bargaining is defined as 'the 
proportion of employees in a plant or an industry or a country 
covered by collective bargaining. ' Similarly, the level of 
bargaining is the level of the aggregation of a bargaining 
unit, the depth of bargaining is 'the involvement of local 
union officers and shop stewards in the administration of 
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agreements, ' union security is 'the support given by employers 
to union efforts to recruit their employees and retain them in 
membership. ' To these, another independent factor, the degree 
of control of collective bargaining, is added. 51 
Union density is, then, a function of the extent, depth and 
security of bargaining. Union government is a function of the 
level of bargaining and strikes are that of the level of 
bargaining, the degree of control of agreements and other 
factors such as the economy and unionists' attitudes. 
Although, in the empirical analysis, he did mention other more 
conventional factors of union growth, such as plant size and 
statutory support by the state, the predominant focus was upon 
systems of collective bargaining, which made his work specific 
rather than general. 52 
Bain's Model of Union Growth 
Bain's early study of white-collar unionism in 1970 shows his 
debt to the Oxford school as well as a germ of later studies of 
union growth that marked a principal expansion of the basis of 
research in industrial relations in the U. K.. Examining a range 
of factors which might affect the cross-sectional patterns of 
trade union growth, he extracted three strategic variables 
which he considered significantly related to the growth of 
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aggregate unionism; namely employment concentration, union 
recognition and government actions. 53 
In his survey, employment concentration constitutes one of 
the work situation variables together with such factors as 
opportunities of upward occupational mobility, the level of 
mechanization and automation, and proximity to unionized manual 
workers. Examining mainly the cross-sectional data, he 
concluded that concentration is the only necessary condition of 
trade union growth amongst these variables, which can be 
explained by some a priori_ reasoning, namely probable 
bureaucratic treatment of employees and correspondent active 
recruiting policies by trade unions. 
He mentioned three major reasons for the importance of 
employers' recognition of unions, 
"Firstly, workers, especially white-collar workers, tend to 
identify with management, and they are, therefore, less likely 
to join trade unions the more strongly management disapproves 
of them. ... Secondly, the more strongly management 
disapproves of trade unions, the less likely workers are to 
join them in case they jeopardised their career prospects. .. 
Finally and most important, unions are usually accepted on 
instrumental rather than ideological grounds, 'as something to 
be used rather than as something in which to believe. ' ... 
The less recognition an employer is prepared to give a union 
the more difficult it is for the union to participate in the 
process of job regulation and thereby demonstrate to employees 
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that it can provide a service for them. In such circumstances 
not only are a large number of employees not likely to join 
unions, but many of those who have already done so are likely 
to let their membership lapse because the return they are 
getting is insufficient, " 
Bain also stressed the crucial function of government policies 
and the consequent favourable social climate, which brought 
about, directly or indirectly, most of the recognition of 
white-collar unions in the private sector. 54 
This model has been criticized on some points. For instance, 
Adams pointed out the lack of variables which would enable a 
logical explanation of union growth and of a micro-theory. 
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According to Bain's statement, employment concentration is a 
favourable condition for the growth of white-collar unions, but 
'it is not by itself sufficient. ' The only other variable in 
the equation, recognition by the employer, is a function of 
density and government action. And if, as can be speculated 
from his statement, government action is not by itself a 
sufficient condition for the achievement of positive 
recognition, unions must first have some numbers to win 
recognition. For density to advance, density must first exist 
but the factors responsible for the original attainment of 
membership by unions are not explicated. 'In short, the model 
is circular. i56 He also wrote, 
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"in order this model to be credible, Bain requires some 
motivational determinant of worker behaviour. .. Most of the 
factors which other writers have suggested as determinants of 
the motivation which employees might have for joining a trade 
union, including dissatisfaction with earnings, other terms and 
conditions of employment, employment security, and 
opportunities for promotion, 
'negligible importance. "'57 
Bain rejects as being of 
It is worth noting that the results, at least partly, derive 
from the nature of his research as a sociological cross- 
sectional analysis. As for the earnings, for instance, what 
Bain showed in his cautious study is that his cross-sectional 
empirical evidence does not support the argument that the 
narrowing manual-nonmanual earnings differential, or an aspect 
of 'proletarianisation', was a major determinant of the cross- 
sectional pattern of unionisation. In his quantitative back-up 
analysis, he regressed changes in relative earnings of white- 
collar workers in comparison with those of manual workers in 
manufacturing industries upon union density in respective 
industries. There seem to be at least two problems here. One is 
the rather flimsy sociological hypothesis, which assumes that 
an employee perceives and acts upon the historical shift of 
relative earnings at a macro level. Another is that his type of 
aggregate comparison at an industry-level which covers all 
manufacturing industries would wipe out a 'minor' effect of 
economic crisis in, say, the textile industry, as a consistent 
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effect of earnings upon union density would only be detectable 
when such an effect covers throughout the industries. An 
approach may naturally exclude actually functioning factors. 
Bain and his collaborators' subsequent analyses of union 
growth rest more upon economic researches than sociology and 
the first of their series of statistical surveys in the U. K. 
was Union Growth and the Business Cycle, 
_ 
which followed some 
early econometric work based on U. K. data ( Hines, 1964 ), the 
United States ( Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969 ) and Australia 
( Sharp, 1971 ). 58 
Theirs is a 'business-cycle model' of union growth which 
assumes significant causal effects of economic variables whose 
fluctuation constitutes a part of a dynamic economic system. 
Nevertheless, in so far as the theoretical reasoning of the 
empirical model is concerned, it does not quite fall into the 
category of economic analysis. Compared with, for example, the 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel model, which claimed to explain the 
progress of. the American labour movement in the twentieth 
century by a 'single behavioural relationship' of utility 
maximization in a commodity market where union services are 
demanded and supplied, Bain and Elsheikh adopted a more 
methodologically neutral framework which they claimed to be 
'compatible not only with economics but with other disciplines 
upon which the wider studies draw. '59 
In the Bain-Elshheikh model, the determinants of the rate of 
change of union membership are the rate of change of retail 
prices (P), the rate of change of money wages (W), the 
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level and/or the rate of change of unemployment (U) and the 
level of union density lagged one year ( Dt-l ). Hence, with 
60 the disturbance term e, the general form of the model takes, 
T=f(P, W, U, D, e) 
Economic factors fluctuate in accordance with the business 
cycle, which affect both the propensity and the opportunity to 
unionize. 61 In their model, the rate of change of retail 
prices, the rate of change of money wages, and the level and/or 
rate of change of unemployment directly relate to the business 
cycle theory. Prices rise with excess demand and full 
employment. In so far as workers perceive an increase in retail 
prices as a threat to their real standard of living, they are 
more likely to become and to remain union members to protect 
it, hence changing the propensity to unionize ( threat 
effect ). It might also affect the opportunity to unionize via 
a changing attitude of employers through a more probable 
concession to workers' demands under high product market demand 
( prosperity effect ). A variable which allows for an 
inconsistent impact of price rises upon union growth ( PS ) 
was also included in the equation. 62 
Although wages tend to fluctuate in fairly close relation 
with retail prices, the rate of change of money wages (W) is 
also used as an explanatory variable because of their possible 
discrepancy. One hypothetical influence of money wages is 
called a 'credit effect'. It is argued that 
42 
"when money wages are rising, workers may, rightly or wrongly, 
credit such rises to unions and hope that by bargaining or 
continuing to support them they will do as well or even better 
in the future. "63 
The level and/or rate of change of unemployment ( U, U) 
are supposed to affect both the opportunity to unionize by 
influencing the relative bargaining power of employers and 
unions, and the propensity to unionize by influencing the 
benefits that unions can provide. But the relationship is 
thought to be weak and to be characterized by a time lag. 64 In 
short, when prices and wages are rising and unemployment is 
low, there are adequate grounds to assume that union membership 
increases. 
The possible negative relationship between the rate of 
change of union membership and the level of union density (D) 
has also been pointed out as an organizational factor. The 
'saturation effect' occurs '. ... partly because there are 
fewer workers left to recruit and partly because those who are 
left have less propensity and/or ability to unionize-165 
However, non-linear relationship between these two variables 
are suggested and some possible patterns such as the linear, 
the inverse and the quadratic forms are tested. Other socio- 
economic variables, namely the percentage of members in the 
House of Commons who could be broadly defined as labour 
supporters, dummy variables for favourable labour legislation 
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and the result of the Gallup Polls from 1952 onwards were also 
tested to measure the influence of the social climate on trade 
unions. 
66 
The model was tested on UK data for the period 1893-1970. 
The empirical results indicated that all variables apart from 
the socio-political ones were statistically significant and it 
confirmed that around seventy per cent of the variation in the 
rate of change of union membership could be explained by the 
variables employed. ( Table 2.4.2. )67 
Some problems of the Bain-Elsheikh model have been pointed 
out, which have influenced the later development of similar 
models. 68 Roughly, the criticism consists of four points; weak 
theoretical foundation, omission of compositional and 
structural factors, simultaneity between the dependent and 
independent variables, and structural stability of the model. 
The first criticism partly derives from economists' practice 
where formal formulation of behavioural patterns, at least 
ideally, serves as an empirical model. Nevertheless, it has 
also a general implication as Bain and Elsheikh's reasonings 
still retain logical weakness; why, as Richardson questioned, 
should non-unionised workers attribute to union activity a 
generalised increase in wages? 
Omission of structural variables can be justified if their 
model exclusively deals with short-run factors. The problem is 
that the separation of the short-run and structural factors 
seems to require a more subtle treatment. Richardson's point 
was that the standard deviation of the annual changes of white- 
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collar workers as a percentage of all workers for manufacturing 
( . 35 ) was, for instance, nearly as large as the trend 
( . 40 ). 
Simultaneity causes a technical problem as union growth 
models conventionally include such economic variables as wage 
rates and unemployment rates, which trade unions may influence. 
Although many studies have just neglected the problem, one of 
three possible solutions may be adopted. The first method is to 
assume or evaluate the marginal causal relationship from union 
growth to the business cycle since, if the opposite 
relationship is much stronger than this, the bias of the 
coefficients and the error variance would be relatively small. 
This is a pragmatic solution as other solutions are more time- 
consuming. 69 
Secondly, it is possible to adopt an instrumental approach 
in an ordinary least squares estimation, which is used to 
obtain consistent estimates when there is a measurement error 
in independent variables or when there is simultaneity. 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel, and Booth considered this method. 
Thirdly, it is possible to adopt a simultaneous equations 
model, in which the interrelationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is explicitly assumed. This approach has 
become increasingly common in recent American cross-sectional 
surveys, as they intend to measure an effect of wages upon 
union growth as well as an effect of union growth upon wages. 
Especially when the observation period is as long as in the 
Bain-Elsheikh model, there is a possibility that the parameters 
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of independent variables change over time, consequently 
reducing the predictive power of the model. Bain and Elsheikh 
divided their whole observation period ( 1893 -1970 ) into two, 
one in 1922 and another in 1933, which are the eras of the 
outset of the post-war depression and the withdrawal of 
Southern Ireland from the United Kingdom, and the revival of 
trade unionism after the depression respectively, and estimated 
four separate regressions. Then, they applied the chow test and 
concluded that 'there had not been a structural shift. '70 
Nevertheless, some later assessments of the model suggested 
that the performance of the model is not as satisfactory as 
they claim. Richardson split the whole period in 1950 and, also 
using a chow test, found that, for the post-war periods, 'the 
equations are sometimes only marginally significant as a whole 
and of the individual variables only the change in money wage 
variable is significant by conventional standards. '71 
Similarly, both Sheflin et al and Fiorito, examining the model 
of American trade union growth by the same authors, insisted 
that the Wagner Act brought about a significant structural 
shift of the processes of union growth. 
72 
This is probably the nature of union growth. Its processes 
are governed by such diverse and inter-related socio-economic 
factors that conventionally observed regular occurance of 
micro-economic behaviour, such as the pattern of consumption, 
may not be adequate. What is required is a historical model 
that grasps the core of it. 
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3. Rational Choice and Aggregate Behaviour 
The last approach to union growth considered here is the theory 
and models of economists. Their paradigm is explicitly 
individualistic; assuming union services as collective or 
private goods demanded and supplied in a market, they 
conventionally regard union growth as a consequence of optimum 
choices by rational consumers. 73 
The demand for union services is supposed to be a function 
of such factors as price of services, income, pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits of union membership, the price of 
substitutes for union services and individual attitudes toward 
unionism. The supply function is determined by the relative 
price of such services, costs of organising, costs of providing 
and maintaining the services and union goals. The equilibrium 
level of unionism is determined by the two functions. Although 
the rigid demand and supply framework has rarely applied 
explicitly, it nevertheless underlies most of the cross- 
sectional and time-series models. A merit of the approach seems 
to be obvious. Its tight theoretical framework makes the human 
action more tractable, thus enabling both a formal treatment of 
the theory as well as statistical support of it. The aggregate 
action becomes predictable. 
The economists' original concern was to theorise the 
processes of wage determination in the labour market and the 
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object of the study of union growth was to add another equation 
to their model in order to treat explicitly what had been 
'exogenous' before. Nevertheless, the study of union growth can 
also be seen as one of the expanding, though less 
controversial, in comparison with crime or marriage, fields of 
neo-classical theory, as the action of joining or quitting 
unions has traditionally been regarded to have social aspects 
many of which are not quantifiable. 
74 Indeed, many 
sociologists working in similar fields have often regarded the 
theory as being too narrowly based. 75 
Business-cycle Models 
The economic theory of union growth originates with the 
institutional economists, such as Commons, who began the task 
of formulating the relationship between union growth and, 
primarily, the business cycle. Their work was followed by a 
series of attempts to analyze and formulate the factors of 
union growth after the war. Dunlop, for instance, identified 
four main factors as long-run determinants. First, a strategic 
position of workers in the technological or market structures, 
second, labour market attachment, third, community and 
governmental influences and finally the system of values held 
by the society. On the other hand, he regarded the short-run 
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variation of the membership as 'predominantly a market 
reflex. '76 
Shister also developed one of the most comprehensive 
descriptive frameworks of union growth, which is summarised in 
Table 2.3.1. His argument not only laid a foundation for later 
developments of the economic study of union growth, but 
incorporated some essential arguments later put forward by 
sociologists. He considered that the crystallization of a 
working class, for instance, may be an important contributing 
factor of union growth. Nevertheless he insisted that the 
effect of such a process would be mediated by occupational 
mobility as well as short-run cyclical factors that materialise 
the potential. 77 
It is during the last two decades that these descriptive 
analyses has been developed into some econometric models of 
union growth or status based either upon a cross-sectional or a 
time-series framework. 78 A series of business-cycle models of 
union growth from Hines ( 1964 ) to Curruth and Disney ( 1988 ) 
constitute a tradition of time-series analyses, which is often 
found in standard textbooks of labour economics. 
79 Although 
they conventionally operate within the neo-classical framework, 
a lack of the equivalent micro-underpinnings makes these models 
somewhat akin to that of Bain and Elsheikh, or other 
statistical analyses in industrial relations, sociology and 
social psychology. 
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Table 2.3.1 Shister's Model of Union Growth 
1. Economy & Work Environment 
A. Economic Change 
cyclical variations of economy 
lagging wage rates 
increased bargaining power 
employment expansion and 'social 
pressure' 
rate of occupational mobility 
C. Proximity Influence 
institutional proximity 
physical proximity 
B. Structure of Industry 
technical & market contours 
skill scarcity 
bureaucratisation 
turnover rate 
firm size or closeness to management 
conditions of labour market 
conditions of product market 
composition of labour force 
sex composition 
age composition 
ZDDDDDDDDDDDDDD? 
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@DDDDDDDDDDDDDDY 
2. Socio-legal Framework 3. Leadership 
social climate organising techniques 
structural & administrative framework 
internal operation 
collective bargaining relationships 
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Ashenfelter and Pencavel claim to explain the progress of 
the American labour movement in terms of a single behavioural 
relationship of maximization. 
80 The rate of change of prices 
and employment in the unionized sector capture the movement of 
the relative benefits and costs of union membership to 
individual workers over time. It is argued that when consumer 
prices are increasing, it is probable that the discrepancy 
between the expected and actual wages become larger, and 
employer retaliation and the trouble in joining a trade union 
are reduced because of the tight labour market and union 
membership drive. 
When employment is increasing, organizing efforts are likely 
to be made under favourable conditions for a trade union, and 
it often leads automatically to upturns in membership under 
union security agreements. They postulate a time lag ( three 
years moving average ) between membership (T) and employment 
(E) to account for the response time of the workers to 
employment conditions. The unemployment variable ( Upt ) is 
supposed to capture labours' stock of grievances. Incorporating 
the difference between the current year and the year of the 
preceeding trough in the business cycle in order to allow for 
the 'decay' of such grievances, they originally hypothesized 
that, 
9( Upt. t-i )= k(t-i)UPt 
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However, as little evidence of decay was detected in the actual 
modelling process, the variable Upt was used for the 
estimation. Density term, (T/E)t, or its inverse form, is 
incorporated into the model to capture what Bain and Elsheikh 
called the saturation effect. Political dummy ( Gt ) is 
supposed to be an approximate measure of the 'general climate 
of opinion towards trade unions, or pro-labor sentiment', which 
is assumed to influence trade union legislation. 
81 They also 
adopted instrumental variables (IV) estimates to allow for a 
possible simultaneous equations bias between membership and 
prices. 82 The model explains about 75 percent of the 
fluctuation of union growth. All the explanatory variables are 
significant at 5 percent level apart from some of the 
employment variables. 
83 
Similarly, following the work of Booth, Curruth and Disney 
tried to explain union growth in terms of such factors as 
employment, previous year's density, retail price, nominal or 
real wages and a political dummy that captures the effect of 
non-Conservative government. 84 Their methodological contention 
was to deal with short-run and long-run growth more explicitly 
than their predecessors and empirically, they applied the model 
to explain the downturn of union membership since 1979 in the 
U. K.. 85 
A priori signing of some variables, especially those of wage 
inflation and unemployment rate, were avoided on the ground 
that 'in a sellers' labour market, higher wages may be gained 
without union action and indeed may be hindered by the inertia 
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of union contracts' and 'higher unemployment, it could be 
argued, induces greater proportional membership as a defence 
reaction if unions are perceived as able to forestall 
reductions in employment. '86 
Chow test, normality, Lagrange multiplier and 
heteroscedasticity tests are satisfactory and they claim that 
their model variance dominates that of the Bain-Elsheikh model. 
The employment, unemployment and error correction terms are 
well determined and highly significant. It is shown that if 
employment and real wages are growing at 2 per cent per annum, 
the equilibrium density is 45.7 per cent for the real-wage case 
and 39.6 per cent for the nominal inflation case. In contrast 
to other studies, the sign of real-wages variable is negative, 
indicating that, as they claim, the incentive to unionise is 
far stronger when real wage growth is lower. They also 
confirmed that 'the change in unemployment is strongly 
significant and negative, although acceleration ( or 
deceleration ) of any change has an offsetting effect. ' The 
political dummy also suggests that in steady state the presence 
of a non-Conservative government raises density by 2.5 
percentage points. 87 Their empirical object of the research 
was to forecast the decline of over 2 million trade union 
members since 1979. Their model does predict the downturn in 
density in this year exactly, although the Bain-Elsheikh model 
shows a time lag of one year. 
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Economic Theory of Union Growth 
The rational choice models of union growth, most of which have 
been developed since 1970, assume that an individual aims to 
maximize his or her utility that is represented by one's 
utility function. In a binary choice situation concerning union 
status, he joins a trade union when he considers that the 
benefits of so doing outweigh the costs, the foremost benefit 
often being considered to be the net wage gains that may result 
from membership. 
Thus, Lee, and Duncan and Leigh claimed that an individual 
joins if union-nonunion wage differentials exceed his 
reservation wage, or his specific preferences, which is, in 
turn, considered to be a function of individual 
characteristics, monetary and non-monetary costs of becoming a 
union member and unobservable random factors. 
88 Monetary and 
non-monetary costs are assumed to be able to be represented by 
individual characteristics and industries of employment. 
Personal characteristics in the empirical assessments include 
such factors as region, education, experience, race and sex. 
Concerning the narrow economic determinism of the models, a 
recent attempt by Alison Booth to apply Akerlof's social custom 
model in this field may be stimulating. 89 Akerlof's effort was 
to incorporate, at least partly, the sociologists' and 
psychologists' concepts of norm or social custom into a 
maximization framework; an individual does not live in the 
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vacuous world where he can choose his action in a way that is 
only consistent with his preference but lives in the world 
where his action is, internally and externally, consciously and 
unconsciously, regulated by a network of rules and customs. And 
that such customs are often effectively maintained by 
sanctions, notably by reputation within a community. 
A social custom is an 'act whose utility to the agent 
performing it in some way depends on the belief's or action's 
of other members of the community' and, hence, each 
individual's utility function can be thought to include a 
reputation component. An individual joins a union if the 
utility of so doing exceeds the utility of not so doing, and, 
under certain circumstances, the utility obtainable from 
joining a union is considered to be a function of wage gain, 
subscription and organisation costs as well as reputation. The 
utility obtainable from not so doing is a function of the union 
wage - the individual is assumed to be free riding. 
90 
Naylor and Gregg's attempt is an integration of Booth's 
social custom theory and Freeman's 'resource mobilisation' 
model, in which the individual utility function is also 
supposed to be dependent upon bi-directional organisational 
resources; union expenditures to facilitate union growth and 
firm resources to deter it. 91 When do the social custom 
effects function? The reasoning is quite sociological; the 
effects may be stronger where 'isolated mass', rather than 
'integrated individuals', exist and where a tradition of 
employee involvement is strong. Hence, as Bain and Elsheikh 
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showed, part-time workers in the manual sectors often conform 
to the social custom of joining, whereas amongst non-manual 
workers where density is relatively low, they feel no such norm 
and do not join. 
92 In the same way, the attitude of a firm and 
an attachment to management would deter the function of the 
effects. 
4. Theories and Empirical Findings 
Without being atheoretical, the best link between the theories 
may still be found in the empirical findings. This is 
particularly so as the content of the theories is fairly 
diverse. In the sociologists' model, for instance, the concept 
of 'stratification' links aspects of class situation, in which 
individuals who play a certain role in the societal division of 
labour are located. As for the study of union growth, no a 
priori priority is given to any component of the situation, 
such as economic ( market ) or social ( work and status ), and 
this is primarily thought of as an empirical problem. In the 
traditional class analysis, a micro-theory was not explicitly 
considered. This is because action has been assumed to be 
logically consistent with the elements in such a situation and, 
if it is not, the factors are simply regarded not to have good 
explanatory function. 
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This type of approach is not particularly 'sociological', 
but has been widely used in social studies. Lockwood's 
framework of class situation, for instance, may be compared 
with Dunlop's or Shister's framework of union growth, upon 
which Ashenfelter and Pencavel formulated their time-series 
model. 93 Despite the differences in the explanatory criteria 
they use, it is not hard to see that they are methodologically 
parallel; in Dunlop's words, they are specifying the components 
of 'total environment'. 94 
Some sociologists, such as Raymond Boudon, treat the 
approach in a more positive fashion. Despite a lack of an 
explicit micro-foundation, many well-grounded sociological 
hypotheses are reducible to the sphere of individual action and 
certain elements of the foundation of decision making, such as 
preference, an exogenous assumption of the neo-classical 
theory, are obviously regarded as a function of the social 
components of such an environment. 95 Referring back to the 
less refined Weberian criteria of social action may broaden the 
perspective. Some sociologists now explicitly operate within a 
framework where utility maximization is regarded to be a type 
of social action. 96 
On the other hand, the economists' framework is, at least at 
the level of utility maximization as an intrinsic logic of 
human action, hard to verify directly. Nevertheless, in 
empirical surveys of this style, it seems to be reasonable to 
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Figure 2.4.1. Processes of Union Growth 
Union Growth 
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Market Situation -> Individual Utility -- Union Services 
earnings 
job security 
reputation 
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Labour Legislation 
examine the validity of causalities assumed within the 
traditional demand and supply framework and to re-assess the 
logic of action behind the observable patterns. Such a task is 
of some importance as, without a well-grounded understanding of 
the actual causal processes, any statistical model would merely 
trace the surface relationships amongst quantifiable variables, 
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with robust-looking, but nevertheless incorrect, interretations 
of them. 
The factors of union growth may be schematically located 
according to the function that they play in the causal 
processes ( Figure 2.4.1 ). Here, the basic idea is that much 
of the individual utility of union services, which underlies 
the demand for such services, or union growth, derives mainly 
from the individual's specific situation in the structure of 
the labour market. Three components of utility may be of 
particular importance; earnings, job security and reputation. 
The demand as well as the effective supply of such services are 
conditioned by some market and institutional factors such as 
firm size and the bargaining relationships of unions with 
management. The function of the state cannot be ignored in 
forming such bargaining relationships between trade unions and 
employers or their associations. 
One contention of this work is that, in examining the 
substance of causal relationships, short-run 'cyclical' and 
long-term 'structural' determinants of union growth should be, 
at least methodologically, explicitly separated. This was 
Dunlop's intention. In developing time-series models, some 
economists, such as Booth, took heed of the facts that they are 
extracting cyclical, fractional factors from the totality of 
causal components and incorporating them into their models 97 
Nevertheless, few have attempted to simulate the structural 
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TABLE 2.4.1 Results of Cross-Sectional Studies 
Model Bain Farber Bain Duncan Hirsch Hundley 
Elias Saks Elsheikh Stafford Berger 
( 1985) ( 1980) ( 1980) ( 1980) ( 1984) ( 1989 ) 
Sample UK/NTS US/NLRB UK BS us US/CPS 
general general general manual manufac. non-manufac. 
Determinants 
earnings +-+ NC 
job security + 
part-time -- NC 
white-collar -- 
promotion - 
unionisation + 
firm size ++ + + 
capital intensity ++ 
concentration + NC 
physical demand ++ NC 
sex ( female )- NC - -- - 
race + NC + NC 
age NC 
education - NC NC NC - 
tenure, experience + NC ++ 
region: ++ NC + NC 
* region: OK samples, the North, Wales and Scotland = 1, US samples, SMSA 
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TABLE 2.4.2 Results of Time-Series Analyses 
Modelt Hines AP BE Booth CD** 
DK/1964 US/1969 UK/1976 UK/1983 UK/1988 
Sample 1893-1961 1900-1960 1893-1970 1895-1980 1896-1984 
Determinants 
constant 
price inflation + ++ NC + 
wage inflation ++- 
employment t NC + 
t-l + 
t-2 + 
others or t-3 NC 
density t-l +++ 
others or t-2 -- 
unemployment t +-+ 
t-l -+ 
t-2 NC 
membership t-l + + 
t-2 NC 
t-3 - 
profit t-l + 
political dummy ++ 
Model: AP; Ashenfelter & Pencavel, BE; Bain & Elsheikh, CD; Curruth & Disney. 
it CD model has lagged p and w, the rates of change of e and u and lagged m-e. 
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processes of union growth, as it does not easily fit into 
conventional business-cycle models. It is needless to say that 
these are relative concepts. It is likely that cross-sectional 
surveys tend to identify structural factors, but the effects of 
the short-run fluctuations of certain factors could not be 
excluded. Conventional time-series models are more likely to 
detect cyclical factors, but there is always a possibility that 
structural changes underlie short-run behaviour, thus leaving 
the distinction as a purely empirical problem. 
A substantial number of works have been carried out by now 
and most of the likely determinants of union growth have been 
listed. Such factors are, for the sake of presentation, 
classified into earnings, non-pecuniary features of employment, 
institutional conditions of union growth and socio-demographic 
characteristics of employees in the following section. The 
first two roughly correspond with market and work situations in 
the stratification approach. Selective results are shown in 
Tables 2.4.1. and 2.4.2. 
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Earnings 
Empirical results on the effect of earnings and other benefits 
upon union growth have often been contradictory and their 
interpretation remains controversial. Some sociologists, such 
as Lockwood, did not attribute much significance to this factor 
as, amongst his sample of 'black-coated' workers, 'there is 
little demonstrable connection between unionization and 
economic position in the narrow sense of income and degree of 
job security'. 98 Similarly, Bain's study of white-collar 
unionism in manufacturing industry did not find a significant 
relationship between the two variables, although, as mentioned 
before, his results should be interpreted to demonstrate that 
earnings are not a dominant determinant of the cross-sectional 
pattern of unionisation. 99 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Lockwood's statement 
has an implicit inference from the standpoint of the 
'stratification' approach; the lower one's location in the 
stratification system, the more one tends to be exposed to 
conditions which make collective bargaining favourable. 
Lockwood had noticed a pattern when he continued the remark 
writing that, in his sample, 'it was among the more highly paid 
and secure clerical population that the degree of unionisation 
was highest', suggesting that union growth follows a rather 
different logic. 100 His finding is consistent with 
Kornhauser's observations of male manual workers and Bain and 
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Elsheikh's inter-industry and inter-establishment analyses. 
101 
But it differs from Prandy et al's who wrote that 'those who 
earn more are less likely to be union members', although 'this 
situation was less clear-cut for staff associations', and with 
Farber and Saks' findings from an analysis of individual votes 
in the National Labour Relations Board ( N. L. R. B. ) in the 
102 States. 
However, Lockwood's and Kornhauser's work did not involve a 
systematic statistical analysis and other studies merely 
indicate overall relationships between earnings and union 
membership. It was Bain and Elias who, using the National 
Training Survey data in the UK, produced a more general 
assessment of the relationship between employees' location 
within the earnings distribution and union membership. Their 
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results are reproduced in Figure 2.4.1.103 Generally, the 
union membership function has a convex form, although such a 
relationship is less conspicuous amongst manual workers. They 
produced two explanations for this. First of all, the 'cost of 
union membership, union subscriptions, tend to decrease as a 
proportion of earnings as the level of earnings increases' and 
secondly, another 'cost of union membership, employers 
retaliation, tends to increase with earnings'. 104 
The first reasoning is virtually identical with the 
economists' explanation; union services are a normal good. This 
explanation is, at best, dubious not only because it is far 
from a 'common sense' understanding of the value of membership 
but does not explain the downturn of the membership function. 
In short, more empirical support seems to be required. The 
second reason amounts to the argument that the observable 
pattern does not derive from the earnings component per se, 
_but 
derives from job characteristics which necessarily entail 
differences in earnings. Sociologists may associate this 
specific explanation with one's location within the authority 
structure. 
Some economists, notably in America, have attempted to 
measure the simultaneous effects of union-nonunion wage 
differentials upon the union status of workers and that of 
union status upon wage differentials. Their results are not 
necessarily consistent as Ashenfelter and Johnson, Schmidt and 
Strauss found that wage differential does affect union status, 
but not vice versa, whereas Lee observed a simultaneous 
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relationship and Hirsch and Berger 'did not find the predicted 
union-nonunion wage differential .... to significantly 
affect the likelihood of membership. '105 As Hirsch and Addison 
wrote, amongst the economists, 'there is some disagreement 
whether or not an income variable belongs in the union demand 
function', because the positive effect may 'result from the 
fact that the wage rate is a proxy for other factors that 
increases expected benefits and/or lower the costs of union 
representation'. 106 
One solution to this problem may be to study the subjective 
meaning of joining unions. Guest and Dewe's social 
psychological study, for example, suggests that dissatisfaction 
with pay and fringe benefits, together with such aspects of 
employment as promotion, participation, communication and job 
security, appears as a significant determinant of union 
membership. 107 This at least indicates that, as shown in many 
business cycle models, earnings per se can be a short-run 
determinant of union growth. A similar study of N. A. L. G. O. by 
Nicholson et al, however, did not detect this relationship. 108 
Non-pecuniary Features of Employment 
Some recent research suggests that the individual utility of 
union membership can also derive from such non-pecuniary 
aspects of employment as job security and reputation, amongst 
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others. 109 These utility components may be considered to 
derive, at least partly, from the nature, or the institutional 
characteristics, of labour markets which serve as conditions of 
union growth. This is particularly applicable to job security. 
'Structured' internal markets often require the acquisition of 
general or specific skill and offer promotion prospects, which 
reduces turn over rates. 
110 Leaving aside the preferences that 
individuals may bring into labour markets, this forms a 
situation upon which they act. 
Farber and Saks' work on the N. L. R. B. votes, for example, 
illuminates such causal processes. Amongst the individuals who 
feel it difficult to replace their jobs, those who are not 
dissatisfied with job security are 'significantly less likely 
to vote for unionization' and those who are dissatisfied are 
'significantly more likely to vote for' it. lll Those who have 
a satisfactory supervisory relationship are less likely to vote 
for unionization if it would cause a deterioration of such 
relationships and those who are dissatisfied with them are more 
likely to vote for it if it would help this. Similarly, 'if 
individuals felt that the chances for promotion were good, then 
they would be less likely to vote for the union'. 
But the results of Farber and Saks on the effect of 
promotion prospects upon union growth are not consistent with 
Crompton and Jones' observation in British financial 
industries. However, they are largely consistent with the study 
of Guest and Dewe, in which dissatisfaction with promotion 
opportunities, job security and supervisory relations appear as 
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highly significant determinants of union growth. 
112 They also 
found that 'union members are no more likely to consider 
leaving the company'. This means that such measurable factors 
as job-specific training, tenure and work experiences indicate, 
at least partly, the effect of this 'security-mobility' 
component of utility. 
Furthermore, skill requirements in the primary market would 
come to constitute an integral part of organisational resources 
of trade unions. As Dunlop wrote, these workers, 
"furnish labor services at decisive points in the productive 
stream where the withdrawal of services quickly breaks the 
whole stream". 
He referred to these points as technological or market 
strategic positions. 113 
To locate in an 'un-structured' secondary labour market, on 
the other hand, systematically reduces the utility of union 
membership. Dissatisfaction with job security would be less 
intense as an alternative job is relatively easily available, 
promotion channels do not usually exist and, hence, supervisory 
relationships may be more casual than in those jobs in the 
primary market; in short, it may be quite 'rational' for these 
employees to be indifferent to union organizations. 
Furthermore, as has often been pointed out, high turn over 
rates among this class of employees also means a high 
'attrition rate' that lowers the return for the unit of 
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organisational resources unions devote to recruitment. 
114 
Wherever it is incorporated into an analyses, part-time 
employment ( or certain socio-demographic attributes of 
individuals such as sex and race ) appears as a negative factor 
for union growth, as shown in, for instance, Lee, Bain and 
Elsheikh, and Antos et al amongst others. 
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Most of these features of the labour market probably 
correlate with earnings and thus could be 'other factors' whose 
effects upon union growth are captured by the pecuniary 
measurement. Although most of the research does incorporate 
non-pecuniary factors, it is quite possible that their 
diversity and complexity make the seperation of the 'pecuniary' 
and 'non-pecuniary' effects more difficult than it is often 
considered. 
The second non-pecuniary component of utility of union 
membership, reputation, is usually used to represent the 
influences of other union members upon non-union members. The 
opposite case, when employees conform to 'managerial belief' 
and do not to join, seems to be considered that they do so as 
union services do not satisfy their needs. Nevertheless, 
evidence from Farber and Saks, for example, suggests that some 
employees do not join because they do not wish to deteriorate 
existing supervisory relationships unnecessarily. 
116 In the 
same way, as memtioned earlier, Bain and Elsheikh found that 
part-time employees in highly unionised sectors tended to 
conform to the social custom of joining whereas those employees 
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in poorly organised non-manual sectors did not. A similar 
effect was also detected by Railings and, Bain and Elias. 
117 
Institutional Conditions 
Under this title are included factors that condition the 
function of trade unions and the industrial relations system, 
such as firm size, union organisers, recognition and bargaining 
relationships. The institutional framework seems to be crucial 
as this has not only to do with their effective function but 
also the installation of the very market mechanism. Firm size 
is often related to a demand condition; as Hundley wrote, the 
'returns to a collective decision-making mechanism may be 
greater in a large firm' whereas 'in smaller firms, informal 
mechanism may be sufficient', 118 Bain and Elsheikh, Hirsch, 
Hirsch and Berger, and Bain and Elias found a positive 
relationship between firm size and union membership. 119 
Hundley found the relationship significant in his non- 
manufacturing samples but not in the manufacturing samples. 120 
Naylor and Gregg also demonstrated that firm size primarily 
appears as a significant determinant of union density amongst 
non-manual workers in the non-union sector. 121 
Union leadership is, on the other hand, a factor on the 
supply side. Apart from historical studies, there had been few 
systematic surveys on the effect of union leadership and 
70 
structure upon union growth. Nevertheless, Undy et al regarded 
that positive-expansionist policies and the centralised 
structure of T. G. W. U. and then A. S. T. M. S. affected the growth 
of those respective unions and thus, found it 'impossible to 
accept' Bain's implication that 'unions are relatively 
powerless to affect the aggregate level of unionisation by 
positive and deliberate action'. 
122 Some recent work also 
shows that some personal and demographic characteristics of 
organisers do affect union recruitment. 123 
Employers attitudes, recognition and bargaining 
relationships also appears as significant determinants of union 
growth. Non-recognition can mean that union membership may not 
associate with any increase in utility, even if the potential 
demand for such services exists. Thus, Kornhauser and Bain et 
al hypothesised that, as unionism succeeds in establishing 
itself firmly, the nature of causality would naturally change, 
from a voluntary act based upon certain attitudes or 
preferences to a quasi-obligatory act which depends upon social 
custom or coercion. 124 Regardless of the validity of this 
inference, there seems to be good reason to assume that, in 
time-series analyses, an attainment of recognition may cause a 
structural change in the process of union growth. In the cross- 
sectional studies, union recognition appeared in Bain's study 
as one of a few determinants of an overall pattern of 
unionisation in the white-collar sector of British 
manufacturing industries. Although Farber and Saks did not find 
the effect significant, Naylor and Gregg's, and Poole et al's 
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statistical work also demonstrated that the nature of the 
bargaining arrangements, as Clegg would have claimed, can be an 
important determinant of union membership amongst both manual 
and non-manual employees. 125 
Socio-demographic Features of Individuals 
Under this title, such factors as sex, race, age, education and 
regions are commonly dealt with. These personal attributes have 
fairly different causal effects. Sex and race, via custom and 
discrimination, closely relate to the labour market structure 
and thus, have implications for the growth processes as was 
discussed above. It is worth noting that some studies in the 
United States, including that of Farber and Saks, Antos et al 
and Hirsch and Berger, have shown opposite effects between the 
two variables; female employment generally decreases union 
density whereas the employment of black or non-white often has 
a positive effect. 126 The labour-market related function may 
also be applicable to such a factor as education, which is 
demonstrated by some models mentioned above. In comparison with 
this, the effect of age and education upon union growth seems 
to be less clear-cut. Although accepting Shister's argument 
that younger workers are likely to show greater propensity to 
unionise, Bain and Elsheikh, for instance, also maintained that 
older workers may have more opportunity to unionise, thus 
72 
leaving it as a purely empirical problem. Thier survey supports 
the latter notion. 
127 
Economists generally argue that, while preferences and 
attitudes toward trade unions may vary considerably, much of 
this variation amongst individuals stems basically from 
differences in the expected benefits of membership. 
128 Thus 
changes in the pattern of union growth are attributable to the 
changes in such benefits but not 'ad hoc' changes in preference 
structure per se. 
_ 
Nevertheless, systematic differences in 
preferences are sometimes observable at aggregate levels. 
Region is often regarded to be such a factor. 
129 Blackburn 
once wrote that, in Britain, a watershed of people's attitudes 
may be found somewhere around the Wash-Severn line. But the 
sources and continuity of the alleged differences in attitudes 
require examination, as they may derive immediately from the 
situation found in the North which has, in his words, 'more 
manufacturing industry, less money and there are people in 
lower social status', 130 Or, as has been shown by some 
writers, area differences in political attitudes may influence 
the pattern. 131 
1. Cronin, J. E. 1919. Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain. London: Croom Helm. 26. 
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different theoretical context. In the Marxist framework, the conceptual link of the term 
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dynamic terms, rather than in broadly descriptive economic and sociological terms. ... 
Both aspects of the process of proletarianization thus reflect the same aim : the increase 
in surplus labour or surplus value. ( ibid., p. 9 )' 
Similarly, Abercrombie and Urry, summarizing the argument of Braverman, wrote, 
'... it is the accumulation of capital which fundamentally determines the organization of 
the capitalist labour process, and in particular the tendency for labour to become 
progressively fragmented and deskilled, and for the work of 'conception' ( mental labour ) 
to be separated off from the work of 'execution' ( manual labour ). ( N. Abercrombie and 
J. Orry, 1983, Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes. London: Allen & Unwin. 56 )' 
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Hence, criticizing a neo-Weberian conception of market and work situation, exploited and 
developed in this field especially by Lockwood, Crompton wrote, 
... for Mari, market relations represent only one side of 
the reality, they are 'surface 
process' which mask the relationships underlying market activity --- i. e. capitalist 
relations of production. ... Lockwood's discussion of the 
'work situation' compares 
clerical with manual workers in respect of job content and working conditions, and 
proximity to positions of authority within the workplace. Although I would not deny that 
there exist considerable differences between manual and white-collar work and authority 
relationships, I would argue that ... such relationships can only be fully understood 
if 
they are seen as being mediated through capitalist production relationships. ' 
11. Ibid., pp. 401-408. See, Crompton, R. and J. Gubbay. 1917. Economy and Class Structure. 
London: Macmillan, on the relationship between the location of the clerk in the structure of 
production relations and the empirically occurring 'market' and 'work' situation of 
clerical work. 
12. Crompton 'would not claim that the identification of the abstract categories 
constituting 'double proletarianization' enables a mechanically simple 'reading off' of 
these market and work situations. ( Crompton, R. 1979. op. cit. 401. )' 
13. As for the excision of the control function, 
' It is amongst the 'low-trust' man below the promotion gap that we should look for 
unionization in response, to the mechanized centralization of control In white-collar 
bureaucracies. Crompton unfortunately offers no evidence on this point. ... whilst the 
formation of an office proletariat ... . may be a necessary condition for the substantial 
unionization of workers in white collar industries, it is by no means a sufficient one. ' 
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and stressed the importance of three broad sets of factors, namely the strategic factors 
identified by George Bain, inter-organizational competition which are highly significant in 
the financial industries, and the 'organizational form' taken by proletarianization. 
Heritage also doubted the significant impact of declining relativities on unionization. The 
'strategic factors' mean i) the business cycle variables ii) the employers' attitudes iii) 
the government policies. The 'organizational form' approximately denotes the composition of 
the labour force, especially the importance of the expanding female section, who are 
effectively denied the occupational mobility by a variety of obstacles, and hence 
eliminated from exercising capital function. ( Heritage, J. 1980. 'Class Situation, White- 
collar Unionization and the Double Proletarianization Thesis :a Comment'. Sociolo 
vol. 14 no. 2. Crompton's reply is also in the same volume. ) 
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It is also worth noting that Crompton and Jones, after their sociological survey, 
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context of life-cycle. Referring to the empirical works of Nicholson et al. and Low-Beer, 
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'Union activists were using the union as an expression of their values and beliefs as 
Individuals, which they had in a sense 'brought to' the organizational context. ' 
despite our caution in predicting a direct relationship between objective class 
location and patterns of trade union membership and behaviour at the organizational level, 
we would not expect there to be no association whatsoever. We would frankly admit that the 
trend of recent empirical findings runs against this interpretation. Nicholson et al.., for 
example, found that the causes of individual union members' decisions to participate or not 
77 
to participate in union activities 'have been firmly identified as less in the sphere of 
work experience than in more widely based value orientations. ' 
For example, 
'the most important variables explaining strike participation among technicians were the 
individual's political position, which itself was influenced by the nature of his family 
background ; in short, his political socialization. ( Crompton, R. and G. Jones. 1984. 
op. cit. p. 179. )' 
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D. Lockwood, they wrote, 
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' Although the notion of 'work situation' recognises that groups have different experiences 
of work, these experiences are not themselves related to the structure of capitalist 
relations of production. ( Ibid., p. 22 )' 
23. Lockwood, D. 1958. op. cit., p. 34. 
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actions occasioned by their role in the division of labour of the office, and by their 
position in the hierarchy of social rank in society at large. ' 
'There's little demonstrable connection between unionization and 'economic' position in the 
narrow sense of level of income and the degree of job security ... On the contrary, it is 
among the more highly paid and secure clerical population that the degree of unionization 
is highest. ... There is in fact no general correlation between social status and trade 
unionism in the clerical field. ( p. 150 )' 
And explored such aspects of work situation as the size of work units, authority structure, 
mechanization and the age and sex composition of labour forces and confirmed a general view 
that, 
'Office workers, therefore, are now devided into classes. The managerial staff is being 
more and more sharply distinguished from the subordinates, and the standardisation of 
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actual causal process. Nevertheless, Strauss, for example, considers that, although the 
importance of such things as low wages depends to a considerable extent on the worker's 
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52. Ibid. pp. 20-21. For the sake of comparison, Shister's frameworks may be mentioned. This 
is reproduced in Table 2.3.1. Three main criteria of the factors of union growth are; 
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Proximity Influence 
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( See Dunlop, J. T. 1948. The Development of Labour Organisation :A Theoretical 
Framework. ' Lester, R. A. and J. Shister ed., Insights into Labour Issues. pp. 163-193. 
Shister, J. 1953. 'The Logic of Union Growth'. Journal of Political EconomyL LII pp. 413- 
33. ) 
53. Bain, G. S. 1910. The Growth of White-collar Unionism. 
The factors are summarized in the following two-equation descriptive model. 
D=f(C, R) 
R=g( D, G) 
where 
D: the density of white-collar unionism 
C= the degree of employment concentration 
R= the degree to which employers are prepared 
to recognize unions representing white-collar employees 
G= the extent of government action which promotes union recognition 
The probable similarities of the factors which affect manual and non-manual union growth 
have also been pointed out. 'There are many similarities in the way in which union 
membership among white-collar and manual workers fluctuate over time, and the correlation 
coefficient is r=+. 86 over the years 1892-1919. ( Bain, G. S. ed. 1983. Industrial 
Relations in Britain. 10. ) 
54. Bain, G. S. 1970. op. cit. 183. 
He examined such factors as 
84 
a. socio-demographic characteristics of the white-collar workers: sea, social origins, age 
and status. 
b. the economic position: earnings, other terms and conditions of employment. 
c. the work situation: employment concentration, opportunities for promotion, mechanization 
and automation, and proximity to unionized manual workers. 
d. the public image, the recruitment policies and structures of unions. 
e. employer policies and practices. 
f. government action and social climate. 
The concept of work situation derives from the premises of British sociology. Amongst the 
factors examined, he regards only the first factor can be proved to have a clear function 
of promoting unionism. There are two reasons for this; the development of a 'bureaucratic' 
treatment of employees and correspondent active recruiting policies often adopted by trade 
unions. He wrote, 
'Since the rules apply to him as a member of a group rather than as an individual, the most 
effective way of modifying them in his favour is by collective bargaining rather than 
individual bargaining. .. trade unions tend to concentrate their recruiting efforts on 
such groups. ' 
This is because, 1) Employees are probably more favourably disposed towards trade unionism 
because of the reason pointed out before, and therefore easy to recruit. 2) The economy of 
scale on recruitment. In general, the larger the group recruited the lower the per capita 
cost for both recruitment and administration. 3) The possible greater impact of collective 
agreements. 4) 'The more members union recruits, the more power it is able to wield in 
negotiations with employers as well as within the labour movement. ' 
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As for the opportunities of promotion, pointing out the limited scope of existing 
empirical research, he wrote that, 
'blockage of promotion opportunities is very often associated with bureaucratization, and 
it is highly probable that the effects of the latter upon unionization are reinforced by 
the effects of the former', 
but it cannot be regarded as a necessary condition for its growth because of the existence 
of many exceptional cases such as bank employees, draughtsmen and journalists, which can 
also be applied to the case of the proximity to manual workers. 
It is often argued that office mechanization reduces the average level of skill, thereby 
changing the internal market structure and increasing dead-end specialization and de- 
creasing promotion prospects, which facilitates 'assembly line' work flows that are often 
characterized by shift work, control of work pace, piece work, introduction of work study 
and lower motivation of workers. Nevertheless, his observation suggests that 'so far office 
mechanization and automation have not had the dire results which some people have 
predicted. ' 
Proximity of white-collar employees to unionized manual workers is alleged to affect the 
growth of white-collar unionism in two ways. 1) The so-called 'demonstration' and 
'learning' effects :a demonstration of the benefits of trade unionism by unionized manual 
workers or opportunity to learn about these benefits are provided. 2) Direct stimulation by 
'manual unions directly recruiting white-collar workers into their ranks or at least 
lending white-collar unions moral, financial, and strategic support in their organizing 
drives. ( Ibid., pp. 12-86 )' 
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Bain mentioned these factors as follows. 
'For example, while the strategic variables may explain the existence of unionism per se 
among a given group of workers, which particular union is successful in organizing the 
group may be determined by union structures and recruitment policies. ... Similarly, the 
explanation of why one worker in a given environment joins a union while another worker in 
the same environment does not, may well be found in the different personality or attitude 
structures of the two individuals. ' 
Criticizing the works of Prandy ( 1965 ) and Blackburn ( 1967 ), he also wrote, 
'But the strategic variables predominate, and unless they are held constant, any 
explanation of these less aggregative patterns of union growth is likely to be obscured or 
distorted. ... Regrettably, most of the studies which have tried to ascertain the 
determinants of the individuals' propensity to unionize by means of attitude surveys have 
not controlled for these strategic variables. ( Bain, G. S. 1910. op. cit. 187 )' 
51. Ibid. 153. 
Price also questioned the explanatory power of the model saying, 
'it tells us very little about the process of growth and decline after the recognition has 
been achieved. While recognized unions may generally enjoy a higher level of density than 
unrecognized unions, there are enormous variations in the process of growth and decline, 
and apart from variations occurring in the level of employment concentration, there is 
nothing in the model to explain such variations. ( Price, R. 1983. 'White-collar Onions: 
Growth, Character and Attitudes in the 1970s' Hyman, R. and R. Price ed. The New Working_ 
Class?; White-collar Workers and Their Organizations. London: Macmillan. 153. )' 
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Elsheikh pointed out, the emphasis is upon the demand side. 
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Tt -- al + a2 Pt + a3 Wt + a4 Ot-1 + a5 Dt-1 + et 
where subscripts denote time and the following signs of the coefficients are expected. 
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a2, a3 >0 
a4, a5 (0 
61. Ibid. 62. 
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unemployment benefits which work contrary, and the relationship is supposed to be 
relatively weak. ( Ibid. 66-67. ) 
65. Ibid. 67. 
66. Ibid. 85-86. 
'since the periods 1915-1920 and 1940-5 were characterized by compulsory arbitration and 
other measures which produced a social climate particularly favourable to trade unions, 
dummy variables which took the value of unity during these periods and zero for all other 
years were included in the model. ' 
67. Some of their results are reproduced here. 
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TABLE 2.2.1 Bain-Elsheikh Model 
Equation 12345 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Period 1893-1970 U. K. 
Constant 6.321 5.762 6.041 -4.290 1.714 
(5.048) (3.956) (4.319) (-3.332) (0.587) 
P 0.633 0.451 0.583 0.606 0.171 
(8.518) (4.994) (5.938) (5.731) (9.223) 
Pt-1 0.272 
(3.512) 
Pst -0.504 -0.333 
(-3.470) (-2.174) 
Wt 0.360 0.494 0.423 
(3.298) (4.511) (3.584) 
(w/P)t 0.429 
(4.050) 
Dt-1 -0.202 -0.202 0.542 0.251 
(-5.101) (-5.153) (1.880) (0.881) 
(Dt-1)2 -0.014 -0.008 
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(-2.604) (-1.624) 
(Dt-1)-1 83.603 
(4.226) 
Ut-1 -0.563 -0.441 -0.345 -0.622 
(-2.137) (-1.719) (-1.219) (-2.460) 
Ut-2 0.612 0.281 0.514 0.541 
(2.467) (1.151) (1.953) (2.299) 
Corrected R2 0.608 0.675 0.725 0.663 0.702 
SER 4.18 3.85 3.54 3.92 3.69 
DW 1.503 1.647 1.705 1.503 1.661 
SOURCE : Bain and Elsheikh. 1976. op. cit. 
TABLE 2.2.2 Bain-Elsheikh Model Industry-Level 
Equation 123 
Method CORC CORC OLS 
Industry Metals & Chemicals & Printing & 
Engineering Allied Publishing 
Period 1926-1938 and 1948-1974 G. B. 
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Constant -8.637 24.232 8.586 
(-2.241) (2.614) (2.167) 
W-P -1.063 -1.189 -0.401 
(-2.004) (-1.424) (-2.557) 
Dt-1 -0.616 -0.080 
(-2.516) (-1.701) 
(Dt-1)-1 495.22 
(2.482) 
D -0.626 -1.453 -0.480 
(-2.046) (-1.884) (-1.609) 
L 0.946 
(3.449) 
SD 1.643 2.014 0.459 
(2.906) (2.183) (2.195) 
R2 0.724 0.487 0.243 
DW 2.094 2.009 2.058 
SOURCE : Bain and Elsheikh. 1982. op. cit. 
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NOTE : CORC is the Cochran-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure. L denotes the rate of 
change of potential membership, and SD is slope dummies introduced to allow the intercept 
and the slope of the equations to shift between the two sub-periods. 
See also, Elsheikh, F. and G. S. Bain. 1979. 'The Determination of the Rate of Change of 
Unionization in the U. K.: A Comment and Further Analysis'. Applied Economics, vol. 11. 
Bain, G. S. and F. Elsheikh. 1982. 'Union Growth and the Business Cycle: A Disaggregated 
Study. ' British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 20. 
68. For assessments of the Bain-Elsheikh model, 
Richardson, R. 1911. 'Review Article: Trade Union Growth'. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, vol. XV, No. 2. 
See also 'reply' and 'rejoinder'. 1978. British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. IVI. 
These articles can also be found in McCarthy, W. E. J. ed. 1985. Trade Unions, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books. 
Sheflin, N., L. Troy and C. Koeller. 1981. 'Structural Stability in the Models of American 
Trade Union Growth'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 96. 
Fiorito, J. 1982. 'Criticism and Comment, American Trade Union Growth: An Alternative 
Model', Industrial Relations, vol. 21, No. l. 
69. See Sharpe, I. G. 1971. op. cit. 
Bain, G. S. and F. Elsheikh. 1976. op. cit. 
Burkitt, B. and D. Bowers. 1918. 
Moore, W. J. 1978. op. cit. 
Sapsford, D. 1986. 
70. Bain, G. S. and F. Elsheikh. 1976. op. cit. 
71. Richardson, R. 1977.281. 
72. Sheflin, N. et al. 1981. op. cit. 87-88. They write, 
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'unlike earlier studies that hypothesized a war year shift, our results suggest that the 
transition occurred earlier, around 1937-1938, reflecting, most likely, the impact of the 
Wagner Act. Not surprisingly, we found indications of very different processes at work in 
the two subperiods. ' 
Similarly, Fiorito concluded that 
'consideration must be given to the possibility that these variables' influences may not be 
consistent over time. Moreover variables which have been identified in cross-sectional 
studies, such as sex, race, and occupation may play an important role in a time-series 
framework. ' 
73. Hirsch, B. T. and J. T. Addison. 1985. The Economics of Unions. Boston: Allen & Onwin. 
Pencavel, J. H. 1971. 'The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise'. Industrial and Labour 
Relations Review, vol. 24. 
Ashenfelter, 0. and G. Johnson. 1972. 'Unionism, Relative Wages and Labour Quality In O. S. 
Manufacturing Industries'. International Economic Review, vol. 13,488-508. 
Pencavel, for instance, regarded the act of joining a trade union as something 
'akin to the purchase of a capital asset. Membership in such associations renders services 
for consumption, in return for which the member is obliged to pay certain cost, ' 
and constructed the demand function for union services in terms of the theory of consumer 
choice, namely the demand depends on an income variable, the price of and return on these 
and alternative services, and the tastes and preferences. The desired stock of union 
services in time t is written as, 
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Mtt =f( Ilt, %2t, ... Ißt ) 
where Xi's are the variables determining demand. 
Pencavel included permanent real income per capita (Y), union dues (D), the interest rate 
on building-society shares (R), a wartime dummy (W), and constant adjustment coefficients 
for the supply of union services (u) in the operational form of the function. Thus, 
Mt = na0 + uaiYt + na2Dt + ua3Rt + ua4Wt + (1-u)Mt-1 + net 
where Mt is the percentage of the labour force unionized and e is a stochastic disturbance 
term. The 'free rider problem' on the public goods provision is also considered. Paying 
heed to other social factors, he also wrote, 
'The generally low values of the elasticities ... may indicate that economic factors play 
a limited role in accounting for the growth of trade unionism and that a comprehensive 
eiplanation needs to draw on the related disciplines of sociology and political science as 
well. ( Pencavel, J. H. 1911. 'The Demand for Union Services: An Exercise'. Industrial and 
Labour Relations Review, XXIV. )' 
74. Becker, G. S. 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
75. Cronin, J. E. op. cit. 
Etzioni, A. ed. 1991. Socio-economics: Towards a New Synthesis. N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 
76. Dunlop, J. T. 1948. op. cit. 
77. Shister, J. 1953. op. cit. 
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In fact, many of the later arguments on the determinants of union growth can be found here, 
although some have been dropped from major analyses. 
social custom; the expansion of employment in bargaining units where unionism is strongly 
intrenched would lead to substantial growth as 'most of new employees will join the union 
because of the social pressure of the organised nucleus. ' 
long-run asymmetry; 'over time, the reductions in membership during cyclical declines in 
employment tend to become proportionately smaller' because of the social welfare unions 
provide and costs of leaving and joining a union. 
firm size; would represent such factors as closeness to management, work conditions and 
costs of organisation. 
age composition; would measure such factors as 'loyalty' to a firm, cost of leaving a job 
and to find another job and education. 
leadership; might be important as it shows the 'ability to adapt the relevant group to 
changing socioeconomic conditions. 
78. See, for example, Fiorito, J. and C. R. Greer. 1982. 'Determinants of O. S. Unionism: Past 
Research and Future Needs' Industrial Relations, vol. 21, no. 1,2. 
Stepina, L. P. and J. Florito. 1986. 'Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Union Growth and De- 
cline' Industrial Relations, vol. 25, no. 3. 
79. Hines, A. G. 1964. 'Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom: 1893-1961' 
Review of Economic Studies, XXXI. 
Carruth, A and R. Disney. 1988. 'Where Have Two Million Trade Union Members Gone? ' 
Ecconomica, 55, 
80. Ashenfelter, 0. and J. H. Pencavel. 1969. 'American Trade Union Growth, 1900-1960' 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXXXIII. 
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Their model still maintains character as a direct descendant of the institutional 
economists. Following these and Hines, they embarked on work to incorporate some factors 
into a model, which was, in a sense, the natural application of the standard procedure 
because some of the identified factors were quantifiable readily. They considered that the 
major benefits of union status are higher wages, greater employment security and better 
working conditions. The costs are dues, retaliation from the employers and inconvenience of 
becoming a member. 
Their model's general form is, 
n 
Tt =00 + al Pt 7a2i Et-i + a3g( Upt, t-i )+ a4 ( TIE )t-1 + a5 Gt + nt 
i: o 
where Et is the rate of change of employment in the unionized sectors of the economy, Up t 
is the amount of unemployment in the preceding trough of the business cycle and Gt is the 
proportion of Democrats in the United States House of Representatives. 
It is expected that 
a1º a2iº a3 and a5 >0 
a4 <0 
81. Ibid., 438-439. Note that the definition of union density in the Bain-Elsheikh model 
is T/L: 100, where denominator, or potential union membership, is defined to include all 
employees, whether employed or unemployed, who are legally permitted to unionize. 
82. If T influences P significantly, an assumption of the regression model breaks down, 
and the OLS estimator of the coefficient on P would be biased and inconsistent. A least 
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squares linear combination of the unemployment rate, percentage changes in average labour 
productivity, and the lagged rate of change of money wages were used for the instrument. 
The result suggests that the rate of change of prices has a strong effect on union growth, 
but not the opposite relationship, which implies that the trade unions are to some extent 
'defensive' organizations. ( Ibid., 444. ) 
83. Their results are reproduced here. 
TABLE 2.3.1 Ashenfelter-Pencavel Model 
Equation 1 2 3 
Method OLS OLS IV 
Period 1904-60 1904-60 1904-59 
** ** *x 
Constant -10.584 -15.322 -11.070 
(2.506) (3.027) (2.551) 
:* ** it 
Pt 0.673 0.683 0.614 
(0.128) (0.128) (0.208) 
Et 0.127 0.122 0.150 
(0.079) (0.080) (0.103) 
*: 
Et-1 0.110 0.107 0.119 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.059) 
:*: 
Et-2 0.083 0.082 0.084 
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(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) 
Et-3 0.047 0.046 0.044 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
* * : 
dEt-i 0.367 0.351 0.391 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.196) 
** *: 
Opt 0.249 0.290 0.220 
(0.096) (0.095) (0.107) 
x : 
(T/E)t-1 -0.063 -0.055 
(0.027) (0.028) 
(T/E)-1t-1 69.170 
(31.130) 
Gt 0.222 0.216 0.230 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.058) 
R2 0.749 0.749 0.751 
SER 3.74 3.74 3.74 
DW 1.66 1.68 1.62 
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SOURCE : Ashenfelter and Pencavel. 1969. op. cit. 
NOTE : The figures in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the estimated 
regression coefficients. The t test is shown by asterisks. One denotes significance at the 
5 percent level and two indicate significance at the 1 percent level. 
84. Curruth and Disney. 1988. op. cit. 
Booth, A. 1983. 'A Reconsideration of Trade Union Growth in the United Kingdom. ' British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 21. 
An unrestricted general model with all the variables transformed into logarithms takes the 
form, 
3v 3 3( 33 
/j 4 ýi tt-i-1 +d üi et-i + dQj Pt-i +d9 wt-i + dQi nt-i + 
5t tt 
i=0 i=0 1=0 1=0 i=0 
where tt=lnTt and T denotes trade union membership, 8 denotes employment, P is retail price 
index, W is the hourly earnings index, ü is the unemployment rate and n is the error term. 
Simplifying the general model using the sample evidence in order to obtain a parsimonious 
specification, the estimating equation takes the form, 
ltt = a0 let + al llet + a2 (m-e )t-1 + a3 lpt-1 + a4 lwt-1 + a5 lut 
+ a6 hut + a1 ltt-1 + a8 ltt-2 + a9 ltt-3 + DPo1 + 
6t 
where ltt is the rate of change of trade union membership, let and liet denote the 
rate of change of employment and its rate of change ( whether the change is increasing or 
decreasing ), (m-e )t-1 is the previous years density defined over employment, lpt-1 
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and lwt-1 are the rate of change of retail price index and nominal wage respectively, 
lagged one year. Rate of change of past years membership and a political climate dummy are 
also incorporated. The dummy variable takes the value 0 when the Conservatives were in 
power and 1 when Labour, Liberals or a coalition, and at is the disturbance term. Note 
that, as llnZt = In ( Zt-Zt-1 )w( Zt-Zt-1 )/ Zt-1, their model is not very different 
from the Bain-Elsheikh model. They also tested the real wage model, in which the variable 
1( w-p )t-1 was used. Note that, unlike Bain and Elsheikh, and following Ashenfelter 
and Pencavel, they defined 'potential membership' to exclude the unemployed. 
85. Their equilibrium or steady state level membership is the same as that of the previous 
year modified by the rate of change of employment and the feed-back from the previous 
year's density. As shown in the estimating equation, disequilibrium or short-run effects 
are presented further by retail prices, wages, unemployment rate, past years membership and 
political climate. 
Variables are transformed into logarithm as, by observing the relationship between the 
residual of membership regressed on employment and unemployment, they found that 'high 
unemployment tends to lead to increasing negative residuals, whereas periods of low 
unemployment ultimately lead to increasing positive deviations of membership from 
employment. (p. 7)' 
86. Ibid. 6. 
81. Their results are reproduced here. 
TABLE 2.3.2 Curruth and Disney Model 
Equation 123 
Method OLS OLS OLS 
Period 1896-1984 
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lpt-1 0.59 0.54 
(3.74) (3.40) 
lwt-1 -0.45 -0.43 
(3.35) (3.24) 
1(w -p )t-1 -0.39 
(2.97) 
lut -0.079 -0.077 -0.073 
(6.63) (6.27) (6.02) 
lint 0.048 0.048 0.048 
(4.53) (4.64) (4.64) 
ltt-1 0.50 0.47 0.50 
(5.49) (5.12) (5.61) 
ltt-2 0.095 0.11 0.13 
(1.06) (1.23) (1.44) 
ltt-3 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18 
(2.58) (2.63) (2.50) 
-0.011 -0.007 -0.007 
(3.21) (1.65) (1.65) 
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let 0.52 0.61 0.56 
(2.44) (2.48) (2.61) 
llet 0.70 0.66 0.70 
(4.46) (4.21) (4.50) 
DPo1 0.015 0.018 
(1.93) (2.42) 
SER 0.035 0.035 0.035 
RSS 0.098 0.094 0.097 
Forecast %2 0.50 0.51 0.37 
Chow F 0.37 0.37 0.32 
Normality X2 10.56 6.79 4.29 
LM F 1.91 1.89 2.20 
H. SOR F 1.40 1.38 1.38 
H. (W) F 1.33 1.29 1.41 
SOURCE : Carruth and Disney. 1988. op. cit. 
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NOTE : LM F is the F-form of the Lagrange multiplier test. H. SOR and H. (W) denote 
heteroscedasticity tests based on the squares of the regressors and White (1980) 
respectively. 
88. Lee, L. 1978. 'Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative 
and Limited Dependent Variables. ' International Economic Review, vol. 19, No. 2. 
Duncan, G. M. and D. E. Leigh. 1980. 'Wage Determination in the Union and Nonunion Sectors: A 
Sample Selectivity Approach, ' Industrial and Labour Relations Review, vol. 34. 
See also, Hanushek, E. A. and J. E. Jackson. 1977. Statistical Methods for Social Science. 
Schmidt, P. 1978. 'Estimation of a Simultaneous Equations Model with Jointly Dependent 
Continuous and Qualitative Variables: The Union-Earnings Question Revisited. ' International 
Economic Review, vol. XIX. 
Lee's model is close to conventional economic practice. Union services are assumed to be 
demanded 'if the percentage union wage differential exceeds his reservation wage which 
summarizes his specific preferences, ' 
wni ' Wni 
------------ > pi 
Wni 
where pi is assumed to be a function of the characteristics of the person and the costs of 
becoming a member. Thus, 
pi = aXi + bCi + e1i 
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where %i is a vector of individual characteristics, Ci is an index which summarizes the 
monetary costs and non pecuniary costs of becoming a union member, and el is the error 
reflecting unobservable random factors which is assumed to be normally distributed. 
The explicit and implicit costs Ci for an individual worker i are, 
Ci = rl + r2%i + r3Zi + e2i 
where Xi is a vector of characteristics and Zi is a vector of attributes of industry. 
Thus the individual i joins the union if, 
Wui ' wni 
----------- >(a+ br2 )X + brl + br3Zi + eli + be21 
Wni 
In the form of a probit model, if Ii: > 0, worker i is in the union, otherwise not, where 
Wni - Wni 
Ii* -- do + dl (----------- + d2Xj + d3Zi - ei 
Wni 
Altough this is the union status equation, union and nonunion wage equations were also 
adopted to allow the simultaneity, which are, 
wui ' bu0 + hul%ni + hu2Zui + eui 
Wni ' hn0 + hnlgni + hn2Zni + eni 
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where Wui, Wn! are the union and nonunion wage rates for the individual i, %i is a vector 
of personal characteristics, Zui, ni are the attributes of the unionized and non-unionized 
industries respectively, and eu, en are random residuals. 
89. Booth, A. 1985. 'The Free Rider Problem and a Social Custom Model of Trade Union 
Membership. ' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, C, 253-261. 
Akerlof, G. A. 1980. 'A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One 
Consequence. ' The Quarterly Journal of Economics, %CIV, 749-75. 
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Great Britain'. Warwick Economic Research Paper. mimeo. 
Freeman, R. B. 1976. The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition and 
Union Organizing Success'. Quarterly Economic Review, vol. 76. 
92. Bain, G. and F. Elsheikh. 1980. 'Unionisation in Britain: an Inter-Establishment 
Analysis Based on Survey Data. ' British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. VIII, 169-178. 
93. See sections 1 and 3. 
94. Dunlop, J. T. 1948. op. cit. 
95. Bondon, R. 1981. The Logic of Social Action. ( trans. D. Silverman ), London; 
Routledge. 
96. For an example in growth study, see Guest, D. E. and P. Dewe. 1988. 'Why Do Workers 
Belong to a Trade Union? A Social Psychological Study in the UK Electronics Industry'. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 26,178-193. 
For an example of a general argument, see Etzioni, A. ed. 1991. op. cit. 
97. Booth, A. 1983. op. cit. She wrote, 
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'the business cycle theory may be regarded as offering an explanation for short-run 
deviations from long-run or trend growth. It is desirable therefore to view the business 
cycle theory of unionization i) within the context of long-run structural factors that 
affect trade union growth, and ii) as one facet of the whole economy. ' 
98. Lockwood. D. op. cit. 150. 
99. Bain, G. op. cit. 
100. Lockwood, D. Ibid. 
101. Kornhauser, W. 1963. op. cit. 
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3. The Banking Industry and the Industrial Relations System 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the 
banking industry and its industrial relations system, upon 
which the subsequent empirical analysis of union growth will 
rest. It has already been seen in the previous chapter that, 
leaving aside the institutional factors, a substantial part of 
the observable patterns of the aggregate action amongst 
employees can be considered to stem from the social and 
economic situation in which they are located and that such 
patterns would be most systematically considered in terms of 
the structure of the labour market. Thus, the basic operational 
framework is the dual labour market theory, which is probably 
of some help in bringing together some aspects of the 
organisational structure of contemporary enterprises, labour 
management and union growth at a concrete level of day-to-day 
operation. 
Hence, the first section of this chapter will describe the 
theory briefly. This is followed by an overview of the 
industry, the development of its internal markets, its 
industrial relations system and some aspects of unionisation 
which will not be dealt with in the subsequent time-series 
analysis. 
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1. Rise of Dualism 
The dual labour market theory, more a sociological theory than 
an economic theory in its basic construction, originally 
derived from the labour force problems of the disadvantaged, 
particularly those of the black workers in the urban areas in 
the United States. Why are they so poor? Some economists, 
notably Doeringer and Piore, thought that orthodox neo- 
classical labour economics was not very competent in solving 
such a problem and started developing a systematic account of 
the structure and function of the labour market at a concrete 
level, although the origin of the theory can be traced back as 
far as the American institutionlists. 
l 
At the core of the theory is the assumption that the labour 
market is divided into two, or more, distinct segments, between 
which there is immobility of the labour force. From this idea 
some theorists developed a systematic account of such themes as 
the generation and the function of the segmentation, social 
behaviour traits of the labour force and its relationship with 
social stratification. The novelty of such a conception can 
best be seen in comparison with orthodox economic theory, which 
generally assumes that the rational maximizing behaviour of 
individuals generates socio-economic structure that is 
essentially continuous. 
Although neo-classical labour economics consists of the 
supply theory based upon the utility maximization of workers 
and the demand theory based upon the profit maximization of the 
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employers, the application of the same theoretical postulates 
into the field of income distribution had resulted in the 
development of human capital theory. It is assumed that, under 
conditions of workers' identical preference, equal natural 
abilities, identical non-monetary advantages of jobs, same 
length of working life and same uncertainties of earnings and 
unemployment, a rational school leaver would behave in a way 
which reflects the costs incurred in and the benefits derived 
from the education. Hence it can be predicted that, once 
allowances are made for all non-pecuniary factors, the 
remaining wage differential will be explained as a function of 
human capital endowments such as schooling, O. J. T. and so 
forth, which reflect different labour productivity. Against 
this, the dual labour market theorists insisted that, 
"where race and sex are introduced as further explanatory 
variables ( of low earnings ), any given level of human capital 
investment yields lower returns for females and for non- 
whites, " 
from which they postulated that there was immobility of the 
labour force between the segments. Thus, 2 
"workers are barred from the primary sector not so much by 
their own lack of human capital as by institutional restraints 
such as discrimination and by a simple lack of good jobs. "3 
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Methodologically, this provides another example of the 
controversy concerning the logic of aggregate or, in fact, 
individual action; should it be considered as a consequence of 
a subjective decision to fulfil a certain end or can it be 
understood that such action is largely deducible from the 
environment in which an individual is located? This can be an 
empirical problem. Berger and Piore, who started from the 
paradigm of traditional economic theory, found that, 
"by starting from the premise of groupings that are 
institutionally defined, we could analyze individual behaviour 
as the response to rules and incentives that develop in 
different segments of society. "4 
Despite the fact that much of the novelty that dualism had 
seems to have been effectively absorbed into the flexible 
framework of neo-classical economics, the challenge of it, 
including its Marxian 'radical' version, stimulated a large 
amount of empirical work in the field and seems to have 
contributed to a better understanding of the nature and 
function of labour markets at a more concrete level. It filled 
a gap which neo-classical theory left as a black-box. 
The nature of labour market discontinuity may also be an 
empirical problem and can significantly differ even amongst 
Anglo-Saxon societies. Piore, for example, proposed in his 
early work a two-sectors model with sub-tiers. 5 The primary 
sector consisted of upper and lower tiers. An upper tier 
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included professional and managerial jobs which provided the 
highest pay and status, good working conditions, employment 
stability and greater promotion opportunities. The mobility and 
turnover were essentially associated with advancement. These 
jobs lack the elaborate set of work rules and formal 
administration procedures which characterise lower-tier 
employment. Formal education is often an essential requisite 
for employment. A lower tier offers jobs with relatively high 
wages, good working conditions, chances of advancement, equity 
and due process in the administration of work rules, and above 
all, employment stability. Thus, the sector has a structured 
'internal market', which is defined as an 'administrative unit, 
such as a manufacturing plant, within which the pricing and 
allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative 
rules and procedures' in contrast with the external labour 
market of neo-classical theory where they are determined by 
economic variables. 
6 
The secondary sector, on the other hand, is characterised by 
low wages, poor working conditions, high labour turnover, 
little chance of advancement and a personalised relationship 
between workers and supervisors. The secondary sector may, a) 
be completely unstructured, b) be characterised by secondary 
internal markets with formal internal structures which have 
many 'entry ports' and short 'mobility clusters', c) have 
secondary jobs attached to internal markets in which the 
remainder of the jobs are primary. 
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The underlying determinants of the internal market structure 
is regarded to be technology in use and a corresponding skill 
requirement, which is, in turn, dependent upon the products 
market situation .7 Corresponding techniques of production may 
be classified as, a) one requires general skills such as 
generally trained professionals and highly trained craft 
workers, b) one breaks the work into highly specialised 
individual tasks, reminiscent of Adam Smith's pin factory and 
c) one requires general unskilled labour. Thus, it is argued 
that these skill requirements determine the structure of the 
market segments, each of which may correspond with the primary 
upper, primary lower and the secondary market respectively, 
although they did not disregard the important functions of 
other factors such as the system of O. J. T., customary law, 
conditions of external market and the effect of trade unions 
and management. 8 It may be worth noting that, in contrast to 
this, some radical economists like Gordon, Edwards and Reich 
attributed the segmentation to a successively adopted 'social 
structure of accumulation' or the 'systems of labour control', 
which some of them assumed to have taken three historical 
forms; 'simple', 'technical' and 'bureaucratic' controls. 
9 
Doeringer and Plore considered that thus established 
internal markets carry out some basic functions. These include 
enhanced job security and chances of advancement, turnover 
reduction, which is necessary to minimise the quasi-fixed 
factor of production, and technical efficiencies in 
recruitment, screening and training. The primary sector, where 
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internal markets are prevalent and jobs usually have little 
connection with the external market, often requires job- 
specific skills which make long employment relationship 
indispensable, whereas high turnover rates in the secondary 
sector do not affect productivity. It was upon this 
understanding of the labour market structure that they proposed 
social policies to create primary jobs in urban areas. 
2. The Banking Industry 
Banks in the U. K. are currently classified under the following 
categories; the Bank of England, the High Street Banks, Trustee 
Savings Banks, Merchant Banks, National Girobank, National 
Savings Banks, British Overseas Banks and Foreign Banks. 10 The 
High Street Banks include most of the major retail banks, 
namely, Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds, Midland, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Bank of Scotland, Citibank, Clydesdale, Co- 
operative, Coutts & Co. and Standard Chartered Bank. Trustee 
Savings Banks, starting as savings banks which accepted 
deposits with interest but did not offer current accounts or 
lend money, developed into four large commercial banks and 
their previous role is now undertaken by the National Savings 
Bank which is run by a governmental Department of National 
Savings through post offices. Merchant Banks are those whose 
main activities are the acceptance of bills of exchange, 
I 
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issuing house services and corporate financial services, 
relying upon the wholesale money market for deposits. It is the 
retail banks, particularly the four largest English clearing 
banks, that will be the focus of this work. 
Banks and Internal Markets 
The structure of retail banking in Britain, which had long 
operated under the London clearing banks, the Scottish and the 
Northern Irish banks and discount houses, underwent a marked 
re-organisation in the past decade. Following the affiliation 
of the Co-operative and the Trustee Savings Banks, and the 
National Girobank into the London Clearing House in 1975 and 
1980 respectively, the 1980s saw a change in the structure of 
the clearing system. The Association of Payment Services 
( APACS ) was established in 1985 to deal with payment clearing 
and money transmission services, under which operational 
companies were placed; Clearing House Automatic Payment System 
( CHAPS ) and Town Clearing Company, Cheque and Credit Clearing 
Company, and Bankers' Automated Clearing Services Limited 
( BACS ). The settlement members include all major High Street 
Banks as well as the Bank of England, Trustee Savings Banks and 
National Girobank. Accordingly, the Committee of London 
Clearing Bankers, which had co-ordinated interest rates, 
organised the clearing system and functioned as a liaison body 
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with the Bank of England and Whitehall. By September 1985 it 
had also reorganised into the Committee of London and Scottish 
Bankers. ll 
Amongst the High Street Banks, Barclays Bank has a certain 
share in the Bank of Scotland and also has common directors. 
Coutts is wholly owned by National Westminster Bank and a part 
of the share of the holding company of Royal Bank of Scotland 
is held by Lloyds. Clydesdale, which had been a subsidiary of 
Midland, was sold to National Australia Bank in 1987. Midland 
itself is scheduled to be bought by a foreign bank. A 
substantial value of shares are also held by individuals, and 
despite the existence of well over 100,000 small to medium 
shareholders, the top one per cent in number owns approximately 
80 per cent in value of the shares of Barclays and National 
Westminster. 12 
Historically, the foundation of major clearing banks was 
laid down through the Amalgamation Movement between 1900 and 
1925. The pace of concentration was such that 106 English joint 
stock banks in 1891 had decreased to 34 in 1918.13 The merger 
of Lloyds Bank with Capital and Counties Bank in the latter 
year was toward the end of the process and, at that time, the 
company had well over 10,000 employees. The next major 
reorganisation of the industry occurred nearly a half century 
after when the government reversed its long-established 
attitude against concentration that had been maintained since 
the Colwyn Committee. National Westminster was formed in 1968 
from the National Provincial Bank, which had acquired the 
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District Bank in 1962, and the Westminster Bank. The business 
of the three banks were transferred to the new bank in January 
1970. 
After the failure of the triple merger between Barclays, 
Lloyds and Martins in 1968, Martins merged into Barclays. 
Williams & Glyn's was formed in 1969 to take over the business 
of three banks; Glyn, Mills & Co, William Deacon's and the 
National Bank. Williams & Glyn's later merged with its parent 
bank, Royal Bank of Scotland in September 1985. Thus, 11 London 
clearing banks in 1960 reduced their number to 6 through the 
mergers in the late 1960s, which has been followed recently by 
entire restructuring of the industry. 
The Trustee Savings Banks, which originally started as small 
savings banks whose deposits were paid over to the government, 
started to run current accounts in the 1960s. Following the 
recommendations of the Page Committee, over 73 regional savings 
banks in the beginning of the 1970s were merged into around 18 
banks in 1974 and now consist of four banks that cover England 
and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the Channel Islands. 
In Scotland, the National Commercial Bank, which was formed by 
a merger between the National Bank of Scotland and Commercial 
Bank in 1958, merged with Royal Bank of Scotland in 1968. 
Lloyds maintained 16 per cent of its holding company, National 
and Commercial banking Group. Barclays sold British Linen Bank 
to Bank of Scotland in 1969 for 35 per cent shareholding of the 
latter. 
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Clearing banks, particularly Barclays and Lloyds, have also 
had investments in international banking. A major change 
occurred in Barclays in 1971 when it obtained full ownership of 
an independent public company, Barclays DCO ( Dominion, 
Colonial & Overseas ) which had vested interest in Africa and 
the Caribbean islands, in order to avert conflicts of interest 
between different bodies of shareholders. The bank was re-named 
as Barclays Bank International, which gave Barclays an 
extensive network in developing countries. Barclays' own 
foreign department was transferred to B. B. I. In the next year. 
A similar move was taken by Lloyds, which lead a merger between 
its wholly and partly owned subsidiaries, Lloyds Bank Europe 
and Bank of London and South America ( BOLSA ), in the same 
year and then, buying out the minority interest, launched as 
Lloyds Bank International in 1974.14 Lloyds also had some 
interest in Grindlays Bank, which was, in 1984, bought by the 
Australia and New Zealand Bank. Midland has some shares in 
Standard Chartered. National Westminster Bank conducts its 
foreign businesses through the parent bank and International 
Westminster Bank. 
Probably a recent feature in the industry is an increasing 
competition not only within the clearing banks, but between the 
clearing banks and other deposit taking institutions such as 
National Girobank and building societies. The former was 
launched in 1968, which had an immediate effect upon the 
clearing banks cash transmission mechanism, but its services to 
businesses are still limited. Building societies, which 
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generally borrow on a rather short-run basis and lend for house 
mortgages, also have been allowed to expand their sphere of 
services, which range from cheque accounts to unsecured loans 
for purposes other than house purchase. Towards the end of the 
1970s, total deposits with building societies had surpassed 
those with the clearing banks. 15 
Most of the banks now have developed divisions according to 
the function each of which performs, which are co-ordinated by 
the general management. Divisions in a major clearing bank 
consist of domestic banking, international banking, related 
banking services, management services, financial control, 
personnel, or premises divisions etc, some of which can be 
joined directly through entry schemes. Domestic banking 
division, for instance, controls a branch network which is 
supported by management services division, and has regional and 
divisional offices above it. Related banking services division 
deals with taxation, investment, share dealing or insurance. 
Although actual allocation of human resources differs from bank 
to bank, nearly 75 per cent of the staff in a major clearing 
bank were allocated on a regional basis. 16 
Positions in enterprises are commonly graded into a 
hierarchical order according to the requirements of the jobs. 
There are clerical or 'unappointed' staff, who constitute some 
90 per cent of the total staff (A bank in 1989 ), above which 
there are the employees who hold jobs with a formal status. 17 
They are called 'appointed' staff who are often subdivided into 
two levels; General Managers' Appointed Staff and Board 
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Appointed Staff. Clerical jobs are systematically graded into 
four to six levels. Each grade has a substantial list of jobs, 
but a benchmark and some other job titles in another bank are 
as follows. 
Grade I Machinist. ( Ledger Operator, Remittance Clerk ) 
Grade II Cashier ( Statement Clerk, Control Clerk ) 
Grade III Junior/Trainee Securities ( Manager's Secretary ) 
Grade IV Sole/No. l Security Clerk ( Chief Cashier ) 
Although the benchmark job title of Grade II is Cashier, it may 
be classified into Grade III or Grade IV in some cases as the 
responsibility of this job varies much. 18 The first two grades 
often account for over half the total employees. 
These grades, according to which maxima conditions of 
employment are set, are classified in terms of such factors as 
the duration of the employment and skill requirements. This is 
commonly measured by job evaluation systems, many of which have 
been operational since the 1970s. One system works as follows. 
All jobs of unappointed staff are evaluated according to six 
factors; experience, complexity, judgement and initiative, 
supervision of staff, responsibility for avoiding loss to the 
bank, and personal contacts. The first item, for instance, 
experience, is classified from 3 months to 3 years, according 
to which certain points are allocated. The position of a job in 
grades is then determined according to the total points. 
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Managerial jobs have similar a kind of job evaluation 
system. Lloyds Bank, for instance, has the so-called Profile 
Method for the evaluation of the jobs of Board Appointment 
Holders. 19 Twelve job characteristics, which include level of 
authority and influence, effect of performance on the bank, 
involvement in day-to-day personnel activities, overall 
responsibility for personnel resources, recognition and 
comprehension are identified. Each has a set of level 
guidelines according to which certain points are allocated. 
Jobs under the points total 158 are classified as Grade 1B and 
420 points and above are Grade 6. 
The system is occasionally subject to re-evaluation. This 
happens not only as requirements of the jobs gradually change 
over time, but because of some other external factors 
including, in a recent case, the requirement of equal pay 
legislation. One such example is a proposition by Lloyds to 
adopt the HAY system, which is fairly widely used in British 
industry and particularly in the finance sector. Concern of 
staff, and the unions, about such a system is its 'fairness' 
than anything else. 
Recruitment of the employees is generally carried out in 
terms of a tier system in order to reflect different types of 
jobs that the enterprises offer. 20 This partly reflects the 
market segments, although the problem of sexual and racial 
equality adds another aspect to it. Generally, a two-tier 
system with or without another option seems to be common. Human 
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Table 3.2.1 Proportion of Female Staff 
NAT WEST LLOYDS MIDLAND 
1974 
Grade 1 75.2% 78.5 75.5 
2 72.3 74.3 75.1 
3 43.8 50.7 44.4 
4 12.2 30.9 17.7 
Above 4 28.6 5.0 18.4 
1979 
Grade 1 72.9 73.3 73.1 
2 75.4 76.2 78.3 
3 51.0 55.9 53.3 
4 20.0 32.9 24.2 
Above 4 4.3 4.7 8.0 
Sources: Egan, A. 1982. 'Women in Banking: A Study in 
Inequality' Industrial Relations Journal_, vol. 13, No. 3,20-31. 
Bifu Report, September 1981. 
capital, particularly education, often functions as a screening 
device and 'A' level or graduate applicants are often eligible 
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to apply for a career course with adequate management 
development programmes. This is sometimes called 'advanced' 
entry in Barclays or 'accelerated' in National Westminster and 
may allow a candidate to start from Grade II of the 
hierarchical structure. Moving around the regions, they acquire 
experience that is indispensable in branch work specifically 
and banking as a career generally, and take up jobs in the 
upper tier in a relatively short period of time. 
Through 'standard' or 'general' entry with certain 
requirements of '0' levels, employees who generally fill the 
lower tier of markets are recruited. The recruitment usually 
takes place at the regional level and applicants are not 
expected to be mobile automatically, from which some area 
differences of the general traits of the employees derive. 
Generally, more female entrants apply for the latter type of 
jobs and around 60 per cent of the second entry are estimated 
to be female. 21 This tendency is rather accelerated by the 
higher turnover rates of female staff ( 10 to 20 per cent in 
comparison with 4 to 9 per cent of male ) and discrimination. 
Many banks started reviewing the situation following the Sex 
Discrimination Acts, 1975 and 1986, and the Race Relations Act 
1976. 
Recent figures on female employees in different grades are 
shown in Table 3.2.1. It can be seen that male employees who 
are classified into Grade 1 are generally less than 30 per cent 
and this figure is even less in Grade 2. As a certain 
proportion of male employees in Grade 2 are naturally within 
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the management development programmes, most of the labour force 
in the grade who have no career prospects are female, many of 
whom work in banks before their marriage. Hence, despite the 
alleged recent changes and progress in female labour market 
participation, gender still seems to represent segmentation. It 
has also been argued that an increasing proportion of female 
employment basically derives from changing patterns of skill 
requirements, which has particularly reflected the advent of 
office automation that degraded the general task into 
subdivided routine procedure. 
Developments of Internal Markets 
Let us overview the processes through which the present system 
of internal markets emerged. As has just been mentioned, it was 
the Amalgamation Movement which brought about a rapid expansion 
of the scale of the enterprises. Lloyds Bank, for example, 
employed only 1,700 male staff ( exclusive of managers ) in 
1900. This had increased to over 10,000 within less than 30 
years. Despite this expansion, there were few systematic 
attempts to develop modern methods of labour management. There 
was no comprehensive training scheme available for the staff, 
apart from the on the job training. Recruitment of clerical 
staff was almost entirely depended upon recommendation within 
the bank or by influential customers, reminiscent of the old 
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labour aristocrats. A later example in the Midland Bank 
suggests that, in the buyers' labour market, the bank had a 
long waiting list of such recommended applicants, although they 
were further selected by written competition. 22 
In 1918, although most branches had a typewriter, all the 
book-keeping was done by hand and accounts kept in ledgers, 
with the copies for the customers written in pass books. 
23 
There were already a certain number of female clerks, who 
typically engaged in typing or filing and who sometimes 
symbolically referred to as 'female' in staff records just 
beneath the list of their male colleagues who were mentioned by 
the position in the bank and by name. 
Early mechanisation began towards the end of the 1920s with 
the introduction of a mechnical book-keeping system, whose 
process continued up until the 1950s. The ledger posting 
machine also had particular effects upon the labour process of 
routine branch work. It was generally considered that two 
machines enabled the banks to replace two male clerks with one 
unskilled female operator, although this rule was not fully 
applicable to smaller branches with less than ten employees, 
which required only one machine that released one male clerk. 
24 
Banks' investment in mechanisation was reported to be 
particularly intensive around 1930.25 
Accordingly, female employees increased continuously. 
26 
They were often employed permanently to posts that the 'men 
tire of the machine operating more quickly than the women'. 
127 
Table 3.2.2 Turn Over Rates ( Lloyds Bank ) 
1938 1949 1959 1969 
MEN - 6.1 4.6 10.9 
WOMEN 8.8 21.4 18.4 28.0 
Source : Bank record. 
Note : Calculated as (number of staff in the beginning of a 
year)/(those who left in the year)*100. 
Despite a slight chance of promotion to a secretarial post, 
they were often called upon to retire earlier or had to leave 
the job because of a marrige bar emposed at that time. 27 The 
proportion of female labour was still small at this time, with 
around 2,000 females out of 13,000 in the Midland and 1,388 out 
of 12,334 in Lloyds. 28 This indicates the existence of the 
dual structure with a much smaller secondary sector in the 
early years. As shown in Table 3.2.2., the turnover rates of 
female staff had been necessarily high, although not as high as 
it has been in more recent years. The rate of 21.4 per cent in 
1949 probably reflects an effect of the war, as those who were 
in the services were returning. This year being excluded, a 
128 
general trend of an increasing turnover rate by 1 to 3 per cent 
emerges. 
There do not seem to have been uniformly applicable grading 
schemes in operation in the clearing banks prior to the 1920s, 
although the necessity of 'scientific grading' had sometimes 
been suggested in early documents of the Bank Officers Guild so 
that the 'aspiring bank clerk has some definite and 
comparatively near position to aim for'. 29 In Lloyds Bank, 
men recruited prior to 1929, many of whom at the age of 17, 
were on one of the three scales according to the place where 
they worked, namely London, large towns and small towns, each 
of which had a certain scale ceiling. 30 
It was in the 1930s that banks laid the foundations of the 
contemporary systems of labour management. The structural 
reason for this was a rapid expansion of the enterprises and 
the immediate reason of this was the Great Depression, although 
some banks' attempts, such as those in the Westminster and the 
Midland, seem to have preceded this. Although, unlike the 
steel, textile and shipbuilding industries, banking was 
somewhat removed from the economic catastrophe, banks did 
experience a contraction in lending and a decrease in profits 
at the beginning of the 1930x. 31 Facing the need to cut costs, 
Lloyds, for example, launched the organisation committee, which 
reported on staff grading, staff training, recruitment of 
graduates and managers' salaries. The argument of radical 
economists, who insisted that the development of an 
hierarchical structure in large scale organisations is a new, 
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growing type of system of control, seems to have some grounds 
here, as the memoranda of the Committee recommending the 
change, 
"for the better training of the staff, in the best interests of 
discipline and economy and for the selection and promotion of 
our best men, it is necessary to institute clearly defined 
divisions - other than those of salary only - to mark and check 
the progress of the members of the staff. "32 
The grading scheme for male staff was introduced in 1930. The 
scheme had four grades from A to D. Grade A incorporated those 
staff who are 'probationers, temporary, supplementary and 
female clerks and all others not on the permanent staff of the 
bank'. It was claimed that if the bank is to obtain the full 
advantages of the possible savings, this must be done in this 
grade particularly in relation to female clerks, as a 'growing 
proportion of the merely clerical work of the larger offices 
will be carried out through the increasing use of mechanical 
33 appliances'. 
Grade B included junior clerks on a permanent basis who were 
expected to pass the Preliminary Examination of the Institute 
of Bankers. Promotion to the next grade depended on individual 
merit and suitability. Grade C comprised clerks of five years' 
service or over with a general requirement of the Final 
Examination of the Institute of Bankers. Senior clerks in large 
branches, heads of departments, sub-managers and managers were 
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chosen from Grade D. 34 A new method of marking the performance 
of staff also came into effect in 1931, in which every member 
of staff was assessed in terms of manners, appearance, general 
intelligence, technical knowledge, punctuality, handwriting, 
business acquisition, ambition and general conduct. 
35 
The principal merits of the grading scheme for the bank were 
threefold. It not only automatically eliminated unsatisfactory 
probationers at an early stage, but enabled the bank to retain 
staff who did not work permanently within Grade A, whose 
salaries were proportionate to the duties involved. This 
resulted in a considerable saving, as much of the augmenting 
simple clerical work was to be carried out by young female 
employees. Secondly, the grading scheme provided the employees 
with a systematic on-the-job-training, through which they 
acquired a fairly comprehensible training in general 
accountancy work, that started with work concerning day books, 
waste books, pass books, postal matters, letter filing through 
ledger training to security work, stock and share transactions, 
and foreign exchange operation. Formalised training was also 
launched later in the 1930s. Finally, it did intensify the 
'healthy competition' amongst the employees, thus facilitating 
their voluntary integration into the organisation in a 
different fashion from before. One thing that should be noted 
in conjunction with the Marxian argument, however, is that the 
development of the dual structure itself preceded this rather 
intentional re-organisation. 
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An employee, remembering the inspection in the 1920s, 
described the shifts in supervision as follows. 
" We used to start looking for inspectors after about 12/15 
months. ... I think with the years the inspections probably 
have tended to get more spaced out. One feels inspections were 
a little more frequent in the 1920s than in the 1950s. [I] 
expect the attitude of mind of the staff on the one side and 
the inspectors on the other has completely changed, I mean in 
days gone by you were absolutely in fear and trembling. The 
whole thing was a traumatic experience in the extreme. You 
almost got frightened to put your pen down in case they accused 
you of not getting on with the work. ', 
36 
Such a statement may be but a subjective impression. But it is 
not difficult to imagine that that change in the management - 
staff relationship, even if it was not the 'complete change in 
personal relationships', which has always been quoted by 
sociologists as a reason for the development of white-collar 
trade unionism was under way. 
This system of labour management lasted for well over four 
decades without fundamental changes. Salary scales in the 1950s 
or 1960s in Lloyds, for instance, show that at least three 
grades were operational for male permanent staff whereas 
virtually all female staff were allocated under a single scale, 
indicating an existence of a distinct market segment. Salary 
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scale for the female was often slightly unfavourable than that 
for the male just after the entrance into the labour market 
( 215 for the female of 17 years old in comparison with 240 
for the male counterpart in 1955 ). But the difference 
progressively increased as time passed and a woman of 30 years 
old received only 500 whereas male staff of the same age 
received 710 in the first grade and 780 in the second. 
37 
Nevertheless, composition of the labour force has changed 
substantially. An increase in the female labour force is shown 
in Graph 3.2.1. This is an institutional example, but the trend 
in the clearing banks may be supposed to have followed a 
similar path. The outbreak of the Second World War had a 
significant impact upon the labour market participation of 
women, but the effect of the event upon the structural change 
was temporally in nature and as the war ended, their employment 
level was pushed back onto the trend line. By the end of the 
1960s the number of female employees who worked in the major 
clearing banks exceeded that of men. 
One cause which led to an increase in female employment and 
the expansion of the secondary sector was mechanisation, which 
consistently increased the existing division of labour and 
degraded the skill requirements of certain clerical jobs. Thus, 
the reorganisation mentioned above was in a sense to give the 
dual structure a formal institutional basis. Another cause was 
the opening up of certain 'jobs for the male' to female staff, 
which may have or may have not accompanied the process of 
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degradation of work. Cashier, for instance, predominantly a 
men's job, was taken over by women. The post of Security Clerk 
has also gradually been opened to women. 
Mechanisation has been carried out with some successive 
stages and this is generally under the constraint of technical 
development. The first stage saw the introduction of book- 
keeping and ledger posting machines. This was then followed by 
an introduction of certain mechanical and electronic apparatus 
such as accounting machines and cheque sorting machines in the 
1950s and 1960s. Electronic accounting machines, which Lloyds 
started to introduce at branches in 1961 and 62, were then 
withdrawn by the end of 1970 as computers took their place. 38 
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The attempts to automate the data processing process, 
particularly cheque clearing, started in the mid 1950s when an 
electronics sub-committee of the Committee of the London 
Clearing Bankers was set up to assess the relative merits of 
different types of coding systems. The sub-committee's decision 
in 1961 actually followed the Lloyds' introduction of a 
standard American cheque sorting machine, which was first used 
to automate the clearing processes and computerising customers' 
accounts. The cheque sorting machines 'have taken the place of 
hundred of girls who flipped through the cheques by hand each 
morning' and was roughly estimated to have saved some 600 jobs 
in each of the Big Five. 39 The advent of microtechnology has 
been particularly prominent since the end of the 1960s. 
40 What 
is now known as BACS was launched in 1969, which changed the 
process of money transmission from paper to tape, and then to 
telecommunication link. This was followed by CHAPS that enabled 
electronic fund transfers of 10,000 and over. At the branch 
network level, the introduction of automatic teller machines 
and counter terminals have been two of the most significant. 
Many sociologists still seem to disagree with the assessment 
of the effects of micro technology upon the occupational 
structure. Despite this, it seems to be often assumed that, 
although it created a certain number of skilled specialists who 
deal with the software side, the 'potential effect of 
technologically induced deskilling on the male career structure 
has been, up to now, significantly reduced by the presence of 
41 women who are largely excluded from promotion'. 
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A systematic reconsideration of this structure has been 
carried out by some banks since the 1970s. The prime incentives 
were legislative, namely the Equal Pay Act of 1970, the Sex 
Discrimination Act and the Employment Protection Act of 1975, 
although the effect of the latter two upon bank organisations 
were often considered to be fairly limited. 42 A systematic 
change occurred in the way jobs in the secondary sector are 
filled. Sex distinction does not serve as a principal means of 
segregation and it has come to be considered as a purely 
voluntary one, although, as has been seen in the previous 
section, the institutional change naturally did not shift the 
customary pattern amongst employees in a day. 
3. The Industrial Relations System in Banking 
The industrial relations system is a relationship between 
employees and their organizations, employers and their 
organizations and the state and its agencies, through which 
certain rules that regulate workplaces are formed. Such rules 
are often classified into two broad categories; substantive 
rules which regulate terms and conditions of employment, and 
procedural rules which establish methods and procedures for 
reaching substantive agreements and resolving disputes over 
them. 43 When terms and conditions are determined through joint 
regulation of employees' and employers' organizations, such a 
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process is commonly called as collective bargaining, the term 
derives from the Webbs. 
In this section, the current situation of the industrial 
relations system and the patterns of collective bargaining in 
the banking industry will be explained, which supplements the 
major historical study in the subsequent chapters. It covers an 
overview of the trade unions and staff unions in the industry, 
the collective bargaining arrangements in some banks, some 
aspects of trade union organisation such as structure and 
industrial action, and the function of the state. In the last 
part, patterns of unionisation not dealt with in the later 
analysis will be mentioned. 
Outline 
The system of industrial relations in the banking industry has 
shown at least two prominent features; divided staff 
representation and recent 'institutionalisation' or 
'decentralisation' of collective bargaining. The former is a 
historical division of staff representation between a national 
industrial union and house unions and staff associations in the 
major English clearing banks. The latter is a recent breakdown 
of joint machineries at both national and domestic levels, 
which somewhat reflects a general tendency in the British 
industrial relations system as a whole. Two national industrial 
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unions, Bifu and M. S. F., and house unions and associations have 
been present in the industry. 
a. The Banking, Insurance and Finance Union: Bifu was 
originally launched as the Bank Officers' Guild in 1918 in the 
turmoil of the First World War and the amalgamation movement in 
the industry. It amalgamated with its declining counterpart in 
Scotland, the Scottish Bankers Association in 1946 to form the 
National Union of Bank Employees. Then, following a 
diversification policy in the 1970s, it changed its name to 
Bifu in 1979, covering employees in all grades in banks, 
. finance houses, credit card companies, building societies and 
insurance companies. Bifu now has approximately 170,481 members 
( December 1989 ), among whom about 150,000, or 88 per cent, 
work in banking including technical staff and about 80,000, or 
some 47 per cent in the English clearing banks. It has been 
affiliated to the T. U. C. since 1940 save for a short period 
between 1973 and 75, when it was expelled for registering under 
the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 in defiance of T. U. C. 
policy. 
b. The Manufacturing Science and Finance Union ( M. S. F. ): 
A. S. T. M. S. gained some membership in the Midland Bank and its 
subsidiary, the Clydesdale Bank, by absorbing their staff 
associations in the beginning of the 1970s when N. U. B. E was 
excluded from the T. U. C. However, probably partly because of 
its more radical image, and partly because it stood aloof from 
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the then operative national negotiations, its membership 
stagnated and it was subsequently 'de-recognised' by Midland 
Bank in May 1989. 
c. Staff Associations and Staff Unions: The first annual report 
of the Certification Officer depicted the features of staff 
associations as, 
"Organisations, usually of white-collar workers, not affiliated 
to the T. U. C. whose membership is confined to the employees of 
a single employer ( or associated employers ) in sectors other 
than central and local government and the nationalised 
industries. ""44 
Generally, such a description still holds, although certain 
features may be subject to changes. Some of the most 
influential organisations do not even retain the name of 
'association' any more, as they gradually changed their 
character. As this happens, the only remaining major difference 
from the industrial unions is that they confine their 
membership in a single company or a company group. 
Such house associations and unions can be found in various 
industries. For instance, there were 14 associations in 
insurance, 12 in food/drink/tabacco, 11 in building societies 
as well as construction/retail/services, 9 in banking as well 
as aerospace, engineering and allied industries in 1979, when 
the total number of such associations was 88. However, by 45 
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far the largest staff associations are found in the banking 
industry and it is these organisations which are covered in 
this research; Barclays Group Staff Union ( Membership in 
December 1988,51,317 ), NatWest Staff Association ( 39,518 ) 
and Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union ( 27,770 ). They now hold 
approximately 118,600 employees, or a nominal density of 51 per 
cent, in the three banks. The size of other staff associations 
were reported to be very modest with average membership of some 
85 organisations around 1,150 at the time of the survey by the 
46 Certification Office. 
Most of the staff associations in the banking industry were 
established between 1918 and 1921, as a managerial reaction 
against the launch of the Guild. These include the ones in 
Lloyds, Westminster, National Provincial, Midland, Union Bank 
of Scotland, Barclays and Martins. There also existed 
associations in other banks, many of which were rather short- 
lived; 
est. dis. 
Yorkshire Bank S. A. 1926 1968 
District Bank S. A. 1940 1969 
Williams & Glyns' Bank S. A. 1940 1973 
Royal Bank of Scotland S. A. 1945 1975 
Coutts & Co. S. A. 1950 1977 
Bank of England S. O. 1973 1987 
The staff associations in Yorkshire, Royal bank of Scotland and 
Bank of England transferred engagements to Bifu. Williams & 
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Glyns' S. A. dissolved as N. U. B. E. gained sole bargaining rights 
in the bank, and Martins Bank Staff Association joined Barclays 
Bank Staff Association in December 1969 following the parent 
banks' merger. Similarly, the National Provincial Bank Staff 
Association, National Provincial Ladies Guild, Westminster Bank 
Guild and the District Bank Staff Association merged to form 
the National Westminster Staff Association in September 1969. 
Small Coutts Staff Association joined National Westminster 
Staff Association in 1977. Staff associations in Barclays, 
National Westminster and Lloyds formed a federation, C. B. U, 
from August 1980 till April 1988 for the purpose of national 
negotiation with the Employers' Federation. 
The Original aims of these associations were, in the term of 
Fox, 'unitary', or a belief in the harmony between the 
employers' objectives and those of employees, rather than the 
'pluralistic' or the 'radical' views. 47 However, significant 
changes in their character have been observed after the Second 
World War, and the Cameron report published towards the end of 
1963 concluded that, 
"the Staff Associations are in a position where domination 
could be exercised by the employers, there could be found no 
evidence where such potential domination was actually 
executed. "48 
All three associations hold a certificate of independence under 
the Employment Protection Act, 1975. 
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The industrial relations system and collective bargaining 
arrangements in the banking industry may be classified into the 
following sectors; Bank of England, clearing banks, foreign and 
overseas banks and merchant banks. 
49 The second category is 
subdivided into the 'big four', other High Street banks and the 
T. S. B., and Scottish banks. 
a. The Bank of England: Some 5,186 staff were employed in the 
Bank of England in December 1989, including those in printing 
work. 50 The Bank of England Staff Organization was set up in 
1973, which transferred engagement to Bifu in 1987. The Bank of 
England Section of Bifu now has well over 3,000 members, 
representing all classes of employees except print workers and 
senior managers. Since the estimated proportion of the print 
workers is around 25 per cent, Bifu organizes roughly 90 per 
cent. Assuming that Bifu's membership figures include about 15 
per cent of pensioner members, the approximate real density is 
a little" under 80 per cent. This figure may be slightly 
underestimated, as a number of senior managers are not 
controlled. The collective bargaining arrangements cover 
salaries, overtime, holiday entitlement and other terms and 
conditions of employment. They also have provision for 
conciliation and compulsory arbitration. 
b. The 'Big Four': Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds and 
Midland Banks employed some 282,400 staff in December 1989 
including part-time employees. Most of the staff are either 
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'clerical' or 'managerial', but it also includes technical and 
services staff who constitute a few per cent of the total 
employees. All the negotiations are currently carried out 
domestically. In the largest three clearing banks, namely 
Barclays, National Westminster and Lloyds, such negotiations 
are carried out both by a national industrial union, Bifu, and 
a staff association and staff unions, namely B. G. S. U., N. W. S. A. 
and L. B. G. S. U. separately, both of which have similar 
procedural agreements. In the Midland Bank, Bifu has sole 
negotiatiating rights, as another T. U. C. affiliated union, 
M. S. F. was de-recognised by the Bank in May 1989. 
Bifu has a nominal density of 16 to 26 per cent in the 
largest three banks, or approximately 21 per cent on an average 
( Dec. 1989 ). It has steadily increased its membership in 
Midland and now organises over 50 per cent. Pensioner members 
being assumed to be 15 per cent and controlled together with 
technical and services staff, the figures become between 14 and 
24 per cent in the three banks and a little less than 50 per 
cent in Midland Bank. These figures may be slightly 
overestimated, as possible dual membership of Bifu and SA/SU is 
not controlled. Generally, staff association and staff unions 
have been performing better in the three banks, and their 
nominal density is; B. G. S. U. 43 per cent, N. W. S. A. 47 per cent 
and L. B. G. S. U. 45 per cent. Approximate pensioner members being 
subtracted, these density figures become 36,40 and 39 per cent 
respectively. Total union density varies from around 45 per 
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cent in Midland to a little over 60 per cent in the most 
organised banks. 
The procedural agreements in each institution generally 
covers salaries, territorial allowances, overtime, working 
hours, holiday entitlement and job evaluation scheme, although 
there are some differences in terms of the range of the work 
force covered by the agreements as well as negotiability of 
some basic items like pensions. 51 Employers have refused to 
enter a compulsory arbitration agreement under the divided 
staff representation, which was once operative in the sector. 
The current arbitration agreement is the so-called veto system, 
in which before one staff body can go to arbitration the other 
must have indicated its acceptance of the outcome. 
Historically speaking, the organisational structure of the 
associations were transformed from largely automatic bodies for 
liaison into voluntary trade unions to suit the war-time 
regulation in 1940. They were recognized by management and 
carried out negotiations in these days, except in Barclays 
where B. O. G. was recognised in 1941. A marked development 
occurred in 1968 when N. U. B. E. succeeded in setting up the 
Joint Negotiating Council for Banking, thus gaining national 
recognition, after which it secured domestic procedural 
agreements in the respective banks. The Federation of London 
Clearing Bank Employers was established in the same year for 
the purpose of national negotiation and the Central Council of 
Bank Staff Associations was reorganized as a negotiating body. 
The J. N. C. was then composed of the employers side (6 bank 
144 
directors or officers of GM level or above ) and the joint 
staff side (3 each from the C. B. S. A. and N. U. B. E. ). National 
non-clerical negotiating machinery was also established in June 
1970. 
Recent changes in the industrial relations system in the 
clearing banks may be characterised as 'institutionalisation' 
or 'decentralisation' which started with N. U. B. E. 's withdrawal 
from all joint machineries for clerical and managerial staff 
both at national and domestic levels. National negotiation was 
resumed in 1980 separately between the Federation and Bifu, and 
the Federation and the newly formed Clearing Bank Union which 
was composed by Barclays Group Staff Union, NatWest Staff 
Association and Lloyds bank Group Staff Union. However, 
national negotiations also halted in July 1987 when the 
National Westminster Bank withdrew from the Federation, which 
was immediately followed. by the remaining two banks. The break- 
up of the Federation was then followed by a winding-up of the 
C. B. U. in April 1988. 
This process of decentralisation of pay determination 
reflects a general trend in British industry in the 1980s. 
Behind it was the employers' preference for a flexible pay 
structure reflecting performance. Of the 346 respondent 
companies to a C. B. I. survey, about one quarter replied that 
their bargaining arrangements had been decentralised between 
1981 and 1986, although 59 per cent had made no change. 52 
This, at least partly, seems to reflect Conservative economic 
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policy at the time to make the British economy more 
competitive. 
c. Other High Street Banks and the T. S. B.: The Trustee Savings 
Banks have become the most important amongst other High Street 
banks as they developed from small local savings banks into 
four large regional banks with a wide range of services. T. S. B. 
now employ about 25,100 staff and they are covered by a 
voluntary agency shop agreement signed with Bifu in 1972 
together with the Co-operative and Yorkshire Banks. Coutts 
Staff Association merged with N. W. S. A. in October 1977, 
although Bifu also has a nominal density of around 5 per cent. 
d. Scottish Banks: Three major Scottish banks, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland, Bank of Scotland and Clydesdale Bank employ 
approximately 40,100 staff ( Dec. 1989 ). The Royal Bank of 
Scotland is the fifth largest High Street bank, and its 
absorption of its subsidiary, Williams & Glyn's in 1985 brought 
it a large branch network in both Scotland and England. Other 
banks in Scotland have relatively few employees and have no 
significant collective bargaining. As in the English clearing 
banks, all the negotiations are currently carried out 
domestically. 
Bifu has the sole negotiating rights in the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Bank of Scotland. Clydesdale Bank recognises both 
Bifu and M. S. F.. Bifu has considerably higher density in the 
largest two Scottish banks than their English counterparts, as 
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their respective staff associations merged into Bifu. It now 
organises approximately 45 to 75 per cent in these banks. The 
average nominal density in December 1989 was 63.3 per cent, or 
55.3 per cent if pensioners and technical and services staff 
being controlled. 
Historically, national machinery in Scotland, the Joint 
Negotiating Council of the Scottish Banking Industry, was 
established in 1970, which was then composed of the Federation 
of Scottish Bank Employers, staff associations and N. U. B. E. The 
national non-clerical machinery followed this in 1971. The Bank 
of Scotland Staff Association and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Staff Association transferred engagement to N. U. B. E. in 1973 
and 1974 respectively. The machinery ceased to function, as the 
Federation, which was against the unilateral arbitration clause 
in the procedural agreement, withdrew in 1983. The Federation 
dissolved as Clydesdale Bank withdrew from it in 1986, thus 
halting all national negotiations. 
e. Foreign and Overseas Banks: There are over 400 foreign banks 
that have branches in the UK, the largest being American banks, 
and they employ approximately 40,000 employees together with 
British overseas banks. The major union in the sector is Bifu, 
which has sole negotiating rights in some 20 foreign banks and 
4 overseas banks. It also has substantial membership in 
Standard Chartered Bank, where its nominal density is 58 per 
cent ( Dec. 1989 ). M. S. F. also has some membership in the 
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sector and there are several staff associations. Procedural 
agreements generally covers salaries, hours and overtime. 
f. Merchant Banks: Historically, there has been little 
collective bargaining in merchant banks and Bifu has only 
negligible membership in the accepting houses. However, recent 
moves by large banks to establish subsidiary merchant banks 
caused serious disputes between managements and the unions, as 
some of the transferred staff were union members. These new 
merchant banks, including Barclays de Zoette Wedd, National 
Westminster Investment Bank, and Lloyds Merchant Bank have been 
maintaining this long-established practice of merchant banks 
not conducting negotiations through trade unions. However, a 
breakthrough may occur some time as Midland Montagu, an 
investment banking division of Midland Bank, had already 
suggested its intention to grant union recognition in 1987, 
provided that 30 per cent of its 2,100 staff joined. 
Union Organisation: Structure 
Students of trade union organisations often observe both 
devolutionary shifts and a tendency of centralisation, making a 
meaningful generalisation difficult. Some of the large unions 
like T. G. W. U., G. M. W. U. and N. U. P. E. are thought to fall into 
the first category whereas E. E. T. P. U. and A. U. E. W. -E. represent 
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latter. 53 Bifu, where executives have coped with the 
increasingly diversified and complicated organisation by 
creating relatively autonomous sections may fall into the first 
category. When it set up its English Clearing Bank Section in 
July 1980, it was already the fourth section to be created. The 
Section Council then consisted of members from the constituent 
institutional committees and officials from the respective 
banks, and had a reasonable autonomy vis-a-vis the Executive 
Committee, with basic functions of co-ordinating the 
negotiations in the respective banks as well as negotiations 
with the Federation. 54 
Although 'sectional isation' of the union organisation and 
the increasingly significant function of such units were 
essentially an adjustment of the union to the changing patterns 
of its membership and to enable it to carry out effective 
collective bargaining, it also inevitably brought about a 
problem of re-constitution of the organisation. The National 
Executive Committee, the governing body of the union with sub- 
committees under it, had been elected almost exclusively by 
Area/Regional Councils, only with some exceptions given 
temporarily to, for example, newly transferred organisations. 
The amended current constitution and rules carefully maintain 
the integration of the organisation by allowing any section to 
elect section membership of the committee if it has had no 
member elected from the areas. 55 
A more realistic problem for Bifu executives is, however, an 
alleged inferior function and the inability of the organisation 
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to absorb grass-roots demand and reflecting it. in union 
policies especially in comparison with the much smaller staff 
associations and staff . unions, most of which have a more 
straightforward structure of staff representation consisting of 
office representatives of area or sectional committee, general 
council and executive committee. With its well over 150,000 
members widely spread in the banking, insurance and finance 
sector, even its some 20 regional organisers could have been 
insufficient for effective communication. This may have been 
particularly so as many of the 30 members of the Executive 
Committee might not have been involved in particular 
institutional problems directly. The existence of seconded 
officials and office representatives, who may have paid time 
off from work to deal with grievances of the members and local 
problems, is claimed to have eased such shortcomings 
particularly in the 1970s. It is rather ironical that it was in 
this decade when N. U. B. E. suffered a severe defeat in the major 
London clearing banks. 56 
Financial independence is another important aspect of union 
organisation, as a lack of it may easily produce employers' 
interference. All the unions and associations considered here 
are 'independent' 
derives from membe 
differences in its 
that 94 per cent 
1989, followed by 
in B. G. S. U. about 
in this sense, and their income basically 
; rship subscription, although there are some 
source. Bifu's financial statements indicate 
of its income comes from subscriptions in 
rent, service charges and interest, whereas 
the same proportion derives from membership 
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subscription and the commission of its mutual trading scheme 
with external companies, particularly insurance services to its 
members, which is followed by a more modest gain from 
interest. 57 This tendency away from subscription is less 
prominent in other staff associations and staff unions, and 
their proportion in N. W. S. A. is approximately 80 to 11, with 
most of the latter deriving from its NatWest Insurance. 
Exploitation of other sources of income enabled some unions 
to reduce subscriptions, consequently reducing the cost and 
enhancing the benefits gained from membership. Empirical 
findings do suggest that such factors as political attitudes 
and ideology may affect the overall pattern of union growth. 
Nevertheless, given the widely acknowledged non-ideological, 
instrumental commitment to trade unions on the side of non- 
manual employees, this may affect both the short-run as well as 
the long-term growth patterns of organisations particularly in 
a competitive situation. Monthly subscription of major unions 
and associations in January 1990 was as follows. 
BIFU 
25 and Over 4.20 
Under 25 3.60 
Part-time 2.50 
Pensioners 0.33 
B. G. S. U. 
Appointed 2.98 
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Unappointed 1.49 
Part-time (16hrs+) 1.12 
(16hrs-) 0.75 
Pensioners 0.37 
N. W. S. A. 
Managerial 4.10 
Other Appointed 3.25 
Unappointed 2.50 
Part-time 1.25 
Pensioners 0.25 
L. B. G. S. U. 
Board Appointment Holders 5.05 
Appointed 4.25 
22 and Over 3.40 
Under 21 2.80 
Non-clerical 2.80 
Part-time 2.00 
Pensioners 0.85 
YTS Free 
Comparison of these figures with those in 1975 suggests that, 
although the difference between Bifu and SA has narrowed by, 
say, 30 per cent, a Bifu member may pay three times as much as 
a B. G. S. U. member in some cases. 
58 
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Historically, membership eligibility was restricted within 
the clerical staff. Consequently, apart from staff 
associations, small messengers' organisations were established 
in many large banks. Even in Bifu, manual staff were allowed to 
join the union only in 1941, one year after its affiliation to 
the T. U. C., although its 'Technical and Services Section' had 
around 5,600 members, or about 3 per cent of total membership. 
Transfers of technical and services associations into principal 
staff associations and staff unions are rather recent 
phenomena, and it was in 1977 when the Technical and Services 
Union of National Westminster Bank, for instance, transferred 
to National Westminster Staff Association. A notable exception 
is that of Lloyds' Technical and Services Union, which 
transferred to Bifu. 
Union Organisation: Policies and Industrial Actions 
Some distinct features of white-collar unionism may be seen in 
some of the activities of the unions in the industry. The 
policy of 'individual representation' which is actively 
promoted by B. G. S. U. in conjunction with collective 
representation, for example, may be one of such features, as 
individual bargaining vis-a-vis collective bargaining has long 
been the particular concern of the employees in the primary 
153 
sector of labour markets. This includes managements of 
grievances of individual staff in relation to, say, salary and 
promotion. 
Various types of supplementary services including insurance 
services and travel schemes, reminiscent of old craft unionism, 
may also be a rather recent development. These are usually 
provided exclusively to union members by external insurance 
companies, unions taking commission from them. This type of 
service has been most actively promoted by B. G. S. U., which now 
has extensive household, accident and motor insurance schemes. 
As mentioned earlier, the significance of such projects is 
twofold; it directly increases the benefits that members get 
from union services, possibly reducing the cost incurred at the 
same time. This also avoids the 'free-rider' problem as the 
service is strictly confined within membership. 
In fact, such schemes seem to have been fairly popular, and 
it was reported that around 40 to 50 per cent of the B. G. S. U. 
members used the scheme, although this proportion is much lower 
in N. W. S. A. and L. B. G. S. U. 59 Bifu has also had similar scheme, 
but it seems to be only towards the end of the 1980s when it 
launched a fully comparable scheme to that of B. G. S. U. 
Some white-collar unions started in the beginning of the 
century from nil, and then they had to build up their 
organisations, gradually increasing their density. It is only 
after this that they acquire the material basis to transform 
their character gradually into a more assertive form. At least, 
this is what some sociologists including Blackburn have argued, 
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and despite a lack of good theoretical grounds of. such a 
phenomenon, it roughly matches the experiences of the trade 
unions and staff associations in the industry. As is well 
known, some of these sociologists at Cambridge also elaborated 
a measure of union character, or a 'level of commitment to the 
general principle of trade unionism'. It is unfortunate that 
their formulation is basically for the purpose of cross- 
sectional sociological survey and its applicability to 
historical time-series analysis is very limited. 
Quite apart from the problem of accurate measurement of such 
a process, Bifu's history does show a long-term shift with 
increasing 'unionateness', although it may not necessarily 
follow a linear pattern. Being established as the Bank 
Officers' Guild in 1918, it immediately registered as a trade 
union. It was in 1940 when it affiliated to the T. U. C., 
although it persisted in its 'non-party political' stance. 
Throughout the 1940s and the 1950s, it was recognised by only 
two major banks, Barclays (1941) and the T. S. B. ( 1947 ), and 
it was in the latter that it underwent its first industrial 
action in 1963, after which an able general secretary, Brooks, 
declared that it had at last became a fully functional trade 
union. 
An extremely successful national strike in 1967 brought 
about full recognition in the London clearing banks and the 
establishment of national machinery, the Joint Negotiating 
Council. The 1970s saw relatively few industrial actions with a 
notable exception of the one at the Co-operative Bank in 1974 
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over the pension scheme, but this seems partly to reflect the 
function of the machinery with a compulsory arbitration 
agreement, as well as stagnation in the economy as a whole. The 
breakdown of the machinery in 1978 may have increased recourse 
to industrial action. These include, an industrial action of 
Lloyds over working hours and a strike at Midland Computer 
Centres over pay in 1979, industrial action involving a strike 
in the clearing banks over pay in 1981, a three-week strike at 
Midland Bank Heathrow office over shift patterns and a half day 
Christmas strike in the English clearing banks including the 
Co-operative Bank over holidays in 1983, a three day strike at 
Midland Computer Centre over shift allowances in the end of 
1986 and the beginning of 1987, an overtime ban in major 
English clearing banks in 1987 and a one day strike at Barclays 
D. P. and an overtime ban in Lloyds in 1989. It also experienced 
a strike within the union in 1984. 
Historically, staff associations and staff unions have been 
much more modest, retaining the sense of loyalty to the 
employers, which basically reflects the preference amongst the 
employees. Despite this, changes did occur. Strike clauses, 
once non-existent, were incorporated into their rules and 
constitutions and then, restrictions upon industrial action 
were relaxed in two staff unions. It was after these changes 
that B. G. S. U. and L. B. G. S. U. embarked upon their first 
industrial action in 1987. Explaining the cautious approach of 
the staff unions, an official mentioned a white-collar 
mentality. 
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"Bank staff are not used to industrial actions. We have just 
started mobilising them into an overtime ban. ""60 
The State and Industrial Relations 
The state and its agencies have played important roles in the 
development of the industrial relations system in banking both 
by acting as the third party and by actually shaping it, 
although such consequences may not have been intentional. 
Their are two major sources of influence which are of 
particular importance in relation to the analysis to follow 
later in this research; collective labour law and incomes 
policy. The former actually shaped the system and determined 
the sphere of state intervention, whereas the latter often 
affected the short-run growth patterns. 
Since collective bargaining came to be seen rather in a 
favourable than hostile manner by both the employers and the 
state, particularly as a practical means to regulate conditions 
of employment, the orthodoxy of 'non-interventionist' public 
policies began to emerge. 61 Two such policies can be seen in 
the final report of the Royal Commission of Labour in 1894 and 
the Reports of the Whitley Committee after the First World War. 
The government appointed the Whitley Committee on Relations 
between Employers and Employees in 1916. The background was the 
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expansion of the economy, the alteration of the production 
processes during the War, and the consequent emergence of a 
powerful Shop Stewards Movement in such industries as 
engineering and shipbuilding. The Report recommended the 
establishing of joint machinery at a firm, district and 
national levels in industries where there existed well 
developed organisations. This became the prime objective of the 
newly formed, still fragile Bank Officers' Guild and, in fact, 
remained so until the beginning of the 1930s when it was 
replaced by the demand of recognition with arbitration 
agreements. 
Historically, there were two major deviations from the non- 
interventionist orthodoxy of British Labour Law before the 
1960s; the Emergency Powers Act 1920 and the Trade Disputes and 
Trade Union Act of 1927 passed in conjunction with the revival 
of the Triple Alliance and the General Strike in 1926, and the 
war-time Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration 
Order, or the Order 1035, of 1940.62 The former, which 
restricted sympathetic strikes and picketing, did affect union 
growth, but such effects seem to have been submerged soon by 
the Depression. It was rather latter Act which played a crucial 
role in shaping the industrial relations system whose form was 
to last some 30 years. 
Orders during the War were issued under Defence regulation 
58AA to extend government control over industry. Following the 
recommendation of the National Joint Advisory Council, which 
was composed of the British Employers' Federation and T. U. C. 
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representatives under the chairmanship of the Minister of 
Labour, the Arbitration Order came into effect in 1940, 
enabling the Minister to refer disputes to compulsory 
arbitration by the National Arbitration Tribunal. This Order 
had an unintentional effect upon the banking industry, as it 
forced many staff associations to change their organisations 
from automatic to voluntary ones in order to comply with its 
requirement, thus establishing the 1940 industrial relations 
system in which two genres of staff representative bodies, 
B. O. G. and the staff associations, co-existed with recognition 
being given only to the latter. The Order was replaced in 1951 
by the Industrial Disputes Order. 
Then, in the 1960s, the non-interventionist legal system 
began giving way to a more reformist or restrictive approach. 
The background of this was the retardation of the British 
economy, a part of whose cause was often argued to be 
inefficient labour practices and wage inflation. The Donovan 
Commission, set up by the Labour government, produced one of 
the most detailed reviews of the industrial relations system in 
1968, in which voluntary reform based upon a new legal 
framework was recommended. 63 It also pointed out the existence 
of two systems of industrial relations, the formal system 
embodied in official institutions and the informal system at 
plant level, and proposed effective regulation of the informal 
system by formal plant agreements. 
The Conservative Party's Industrial Relations Act of 1971 
and the Industrial Relations Code of Practice of 1972 were an 
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attempt at reform in a rather restrictive way. Any breach of 
collective bargaining agreements was to be deterred by legal 
means in order to eliminate the alleged informality and 
disorder of the system. Trade unions became legally liable 
under the Act, reminiscent of 'Taff Vale', closed shop 
agreements were replaced by an 'agency shop' where employees 
were given the right to belong as well as not to belong to 
trade unions, and the Secretary of the State was provided with 
a power to order a 'cooling-off' period of up to 60 days in 
industrial disputes. Behind the Act was a conservative ideology 
of free market economy, where trade unions were regarded as 
interfering with the free functions of the labour market by 
restricting the originally free relationship between the 
employers and employees. 
The T. U. C. 's special congress voted to boycott the procedure 
of registration under the Act. N. U. B. E. 's registration in 
defiance of the T. U. C. resolution brought about an odd 
situation in the staff representation in the industry. The 
union was suspended from the T. U. C., consequently being 
deprived of protection against inter-union competition under 
'Bridlington' rules. This enabled A. S. T. M. S. 's entrance into 
the banking industry, and it succeeded in absorbing two staff 
associations, namely those in Midland and Clydesdale, which 
were to opt out of national negotiation. 
The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 was repealed and 
replaced by the 1974 Labour government, being revived only by 
the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 which followed the failure 
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of the Social Contract. Labour's legislation in the mid-1970s 
had three stages; the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 
1974 and its Amendment Act of 1976, which repealed the 
Industrial Relations Act and restored the principal of 
unenforceability of collective agreements in terms of legal 
means, and the Employment Protection Act of 1975, which 
introduced new legal rights for employees and unions and 
established the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
( ACAS ), and the Bullock Report on industrial democracy in 
1977.64 
As the economy deteriorated during the stagflationary 
period, and as the Social Contract between Labour and the 
T. U. C. began to be seen as a voluntary pay restriction rather 
than as a part of a comprehensive egalitarian public policy 
without much gain, general dissatisfaction increased to bring 
about the 'winter of discontent' in 1978 and 1979, and a new 
Conservative government. Employment Acts in 1980 and 1982 aimed 
to re-adjust the balance of power between employers and trade 
unions under the same spirit of the Industrial Relations Act. 
Details included reduction of immunities, particularly in 
relation to those engaged in picketing and secondary action, 
restriction of the definition of trade disputes, and re- 
introduction of the liabilities of unions. 
Incomes policies in Britain have often been launched in 
situations of crisis, particularly in relation to the balance 
of payments. 65 Major restrictions were imposed in relatively 
short-periods ( 1948-50,61-62,66-70,72-74 and 75-76 ), 
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although some efforts to directly control wage inflation had 
been almost continuously present particularly between 1965 and 
1978. Unfortunately, most of them failed to stabilise wage 
inflation as the termination of the restrictions was often 
followed by a 'rebound' effect. 
Of these, by far the most important in terms of the banking 
industry was the one between 1966 and 1970, which consequently 
provided N. U. B. E. with a chance to gain recognition and to 
establish national machinery. Following the economic problems 
in early 1966, the Labour government imposed a six-months 
freeze on prices and incomes in July, which was followed by 
'severe restraint' of same duration. 
66 A Prices and Incomes 
Act of August 1966 made it the first statutory control on 
incomes. 
Although the T. U. C. operated a voluntary early warnings 
system in the early phase, it started pressing to repeal the 
Act from September 1967. In the banking industry where the 
restraints coincided with a proposed alteration of working 
hours, it provoked the strongest dissatisfaction ever observed 
in its history, which N. U. B. E. successfully mobilised into a 
national strike action in order to obtain recognition and 
establish national machinery. This tendency of 'rebound' was 
more or less common in other sectors of the economy, and the 
termination of the freeze in 1970 induced soaring number of 
industrial actions. Thereafter, restrictions were re-introduced 
by the Conservative's Counter-Inflation Act of November 1972 
and 73 as well as Labour's Social Contract in the mid-1970s. 
162 
Nevertheless, incomes policies were generally to give way to 
monetary control. 
Patterns of Unionisation 
Graph 3.3.1 shows the historical growth of Bifu and SA in the 
four largest clearing banks, which is comparable with similar 
graphs by Robin Blackburn. The Staff Union has been most 
successful in Barclays Bank. The bank had been a N. U. B. E. 's 
stronghold until 1972, when it was surpassed by the 
association. Almost throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, the 
Barclays' association ( union ) succeeded in recruiting the 
growing number of employees in the bank, whereas Bifu 
constantly decreased its density. The situation is somewhat 
similar in the National Westminster Bank, where staff 
associations had substantial membership compared with N. U. B. E. 
before the merger in 1969. Although N. U. B. E. boosted its 
membership just before the merger and maintained it until 1972, 
it lost its membership abruptly thereafter, widening the 
difference between staff union membership. In Lloyds, there had 
not been that drastic change in the situation and both Bifu and 
the staff union seem to have got out of the stagnation at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
In the Midland Bank, a new staff association was launched in 
1953. This organisation grew rapidly, surpassing N. U. B. E. 
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membership in 1960. However, membership stagnated after the 
establishment of the machinery, and it transferred to 
A. S. T. M. S. in 1974 after which no data is available. However, 
it seems to have been the case that an outflow of membership 
from A. S. T. M. S. had taken place, and the approximate membership 
of 10,000 at the time of the merger is supposed to have 
declined to some 6,000 by the end of the decade. The union 
failed to halt this trend, and was de-recognised in May 1989 
despite a slight recovery in membership. 
The institutional differences of density of Bifu and staff 
associations generally seems to be categorised into four 
patterns, which are largely organisationally determined. One is 
the those banks where staff associations have been operating 
successfully, thus creating a system of dual representation. 
These include Barclays, National Westminster and Lloyds as we 
have just seen. In all these banks, staff associations were 
established in the early years of the 1920s, and the large 
sizes and expansion of the respective institutions enabled them 
to develop without being absorbed. Generally, the staff 
associations and unions have a higher density than Bifu, 
although their historical development may differ depending on 
the particular institutional circumstances. In a nominal 
density term, Bifu has approximately 20 to 30 per cent whereas 
the house association and unions now organise some 50 to 60 per 
cent. 
The second pattern is where staff associations were absorbed 
by other much larger associations. There are only two examples 
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that fall into this category; District's and Coutts' 
associations. The former followed a merger of the parent bank. 
The third pattern is where staff associations merged with or 
absorbed by Bifu. Generally, the establishment of these 
associations were relatively new and their size was small. 
These associations include those in the Yorkshire, Williams & 
Glyn's, Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of Scotland and Bank of 
England. The case of Midland and Clydesdale, where staff 
associations transferred to A. S. T. M. S., may also be regarded as 
falling into this category. In these banks, Bifu generally 
enjoys high density, ranging from 50 per cent in Midland Bank 
to nearly 100 per cent in Yorkshire Bank. The absence of 
competition may enable the union to grow further in the future. 
The final pattern is those banks where there have been no 
influential staff associations. These include the T. S. B. and 
Co-operative Banks where Bifu enjoys membership security 
agreements. In the T. S. B., Bifu had already achieved a nominal 
density of 75 per cent in the mid-1960s. 
Grade and area distributions may be of particular interest 
for sociologists but unfortunately, accurate, comparable 
figures of all the unions were not available for the former. It 
has been argued that historically, staff associations and 
unions have been stronger amongst the employees in the primary 
sector of the labour market, whereas the more unionate Bifu 
tends to get its support from the lower sections of the 
hierarchical structure. Probably, there is still some truth in 
such an argument. Not only the L. B. G. S. U. has maintained sole 
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Table 3.3.1 Area Density 
AREA Bifu SA 
1961* 1987 1987 
Greater London 36 16.7 (21.4)** 18.0 
South East 39 6.0 ( 9.1) 22.4 
East Anglia 65 25.0 (47.4) - 
South West 28 28.1 (47.3) 42.7 
West Midlands 58 25.3 (36.7) 29.0 
East Midlands 58 20.7 (26.3) 18.5 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 55 24.9 (33.9) 21.9 
North West 69 27.8 (41.3) 21.6 
North 49 18.4 (25.9) 26.2 
166 
Wales 73 40.0 (49.5) 33.9 
Scotland 42 34.9 (51.8) - 
SOURCE: Union data. 
NOTES: * 1961 figures are taken from Blackburn, R. op. cit. 
** Figures in parenthesis are calculated taking 'banking and 
finance' as a denominator. 
bargaining rights for appointed staff, but another house union 
organises around 70 per cent of the district membership of the 
same category, although its overall district density was well 
under 60 per cent in December 1987.67 It can also be shown 
that staff in head offices, who are proximate to the core of 
the hierarchy, and part-time staff, who have only a weak labour 
market attachment, are among the most difficult to recruit, 
comparable figures being 40 and 35 per cent, respectively. 
However, sex distribution of Bifu and SA membership does not 
follow this schematic pattern. Despite the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of female staff have been unappointed 
clerical staff, it is only in the 1970s that the proportion of 
female membership of Bifu exceeded that of all other staff 
associations. 
Blackburn depicted area distribution of N. U. B. E. membership 
in 1961 as follows. 68 Although it was strongest in South Wales 
( estimated density of 82 per cent ) and in the North-West ( 69 
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per cent it was weak in Scotland ( 42 per cent ), Greater 
London ( 36 per cent ) and the Southern England ( 28 per 
cent ). How has this changed in these three decades? 
The area distribution of nominal Bifu and total staff 
association and unions membership is shown in the approximate 
nominal density term in Table 3.3.1. All the data is for 
September or December 1987 when the last Census of Employment 
was carried out, except that of the N. W. S. A. where only 1989 
figures were available. Because of the reasons stated below, 
figures are only an approximation and are not comparable 
between the two categories of organisations. Firstly, accurate 
employment data cannot be specified. For Bifu, two sets of 
different data are taken from the Census of Employment; 
'banking, insurance and finance' and 'banking and finance' 
section. This inevitably ignores potential members who have 
already been organised into competing unions in the same 
section of the economy like M. S. F., APEX and N. U. I. W ( National 
Union- of Insurance Workers ) as well as staff associations in 
the sector. For the staff associations and unions, those 
employed in the 'banking' section was used as a denominator. 
This considerably underestimates density. Secondly, all figures 
of staff associations and unions exclude institutional members. 
Thirdly, some errors are unavoidable in the process of re- 
classification of the areas, as their boundaries are not often 
clearly indicated. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen that general patterns of area 
distribution of Bifu ( N. U. B. E. ) have been historically fairly 
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stable. It is still strongest in Wales and weak in South east 
and Greater London, indicating that area factors which 
determined the pattern some 25 years ago are still present. It 
improved performance in Scotland, but this probably indicates 
the effects of the merger of staff associations. Combined staff 
associations are strongest in the South West, Wales and the 
West Midlands, and also weak in London. 
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4. Short-run Models and Long-term Growth 
The aim of this chapter, and the subsequent two chapters, is to 
identify the factors and processes of union growth in a 
disaggregate, time-series context. This chapter explores this 
in a rather conventional fashion found in research in 
industrial relations, whereas the later chapters follow a 
historical sociological approach in which both empirical models 
and close historical examination lead to a generalised 
understanding of union growth. 
One of the contentions of this work is to treat explicitly 
the short-run and long-term growth processes. This approach of 
segregating the two processes dates back to the early study 
initiated by Dunlop and rests upon the assumption that the 
historical growth of trade unionism is subject to two broadly 
differentiable factors; those relate to continuous expansion - 
or reduction - of the scale of industries and the changing 
structure of industries which set a trend, and to the business- 
cycle which cause year-to-year fluctuation. The attempts to 
develop time-series models of union growth since Hines were, as 
some researchers, notably Booth, noted, roughly speaking to 
extract and incorporate the cyclical factors into conventional 
statistical models in order to assess the relative impacts of 
observable factors upon union growth. 
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The almost exclusive focus of many analysts upon short-run 
growth, at least partly, derives from the model specification 
itself. In order to avoid spurious correlation, autocorrelation 
and multicollinearity, and to measure the effects of 
explanatory variables explicitly, most of the dependent 
variables are specified as the rate of change of union 
membership or its equivalent; the rate of change of union 
density ( Hines ), the rate of change of union membership ( AP 
and BE ) or one year difference of union membership in 
logarithm ( CD ). This largely wipes out the trend. 
Nevertheless, few attempts have been made to isolate long-term 
determinants of union growth in an empirical context. The first 
part of this chapter exclusively deals with the short-run 
processes of union growth. Then, in the latter part, causes of 
long-term growth are considered. 
1. Short-run Models 
In this section, business-cycle models of union growth are run 
to specify short-run determinants in the banking industry. In 
the first part, basic properties of the business-cycle models 
are reviewed briefly. Following this, certain problems that 
derive from the nature of the research is discussed. The 
results of empirical assessment follows the preliminary models 
in the third section. 
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Inflation and Union Growth 
The core of the business-cycle theory of union growth is the 
economic variables, such as price inflation, wage inflation and 
unemployment rate, which directly or indirectly affect the 
individual utility of union membership. The basic assumption on 
price inflation is the threat effect. Remuneration often lags 
behind price inflation, thus enhancing the utility of union 
services. Or, in the same way, it is possible to argue that 
price inflation has certain effects upon an expected rate of 
change in remuneration and discrepancy between the expectation 
and the actual change could be a cause of unionisation. 
Some incidental effects can also be pointed out. Pay 
negotiations, for example, have often been carried out based 
upon the previous or current year's retail price index. When 
prices are rising, backed up by favourable conditions, union 
activities tend to be intensified, causing a change on the 
supply-side, as emphasised by Ashenfelter and Pencavel. Under 
these circumstances, employers might also behave in a more 
favourable manner to trade unions, as they can pass on the 
extra labour cost to prices ( prosperity effect ), which, 
together with a tight labour market, reduces the possible 
retaliation by employers. Another measure of the prosperity of 
industry sometimes adopted in this type of model is real 
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profit. The variables can be found in Hines (1964), Burkit and 
Bower (1978) and Sapsford (1986) and others. Their argument is 
similar to that on price inflation and consists of workers' 
expectation and 'prosperity effect'. ' 
Although Ashenfelter and Pencavel did not include wage 
inflation into their time-series model, many others did, and 
the theory which supports such attempts goes back to the 
institutional economists. Burkit and Bowers, quoting the 
membership function of Dunlop, argued, 
"the higher is the money wage impact of a union, the greater is 
the proportion of potential members who join it. Campaign to 
organize labour are most likely to succeed when prospective 
recruits can be convinced that they will benefit from 
affiliation: the most convincing of such benefit is usually a 
wage increase. "2 
Bain and Elsheikh called this causality a 'credit effect', as 
mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, a priori reasoning of this 
variable seems to be difficult, as decreasing wage rates may 
induce the employees to join trade unions as a defensive 
organisation. 
The same ambiguity appears in relation to the unemployment 
rate; a buyers-' labour market may further the necessity of 
protection. Furthermore, financial industries were, until 
recently, known to be immune from redundancy. Thus, if the 
variable functions in the model, it would be measuring the 
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effect upon the employees of general conditions of the economy, 
rather than an immediate threat. Thus, the demand for union 
service seems to appear as a positive function of price 
inflation, but the functional form of conditions of employment 
can be a purely empirical matter. 
Organisation and Episodic Events 
Some organisational variables do not quite come into the 
theoretical framework as they do not directly affect the choice 
behaviour of individual employees. Natural union growth that 
derives from an increase or a decrease in employment, for 
example, is mostly an unintended consequence of corporate 
management planning. Provided the propensity to unionize among 
employees at different times is equal, an increase in 
employment may cause a proportional increase in union 
membership, even if the 'union security agreement' that 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel postulated is not applicable to most 
of British banks. The variable is of some interest not only as 
time-series models have often shown some time lag between a 
change in employment and union growth but the propensity to 
unionise historically changes. 3 Certain elements of time lag 
may function in a mechanical fashion; for instance, new 
entrants to the offices in the autumn may join a union some 
time after, as, if the assumed credit effect is to function, 
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most of pay negotiations have been carried out in the new year 
or in spring. 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel also noted a supply-side factor. 
"To the extent that the primary goals of union leadership are 
the long-run growth and survival of trade unions as an 
institution, drives to organize new jurisdictions are more 
likely to take place when they have the highest probability of 
success. A period of increasing employment is favourable to 
successful organizing drives: the organizing funds of unions 
will be larger, and the potential union member is more 
receptive to organizing efforts. "4 
This does bring the argument close to the business-cycle model. 
However, if such an argument has firm ground or not is, again, 
a matter of empirical assessment. In fact, some recruitment 
campaigns have been carried out almost every year and 
successful drives often seem to depend on the existence of 
dissatisfaction or anxiety amongst the employees, which may be 
intensified and mobilised through effective campaigns. 
The negative effect of union density on union growth is 
called 'saturation' effect, which occurs as a result of the 
exhaustion of resources. This variable seems to be particularly 
adequate in the industry where trade unions and staff 
associations have organized a considerable proportion of the 
employees after the war, excluding only those who would gain 
few merits from membership or those whose preference make them 
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opt out of it.. Nevertheless, the 'social custom' effect in the 
service sector would be, with certain exceptions, unlikely 
because, as Mills wrote, many employees in service sectors 
regard unions as something to be used rather than as something 
in which to believe. 5 Structure of enterprises might have 
deprived the normative aspects from trade unionism. 
Recognition, bargaining relationships and female employment 
are often regarded to be long-term determinants of union 
growth. Nevertheless, some, including Richardson, argued that 
they can also have short-run effects. 6 Bain particularly 
insisted that recognition was a significant determinant of the 
cross-sectional pattern of white-collar unionisation. It has 
also been considered in the last chapter that such a factor as 
recognition directly conditions both the demand and supply of 
union services and, in this sense, it is somewhat akin to the 
establishing of the market relationship itself.? It has also 
been argued that recognition, in turn, does not derive from 
good will, but often as a result of industrial conflicts and 
'directly or indirectly, as a result of government policies and 
the favourable climate they created for trade unionism'. 8 This 
effect has often been captured by dummy variables. Female 
employment has been assumed to have a negative effect upon 
unionisation, although propensity to unionise amongst this 
category of employees has been subject to historical changes. 
Here the assumption is that the lower labour market attachment 
of the female labour force systematically reduces the benefit 
of union membership. 
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Modelling social phenomena at a disaggregate level often 
drops the performance of estimated equations. Much of this 
derives from the presence of episodic events, which are not 
formulated as variables whose effects are continuous. Such 
factors may incorporate the effects of successful campaigns and 
industrial actions, as the consequences of such organisational 
mobilizations often far exceed those of non-systematic reaction 
to business-cycle factors. The nature of such effects as well 
as the effects of these events upon the structural situation 
are rather an empirical problem, but it may be close to the 
'credit' effect where the strength and actual benefits of trade 
unions are particularly demonstrated in an obvious form. In 
fact, the very purpose of industrial actions can include 
membership increase, as has sometimes been speculated by union 
officials. 
Structural Stability and Simultaneity 
Equations estimated over a historically long sample period are 
often structurally unstable as the causal relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables change over time. 
Although predictive ability of the model. may not be a prime 
concern in this type of research, identification of the causal 
processes of union growth does matter, and the Chow test has 
sometimes been applied to detect a break point in the 
systematic relationship. Various events can be assumed to cause 
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a structural break. Bain and Elsheikh suggested that, owing to 
a depression and the withdrawal of Southern Ireland from the 
U. K. which affected the internal consistency of their 
statistical series, and the revival of trade unionism after the 
depression, their aggregate model may have undergone such a 
shift in 1922 or in 1933.9 Similarly, Booth found that a 
structural break occurred in the early 1920s, whereas no 
instability was found in the 1930s or 1945.10 The industrial 
relations system in the banking, too, has undergone a series of 
changes, among which two of them may be of particular 
importance; reorganisation of some staff associations as 
voluntary bodies in 1940, and recognition of the then N. U. B. E. 
and the establishment of the national negotiating machinery in 
1968. 
Simultaneous relationships between the union membership and 
business-cycle variables, which make the least squares 
estimation both biased and inconsistent, have often been 
suspected. The estimation method is rather a matter of a choice 
and, in the conventional business-cycle models, the problem is 
often left open on the assumption that the 'single equation is 
a part of a recursive system' without any feed back in the 
current period and that the 'errors are uncorrelated across 
equations'. 11 Ashenfelter and Pencavel used instrumental 
variables estimation which yields consistent parameter 
estimates in a single equation. 12 
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Data 
The data for the preliminary models are at three levels of 
disaggregation. The first, which is shown as model 1, is the 
one run depending on the data originally compiled by the 
Department of Employment that cover banking, insurance and 
finance industries. This model is in nature close to a time- 
series model of white-collar union growth, but at this sage, no 
efforts are made to expand the original research area on which 
the empirical part of this work rests. The second, model 2, 
simulates union growth in major clearing banks in England. The 
third, model 3, depends on firm-level data. Lloyds Bank was 
selected for the modelling chiefly because of the accessibility 
of its abundant statistical sources compiled by an economist of 
the bank, Winton. 
Modelling at different levels of disaggregation is partly 
due to the availability of the data. Although the construction 
of an industry-level model is the main purpose of this 
research, consistent and continuous data of all the variables 
that the theory suggests are difficult to obtain. In fact, the 
only consistent salary data available which cover the whole 
period between 1920 and 1990 are at a firm-level, either 
because official compilation of earnings surveys has been 
discontinued or because many of the clearing banks have not 
such data readily available. 
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The sources of the data are described in Appendix 3. At each 
level of disaggregation, membership, retail price index, 
employment, unemployment, density and profit series are 
generally consistent. The salary or remuneration series of 
model 1 and 2, however, suffer from discontinuity and 
inconsistency. This series is excluded from some estimation. 
Preliminary Models 
In this section, three models of union growth, namely the Bain- 
Elsheikh ( shown as BE ), the Ashenfelter-Pencavel ( AP ) and 
Carruth-Disney ( CD ) models are re-run using three sets of 
data. 
a. Model 1: Most of the data covers the post-war period from 
1948 up to 1979. Following variables are used in the model. T 
denotes the rate of change of trade union membership in 
insurance, banking and finance industries. 13 'Any organization 
of employees which try to regulate their members' relations 
with employees' are regarded as trade unions whatever names 
they adopt for their organization. Retired members have 
generally been excluded where they constitute a substantial 
part of a union's membership. 14 
P is the rate of change of retail price index. REM is the 
rate of change of average weekly earnings index in these or 
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kindred industries. Unfortunately it is difficult to construct 
a perfectly consistent salary series and special attention is 
required for the interpretation of regression coefficients. 
PMEM denotes the rate of change of potential union membership. 
This series, together with trade union membership figures, is 
compiled by Bain and his associates recently. 
15 E was 
calculated from this series by subtracting the number of 
unemployed. Rather than to make an employment series from the 
official publication, this method is preferred because, 
firstly, to avoid the inconsistency of the data which is more 
or less unavoidable, and secondly, thus compiled employment 
data are consistent with the union membership data formulated 
by the same authors. 16 Note that dEi is used for the 
Ashen felter-Pencavel specification, but this is to save the 
degree of freedom of the model which relies on a relatively 
small number of observations and to avoid multicollenearity. 
Ut is the unemployment rate in these industries. 
17 Upt 
denotes the unemployment rate in the preceding trough of the 
business cycle. Generally, unemployment in these industries is 
low and characterised by little cyclical fluctuation. Trade 
union density is calculated using PMEM as a denominator for the 
Bain-Elsheikh specification, and E for the Ashenfelter-Pencavel 
and Carruth-Disney specifications. Following Ashenfelter- 
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Table 4.1.1. /Model 1 
Equation 1234 
Specification BE BE AP CD 
Method OLS 
Period 1949-79 1952-79 1949-79 
Constant 
. 206 -. 301 . 204 -. 227 
(3.198) (2.872) (1.644) (-2.735) 
Pt, pt . 130 . 149 
(. 947) (1.086) 
Rt, remt . 945 . 980 
(1.273) (1.337) 
Et, et 
Dt-1, (t-e)t-1 -. 006 
(-2.919) 
(Dt-1)-1 11.824 
(3.086) 
. 152 
(1.038) 
. 098 
(1.260) 
. 052 
(. 366) 
-. 064 -. 243 
(-2.327) (-2.997) 
Ut, ut . 044 . 045 . 054 . 045 
(2.992) (3.118) (2.645) (3.102) 
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Po1D -. 189 
(-1.749) 
-. 209 
(-1.927) 
. 001 
(1.046) 
-. 190 
(-1.848) 
R2 . 344 . 363 . 258 . 359 
R2 . 213 . 236 . 129 . 230 
SER 
. 026 . 025 . 027 . 024 
RSS . 016 . 016 . 016 . 015 
F 2.625 2.854 2.000 2.794 
DW 2.292 2.241 2.372 2.264 
H. F 1.218 1.345 1.409 1.190 
LM. F . 650 . 464 . 962 . 542 
t statistics in parentheses 
* P, REM, E variables in BE and AP specifications are the rate 
of change. 
* Variables in the CD specification are differences in 
logarithm. 
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Pencavel and Carruth-Disney models, two political climate and 
labour legislation variables are tested. Pol denotes the per 
cent of Labour MPs in the House of Commons, and Po1D is a dummy 
variable which takes a value 0 when the Conservatives are in 
power and 1 when the Labour is in power. 
The result is shown in Table 4.1.1. Generally, the 
explanatory power of the models is insufficient. Compared with 
previous models, price index has generally been insignificant, 
so as the rate of change of employment and potential union 
membership. In consequence, the Ashenfelter-Pencavel model, 
which heavily relies on these variables, failed to achieve a 
statistical significance, although the adaptation of the level 
of employment variable rather than its rate of change improved 
the model performance. Density and unemployment variables are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level but the 
political variables have only weak effects on the fluctuation 
of membership. This result is more or less applicable to the 
Bain-Elsheikh model, too, although unemployment without lag 
showed a little better result. The sign of political and 
political dummy variables are minus, indicating their 
insignificance. Many variables which were insignificant in the 
first modelling are excluded from the Carruth-Disney 
specification and the best lag structure was chosen. In 
consequence, models shown in the table are. almost identical 
with the Bain-Elsheikh specification, although adaptation of 
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the level of unemployment (U) rather than the rate of change 
of unemployment in logarithm improved the model slightly. 
b. Model 2: This model deals with the major clearing banks in 
England, which roughly correspond with the former London 
clearing banks. 18 The affiliation of Co-op and Trustee Savings 
Banks into the London Clearing House in 1975, and that of the 
National Girobank in 1980, expanded the category of clearing 
banks substantially. Furthermore, dissolution of the Committee 
of London Clearing Bankers to form the Committee of London and 
Scottish Bankers in October 1985, which now integrates much 
wider firms in banking, insurance and finance sectors, 
virtually put an end to the traditional category of the London 
clearing banks as an organized body. 
Exclusion of some large firms as the Royal Bank of Scotland 
and the TSB Group comes mainly for historical and technical 
reasons. Since the formation of a wider monetary sector is 
quite a recent phenomenon, the London clearing banks have been 
a dominant group in the banking industry during most of the 
period that this research covers. In consequence, most of the 
time-series data as well as other research in this field has 
been carried out following this category, and construction of 
consistent series outside this category would entail some 
difficulties, even if it was possible. Midland Bank figures are 
also excluded from some series. This is due to the historically 
distinct behaviour of its staff association. As already 
mentioned, the Midland Bank Staff Association was once 
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abandoned in 1950. The new body formed in 1953 was subsequently 
merged with ASTMS in 1974, and now constitutes a Midland Bank 
section of MSF. No data is available during the years, 1948-52 
and 1974-89. 
Following the basic specification of three existing models, 
the following variables are included in the model. Tt denotes 
trade union membership in the year t, T is its rate of change, 
tt is in logarithm and I tis defined as (t t- t t_1). 
19 The 
membership of Bifu ( N. U. B. E. ) and staff associations and 
unions in relevant banks were added up to make a consistent 
time series. The retail price index, average weekly earnings 
index and political variables are the same as those used in 
model 1. Probably the adaptation of this earnings index can be 
questioned in terms of its consistency with other data. A 
salary series of the banks dealt with are hardly obtainable 
before 1969, so this is the second best choice. This deficiency 
of the series might be supplemented by two methods adopted 
here. One is to run different models wherever the series is 
available at different levels of aggregation ( model 1 and 
model 3 ). Another is, following the Ashenfelter and Pencavel 
model, to use price index series to the approximation of 
remuneration series. 20 Nevertheless, because of this major 
inconsistency, particular attention is to be paid to the 
interpretation of regression coefficients where this variable 
is included in the model. 
Employment series ( Et ) is roughly consistent with union 
membership series, and hence density series is also fairly 
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reliable. Major sources of discrepancy are as follows. Bifu 
membership of technical and services staff are excluded from 
the series after the establishment of a separate section in the 
Union, whereas staff associations and unions' figures and 
employment series include these staff. Hence Bifu density might 
be underestimated compared with others. Staff associations and 
unions' figures also include a relatively small number of staff 
employed in other firms of the same group, consequently 
overestimating the staff associations and unions' density in 
particular and trade union density in banking in general, 
especially in the 1980s. 
Coutts and Co., a small subsidiary of the National 
Westminster Bank which employed 1,900 staff in 1988, is 
excluded from the union membership series but included in the 
employment series, consequently underestimating the union 
density. 21 Finally, there has been some dual membership, 
especially in the 1940s and 1950s, and union density might have 
been pushed up considerably during this period. Unemployment 
figures are not included in this model. This is due to the fact 
that there has not been any noticeable evidence of redundancy 
in the major clearing banks under study. 
The result is shown in Tables 4.1.2. and 4.1.3. Generally, 
only 10 to 30 per cent of the variation in union growth being 
explained, overall performance of the models are poor, although 
the Carruth and Disney model seems to have slightly better 
results. The Bain-Elsheikh specification failed to achieve a5 
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Table 4.1.2. /Model 2 
Equation 1234 
Specification BE BE AP AP 
Method OLS 
Period 1950-87 1952-87 
Constant -. 1007 -. 1223 -. 1071 -. 0939 
(-1.4953) (-1.8467) (-1.3977) (-1.4187) 
Pt-1 -. 0694 -. 0864 -. 0501 -. 0687 
(-. 7613) (-. 7508) (-. 4617) (-. 7618) 
Rt . 0238 
(. 2789) 
Et . 0325 
(. 1581) 
Et-1 
. 0941 
(. 5062) 
Et-2 -. 1617 -. 1565 
(-. 8904) (-. 8984) 
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Et-3 . 4141 . 4023 
(2.2827) (2.3170) 
Dt . 0016 . 0018 . 0015 . 0014 
(2.0346) '(2.4069) (1.8281) (1.8647) 
R2 
. 1437 . 2108 . 2877 . 2809 
R2 
. 0948 . 1318 . 1403 . 1881 
F 2.9379 2.6703 1.9519 3.0266 
SER . 0289 . 0275 . 0287 . 0279 
RSS . 0293 . 0226 . 0239 . 0241 
DW 2.3577 2.1900 2.1651 2.2039 
LM. F 1.6679 . 5332 . 7416 . 9765 
t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4.1.3. Model 2 
Equation 12 
Specification CD 
Method OLS 
Period 1952-1987 
Constant 
. 0970 . 1080 
(5.0822) (5.5034) 
ltt-1 -. 4765 -. 4645 
(-2.7980) (-2.9245) 
ltt-2 -. 3210 -. 3029 
(-1.7357) (-1.8465) 
ltt-3 -. 4059 -. 5494 
(-2.4566) (-3.1815) 
( t-e )t . 2543 . 2360 
(3.7016) (3.5804) 
let 
. 4083 . 2791 
(1.6803) (1.1003) 
llet -. 2365 -. 1859 
194 
(-1.3183) (-1.0902) 
lpt -. 1150 
(-. 8967) 
lpt-1 -. 0257 
(-. 1931) 
cremt . 0128 
(. 1277) 
lremt-1 -. 1474 
(-1.5251) 
R2 . 4248 . 4831 
R2 . 2544 . 3299 
F 2.4930 3.1538 
SER . 0258 . 0244 
Durbin-h 1.4468 1.6232 
LM. F 9.3472 2.5872 
t statistics in parentheses 
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per cent significant level of F-statistic, except Equation 2. 
The only variable which achieved a significant level in the 
model is the density term, which, despite their a priori 
reasoning, showed a weak positive effect on union growth. The 
original specification of density lagged one year showed a very 
weak negative effect, but did not achieve a significant level 
of t-test. The rate of change of the retail price index and 
employment, and political variables are all insignificant, 
although adaptation of the employment variable lagged two or 
three years improved the result, which is included in the 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel model. Because of the inconsistency of 
remuneration series, we cannot make a hasty judgement on its 
effect. However, considering the insignificance of the retail 
price index variable, it would be difficult to conclude a 
strong effect upon membership. Equation 2 of the Bain-Elsheikh 
specification includes estimated figures of the MSF Midland 
Bank Section, together with the former Midland Bank Staff 
Association and Bifu membership in the Bank. Some of the strong 
fluctuations were smoothed out as a result of the inclusion of 
these organizations, and this model performance was a little 
better than the original model. 
In this model, the Ashenfelter-Pencavel specification showed 
a slightly better performance. This is mainly due to the 
inclusion of the rate of change of employment variable lagged 
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two and three years. The performance of the Carruth-Disney 
specification was the best of all. This result also suggests 
that there is little evidence to show that decision of union 
membership have been consistently influenced by the rate of 
change of the retail price index and, probably, by 
remuneration. Membership variables lagged one and three periods 
were significant. As with other models, density variable is 
statistically significant unless it is lagged. Since the model 
includes a lagged dependent variable as explanatory variables, 
Durbin h-statistic is reported instead of Durbin-Watson 
statistic. 
c. Model 3: A separate model was run for Lloyds Bank. This is 
due to the accessibility of the abundant statistical data left 
by an economist of the Bank, Winton, which enables this model 
to supplement the weaknesses in previous models. It is only 
this firm among previous London clearing banks which had 
consistent remuneration data that cover almost 70 years and 
thus, this model was run first preliminarily in the series of 
modelling processes. 
As in the previous models, Tt denotes trade union membership 
in the Bank in year t and the specification of Tt and ltt is 
also the same. Trade union membership is the total number of 
staff in the Bank who belong to either Bifu ( former N. U. B. E. ) 
or Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union ( Staff Association ) unless 
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Table 4.1.4. Model 3 
Equation 1234 
Specification BE BE AP AP 
Method OLS 
Period 1949-1985 
Constant -. 0540 . 0093 -. 1384 
(-. 8227) (. 1688) (-2.0530) 
-. 1186 
(2.2316) 
Pt 
Rt 
RREMt 
Et 
Et-1 
. 6076 . 3150 
(3.1884) (2.5715) 
-. 3775 
(-2.3372) 
-. 3752 
(-2.1729) 
. 3341 
(2.7126) 
. 1868 . 3959 . 4121 
(. 8769) (1.9988) (2.0965) 
. 2512 . 2397 
(1.2850) (1.2427) 
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Et-2 -. 3388 -. 3384 
(-1.7018) (-1.7264) 
Et-3 . 2233 . 2092 
(1.4367) (1.3666) 
Dt . 0007 . 0001 . 0013 
(1.0899) (. 2374) (2.1031) 
(Dt-1)-1 -12.4028 
(2.2944) 
R2 . 2495 . 1892 . 3586 . 3739 
R2 . 1813 . 1155 . 2303 . 2487 
F 3.6572 2.5663 2.7957 2.9863 
SER . 0337 . 0350 . 0326 . 0323 
RSS . 0374 . 0404 . 0320 . 0321 
DW 2.3932 2.3330 1.7638 1.7506 
LM. F 1.5712 1.2573 . 2138 . 2330 
t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4.1.5. Model 3 
Equation 12 
Specification CD 
Method OLS 
Period 1952-1985 
Constant . 0084 -. 0148 
(. 5277) (-. 7804) 
ltt-1 -. 2532 -. 2855 
(-1.4634) (-1.4810) 
ltt-2 -. 0038 -. 0907 
(-. 0222) (-. 5017) 
ltt-3 -. 0810 -. 0434 
(-. 4327) (-. 2202) 
( t-e )t . 1151 . 1597 
(1.6886) (2.2960) 
let . 5894 1.0227 
(2.0449) (2.9378) 
filet -. 4152 -. 4808 
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(-1.7297) (-1.8338) 
lpt . 7379 
(3.0614) 
lpt-1 . 4826 
(1.7765) 
lremt -. 4470 
(-2.0580) 
lremt-1 -. 0418 
(-. 1852) 
R2 . 3727 . 3234 
R2 . 1720 . 1069 
F 1.8569 1.4934 
SER . 0335 . 0348 
Durbin h 2.0131 1.4745 
LM. F . 0064 9.3809 
t statistics in parentheses 
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otherwise mentioned. There is little influence of other unions, 
but there seems to be a certain number of dual membership after 
the war. This is because the Association was a compulsory, 
subscription-free organization until the beginning of the 1940s 
and nominal density in some years exceeds 100 per cent. 
The retail price index ( Pt ) series is the same as the one 
used in previous models. Average remuneration index ( REMt ) 
was calculated by dividing the total remuneration paid by the 
Bank, excluding pension contributions, by the number of staff 
employed each year. Employment data exclude messengers and 
part-timers. Hence, actual figures are, for instance, about 2 
per cent less in 1975 and 6 per cent less in 1985 than those 
published by the Committee of London and Scottish Bankers and 
density variable ( Dt ) is overestimated especially for the 
1940s, 1950s and 1980s. 
Results are summarized in Tables 4.1.4. and 4.1.5. Resting 
on the business cycle theory of union growth, the three 
specifications differ in their emphasis on certain factors and 
the results naturally vary. Although such variables as retail 
price index and density are common to all these models, the 
Ashenfelter-Pencavel model tends to show a better performance 
especially where employment variables are important 
determinants and the Carruth-Disney model does so when lagged 
union membership variables are. In model 3, it is the 
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Ashenfelter-Pencavel specification that showed the best 
results. This is mainly due to the fairly strong effects of the 
rate of change of employment variables and the price index, 
although lagged employment variables failed to achieve a5 per 
cent significance level. Further inclusion of dE caused 
collinearity, as in model 2. The density variable is also 
significant, but employment of the original lagged variable 
again made the whole equation statistically insignificant. 
Equation 1 of the Bain-Elsheikh specification are 
significant in terms of F statistic. Retail price index in all 
equations, remuneration variables in equations 1 and 3, and the 
rate of change of real remuneration in equation 2 are 
significant, showing fairly strong positive and negative 
effects respectively. It is indicated that a price inflation of 
one per cent accelerates the rate of change of union membership 
approximately 0.5 - 0.6 per cent and one per cent increase in 
average remuneration, in fact, has given a negative effect of 
0.3 - 0.4 per cent. The models adopting the Carruth-Disney 
specification failed to achieve a significant level. This is 
chiefly because of the insignificance of lagged union 
membership variables, and exclusion of these variables from 
equation 1 significantly improved the model performance. 
However, such a specification does not differ much from the 
Bain-Elsheikh model. 
Generally, model 3 showed different results from the 
previous two models. In this model, just as the other aggregate 
studies of union growth, both business cycle variables and the 
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density term are significant, although poor model performance 
still indicates the existence of other factors unspecified in 
the model. 
One general conclusion drawn from the re-estimation of existing 
models in the banking and other financial industries is that, 
regardless of the level of disaggregation, model performance is 
generally poor, only 10 to 30 per cent of the variance of union 
growth being explained. The models leave much to be desired. 
In relation to this, a few points can be mentioned. Firstly, 
the business-cycle variables have limited explanatory power. 
Much of this decrease in explanatory function probably derives 
from the disaggregation. The results do not necessarily rebuff 
the validity of the individual-based theory, but the fact that 
the price inflation and wage inflation variables, to which the 
utilitarian explanation has been attached, generally appear as 
poor predictors of union growth does suggest that the actual 
explanatory function of it might be rather limited at the 
levels of aggregation covered in the preliminary modelling. 
Thus, secondly, it may be emphasised that it is not atomic 
individuals but those in organisations that are dealt with and 
much of their observable behaviour may be attributable to 
institutional changes beyond individual decisions. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that certain organisational 
variables in the models, which do not assume utility 
maximisation as their intrinsic logic, also seem to have weak 
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causal influence; many employment variables are statistically 
insignificant. 
Furthermore, all these results do not simply derive from the 
disaggregation but from specific conditions at each level of 
aggregation. The business-cycle variables which are 
insignificant in both the sector and industry-based models 
appear as significant determinants of union growth at a firm 
level. Given the consistency of the time-series used in this 
modelling, it is hard to question the validity of the 
estimation itself and the explanation has to be found somewhere 
else. This may relate to the determinants omitted in the 
models. Thus, the theoretical problem seems to become to see if 
such determinants can be reducible to individual decisions and, 
if so, to identify the factors that regulate the decisions. The 
original field of the business-cycle theory has to be expanded, 
and empirical research as well as the construction of a robust 
foundation of sociometrics has just begun. 
Models of Union Growth 
In this section, short-run models of union growth are estimated 
using the same data as in the preliminary models. The models 
are at two levels of disaggregation; model 2 and model 3. 
Although it seems to be quite possible to develop the first 
model, it is not attempted here in order to maintain 
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consistency with the subsequent empirical analyses. Variables 
are extended. These include, 
P retail price index 
R remuneration 
E employment 
D nominal density 
NPR net profit 
STR strategy variable 
ORG organisation variable 
FEM percentage female employment 
POL percentage Labour MP 
Price index, remuneration, employment variables are specified 
as the rate of change variables. Strategy ( STR ) and 
organisation dummies ( ORG ) are included to assess the effects 
of episodic events. The first measures the effects of 
successful recruitment campaigns and all industry-wide 
industrial actions organised either by trade unions or staff 
associations and the latter measures the effect of time-lag in 
membership swing from N. U. B. E. to staff associations. 
At this level of aggregation, specifying such episodic 
events seems to be indispensable and the following procedure 
was adopted. Residuals of an ordinary business-cycle model were 
plotted and the results were compared with the historical 
experiences in the industry. At least two events appeared as 
crucial determinants of short-run growth; industrial actions 
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initiated by trade unions or staff associations and large scale 
organisational shift of membership which followed the 
establishment of the Joint Negotiating Council. As the success 
of campaigns and actions often depend upon the degree of 
support they get from the employees, the processes require 
further analysis to examine the conditions which brought about 
the effects. This is done in the following chapters. 
The results of the OLS estimation are shown in Tables 
4.1.6., 4.1.7, and Graphs 4.1.1. and 4.1.2. In order to assess 
the relative impacts of the explanatory variables, normalised 
equations, which can be obtained by subtracting means and 
dividing each variable by standard deviations, are also 
estimated. This enables direct comparison between the estimated 
parameters, or the beta coefficients, and can be interpreted as 
one standard deviation change in an independent variable would 
lead to an estimated standard deviation change in a dependent 
variable. These results are shown in Tables 4.1.8. and 4.1.9. 
It can be seen that the inclusion of the variables that 
account for episodic events has substantially improved the 
model performance particularly at the industry level, some 60 
to 65 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable being 
explained. The Durbin-Watson statistics and the Lagrange 
Multiplier test suggest that there is no significant 
autocorrelation in the equations. As for the business-cycle 
variables, the same pattern emerges as in the preliminary 
models; two economic variables of model 2 are generally 
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Table 4.1.6. Model 2 
Equation 1234 
Method OLS 
Period 1952-88 
Constant -. 1281 -. 1117 -. 1347 -. 1228 
(-2.7394) (-2.6234) (-3.0940) (-2.7865) 
Pt -. 0169 . 0769 
(-. 1943) (1.1155) 
Rt 
. 0770 . 0716 
(1.2204) (1.5377) 
Et . 2366 . 1011 . 2526 . 2506 
(1.6974) (. 8316) (1.9748) (1.8258) 
Et-1 . 1921 . 1938 . 1850 . 1839 
(1.6320) (1.5918) (1.6328) (1.5800) 
Et-2 -. 0587 
(-. 4838) 
Et-3 . 3562 . 3420 . 3454 . 3171 
(2.6699) (2.7342) (2.8130) (2.5350) 
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Dt . 0015 . 0013 . 0015 . 0017 
(2.8817) (2.7472) (3.1285) (3.0220) 
STR . 0440 . 0452 . 0450 . 0463 
(5.6382) (5.8377) (6.2226) (6.0847) 
ORG . 0388 . 0366 . 0395 . 0412 
(2.2757) (1.7427) (2.5781) (2.4947) 
POL -. 0006 
(-1.0825) 
R2 . 7158 . 6578 . 7129 . 7089 
R2 . 6210 . 5894 . 6437 . 6258 
F 7.5543 9.6127 10.2895 8.5250 
SER . 0186 . 0194 . 0181 . 0185 
D. W. 1.6977 1.6737 1.6669 1.6835 
LM. F. 
. 1000 . 1500 . 1516 . 1030 
t statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4.1.7. Model 3 
Equation 1234 
Method OLS 
Period 1949-88 1949-85 
Constant -. 0117 -. 0077 . 0259 . 0321 
(-1.0885) (-. 8039) (. 7657) (. 4730) 
Pt . 5847 . 6058 . 6312 . 6586 
(4.0134) (4.2405) (4.3592) (4.2485) 
Rt -. 3694 -. 3901 -. 3754 -. 3814 
(-3.0615) (-3.3174) (-3.1732) (-2.7393) 
Et . 2730 . 2733 . 2661 . 2152 
(1.8344) (1.8448) (1.7958) (1.1722) 
Et-1 . 3847 . 3773 . 3710 . 3353 
(2.5484) (2.5153) (2.4740) (1.8225) 
Et-3 
. 1066 
(. 8369) 
D 
-. 0013 
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(-1.0354) 
FEM -. 0008 
(-. 4822) 
STR . 0440 . 0429 . 0450 . 0424 
(4.0808) (4.0260) (4.1534) (3.5788) 
ORG 
. 0689 . 0716 . 0719 . 0645 
(2.5483) (2.6835) (2.6970) (2.2431) 
NPR -. 0108 
(-. 2422) 
R2 . 6015 . 5928 . 6060 . 5958 
R2 . 5144 . 5188 . 5198 . 4804 
F 6.9009 8.0070 7.0313 5.1599 
SER 
. 0263 . 0262 . 0261 . 0268 
D. W. 2.0432 2.1721 2.3123 2.4937 
LM. F. . 1344 . 4425 1.2356 3.3277 
t statistics in parentheses 
211 
Table 4.1.8. Model 2 
Equation 1 2 3 
Method OLS Normalised 
Period 1952-88 
Pt -. 0293 
(-. 1927) 
Rt 
. 1844 . 1720 
(1.2541) (1.5862) 
Et . 2144 . 1927 . 2285 
(1.7284) (1.6851) (2.0055) 
Et-1 
. 1762 . 1761 . 1701 
(1.6930) (1.7158) (1.6960) 
Et-2 -. 0507 
(-. 4783) 
Et-3 . 3180 . 2666 . 3088 
(2.9577) (2.5021) (2.8743) 
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Dt . 3291 . 
2893 . 3399 
(2.9577) (2.7981) (3.2091) 
STR . 5810 . 5813 . 
5947 
(5.7597) (6.0847) (6.3480) 
ORG . 2966 . 3029 . 
3013 
(2.3098) (2.5643) (2.6122) 
R2 . 7165 . 
6900 . 7139 
R2 . 6356 . 6400 . 
6567 
F 8.8474 13.8010 12.4765 
SER . 6032 . 5995 . 
5855 
A. W. 1.7005 1.7231 1.6708 
Lfl. F . 1075 . 0698 . 
1596 
t statistics in parentheses 
Parameters are beta coefficients. 
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Table 4.1.9. Model 3 
Equations 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Period 1949-88 
Pt . 8190 . 8484 . 7610 
(4.0756) (4.3043) (3.5269) 
Rt -. 6379 -. 6736 -. 5914 
(-3.1090) (-3.3673) (-2.6777) 
Et . 2165 . 2168 . 2003 
(1.8628) (1.8726) (1.5967) 
Et-1 . 2990 . 2932 . 2900 
(2.5879) (2.5532) (2.3238) 
Et-2 
Et-3 . 0973 . 1337 
(. 8499) (1.0889) 
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STR . 4722 . 
4601 
(4.1441) (4.0865) 
ORG . 2888 . 3004 
(2.5878) (2.7239) 
. 4892 
(3.9795) 
R2 . 6015 . 5928 . 
5207 
R2 . 5291 . 5329 . 
4502 
F 8.3027 9.8996 7.3862 
SER . 6862 . 6834 . 7415 
D. W. 2.0432 2.1721 2.0909 
LM. F . 1387 . 4560 . 
2823 
t statistics in parentheses 
* Parameters are beta coefficients. 
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insignificant whereas those of model 3 are relatively firmly 
determined. In fact, they are the most significant determinants 
in the latter model; 1 per cent change in price inflation 
brought about an increase of union membership by some 0.6 per 
cent, whereas 1 per cent decrease in renumeration is associated 
with union growth of some 0.4 per cent. 
In comparison with this, union growth at the industry level 
is dominated by organisational factors. Their order of 
significance in the past thirty odd years may roughly be 
considered as follows; industrial actions, density, lagged 
employment and an organisational shift. The presence of 
industrial actions in the industry has increased total union 
membership by 0.05 per cent. At the firm level, the strategy 
and lagged employment variables appear as the next significant 
determinants, but the two year lagged employment variable has a 
wrong sign and three year lagged variable is statistically 
insignificant. Density, feminisation and real net profit 
variables are also statistically insignificant. 
There are at least two problems; a) the differences in the 
function of the economic variables in the two models, and b) 
changes in the function of the economic variables. The first 
thing that should be reconsidered is the inconsistency of the 
remuneration series in the first model. However, it is rather 
unlikely that this caused the differences between the two 
models, as the variable was dropped from some of the former. To 
reaffirm this, two procedures were undertaken. One is to run 
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the first model over a shorter sample period between 1956 and 
1988, which will eliminate the least reliable part of the 
series between 1948 and 1955. Another is to replace a part of 
the series with an accurate and consistent remuneration series 
that is obtainable after 1969 from the report and accounts of 
each enterprise, and to compare the results obtained with the 
original model. This new remuneration series will also be used 
to measure the effects of structural changes in the industrial 
relations system in a subsequent chapter. 
The results of the first test suggest that no significant 
changes in the overall pattern of the estimated coefficients 
can be observed. Although the standard error of the regression 
coefficient dropped marginally ( . 0006 in a non-normalised 
equation ), there was no change in the order of the regression 
coefficients of the variables that were statistically 
significant. Both economic variables had the same signs and 
their t-ratios dropped marginally. Those of the second tests 
show that, although much shortened sample periods brought about 
some changes in the order of regression coefficients, 
differences between the equations with two sets of remuneration 
series were few. Two business-cycle variables, namely retail 
price index and remuneration, were statistically insignificant 
with the same signs, and the three year lagged employment 
variable had a strong impact upon union growth. In fact, the 
accurate remuneration series caused a slightly drop in its t- 
value. These do not prove the nonexistence of possible errors, 
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but nevertheless show that the series taken from the New 
Earnings Survey serves as a tolerable alternative. 
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From these results, and also from the fact that the price 
inflation variable that had the minus sign was statistically 
insignificant in any of the first models, it seems reasonable 
to confirm the earlier observation; although the business-cycle 
variables have significant explanatory power for the 
institutional model, union growth in the major clearing banks 
is, as a whole, governed by organisational factors. 
However, this, of course, means neither that the economic 
variables have played no role nor that the utilitarian theory 
fails. Organisation variables may be predominant whereas 
certain effects of business-cycle variables exist, because a) 
the function of them is directly disrupted by organisational or 
institutional changes and actions, or b) a structural shift is 
caused by some factors, which changed the behavioural patterns. 
Factors of the first case may include structural changes in 
employment, recruitment campaigns and industrial action by 
trade unions, and the establishment and dissolution of the 
national machinery. The model includes only the second factor 
in a rather arbitrary way. Furthermore, the banks and unions in 
the former category underwent a series of institutional or 
organisational changes, whereas the failure of the triple 
merger towards the end of the 1960s left Lloyds Bank intact as 
an historically consistent entity. 
The second case is also likely, as a positive correlation of 
. 1335 between the rate of change of membership and that of the 
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retail price index between 1949 and 1967 turns into a negative 
correlation of -. 1521 between 1968 and 1988 at the industry 
level. The same process is also observable in the institutional 
series where it changes from . 2457 to . 1775 respectively, 
although it retained the same sign. This correlation between 
the B. O. G. membership in the bank and retail price index was 
. 3489 between 1922 and 1944. Thus, overall relationships of the 
two variables can be somewhat similar between the two models 
and, even if the effects of the war are considered, the pattern 
of the change may be described as a movement away from the 
business-cycle processes. 
Two tentative explanations of this may be possible. The 
institutional development of the representative bodies and the 
industrial relations system in the industry would be one and 
certain changes in the function of economic factors the other. 
The first case will be examined in Chapter 7. As for the second 
case, the oil shock in 1973, for instance, caused a 
deterioration of the economy and it was in the beginning of the 
1980s before industrial production began to increase again. The 
presence of stagflation means that the threat effect may exist 
in this period, but the hypothesis that this increases the 
utility of union services may not hold any more, and this may 
have lead to a change in the function of the economic 
variables. 23 
A weak or reducing function of the business-cycle variables 
does not imply that the utilitarian theory fails, either. If, 
for instance, strategic actions with only a slim support of a 
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militant fringe rarely succeed, at least in terms of a 
membership effect, mass support based upon a shared experience 
has to be obtained. Thus, strategic factors can be considered, 
at least to a certain extent, to be capturing the increased 
value of union services. As will be seen in the subsequent 
chapters, union growth associated with an unstable situation in 
the conditions of employment caused by, say, -bank mergers, may 
provide an example. 
Another empirical result that emerges from the models is the 
fact that, even if the rivalry effect is controlled, the 
strategy variable remains highly significant. This means that, 
as there has been only one industrial action in 1987 which was 
organised by both Bifu and the staff unions, increases in 
membership at the times of mobilisation derives more from the 
non-organised section of the labour force than swings between 
unions. The extent of the such influx may be estimated by 
excluding the strategy variable from the equations and 
comparing the results with the original prediction. This 
suggests, for instance, union growth in such years as 1983 and 
1987 may have been around 4 per cent lower if it had not been 
for the industrial action. 
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2. Long-term Growth 
As explained before, business-cycle models exploited in the 
previous section essentially detect the annual fluctuation of 
union growth. The effects of long-term trend factors have 
naturally been present in the data that we have dealt with, but 
their effects may be far weaker than the business-cycle and 
other organisational variables in the annual data. The former 
often brought about the growth rate of well over 10 per cent in 
many years, whereas an average growth rate rests somewhere 
around 3 per cent. The effect of a single trend factor would 
fall below this. In order to understand the total phenomenon, 
structural factors of union growth have to be examined. 
Factors of Long-term Growth 
Factors which have been assigned to be determinants of long- 
term union growth are classified for the sake of presentation 
into two broad categories; labour market or industry 
characteristics, and other organisational factors. The former 
category mainly relates to the structure of the labour market 
and may include female employment or- the nature of labour 
market segments, conditions of employment, age composition, 
area composition, turn over rates, firm size and 
bureaucratisation. The latter includes those factors that 
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associate with, mostly external, organisational conditions of 
union activities, many of which are quasi-independent from the 
labour market structure, and employees' attitudes; union 
organisation, employers' attitudes, collective bargaining and 
the socio-legal framework. Expected effects of these factors 
have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and unnecessary 
repetition is avoided. 
The former factors that relate- to the labour market 
structure may function via two processes; historical changes in 
the conditions of employment and compositional effects. 
Division of employees according to market segments enables us 
to separate out the shared socio-economic situation and thus, 
enables to infer the subjective logic of action they would take 
in the context, given that such an action derives rather from 
utilitarian considerations than from specific preferences. 
Furthermore, naturally, the nature of such situation is not 
historically stable but is subject to transformation. 
Wertrational action is in any case present and can be an object 
of survey. Systematic differences in the aggregate actions of 
those in different market would also bring about changes in 
overall membership patterns as relative significance of the 
segments changes historically. 
Firm size, for example, approximates the closeness to the 
authority structure of an organisation and a necessity of 
collective bargaining as a means to regulate the conditions of 
employment, whereas bureaucratisation can both signify the same 
process and deter unionisation by creating competitive 
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aspirations for individual bargaining. Historically, female 
employment has been associated with the secondary labour market 
that is characterised by little skill requirement, repetitive 
tasks, a lack of mobility chains and high turn overrates. 
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Although recent research suggest that the prevailing custom in 
modern business organisations would generally allow such an 
identification of the personal attribute with a position in the 
market structure, a possible discrepancy might lead to another 
categorisation that depends purely upon the type of labour 
market one participates in. 
Some sociologists have argued that an increasing division of 
labour and degradation of work make the social and economic 
conditions of the employees in the secondary market similar to 
those of manual workers. This is the situation in which class 
oriented consciousness tends to emerge, which would facilitate 
the development of unionism reminiscent of the manual 
version. 25 Social mobility has also been referred to, as major 
mobility studies reveal increasing number of employees moving 
from the manual strata into the service or the clerical strata, 
26 which may accompany a transfer of the established value. 
Neo-Weberian sociologists like Lockwood, on the other hand, 
considered that the environment of an 'office factory', which 
may be characterised by low commitment to work, the lack of 
tight primary group ties and bureaucratic treatment by the 
employers, has facilitated a pattern of consciousness that are 
oriented towards salary and consumption without a strong sense 
of affiliation. 27 
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Some of the sociological approaches have failed to 
adequately provide a solid foundation of individual actions. 
The inference concerning the relative deprivation of external 
conditions, for instance, can amount to the argument that one 
takes an action regarding a historical tendency of the 
narrowing difference between him and a manual worker. 
Subjective orientation can also be questioned as intrinsic 
motivation of the social action. Although Lockwood's argument 
is more realistic, it says little about actual expected density 
amongst a certain genre of employees. In short, what it 
requires is evidence that prove the alleged causation. 
Concerning the nature of the secondary market in the 
industry, at least three features should be noted; the 
proximity effect and the existence of a 'structured' secondary 
market; the relative stability of employment; the function of 
social custom. One of the features of secondary markets in the 
service sector is that they commonly exist and function as an 
integrated part of the dominant primary market. Employees in 
the secondary sector are not physically segregated from those 
in the primary sector but often work within the same sphere, 
thus enabling them to be more aware of the immediate aims of 
their role, the result of which is an integration of these 
employees into the dominant value system. This is an adverse 
example of the original 'proximity' effect proposed to explain 
the expansion of unionism amongst those white-collar staff who 
are constantly in touch with unionised manual workers. 28 
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Such a characteristic of secondary sector employment makes a 
marked contrast with manual employment where the management and 
shop floor workers are often physically separated and connected 
only by intermediate strata like foremen. The crucial 
segregation in the function of tasks in the system of the 
division of labour found in the manual sector is somewhat 
ambiguous in the service sector. Such a situation may hamper an 
emergence of the type of a union-based 'social custom', which 
some manual unions have succeeded in establishing in work 
places. Or when it does emerge, as in banking, it may at the 
same time inherit the characteristics of the organisation where 
a normative pattern can be significantly influenced by those at 
the top of a work group. This aspect of secondary sector 
employment in the private service sector may be reinforced by 
the fact that most of such markets also have some developed 
internal structure, classified and segregated into grades. 
The second point that should be mentioned is relative 
stability of employment in thus 'structured' secondary markets. 
With some exceptions, employment in major banks has been 
historically stable and it is only recently that redundancy has 
come to be a problem. This may eliminate one crucial aspect of 
the utility of union services, security, from this specific 
sample. As will be seen in the subsequent chapters, these is 
ample historical evidence which suggests that, quite apart from 
the existence or non-existence of class oriented consciousness, 
menace to job security can be a major source of union growth. 29 
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The third point is that employment in the secondary sector 
has generally been held by women. The general propensity to 
unionise amongst female employees is substantially low in 
comparison with their male counterparts and at least a certain 
part of this derives from the expected role which the 'second 
sex' plays in the societal division of labour outside the 
labour market. This constitutes a subjective aspect of 
causality and it has been seen in Chapter 2 that the weak 
labour market attachment would systematically decrease the 
utility of union services. 
The consequent high turnover rates also represents an 
objective limit of the propensity to unionise. This factor 
seems to have functioned more in a long-term than a short-run 
context, as, although preliminary regression models did not 
detect an immediate influence of the variable upon short-run 
union growth, a historical tendency does seem to exist. All 
these may be the answers to a question; why, despite 
increasingly similar conditions of employment with manual 
workers, do the employees in the secondary sector take 
different social action from them? 
Determinants of Long-term Growth 
Much of the growth in white-collar unionism after the war 
derives from increases in employment. The banking industry is 
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somewhat atypical in that union growth generally lagged behind 
that of employment. Graphs 4.2.1. and 4.2.2. show the trend at 
two levels of aggregation. Graph 4.2.1 depicts total union 
membership including both Bifu, and staff associations and 
unions in the four major clearing banks and those merged into 
30 them. It can be seen that the proportion of union membership 
( T. M ) to employment ( E. M ) has generally been decreasing, 
despite the continuous growth of union membership. The same 
tendency can be seen in the graph at the firm level, in which 
employment (L), union membership ( TU. A ) and Bifu membership 
( BIFU. A ) between 1920 and 1989 are plotted. 
This inability of trade unions to match growth in 
Table 4.2.1 Average Growth Rates 
Employment Union Membership 
clearing banks Lloyds clearing banks Lloyds 
1922 - 44 . 0107 . 0046 
1948 - 59 . 0209* . 0184 . 0297* . 0224 
1949 - 67 . 0294 . 0239 
1960 - 89 . 0345 . 0366 . 0255 . 0253 
* Figures exclude Midland Bank. Lloyds figures in the second 
and the last rows cover 1949-59 and 1960-88. 
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employment, which has also been pointed out by Bain, derives 
from a few factors. 31 An obvious reason is the existence of 
management-backed, often compulsory staff associations in major 
banks since the 1910s, which pushed up nominal union density as 
high as 100 per cent in 1948. This process can be confirmed 
from historical changes in the average growth rates of 
employment and union membership ( Table 4.2.1. ) and nominal 
density ( Graph 4.2.3. ). Note that density figures are not 
allowed for pensioners and dual members. In 1948, for instance, 
nominal density of the Guild and the association in Lloyds bank 
was over 100 per cent for both male and female employees. 
However, if pensioners being assumed to be 15 per cent of a 
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membership and 10 per cent of the rest of them are dual 
members, the estimated total union membership in 1948 becomes 
12,827 and hence, density of the union and the association in 
the bank is approximately 78 per cent, a substantially lower 
figure but still may be reasonable to assume the function of 
the saturation effect. 
Long-term union growth in the industry and the institution 
after the war may be characterised in density by three phases. 
The first phase saw a relative increase in membership which 
continued from 1948 until the mid-1950s. This brought about a 
peak density around 1955. The second period stretches from the 
mid-1950s till the mid-1960s when union and association 
density substantially decreased. The third phase is 
characterised by equilibrium, or a gradual decline, in nominal 
density. 
The increase in the first phase mainly derives from that of 
male employees. Graph 4.2.4. depicts the historical shift in 
nominal union density in Lloyds Bank with a male and female 
breakdown between 1948 and 1968. Unfortunately the breakdown of 
the Bifu membership series is not available thereafter and 
estimated series are shown. 32 Male nominal density in Lloyds, 
which was 102 per cent in 1948, achieved a peak in 1957 of 131 
per cent. Female density during this period decreased from 103 
per cent to 87 per cent and its early decrease may reflect both 
the lingered effect of the war and the re-start of the 
expansion of the secondary market, as turnover rates of female 
staff at the end of the 1940s were still exceptionally high. 
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The growth in male nominal density seems to have been caused 
mainly by an organisational rather than a behavioural factor 
because, despite a rapid increase in female employment, the 
number of male employees was decreasing in absolute terms. 
Thus, if this period is excluded, male density might have been 
relatively stable. This may also relate to age composition in 
the enterprise, but no definite evidence is obtainable. 
If conditions of employment and hence propensity to unionise 
in each market segment held constant, the process of 
degradation in skill requirements is solely expressed as a 
transfer of certain parts of jobs in the primary sector into 
those in the secondary, which would cause a negative 
compositional effect upon union growth. Under the assumption 
that the sex distinction represents market segments, the 
nominal density figures in 1950 were, for instance, 105 per 
cent for the primary market and 93 per cent for the secondary 
market respectively. Simple calculation suggests that union 
membership in 1980 would be some 40,700, which is in nominal 
density 98.2 per cent. If it had not been for the shift in the 
labour market composition, union density in the same year would 
have been 41,600 or 100.4 per cent, whereas actual union 
membership and nominal density were 34,818, or 84.0 per cent. 
Thus, the compositional effect would have brought about a 
negative effect of a few per cent and actual density was some 
14 per cent lower than this. 33 Much of this seems to derive 
from a decrease in propensity to unionise amongst female 
employees during the second phase. 
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The decrease in female union density largely goes against 
the sociological assumptions, most of which have been developed 
to explain the increase of it. The rapid expansion of the 
secondary market throughout the 1960s and 1970s may have 
increased the 'white-collar proletariat' but did not increase 
the proportion of female employees who were in the unions. 
Heritage had already questioned the validity of the 
proletarianisation thesis when he demanded evidence in relation 
to the effects of office automation. Similarly, the average 34 
annual growth rate of employment in the bank was 2.94 per cent 
between 1948 and 1967 and 3.36 per cent between 1968 and 1988. 
Thus, firm size and the degree of bureaucratisation had been 
obviously increasing, even if there had not been that much 
change in the work unit size. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that both the decline in density and equilibrium after the mid- 
1960s are overall outcomes of often contradictory factors. 
One possible explanation to this decline in female density 
is to associate it with the breakdown of the pre-war industrial 
relations system. Many staff associations had an automatic 
membership system that continued until 1940. Lloyds' 
association was one of these, which obviously made the early 
nominal density very high. *This particularly seems to have been 
the case of female employees in the bank, 80 per cent of them 
being staff association members in 1948. In comparison with 
N. U. B. E. 's female density, which had fluctuated at around 15 
per cent between 1948 and 1967, the staff association's nominal 
female density almost continuously declined from 81.9 per cent 
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in 1948 to 29.5 per cent in 1971, after which it has stagnated, 
thus pulling down the overall union density in the bank. 
If this relative decline of female membership originates in 
the breakdown of an industrial relations system, why did the 
process take such a long time to achieve a new equilibrium 
level? And why is the decrease in the association's density 
less conspicuous amongst male clerks? Although absence of 
crucial information to build a stock-flow model does not allow 
us to consider the situation in dynamic terms, certain 
hypotheses can be made. One is to argue that this period saw a 
gradual decline in a social custom existed in branches. The 
function of such a custom has often been observed by 
researchers. Blackburn, for instance, wrote that, 
"A new sub-manager was appointed and later on a new manager, 
who had previously been manager at ( pro-staff association ) 
branch c. Here, there was a considerable growth of support for 
the staff association, the proportion of membership increasing 
from 22 to 76 per cent, with two-thirds having joined at the 
branch in the interval. The final burst of recruitment occurred 
about the time the new manager arrived from branch c, with 
several clerks joining in the space of a few days. "35 
Membership was an institutional obligation before the second 
world war and it was the Arbitration Order that downgraded this 
to a voluntary act which, in 1948, was still obeyed by most 
employees. However, a custom would be actively followed only in 
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three cases; when there is a collective means to enforce it, 
when it provides incentives to do so, either in pecuniary or in 
non-pecuniary terms, or when one's orientation values it. For a 
substantial number of female employees who had newly joined the 
labour market, this was probably not the case. 
Behind this was also a gradual increase in turnover rates 
that the expansion of the secondary market and, possibly, a 
general change in the normative system of the society at large 
brought about. The labour market was becoming increasingly 
fluid, which obviously increased the attrition rate. Data from 
the bank indicates that the turnover rate of 14.0 per cent for 
women in 1950 became 22.5 per cent in 1966, suggesting a 
weakening labour market attachment amongst female employees. 
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This decreased the utility of union services for individual 
employees and made recruitment more costly for union 
organisations. 
Thus, consideration in the two sub-periods suggests that the 
effects of at least three factors may have been important 
determinants of trend growth; a composition effect that 
followed a shift in the labour market structure, a change in 
social custom and an increase in turnover rates. Expansion of 
employment in the secondary market rather pulled down overall 
density, whose process was furthered by a gradual breakdown of 
social custom, deriving from a change in labour legislation and 
hence, the industrial relations system. Evidence which supports 
the stratification approach is not prominently observed and the 
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same can be said about the experiences of the industry in the 
third period. 
The post-war period has seen marked changes in the 
industrial relations system. Character of staff associations 
had changed from management-backed bodies for social 
interaction to trade unions. There was a series of changes in 
the institutional arrangements of the system in 1969,1978 and 
1987, the first of which also symbolised a change in the 
employers' attitude. However, there is not much evidence to 
argue that these events caused a structural change in the trend 
of union growth comparable with 1940. As will be seen in 
Chapter 6, the effect largely appeared as inter-organisational. 
Rapid growth of the B. G. S. A. between 1970 and 1973, for 
instance, caused a relative decline of N. U. B. E. and the trend 
of overall union membership was almost constant, being 
dominated by an increase in employment and expansion of the 
secondary market. 
The location of 'class consciousness', or other ideological 
reasons for an action, can be problematic, as a utilitarian- 
theory based explanation would largely ignore the role of 
Wertrational actions in the aggregate, long-term processes. The 
approach is tenable only when it approximates to the intrinsic 
logic of ordinary actions. Blackburn's attitude survey in the 
mid-1960s may illuminate the process. His results suggest that 
7 out of 79 clerks who were in a representative body gave an 
ideological reason of joining N. U. B. E. or staff associations, 3 
a practical reason and another 3a financial reason. On the 
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other hand, 17 out of 38 who had ideological reasons not to 
join replied that they did not do so because they ideologically 
disliked unions. 
37 Thus, in this case, 91 per cent of 
decisions to join were taken according to some pragmatic ground 
and some 9 per cent did so from active commitment, which is 
probably the reason why the utilitarian inference holds as a 
reasonable approximation for the social action. 
Ideological commitment is often attributed to early 
socialisation and learning. The former relates to social 
mobility and, as mentioned in Chapter 2, there is some 
correlation between social origins of employees and propensity 
to unionise. Similarly, in so far as 'classes' remain as a 
social reality, a social value which aims to transform the 
situation may be simultaneously perceived. Although, apart from 
certain exceptional periods, 'intellectual radicalism' does not 
seem to have had much influence in the academic institutions in 
England, a movement like the 'Broad Left' group in the 
financial industries may have its origin in this sphere of 
reality. Nevertheless, it seems to be worth noting that the 
logic of social action is always here. 
1. Burkit, B and D. Bowers. 1978. 'The Determination of the Rate of Change of Unionization 
in the United Kingdom: 1924-1966'. Applied Economics, 10.165. 
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Generally, the variable has been specified as the level rather than the rate of change, 
as in lines ( RPt-1/2 ) or in Sapsford ( RPt or (RP/RPI)t ). Burkit and Bowers wrote, 
'the size of current profits governs both the eagerness and the ability of workers to 
squeeze higher wages from employers ... the existence of a high profit level may 
stimulate greater union membership at a given current union wage push. ( ibid. 165. )' 
2. Ibid. 162. 
3. Ashenfelter and Pencavel, op. cit. 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel adopted lag structure on the ground that, 
'workers are reluctant to leave unions immediately when employment is declining both 
because of social and political ties and for economic reasons such as a possible assistance 
in finding re-employment that unions have sometimes provided. .. In addition, union 
membership figures sometimes include as members workers who have temporarily stopped paying 
dues because they are unemployed. ' 
Given employment stability in the industry under study, most of this reasoning may not hold 
in this research. 
4. Ashenfelter and Pencavel, op. cit., 437. 
5. Mills, C. W. op. cit. 
6. Richardson, R. 1977. op. cit. 
7. In Bain's words, 
'the less recognition employers are prepared to give a union, the more difficult it is for 
the union to participate in the process of job regulation and thereby demonstrate to 
employees that it can provide a service for them. In such circumstances not only are a 
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large number of employees not likely to join unions, but many of those who have already 
done so are likely to let their membership lapse because the return they are getting on it 
is insufficient. ( Bain, G. S. 1970. op. cit., 123. )' 
8. Ibid., 181. 
9. Bain, G. S. and F. Blsheikh. 1976. op. cit. 79. 
10. Booth, A. 1983. op. cit. 385. 
11. Ibid. 381-382. 
12. Ashenfelter, 0 and J. Pencavel. 1969. op. cit. 
Hines, A. G. 1964. op. cit. 
13. The rate of change variables are defined as 
( Zt - Zt-1 )/Z t-I 
and lower-case letters in CD specification denote logarithm. 
14. Price, R and G. S. Bain. 1983. op. cit. 
15. Data maintained at the I. R. R. U., Warwick University. 
16. It is not impossible to constract the series directly, but a number of alterations of 
SIC and data collection methods have made it a time-consuming and difficult process. For 
major changes, see Buxton, N. K. and D. I. Mackay. 1977. British Employment Statistics, _. 
Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Department of Employment. 1915. 'New Estimates of Employment on a Continuous basis, 
Employees In Employment by Industry 1959-73', Department of Employment Gazette, 193. 
17. It is defined as, unemployed/ ( employed + unemployed )* 100. The industry to which a 
wholly unemployed person is assigned is that in which he was last employed for more than 
three days. 
18. The following banks and those absorbed by these banks are included in the models unless 
otherwise mentioned. 
National Westminster Bank 
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Barclays Bank 
Lloyds Bank 
Midland Bank 
( former ) Williams and Glyns Bank 
19. Three seperate series, namely Bifa ( N. U. B. E. ) membership, staff associations' and 
unions' membership, and employment data are compiled so that they are consistant with each 
other. 
20. For instance, in the case of Lloyds Bank, estimated correlation coefficient between Pt 
and REM is . 9964, correlation of rate of change variables 
is . 6601 between 1948 and 
1985. 
21. This is due to the availability of the data. 
22. The latter result is shown here. The specification, which may not be printed out here, 
is the same as other equations. Estimation period is between 1969 and 88. 
T=-. 1233 Constant + -. 1105 Pt + . 0994 Rt + . 1911 Et + . 3385 Et-1 + . 2411 Et-2 + . 
6726 Et- 
(-1.8176) (-1.1133) (1.2731) (1.1697) (2.4555) (1.7543) (4.2816) 
3+ . 0012 Dt + . 0445 STR + . 0228 ORG 
(1.4617) (3.4297) (1.3134) 
R2 = . 8343 ( . 6851 ) 
F=5.5927 
SER -- . 0155 
D. W. = 1.7444 
23. However, this period saw increases in real remuneration in the industry, which may have 
had the effect that is envisaged in the theory. This is shown in the table. Performance of 
the banks and the function of the national machinery as a regulator of the pay standard may 
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have affected this. The rates are calculated as the rate of change in remuneration - that 
of the retail price index and include estimated figures (*). 
Table 4N. 1. Average Growth Rates of Real Remuneration 
Major Clearing Banks Lloyds 
1949-69 . 0098* . 0035 
49-73 . 0123: . 0091 
74-82 . 0290 . 0216 
74-88 . 0345 . 0255 
24. Doeringer, P. B. and M. Piore. 1911. op. cit. 
25. Crompton and Jones wrote, 
'we have argued that one important factor, among others, that has contributed to the recent 
expansion of white-collar unionism has been the objective change in the class situation, 
broadly conceived, of many white-collar workers. .. the rationalisation and 'deskilling' 
of white-collar work which has been accompanied by an increasing lack of job security, 
declining conditions of employment relative to manual workers, and so on.... despite our 
caution in predicting a direct relationship between objective class location and patterns 
of trade-union membership and behaviour at the organisational level, we would not expect 
there to be no association whatsoever. ( Crompton and Jones. op. cit. 178-179. )' 
26. Goldthorpe et al. 1987. Social Mobility and Class Structure in Modern Britain. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
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27. Lockwood, D. 1966. op. cit. 
28. Shister, J. 1953. op. cit. Lockwood, D. op. cit. 
29. Such effects of employment stability may be observable clearly in the cases of bank 
mergers; union growth prior to the formation of National Westminster Bank in 1969, that in 
Trustee Savings Banks which underwent a series of mergers particularly in the 1970s, and a 
recent example of Williams and Glyn's Bank before the merger with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland in 1985. 
30. The data are those used in the estimation of short-run growth models ( Model 2) and 
include present Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds and Midland Banks. 
31. Bain, G. S. 1970. op. cit. In the wider banking, insurance and finance industries, union 
density has been continuously increasing. 
32. The estimation was done assuming that the male/ 
female composition of Bifu membership roughly corresponds with the institutional series. 
The correlation coefficient between male members of Bifu and those in Lloyds was . 8113 
1948 - 68 ) and that of female members was . 9428. The estimated series were then combined 
with staff union series to calculate the nominal density. 
33. Four rows in the table indicate following cases. Taking 1950 as a base year, 
Case 1; male/ female proportion (. 65/. 35 and density (1.05/. 93 ) constant. 
Case 2; male/ female proportion, (. 65/. 35) constant. 
Case 3; male/ female density (1.05/. 93) constant. 
A. M.; actual membership. 
year 1950 1960 1910 1980 
Case 1 16670 21190 31850 41780 
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Case 2 16670 23080 32240 38700 
Case 3 16600 20820 31140 40690 
A. M. 16580 21470 28590 34920 
Fitting simple linear trend models, the coefficient of time trend in the union growth 
equation is 588, whereas that of case 2 is 703. 
34. Heritage, J. 1980. op. cit. 
Heritage, J. 1982. 'Feminisation and Unionisation: A Case Study from Banking'. University 
of Warwick, mimeo. 
35. Blackburn, R. 1967. op. cit. 207. 
36. Lloyds Bank. Winton file. Female turn over rates. are reproduced here. 
Table 0.2. Turn Over Rates ( Female ) 
1933 34 35 36 37 38 49.50 51 52 53 54 55 56 51 58 59 60 
6.51 7.5 7.4 9.5 11.3 8.821.414.015.310.710.912.814.916.517.216.218.421.5 
1961 62 63 64 65 66 61 68 69 
22.2 18.6 17.5 19.1 19.4 22.5 25.0 25.8 28.0 
A single regression model run between 1949 and 1969 suggests that a point increase in turn 
over rates decreases female density by -1.56 per cent. 
37. Blackburn, R. 1967. op. cit. 201-223. 
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'Ideological' is 'principled acceptance of trade unionism or internalism, particular 
aspects of an organisation's character. ( 208 )' 
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5. Origins of the Industrial Relations System 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide an analysis of the historical growth 
of staff representation and the industrial relations system in 
the banking industry. Approximately 80 years, from the 
formation of the first staff representative body in the 1910s 
up to 1990, are divided into two periods, and this chapter 
deals with the first thirty years before the second world war 
with particular emphasis upon the growth of the Bank Officers 
Guild, a forerunner of the Bifu, in a clearing bank. 
These chapters are written in much the same way. The first 
part provides a brief description of the development of the 
staff representation and industrial relations system in 
banking. The purpose of this part is twofold. Firstly, it 
provides a basic understanding of the historical development of 
the industrial relations system. Secondly, it serves as an 
operational framework in which the time-series models of union 
growth are estimated. 
The historical processes of institutional developments 
consist of numerous events, in which the intention of 
employees, union officials and managements are interwoven into 
firm, but constantly changing systems of organisation and 
external social and economic conditions. The effects of many of 
these events on short-run union growth may be indirect in 
nature and this is another reason why these empirical parts 
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constitute separate sections. It is not very plausible to argue 
that intermittently held merger talks among trade unions and 
staff associations, or attempts by union officials to gain 
recognition, for instance, can significantly affect the choice 
of union status by employees, although the results of such 
attempts might have the same impact as economic fluctuation and 
organisational changes in firms. 
The latter half of each section is devoted to extracting the 
factors that have directly affected the short-run growth of 
trade unions and staff associations in a systematic fashion. 
Theories and models of union growth revised in Chapters 1,2 
and 4 are extensively used here to assist the aim. These models 
are then followed by empirical research through which the 
results are examined and the theoretical assumptions of union 
growth are tested against actual experiences in the industry. 
This is to develop a systematic understanding of the nature of 
the processes. 
There are some differences between the conventional growth 
models and statistical analysis developed here. One is in the 
adaptation of some new variables which may be episodic ones 
specific to the banking industry. Only a feed-back from an 
empirical survey enables such factors to be included in models. 
Methodologically, we diverge from major econometric models and 
follow the method adopted by Shorter and Tilly, and Cronin, as 
a major concern of this research is not in constructing a good 
model in terms of predictive ability but in an objective 
assessment of relative effects of the various factors. All the 
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variables are standardized and a-coefficients are shown in the 
tables so that the relative effects of each variable may be 
compared directly. 
Finally, a few words on the periodization adopted here might 
be desirable. As has just been mentioned, whole period under 
study is divided into two sub-periods, within which separate 
analysis and modelling are carried out. This periodization is 
due to both the availability of continuous data and the 
possibilities of structural shift caused by major developments 
in the industrial relations system. It is difficult to obtain 
consistent series over such a long period for the wide range of 
variables used in the model. Not all clearing banks have 
compiled consistent employment and remuneration data for 80 
years and it is a firm-level model ( model 3) that is run for 
the period before the war, as the most consistent series were 
available from Lloyds bank. It is only after 1968 that banks 
started publishing such data in annual accounts. Where it is 
not possible, the 'second best' series are used, but the 
interpretation of the result requires a particular caution. 
The second world war was also a turning point in the 
industrial relations system in the industry. The war-time 
Arbitration Order in 1940 made many staff associations, which 
were at that time quasi-compulsory organisations for the 
employees with the support of management, restart as voluntary 
organisations if they were to represent the staff side. Changes 
in constitution soon followed this and the system of dual 
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representative organisations emerged, which has continued until 
today. 
1. Guild and Associations 
The first trade union in the banking industry was established 
in February, 1914 in London. Although this body, the National 
Association of Bank Clerks ( N. A. B. C. ), was formally registered 
under the Trade Union Acts, 1871 and 1876, wartime conditions 
made it difficult to maintain the inexperienced organization 
and it was finally abandoned in the turmoil of the war. 
The move to re-establish the organization was then launched 
in Sheffield. The first meetings were held in December 1917 and 
January 1918, which were developed into a committee under the 
chairmanship of King of Barclays to establish a national 
organization, the Bank Officers' Guild ( B. O. G. ). After the 
launch of the new organization, branches were soon set up in 
Manchester, Sunderland, Newcastle, Darlington and some towns in 
Wales, and the headquarter was transferred to London in October 
1918 with Hannan, ex-bank staff of the Union Bank of Scotland, 
serving as a secretary. 1 
The formation of a trade union in the industry is often 
attributed to three inter-related factors; the deterioration of 
employment conditions of employees caused by wartime inflation, 
the amalgamation movement in the industry which caused far 
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reaching employment instability and salary problems, and the 
consequent emergence of bureaucratic management. 2 Many of 
these have already been mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4. There 
also seems to be some evidence to assume that trade unionism as 
a whole, or particularly white-collar unionism, was in 
favourable social circumstances. 
"Public opinion has progressed tremendously since 1914, and any 
attempt at victimization would receive general and emphatic 
condemnation ... and no institution, either financial or 
government, can flout public opinion. "3 
The serious impact that social and economic changes brought 
about and, probably, the existence of a 'white-collar 
proletariat' can be seen from the abrupt growth of the Guild 
especially in 1919 and in 1920. During these first two years, 
the Guild succeeded in absorbing approximately 27,000 staff, 
most of whom worked in the English Joint Stock Banks, or over 
half of the estimated number of permanent staff. 4 Being 
established as a trade union under the Trade Union Act, the 
Guild maintained distinct characteristics as a white-collar 
union, reflecting the attitudes of its members. Blackburn 
summarized the feature of the Guild in this formative period as 
follows. 
"The Guild quickly established itself as a trade union, 
registered as such and with definite trade-union aims. However, 
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it sought to stand apart from the rest of the trade union 
movement and retain a distinct middle-class character. Non- 
clerical staff were not admitted to membership, the only 
affiliation were with other bank clerks, and although they 
decided to obtain political representation it was carefully non 
political. The militant methods of working-class unionism were 
rejected, and the mere fact that the Guild had a strike clause 
was the cause of much controversy. "5 
An amendment to delete the strike clause was rejected at the 
first General Meeting in October 1919. The President of the 
Guild, Clegg, 'looked upon the clause as being a defensive 
weapon and fought against it being used'. Instead, the Guild, 
"pins its faith rather to the Government scheme of meetings 
between organized employers and organized employees of the 
profession concerned, " 
and advocated the realization of a joint committee under the 
then operative Whitley Scheme as one of its prime concerns-6 
It is well documented that many staff associations were 
formed more or less under the auspices of management to curb 
the rapidly growing influence of the B. O. G. among banks. One of 
the clearest cases is that of the London City and Midland Bank 
where the chairman sent a circular to branch managers stating, 
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"We have further decided to take immediate steps to form an 
Internal Staff Association or Guild, as we do not consider it 
right that any persons other than our own officers should 
influence in the affairs of this bank. "7 
The Lloyds Bank Staff Representative Committee was established 
in November 1918, London Joint City and Midland Bank Staff 
Association in 1919, Westminster Bank Internal Guild in 1919, 
National Provincial and Union Bank of England Staff Association 
in 1919, Barclays Bank Staff Association in 1921 and District 
Bank Staff Committee in 1927. They were also established in 
some smaller banks like Martins Bank and Yorkshire Bank in 1920 
as well. In many cases women were ineligible to vote at the 
elections of officials. Major staff associations then formed 
the Central Council of Bank Staff Associations in 1923, which 
functioned as a consultative body without executive powers 'to 
afford facilities for the discussions of matters affecting Bank 
Staff as a whole'. Similar attempts were made to establish 
associations in Scottish Banks, but, without marked success 
before the second world war. 
In the background of the formation of such house or company 
unions, there was the distinct nature of the employment, 
observed as repeatedly mentioned 'loyalty' of the employees to 
the banks, which, in turn, originates in the early 
paternalistic management and very limited labour mobility 
between the firms, and was constantly recreated thereafter. 
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Being officially 'recognised' by the managements, 
associations organized special committees where elected members 
of the staff sat with representatives from the directors on the 
purpose of negotiation. Those in Lloyds, Barclays, Martins, 
District and Yorkshire Banks did not charge any subscription 
until they were reorganized into voluntary organizations to 
meet the new requirement enforced by the National Arbitration 
Order in 1940. Detailed aspects of the constitution of these 
associations show how they differed from one to another. Lloyds 
Bank Staff Representative Committee, for instance, was as much 
an integral part of the bank's organization, as all the 
expenses were met by the bank and every member of the staff was 
deemed a member without an opportunity of 'contracting in' or 
'contracting out', although staff could 'resign' from Barclays 
Bank Staff Association. Staff associations in the Westminster, 
National Provincial and London Joint City and Midland Banks 
charged a nominal subscription, and generally, they are thought 
to have achieved a high density of 50 to 70 per cent. Rapid 
growth of the Guild stopped thereafter and its membership fell 
till 1929, at least part of which seems to be attributable to 
the rivalry effect. ( Graph 5.1.1 shows the rate of change of 
the membership of the B. O. G., B. O. G. in a London Clearing bank, 
and the retail price index. ) 
This basic structure of the industrial relations system 
remained basically unchanged until 1940, although there were 
some observable changes in union policies and strategies. The 
B. O. G. 's main concern in the early years, namely to establish 
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joint machinery under the Whitley Scheme, was firmly rejected 
by management. Then, in 1933, it was replaced by advocacy of 
recognition with recourse to arbitration. 8 It was also in the 
1930s when the deliberate differentiation from manual unionism 
began to weaken. From 1936 onward, resolutions to affiliate to 
the T. U. C. were submitted continuously, and eventually accepted 
in 1940. This move was taken simultaneously with their Scottish 
counterpart, the Scottish Bankers' Association, which resulted 
in the amalgamation of both bodies in 1946 to form the National 
Union of Bank Employees ( N. U. B. E. ). In the following year, The 
N. U. B. E. opened its door to non-clerical staff for the first 
time. 
In 1940, there was a major change in the industrial 
relations system as a result of the war-time Arbitration Order. 
As the war reached a critical stage, following the 
recommendation of the Consultative Committee of the National 
Joint Advisory Council ( N. J. A. C. ), the government introduced 
the Conditions of Employment and National Arbitration Order 
C. E. N. A. Order 1305 ). The main purpose of this order was to 
prevent essential industries from being interrupted by 
industrial disputes by virtually prohibiting a lock-out by 
employers and a strike by employees unless the case had been 
reported to the Ministry of Labour and remained unsolved for 21 
days thereafter. The Minister was given power to refer disputes 
to compulsory arbitration held by a National Arbitration 
Tribunal ( N. A. T. ), which consisted of members appointed by the 
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Minister, the Employers' Confederation and the Trades Union 
Congress. 
At least four of the staff associations, those in Barclays, 
Lloyds, District and Martins Banks were not qualified to 
represent the staff side under the Order, as their membership 
was not on a subscription-paying basis, and apart from the 
Barclays' association, membership was compulsory. Constitutions 
were altered in haste and new associations were launched in 
1940 and 1941. 
Order 1305 also brought about some rather unexpected 
developments in the system. It was a direct result of the 
opposition in the bank to fee-paying associations that the 
B. O. G. was recognized by the Barclays Bank in January 1941. 
Another move was the first attempt to establish national 
machinery, a 'Joint Council for the Banking Industry', 
comprised of the representatives of management, staff 
associations and the Guild, which started in November 1940. The 
talks were deadlocked as the ad hoc Committee of the B. O. G., at 
that time being a much smaller organization than the 
associations, produced a majority recommendation against entry. 
One reason for it was the employers' demand for joint request 
of consultation on the staff side, and another was the 
proportional system of the staff side representation in the 
draft constitution, both of which might have led to a 
domination of the committee by the associations. 
Although the main concern in this chapter is the growth of 
trade unions in England, especially that of the B. O. G., it 
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seems to be necessary to refer to developments in Scotland. The 
merger between the B. O. G. and the Scottish Bankers Association 
was also significantly influenced by the Arbitration Order. The 
S. B. A., like the B. O. G., attempted to make use of the Order for 
the establishment of a machinery although the Ministry sought 
to establish a joint conciliation machinery similar to that 
then being proposed in England and Wales. The S. B. A., with a 
stronger position in the industry in Scotland, refused to take 
part in a machinery with internal associations, many of which 
were established in Scottish banks at that time and then formed 
the Central Council of Scottish Bank Associations ( C. C. S. B. A. ) 
in 1941. In consequence, the national machinery was established 
only between the employers' organization, the Committee of 
Scottish Bank general managers, and the C. C. S. B. A. This caused 
such a serious membership loss on the side of the S. B. A. that 
there was no choice but to accept a merger proposal offered by 
the B. O. G. 
2. The Business Cycle and Union Growth 
As mentioned earlier, the scope of research about the period, 
between 1920 and 1945, is fairly limited. Because of the reason 
described above, many staff associations do not come into the 
conventional analytical framework of union growth up until 1940 
or 1941. Furthermore, the data provided by the banks are also 
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insufficient to carry out a plausible modelling at an industry- 
level. Even in the major clearing banks, employment and 
remuneration data of this period often have not finished 
compilation, thus making it almost impossible to reconstruct 
these series. 
However, the most consistent and reliable data was provided 
by Lloyds Bank, and in this section, firm-level models are run 
for the analysis of union growth. Of course, as was shown in 
the preliminary models in the previous chapter, such an 
analysis cannot replace a wider study. However, there are also 
some grounds for assuming that the pattern of union growth at 
firm-level approximately simulates the one in other major 
clearing banks, at least during the period under consideration. 
As can be seen in the graph, the growth of the B. O. G. ( shown 
in dots DBIFU ) and that in this bank ( DBIFU. A ) follow 
similar paths. The correlation coefficient between two growth 
variables measured as the rate of change is . 9186 between 1922 
and 1945, indicating similarity of the patterns and, probably, 
the mechanism through which such patterns of growth are 
generated. This correlation drops to . 8551 
between 1946 and 
1985, one of the reasons for which is probably the 
diversification of the union. 
A merit of dealing exclusively with this period rests in 
organisational stability and continuity. Furthermore, unlike 
the period which stretches after the second world war, the 
conditions of the trade union and the industrial relations 
system, if such a 'system' did exist, was such that the 
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processes of union growth was likely to be governed by external 
variables, but not strategic action. This, of course, is a 
relative matter, but it is more plausible to argue that the 
processes observed here rather provide a 'prototype' example of 
short-run union growth. 
The results are shown in Tables 5.1.1. and 5.1.2. The 
variables are the same as in the last chapter and those in the 
latter table are normalised. It can be seen that growth of the 
B. O. G. was crucially regulated by organisational factors, 
especially by the fluctuation in employment. Incorporated 
variables explain around 60 per cent of short-run union growth 
during the sub-period, indicating a fairly reasonable fit in 
comparison with similar disaggregated models mentioned in 
Chapter 2, although a much shorter sample period does not allow 
a hasty judgement. All the equations are statistically 
significant in terms of F statistic and there is no evidence of 
serial correlation in terms of the Durbin-Watson statistic. The 
equations in Table 5.1.2. are normalized and thus, it is 
possible to assess the relative significance of each variable 
directly from the equation. 
Generally speaking, strong effects of the business cycle 
variables are not observed. The retail price index (Pt) is 
statistically insignificant. Although the remuneration variable 
(Rt) shows a negative sign, it is not significant either, 
except that in Equation 5.1.2.2. The rate of change of real net 
profit variable (RNPR) was significant in a few preliminary 
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models which are not shown here, but it seems difficult to give 
a plausible explanation for its negative effect. 
Employment variables with lag structure have a particularly 
strong effect on B. O. G. growth. In other words, an increase or 
a decrease in employment in current year did not affect union 
growth or decline in the same year, but it was in the next year 
or the year after when such an effect is observed. Thus, it can 
be the case that changes in employment merely provide a 
possibility of union growth, a certain part of which may or may 
not be realized through the effects of other factors. 
Feminization (FEM) measured as the percentage of female 
labour force among the total labour force is also significant. 
The sign of the coefficient is plus, indicating a positive 
effect, which contradicts the assumption. However, this result 
is rather obvious. Female employees in the bank were only 20 
per cent before 1938, when war-time labour scarcity resulted in 
a massive introduction of the female labour force. A certain 
proportion of these temporary employees joined the Guild, 
whereas male employees in the forces maintained their 
membership. When the war ended, more than half the female 
employees left the bank, which marked the end of this nominal 
union growth. Hence what the variable measures is not the 
effect of a decreasing propensity to unionize as a consequence 
of an increase in female employment, but mainly the effect of a 
nominal increase in employment caused by the war. The 
employment variable does not capture this effect as the 
original series excludes those who joined the services. 
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Table 5.1.1. Model 3 
Equation 1234 
Method OLS 
Period 1924-45 
Constant . 7104 -. 1528 
(2.6258) (-3.8519) 
Pt . 2802 
(. 7796) 
-. 0705 -. 1337 
(-. 8155) (-4.6346) 
Rt -. 3553 -. 6668 -. 7162 
(-1.0661) (-1.5485) (-1.6950) 
RREMt -. 4362 
(-1.5492) 
Et -. 1159 
(-. 7026) 
Et-1 . 4485 1.2970 1.4301 1.2070 
(2.4231) (2.7979) (2.2443) (2.7471) 
Et-2 
. 4508 1.2820 1.0969 1.1849 
(2.2231) (2.6563) (2.2443) (2.5979) 
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Et-3 . 7403 . 7455 . 
7286 
(1.6146) (1.6812) (1.6148) 
Dt-1 -. 0957 
(-. 4681) 
FEM . 7240 . 0047 . 0045 . 0039 
(2.7491) (3.0094) (3.0801) (3.8673) 
NPR -. 9077 
(-1.2119) 
R2 . 6890 . 7290 . 7432 . 7197 
R2 . 5646 . 6206 . 6404 . 6321 
F 5.5377 6.7246 7.2334 8.2169 
SER . 5763 . 0544 . 0529 . 0536 
DW 1.6015 1.4612 1.6386 1.3817 
LM. F . 6532 1.0319 . 4666 1.4611 
t statistics in parentheses 
P, R, RREM and E are the rate of change variables. 
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Table 5.1.2. Model 3 
Equation 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Period 1924-45 
Pt 
. 1682 
(1.0760) 
Rt -. 0853 -. 3356 -. 2014 
(-. 5530) (-2.0118) (-1.6849) 
Et -. 0511 
(-. 4083) 
Et-1 . 3545 . 3562 . 4132 
(2.4076) (2.8635) (3.6318) 
Et-2 . 3189 . 3257 . 2557 
(2.1137) (2.7316) (2.0450) 
Et-3 
. 2443 . 2392 
(1.6949) (1.6602) 
259 
Dt-1 -. 0796 
(-. 4696) 
FEM . 5113 . 5457 . 
5053 
(2.6065) (3.6035) (2.8973) 
NPR -. 1542 
(-1.0248) 
R2 . 6717 . 7266 . 7248 
R2 . 5691 . 6411 . 6389 
F 6.5463 8.5029 8.4296 
SER . 5463 . 4985 . 5001 
RSS 4.7747 3.9764 4.0015 
DW 1.4873 1.4262 1.6296 
LM. F 1.1370 1.2393 . 5241 
t statistics in parentheses 
P, R and E are the rate of change variables. 
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There is no evidence to argue that union density (DEN) 
either fostered or hampered union growth. Rather it seems to 
have been the case that, as managements of many banks expected, 
the establishment of staff associations had decreased the 
propensity of the staff to join the B. O. G., the consequence of 
which is that its growth was maintained by those employees who 
were pre-disposed to union activities. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to prove the negative effect of the existence of the 
institution-backed organisation statistically, as the 
association, like others, immediately followed the 
establishment of the Guild. Graph 5.1.2. shows the actual and 
predicted union growth using equation 4. The predicted line 
fits roughly, leaving some 'unexplained' growth. 
B. O. G. membership reached a peak in 1923, achieving the 
estimated nominal density of over 50 per cent in both Lloyds 
Bank and other clearing banks including Lloyds. Then came the 
decline from which the union could not recover throughout the 
1920s. The 1920s were also a decade of economic trouble and 
disillusion. The post-war boom suddenly ended in the summer of 
1920, from which the British economy did not completely recover 
until the war. Banking also suffered from this deterioration. 
Equations based upon the organisation variables predict the 
decline of union membership during this period reasonably well 
except the years between 1923 and 1928 when, the feminisation 
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variable being excluded, most of the equations slightly 
overestimate union growth. 
There are some explanations for this. First of all, it seems 
to be natural to assume the rivalry effect that successful 
function of the staff associations brought about, as the 
slowing down and later decline of the B. O. G. membership almost 
coincides with the establishment of the associations. Secondly, 
there seems to have been some internal organizational factors. 
Examining the process of union growth, it becomes clear that an 
abrupt growth in union membership is often followed by a 
decline within a few years, pulling back the membership to its 
original trend line. Much of this phenomenon seems to be due to 
a natural lapse in membership, as many employees who joined the 
union, say, being stimulated by enthusiasm the establishment of 
the Guild created or threatened by the reorganization of the 
industry, tend to fail to extend their membership in the course 
of time, losing their enthusiasm or reasons to do so. 
In July 1925, Clegg, the general secretary of the Guild, 
described the situation in an Annual General Meeting. 
"Our membership at 31st December, 1924, was 24,996, certainly 
less than a year ago, but that is the result .. of the 
deliberate policy of the Bank Officers' Guild initiated by me 
at the Annual General Meeting in 1922, when ... I made a 
strong appeal to our organization to cut off from its 
membership the class of member who is no good to any 
organization, the man who will not pay his subscription to the 
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upkeep of the Association that has done such an immense work 
for him. "9 
Then came the General Strike in 1926 which obviously had a 
negative effect on union growth. It was observed that, 
"at the opening of the year 1926 we enrolled nearly 1,700 new 
members and when the General Strike broke out, we hardly 
enrolled another member in the whole of the year, "10 
although such an episodic effect might not be strong enough to 
detect in a model that covers the whole period before the war. 
The stagnation of the organization was such that the Guild 
encountered a financial crisis by 1927, when it was forced to 
increase subscription. The new subscription from January 1928 
also served to curb Guild membership, although the total 
collapse of the organization, as some executive members feared, 
did not occur. ll 
The Depression started in 1929. However, not only there 
seems to be a time lag between the depression in industry in 
general and the crisis in banking, but its effects were less 
severe in the latter. Managements' attempts to reduce labour 
costs started at the end of 1929 and reached its peak in 1931 
and 1932 with a series of salary and bonus cuts. This was 
especially notable in Lloyds. The Guild embarked on a publicity 
campaign, which attracted particularly good support from 
employees working in local branches and suburban areas of 
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London. It was also helped by the conciliatory attitude of the 
association, and succeeded in the winter campaign and national 
recruitment week in 1929 and in 1930, considerably increasing 
its membership in the midst of the depression. 
However, there seems to be another factor behind this 
successful campaign which struck a chord among employees. As 
shown in the Graph 5.1.2., the business-cycle or organisational 
model predicts an increase in membership in these years, whose 
source possibly comes from an increase in employment just 
before the depression. Hence it seems reasonable to assume that 
this biggest upswing in B. O. G. membership before the war was a 
cumulative effect of three factors; a substantial cut in pay, 
union strategy and the existence of a good number of potential 
union members. 
The models explain neither a slight recovery of the Guild in 
1934 nor its decline between 1935 and 1939 properly. In the 
former case, the factor seems to be rather specific to this 
bank, as the bank continued stringent labour management, 
carrying out further cuts in bonus in that year while the 
general cost of living had already turned up. 
The problem over pay remained unsolved in the next year 
which developed into a 'dispute' between the B. O. G. and Lloyds 
Bank, where reductions were severer than in other banks. A 
similar dispute also occurred in the District Bank where 
substantial differences between the conditions in the County 
section and those in the District section remained after the 
amalgamation. 
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Without having a formal channel of negotiation, the Guild 
had from time to time used the annual general meetings of 
shareholders to express their opinions, and it was through this 
channel that the whole question of reductions in bonus and 
salary scale was argued. Against this move, and the subsequent- 
press publicity, two chief general managers distributed a 
circular stating, 
"We ... think it well to remind you that at the Annual 
Meetings of the Bank in February, 1932 and 1933, the Chairman 
expressly stated that the Board of the Bank could not in any 
circumstances allow the Bank Officers' Guild, a Trade Union 
Organization, to intervene between them and the Staff of the 
Bank, nor would they admit any claims whatever of the Bank 
Officers' Guild to speak on behalf of the Staff of this Bank. . 
.. We therefore strongly urge each member of the Staff to give 
most careful thought to the position, not only in the present 
but for the future, and by individual influence and active 
support of the Staff Representative Committee to help to 
maintain and strengthen the position of the Staff of this 
Bank. x'12 
The 'dispute' was not solved until 1938-9, when the bank 
improved the conditions 'following the increased earning 
capacity of the Bank'. 
Although the problem did not escalate in Lloyds Bank 
thereafter, the management of the District Bank took a stronger 
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line. A circular from the General Management, for instance, 
stated, 
"disapproval has been expressed by certain of the staff of the 
recent policy of the Bank Officers' Guild, as, for instance, 
the publication in the Press of a statement that the staff are 
under-paid compared with the other banks thus lowering their 
prestige in the eyes of their friends and neighbours. Will 
those members of the staff who have resigned or decided to 
resign from the Guild to mark their disapproval of the policy 
of the Guild be good enough to advise us of the fact. ... 
Will those members of the staff ( whether members of the Guild 
or not ) who either voted against or abstained from voting for 
the resolution submitted to the recent meetings convened by the 
Guild also kindly advise us. ""13 
It was observed that following a series of circulars of similar 
kinds, over 100 staff in the bank resigned from the Guild 
during a few months at the end of 1936, and a further 300 in 
the beginning of 1937. 
3. Summary 
Now let us summarise the findings in this chapter before we 
move on to the post war period. First of all, there is some 
266 
evidence to suggest that immediate determinants of union growth 
over the sample period was organisational factors rather than 
the business-cycle variables. The early growth of the B. O. G. 
was basically underpinned by such factors, especially by 
employment with a lag structure, as specified by Ashenfelter 
and Pencavel. 
Nevertheless, it can also be shown that the remuneration 
variable had a certain effect upon short-run union growth. The 
sign of the coefficient is minus, against Bain and Elsheikh's a 
priori assumption and the result, and confirming that of 
Carruth and Disney. The reason for this seems fairly clear-cut. 
Lengthy reductions in labour costs caused dissatisfaction 
amongst staff, which made even a general secretary of a then 
management-backed staff association speak of a 'disaffection of 
the staff'. The Guild's campaign succeeded in grasping this 
dissatisfaction and conseqently it increased its membership 
while economic conditions were deteriorating. Hence, a possible 
function of a 'credit effect' cannot be denied, but such a 
'dissatisfaction effect' exceeds it during this period. 
Two problems derive from this observation; specification of 
the condition that can generally cause the effect and the 
recursive effect of union growth upon remuneration. These 
problems are left open at this stage because of limited nature 
of the data. One thing that is certain is that without having a 
formal channel of negotiation, the influence of the Guild upon 
the labour management of the banks was inevitably indirect in 
nature, and major changes, such as the introduction of the 
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salary scale in the 1920s, were mainly due to managerial 
decisions. As Sykes wrote, although staff associations were 
'recognised' and did make recommendations on general lines, the 
actual increases or other alterations of salary were usually 
decided by a special Management Committee. Hence it seems to be 
difficult to emphasise the function of the Guilds and 
associations as regulators of pay standards during this period. 
Recruitment campaigns were organised almost every year 
throughout the period chiefly by means of a 'personal 
approach', that is, by B. O. G. members to non-members. However, 
their effect seems to depend basically on the conditions of the 
staff. This brings the argument close to that of Bain and 
Price, who wrote, 
"unions and their leaders basically act as catalysts in the 
recruitment process. Before a group of workers can be 
successfully organised there must be some irritant resulting in 
a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction. Unions and their 
leaders cannot create this antipathy, they can only discover 
where it exists, emphasise it, and try to convince the workers 
that it can be remedied by unionisation. ""14 
As has been shown, there were two cases where such a 
widespread feeling of dissatisfaction emerged among staff 
during this period. One was employment instability caused by 
bank mergers and organizational changes, and another was a 
severity and duration of the pay reductions. Apart from these 
268 
organisational and business-cycle variables, we can easily 
imagine that a rivalry effect was constantly present, although, 
as mentioned earlier, lack of data makes it impossible to 
examine the effect through adequate models. Such an attempt was 
made for the period after the war where staff associations and 
unions' membership data are available. 
The influence of the employers' attitude was also observed 
during certain periods when intimidation existed. Such an 
effect is much strengthened because of a common adaptive 
subjective tendency to the structure of the organisation. Fear 
of the jeopadizing career prospects outweigh the pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits that union membership may bring about. 
There is also some evidence to indicate that external socio- 
political factors can directly affect union growth. But the 
effect of such factors on overall union growth seems to be 
rather limited and the only exception during the period was 
government intervention through labour legislation, which 
functioned as a motor to change and create a system of 
industrial relations. 
1. National Union of Bank Employees, Draft History. 
2. The first volume of the Bank Officer, _the organ of 
the B. O. G. referred to the causes of 
establishment as follows, 
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'It would be untrue, perhaps, to say that the European War has caused the movement ; it is 
near the mark to say that the economic stress of the war has precipitated it. ... In 
addition to the economic stress referred to, there was a further factor : that of the 
amalgamation and absorption of Banking Institutions, which has gone on to such an amazing 
extent during the last twenty years, so that the banking of England can be said to be 
carried on by about ten concerns of enormous financial power. The result of this has been, 
necessarily, the elimination of that element of personal intercourse between the bank 
servant and his employer, which had such fine possibilities and which was justly esteemed 
by both. ( August 1919 )' 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., April and May 1926. 
5. Blackburn, R. M. op. cit. 138. 
6. The Bank Officer. August 1919 
The Whitley Committee on the Relations between Employees and Employers was established in 
1916 following the growing influence of the shop steward movement especially in the 
engineering and shipbuilding industries. The Committee recommended the establishment of 
joint machinery at national, district and establishment levels, which would concern itself 
not only with the pay and employment conditions but with wider problems including the 
promotion of productivity and job satisfaction in industries with substantial employers' 
and employees' organizations. Although more than 70 councils were established till 1921, 
it was only in the Civil Service and the Post Office where the Whitley Scheme in this wide 
sense came into effect. 
1. Correspondance of the Midland bank and the Midland Bank Staff Association for Cameron 
Enquiry. 
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8. N. D. B. E. leaflet, Down the Years with N. D. B. E _ Smaller Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Bank and the National Bank recognised the B. O. G. in 1923 and 1932 respectively. 
9. The Bank Officer, July 1925 
10. Ibid., September 1927 and July 1928 
11. Ibid., July 1927 
12. Ibid., March 1936 
13. Ibid., March 1937 
14. Bain, G. S. and R. Price. op. cit. 31. 
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6, A New Era of Industrial Relations 
This section deals with the period after the second world war 
from 1946 to 1990, and written in much the same way as in the 
last chapter. The first part provides a basic industrial 
relations framework in which time-series analysis is carried 
out. This is then followed by an assessment of the results of 
the analysis in the context of an empirical survey. The aim of 
this chapter is to obtain a generalised understanding of the 
processes of union growth at the level of aggregation. 
Such processes would be much more complex than before the 
war. After 1945, many factors which were non-existent or only 
potential before the war have come to function; the emergence 
of staff associations and unions as independent bodies means 
intense inter-union competition that distorts the 'prototype' 
processes based upon the business-cycle and organisational 
factors. Recognition of the trade union and establishment of 
national machinery signifies the emergence of a new regulator 
of the conditions of employment. Intermittently held industrial 
actions represent a new aspect of short-run growth. It is the 
effects of these complex variables upon individual behaviour 
that we are attempting to separate. 
There are some minor changes on the technical side, too. 
Firstly, more abundant data over this period enables us to run 
an industry-level model, which is denoted as Model 2, and it is 
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this model that is the centre of the analysis. As mentioned 
earlier, the data used for this model includes material from 
Barclays, National Westminster, Lloyds, previous Williams & 
Glyn's ( until 1984 ), Coutts & Co., and those absorbed by or 
merged with these banks including Barclays Bank International 
after 1985 ) and Lloyds Bank International ( after 1986 ). It 
has also been mentioned that the Midland Bank's figures are 
excluded from the main models because of a lack of union 
membership figures after the take-over of its staff association 
by the A. S. T. M. S.. This coverage roughly corresponds with the 
former member firms of the Committee of London Clearing 
Bankers. The reasons for the exclusion of some firms in the 
present Committee of London and Scottish Bankers such as 
T. S. B., the Royal Bank of Scotland, Bank of Scotland and 
Standard Chartered have already been mentioned in Chapter 4. 
Despite increasing competition from other clearing banks, 
building societies and the Post Office, the 'big four' still 
dominates the industry, holding about 82.7 per cent of the 
employees in the member banks of the Committee in 1988.1 Model 
1 developed in Chapter 4 is abandoned in this chapter. This is 
due to the difficulty of incorporating the empirical side of 
this research into the analysis, which does not cover insurance 
and finance industries. 
Secondly, staff associations and unions' membership figures 
are also available between 1948 and 1988, with which separate 
models for BIFU growth and SA growth can be run. These 
variables are used both as a dependent variable and an 
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explanatory variable in turn in order to assess the effect of 
inter-union competition, although such a specification may 
cause a simultaneous equations bias in the model. 
2 The models 
in which this effect is controlled have already been shown in 
Chapter 4. 
1. National Machinery and After 
The industrial relations system that the Arbitration Order 
brought about in 1940 and 1941 remained almost unchanged till 
the establishment of the Joint Negotiating Council for Banking 
(JNC) in September 1968, which gave N. U. B. E. national 
recognition, except some banks had already given N. U. B. E. 
institutional recognition prior to the establishment of the 
machinery. In the beginning of 1959, these banks were Barclays, 
Barclays D. C. O., National, the Trustee Savings Banks, C. W. S., 
S. C. W. S. and Greenock. Most of the events in industrial 
relations in the industry during these years relate to the 
efforts to establish national machinery. 
A hardening pay policy by the banks and the consequent 
dissatisfaction among staff in the early 1950s gave some impact 
on staff associations as well as N. U. B. E., and seems to have 
underlain the dissolution of the Midland Bank Staff Association 
in 1951. It started from the anterior events went back over a 
period of more than twelve months, an editor of Midland Venture 
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wrote, when the Bank's cut of overscale increases in December 
1949 was followed by the promulgation of maxima and a 
disagreement over cash payment. Staff dissatisfaction over 
these policies and the association's ineffectiveness were such 
that, in March 1950, some hundred members declined to renew 
their subscription to the association. Then came the Bank's 
announcement of a 10 per cent cash payment for the half year in 
December 1950, which made 17.5 per cent for 1950 as against 20 
per cent by other comparable banks. It 'shook confidence of the 
Grand Committee ( of the association ) severely', and shortly 
afterwards, the Committee unanimously resolved to recommend the 
dissolution of the staff association and resigned. 
3 
Although the association was formally dissolved in 1951, in 
January 1953, a circular inviting the staff to form a new staff 
association was distributed with the approval of the chairman 
of the bank. A vote to form a new association was held in June, 
and it was launched with a domestic arbitration agreement with 
the bank. Similar institutional arbitration agreements were 
soon followed by other banks, which N. U. B. E. officials 
speculated that 'they were created by the Banks to convey an 
impression to the public and to the Ministry of Labour in 
particular, to bank staffs in general, that the internal staff 
associations were, in fact, independent of the employers'. 4 
After the unsuccessful attempt of the 'Norwich Proposals' in 
1947, no startling development took place on the subject of the 
national negotiation machinery until it was raised again in 
1951. N. U. B. E. was recovering from the stagnation of just after 
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the war and also had a practical problem to negotiate over the 
petition it collected in 1950. Talks began with the assistance 
of the Ministry of Labour, and some measure of agreement 
between N. U. B. E. and the C. C. B. S. A. was reached. But in the 
next year, the A. D. M. of N. U. B. E. decided to withdraw from the 
discussion by a narrow majority and returned to the long- 
established policy of non-collaboration with staff 
associations. 5 
The attempt was renewed in 1954 when the N. U. B. E. membership 
voted to seek the establishment of the machinery by a handsome 
majority. The negotiation started under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Labour. However, the newly formed Midland Bank 
Staff Association had not joined the C. C. B. S. A., and amongst 
N. U. B. E. 's vigourous pay campaign, the National Provincial 
Staff Association had already expressed doubts about the 
desirability of the national machinery, which was soon followed 
by a similar statement from Lloyds' Association. Furthermore, 
after the breakdown of the previous talks in 1952, the clearing 
banks had signed institutional arbitration agreements, and for 
that reason, the employers were not 'convinced of any need for 
such a machinery'. 6 
Meanwhile, N. U. B. E. had been pushing the banks for full 
recognition, directly to the Committee of London Clearing 
Bankers and indirectly through the T. U. C. and Parliament. In 
1960, the union made a comprehensive approach to the T. U. C. 
under I. L. O. Convention 98, after which a series of talks took 
place between the Minister of Labour on the one hand, and the 
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union and the C. L. C. B. on the other. It was on this occasion 
that the chairman of the Committee, Sir Olivier Franks of 
Lloyds Bank, gave an assurance that the staff of the banks were 
completely free to join the union or the association. His 
statement was immediately circulated to all branches of the 
bank by the union. 
In March 1962, the T. U. C. forwarded a complaint by N. U. B. E. 
to the I. L. O., which alleged that banking employers generally, 
and employers of the District, Martins, National Provincial and 
Yorkshire Banks specifically, were preventing them from 
exercising their proper and normal function as a trade union by 
supporting and using internal staff associations. According to 
the recommendation by the Freedom of Association Committee of 
the I. L. O., Lord Cameron was appointed to hold an enquiry in 
the spring of the next year. The report was published in 
November. 
The Report concluded that despite the fact that the 
'positive assistance given to the Staff Associations by way of 
facilities for meetings and distribution of literature put the 
former in a stronger recruiting and publicity position than 
N. U. B. E., and despite the fact that the 'Staff Associations are 
in a position where domination could be exercised by the 
employers', there could be found no evidence where such 
potential domination was actually executed. 
7 On the other 
hand, it also urged the four banks to accept oral 
representations from the union, which other clearing banks did 
after the previous talk through the Ministry of Labour, and 
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recommended the setting up of joint machinery to discuss 
national issues. 
Despite the recommendation, talks over machinery did not 
develop quickly. It was November 1965 when, following 
N. U. B. E. 's proposal, a working party was set up to consider the 
possibility of national machinery by the clearing banks, 
N. U. B. E. and the C. C. B. S. A. The party completed a draft 
constitution by the beginning of 1967, but in the middle of the 
year, two staff associations defected from the arrangements and 
the talks collapsed. Consequently, N. U. B. E. took a more 
militant approach to obtain recognition by its own actions and 
embarked on a campaign which it called 'Action 67'. The 
campaign was actually helped by an unsatisfactory pay 
settlement in some banks, the announcement of the extension of 
opening hours and postponement of Saturday closing in October. 
This move by management exasperated staff dissatisfaction over 
the long pay freeze, and N. U. B. E. membership boomed; some 6,000 
employees joined the union in that month. 
Backed up by this growth, the union succeeded in mobilising 
its members into the first strike in the London clearing banks 
in North and South Wales at the end of November 1967, followed 
by the second stage action in Blackpool, Bolton, Doncaster and 
Nottingham in December. Under the threat of a further strike, 
an agreement between N. U. B. E. and 9 out of 11 clearing banks 
was reached, which gave the union national recognition. Talks 
to establish national machinery were resumed on the collapsed 
July 1967 proposals with an agenda enlarged to include hours, 
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overtime, holidays and safety. The union then directed its 
attention to the Midland Bank, which had consistently stood 
aloof from the talks. The Bank and its staff association agreed 
to join the machinery in April 1968, and the Joint 
Negotiatiating Council for Banking was formally established in 
September 1968.8 
After the creation of the machinery, N. U. B. E. then set about 
establishing domestic procedural agreements in individual 
banks. The newly formed National Westminster Bank soon 
recognized N. U. B. E. in May 1969, despite the hostility of two 
of its former constituents; the National Provincial and 
District Banks. Procedural agreements for clerical staff and 
managers were signed in the next year. Similar agreements were 
made with Barclays including non-clerical staff in 1969, with 
Lloyds for the same category in November 1970, and with the 
Midland for clerical and non-managerial appointed staff in 
December 1970. These agreements covered negotiations on all 
aspects of conditions of service which were not the subject of 
the Joint Negotiatiating Council procedure. National non- 
clerical machinery was established in June 1970, and it 
continued operation after the collapse of the joint machinery 
for managerial and clerical staff in 1978. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, large scale re-organization of 
the British banking industry was carried out, which started 
from a change in the attitude of the government towards the 
1918 Colwyn Committee's decision that ruled out further mergers 
in the clearing banks. Soon after this was expressed in the 
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Prices and Incomes Board's Report on Bank Charges, Liverpool- 
based Martins Bank announced its intention to merge with a 
larger bank, which was immediately followed by a merger 
proposal between National Provincial and Westminster Banks. The 
latter merger was carried out without any objection. In 
response to the Martin's announcement, both Barclays and Lloyds 
appeared as bidders, from which a project of a triple merger 
emerged. However, the Monopolies Commission objected in July 
1968, and the result was the absorption of the bank by 
Barclays. As we will see later in this chapter, these mergers 
caused certain institutional as well as' numerical changes 
amongst the trade unions and staff associations concerned. 
As described by Morris, there were some marked changes in 
the policies of N. U. B. E. One of them was a diversification of 
the organisation. 
9 In 1970, the union started a recruitment 
campaign in around 50 associated or subsidiary companies of 
clearing banks including Barclays Unicorn, Lloyds Bank Property 
Company, Midland Bank Finance Cooperation and Bank of Scotland 
Computer Services. Then at the Annual Conference in 1971, 
N. U. B. E. formally decided to recruit staff in other financial 
institutions in which building societies, insurance companies 
and finance houses were included. It was supposed to give the 
union a potential membership of nearly half a million, although 
such a move left the union in competition with other TUC 
members, such as the A. S. T. M. S. In 1972, N. U. B. E. had some 
success in establishing procedural agreements in some insurance 
companies and building societies including the Ecclesiastical 
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Insurance Office, but most of them were small companies with 
less than 300 employees. N. U. B. E. changed its name to the 
Banking, Insurance and Finance Union ( BIFU ) at the conference 
held in Glasgow in April 1979 to reflect its changing 
membership. 
The Conservative Party came into power in 1970 and started a 
major legal reform in relation to the industrial relations 
systems in Britain. Its Industrial Relations Act, 1971 was 
largely to expand the influence of labour legislation. In the 
background, there was an increasing influence for monetarism, 
which, in its political form, insisted on the proper 
functioning of the market economy by means of discarding the 
institutional intervention especially carried out by the 
government and trade unions. The National Industrial Relations 
Court ( N. I. R. C. ) was established which, together with existing 
bodies such as industrial tribunals and the Industrial Court, 
removed most legal proceedings arising out of industrial 
disputes from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The 
system of an 'agency shop', in which employees can choose 
either to join a union, to pay the subscription or to pay the 
same amount to charity, was established, making the previous 
'closed-shop' void or unenforceable. It also provided the 
Secretary of State with the power to order a 'cooling-off 
period' of up to 60 days. 
The T. U. C. fiercely opposed the Act and made a 
recommendation to boycott the Act at a special congress in 
March, which became an instruction. This T. U. C. instruction was 
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obeyed but about 30 unions, one of which was N. U. B. E., that was 
constantly being threatened by competition from staff 
associations. As a consequence, N. U. B. E. was expelled from the 
T. U. C. in 1973. The new Labour government repealed the Act in 
July 1974 and the union re-affiliated to the T. U. C. in November 
1975. 
N. U. B. E. 's exclusion from the T. U. C. put it under the threat 
of poaching by other T. U. C. affiliated unions, especially by 
the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
(A. S. T. M. S. ), led by Clive Jenkins, who had already said that 
his union-was prepared to take up the challenge of N. U. B. E. in 
the financial industry. On the other hand, membership of the 
Midland Bank Staff Association had stagnated after the 
establishment of the national machinery. It was surpassed by 
N. U. B. E. in 1970, and thereafter, had been almost constantly 
declining. It was in such a situation that the executives of 
the association including the general secretary, Smith, looked 
into a chance to re-establish a domestic bargaining system with 
the bank. 10 The expulsion of N. U. B. E. from the T. U. C. gave the 
association the chance, and its executive announced their 
recommendation to transfer to A. S. T. M. S. in September 1973. The 
association actually transferred in the next year, maintaining 
an independent organizational structure. 
This take-over did not alter the situation of the 
association, probably because many staff did not choose the 
more radical trade union. Membership of around 10,000 in 1974 
is supposed to have declined to around. 6,000 in about three 
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years, and reported to have further decreased to around 4,000, 
when it was de-recognized by the bank in May 1989, although a 
slight recovery was observed. The secretary of the Midland Bank 
Section of the M. S. F. finally published a recommendation to 
join Bifu in the same month. 11 
On the other hand, a series of merger talks between N. U. B. E. 
(Bifu) and the remaining staff associations were held 
intermittently between 1973 and 1976,1978 and 1980, and 1982 
and 1985, all of which failed to achieve satisfactory results. 
N. U. B. E. took the initiative on the first merger talks by 
approaching three staff associations in the London clearing 
banks with proposals for bilateral mergers. Then, from 
September 1973, efforts to form a single union in the banking 
industry started both at domestic and national levels. In the 
background was the. entrance by A. S. T. M. S. into the banking 
industry, the expulsion of N. U. B. E. from the T. U. C. over the 
Industrial Relations Act and the union's financial crisis from 
which it did not recover until the Autumn of 1974. 
It was said that especially the move of A. S. T. M. S. created a 
'united-we-stand, divided-we-fall' atmosphere amongst both 
union's and associations' executives, and they succeeded in 
proposing a structure of a new merged union, the Association of 
Banking and Finance Union within four months. Then came the 
deadlock. The biggest gap between the union and the staff 
associations was the extent of the centralization of a merged 
union. Although N. U. B. E. executives insisted on a centralized 
structure, the Confederation of Bank Staff Associations 
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persistently advocated the amalgamation on terms which would 
permit them to retain their autonomy, including their financial 
basis such as collection of subscriptions. 12 At the same time, 
the situation was changing. Despite its research resources and 
publicity, A. S. T. M. S. 's membership of its Midland Bank Section 
had been almost constantly decreasing after the take-over drama 
in 1974, and N. U. B. E. successfully re-affiliated into the 
T. U. C. in 1975, regaining a protection against inter-union 
competition. The talk finally collapsed in the beginning of 
January 1976. 
Then came the collapse of the short-lived Joint Negotiation 
Council. In November 1977, N. U. B. E. gave a notice of withdrawal 
from the joint negotiating machinery for clerical staff both at 
domestic and national levels, and demanded the employers direct 
negotiating rights. The notice came into effect in March 1978. 
The immediate reason for N. U. B. E. 's withdrawal was different 
pay proposals in 1977, in which, being backed-up by superior 
voting strength, C. B. S. A. 's 10 per cent claim was adopted 
against N. U. B. E. 's case. But dissatisfaction among the 
executive members of N. U. B. E. had been long established over 
the largely unexpected consequences of the machinery. Already 
in 1973 and 1974, N. U. B. E. abruptly dropped its membership in 
the London clearing banks, notably in National Westminster and 
Barclays Banks. In March 1976, the union executive committee 
had decided to ask the newly formed Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS, 1974-) for an enquiry into 
industrial relations in Barclays and Lloyds Banks, especially 
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on the financial assistance to the staff associations given by 
the banks. An executive member wrote in the N. U. B. E. News in 
that month, 
"N. U. B. E. does the lion's share of the work involved in such 
machineries and yet some of the staff associations reap the 
membership benefit because of lower subscriptions they 
charge. "13 
In the following two years after the collapse of the 
machinery, pay negotiations was conducted at domestic level 
although the final package agreed were common to the banks 
belonging to the Federation. Thereafter, the union, now called 
Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (Bifu), had national 
negotiations with the Federation without a formal procedural 
agreement till December 1982, when a new procedural agreement 
with five English clearing banks was signed. Domestic 
procedural agreements with some major banks preceded this and 
were signed in 1981.14 
Following the breakdown of the Joint Negotiation Council, 
the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers suggested the 
introduction of a third party to discuss industrial relations 
in the clearing banks, and Dr. Tom Johnston, former head of the 
economics department at Heriot Watt University and the Chairman 
of the Scottish Manpower Services Commission, accepted the 
chairmanship in April. He proposed the first report (Mark 1) in 
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October, in which he suggested the formation of the Clearing 
Bank Union with two-tier structure. 15 
The second Johnston report was then drawn up in October 
1979. The staff associations were prepared to accept it in 
full, but Bifu demanded to set up working parties to examine 
the conditions further. Eventually staff associations at Lloyds 
and National Westminster Banks announced that they were 
withdrawing from the talks in November. The talks took place on 
and off for another two years before they subsequently 
collapsed. It was in the next month that the executives of 
three staff associations, namely NatWest Staff Association, 
Barclays Group Staff Union and Lloyds Group Staff Union, 
announced a merger to set up a break-away union as a federation 
of three organizations. Then a vote among members were taken, 
and the Clearing Banks Union with a membership of around 90,000 
was launched in August 1980 under a general secretary, Jack 
Britz, a former national officer of the electricians' union. 
The third merger talk started informally between Bifu and 
C. B. U. following the failure of industrial action taken by Bifu 
in April and may 1981. It was once 'shelved' in the end of 1982 
when the C. B. U. executives rejected the negotiating framework 
drawn up by the leading officials of both unions, largely 
because of hostility to T. U. C. affiliation from the general 
secretaries of the staff association and unions. This break- 
down lead to the resignation of Britz, who actively promoted 
the merger talk. Then in November 1984, following Bifu's 
decision to drop most preconditions for negotiations, the 
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C. B. U. conference carried a motion to resume the merger talks, 
which started in March 1985. However, after five meetings, 
Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union's decision to give its General 
Council the power to withdraw from the C. B. U. raised the 
prospect of a split in the newly born union, and the talks were 
subsequently halted in September. There have been a few 
sporadic moves on the side of BIFU to resume the merger talks, 
one later in the year and another in 1987 following the change 
in the C. B. U. 's general secretary to Ms Margaret Platt, but 
neither of them developed to a substantial level. 
In 1985, the Midland management announced that it was 
withdrawing from national negotiations in December of that 
year, 
"to determine the major pay and conditions of its staff to take 
account of highly competitive market conditions and freeing 
itself from negotiating with the Clearing Bank Union, which has 
no membership or negotiating rights in Midland., '16 
As Williams and Glyn's bank had merged with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland earlier in the year, only three banks now remained in 
the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers; National 
Westminster, Barclays and Lloyds Banks. Then, towards the end 
of July in 1987, National Westminster Bank withdrew from the 
Federation in the midst of an industrial dispute over pay 
including London and large-town allowances, which was swiftly 
followed by Barclays and Lloyds. Consequently, all the national 
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negotiations halted and were replaced by domestic negotiations. 
Although differences amongst the federation members over 
allowances and pay provided the management of the National 
Westminster Bank, short of labour in the South-east region, 
with a chance to pull out, its move was also a reaction to a 
major change in the industrial structure. 
Relations within the C. B. U., which was originally 
established for the purpose of national negotiation with the 
Federation, were increasingly strained and at a meeting to fix 
C. B. U. 's 1988 budget, the Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union 
representatives failed to turn up. They reported that the cost 
of the C. B. U. was too high a price for a union which no longer 
negotiated nationally with the employers. The annual delegate 
conference of C. B. U. held in Birkenhead voted to abolish the 
union in November 1987, but only after five attempts to do so 
in a six-hour debate, and it ceased to exist in April 1988. 
2. Patterns of Union Growth 
The models used in this chapter are based upon the traditional 
business-cycle model, as in the previous chapters. Although an 
industry level model ( Model 2) is focused upon in this 
chapter, the results of Model 3 are also shown. The modelling 
procedure is as follows. At the first stage, models to explain 
Bifu growth and staff associations and unions ( thereafter SA ) 
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growth are run. Each of them includes the rate of change of 
other organisation's membership variable to capture the rivalry 
effect. At the second stage, each model is re-run with 
variables which measures the effects of industrial action upon 
union growth and the effects of organisational shift. Some 
technical problems, such as simultaneous equations bias, 
structural shift and serial correlation, are also considered. 
At the final stage in this chapter, the main models are split 
into two sub-periods in 1967 and 68 and separate models are run 
to examine a historical shift in the short-run growth patterns. 
Business-cycle and Organisation 
Graph 7.3.1 depicts post-war union growth in the industry, 
namely major clearing banks, level. DBIFU shows the annual rate 
of change of BIFU membership and DSA is that of staff 
associations and unions membership. These two membership series 
were added up and then changed into the rate of change series, 
which is shown as DT. This series had already been used to 
estimate the equations in Chapter 4. 
Generally speaking, membership growth of BIFU shows more 
fluctuation than that of the pre-war period. Some of the sharp 
growth as in 1955 and 1967 can be attributed to very successful 
recruitment campaigns and industrial actions, from which we can 
infer the possible significant effects of strategic factors 
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upon union growth. Another feature we can read from the graph 
is that membership growth of staff associations and unions has 
been more stable than that of Bifu, consequently making the 
combined DT figures akin to the Bifu growth path. This may be 
so even if we control the supposed effects of strategic 
factors, as Bifu growth is also characterised by sharp 
downwards swings as in 1964,1973,1974, and some more recent 
years. 
It is also clear that the establishment of the Joint 
Negotiating Council in 1968 seems to have changed the patterns 
of union growth to some extent. Severe rivalry effects 
observable in the pre-JNC period, say in 1955,61,63,64 and 
thereafter for a few years was somewhat eliminated and both 
bodies come to take similar growth paths. The break-down of the 
JNC in 1978 does not seem to have changed this pattern. 
The following variables are used to analyse the short-run 
growth of trade unions and staff associations. 
P retail price index 
R remuneration 
E employment 
D union density 
SA rivalry variable 
BIFU rivalry variable 
PM potential membership 
PRO real net profit 
STR strategy variable 
290 
ORG organisation variable 
FEM female employment 
Specification of all the variables but those measuring the 
effects of inter-union competition is the same as before. The 
remuneration series represents average weekly earnings and 
employment figures cover those employed in the major clearing 
banks. As the purpose of including a density term is to capture 
the 'saturation effect', which has long been discussed by 
labour historians, it is more desirable to define it over 
potential membership figures rather than employment as in the 
previous chapter. 
There are two ways to incorporate employment and rivalry 
variables. One is simply to add a SA or BIFU variable in the 
models. Another is to subtract the membership figures of SA and 
BIFU from the annual employment data. These latter variables 
are shown as the potential membership variables, PMU and PMSA 
respectively. Since there is no a priori 
_ reason 
on the 
preference of the specification, both of them are tested. Note 
that as SA data are available only after 1948, employment of 
lagged variables shorten the estimation period. 
P, R, E, SA, BIFU and PM are the rate of change variables 
and the strategic union variable ( STR ) is a dummy variable 
which measures the effect of industrial actions. 
STR =2: when a strike action exists amongst all or most of 
the English clearing banks. 
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STR =1: when other forms of industrial action or successful 
campaigns exist in all or most of the English clearing banks. 
STR =0: when industrial action does not exist in all or most 
of the English clearing banks. 
Note that institutional or regional industrial actions are not 
generally included in the variable because of the limited 
nature of such actions upon union growth at the industry level. 
Sources of the data and their weakness are discussed in Chapter 
4 and in the Appendix. 17 Organisation dummy variable 
represents a time lag in the landslide membership swing from 
N. U. B. E. to staff associations at the beginning of the 1970s 
that the establishment of the national machinery brought about. 
The results of the first stage modelling are shown in Tables 
6.2.1. and 6.2.2.18 As all the variables are normalised by 
subtracting the means and divided by the standard deviations, 
estimated coefficients show the relative effect of each 
variable upon union growth. The a-coefficients of the constant 
term is undefined, as it drops out as a result of 
normalization. All the equations are significant in terms of 
the F test, and calculated Durbin-Watson statistics are within 
the upper ( dU ) and the lower ( dL ) limits. The values of 
standard error of regression in some equations are high, but 
this arises from the normalization process. Generally, business 
cycle model with rivalry variables explain 40 per cent of BIFU 
growth and from 30 to 40 pr cent of SA growth at an industry 
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level, although model performance slightly deteriorates at the 
firm-level. 
Inclusion of strategy variables particularly improved the 
performance of the Bifu model, indicating the strong impact of 
them upon union growth ( Tables 6.2.3. - 6.2.4. ). In Tables 
6.2.5. and 6.2.6., variables are normalised and beta 
coefficients are shown. 19 The coefficient . 9813 of employment 
variable lagged three years in the Equation 6.2.3.1, for 
example, can be interpreted as a1 standard deviation change in 
employment has caused a . 9813 change in the Bifu membership. 
Since the units and variance of variables are standardized, a 
relative impact of each variable can be compared with each 
other directly. Actual and predicted growth are estimated and 
shown in the Graphs 6.2.2. These models explain approximately 
70 to 80 per cent of Bifu growth and 40 to 50 per cent of SA 
growth. 
Most of the equations do not include Bifu membership, SA 
membership and employment figures of Midland Bank. As has 
already been explained, this is due to the lack of a reliable 
SA series of the Bank. However, it is possible to estimate such 
figures by intertrapolation, and the results of the models 
based upon this data are also shown in Equations 6.2.3.3. and 
6.2.4.4. It can be seen from these results that model 
performance of both equations improved slightly, but it did not 
bring about much difference in the assessed causalities. 
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Table 6.2.1. Model 2 Bifu 
Equations 
Method 
Period 
Pt 
Pt-1 
Rt 
Et 
Et-1 
Et-2 
12 
OLS Normalised 
1952-88 
-. 2968 
(-1.5922) 
. 3412 
(1.7967) 
. 0628 
(. 4375) 
. 1238 
(. 8913) 
-. 1872 
(-1.3391) 
3 
-. 3061 
(-1.6698) 
-. 3451 
(-1.9484) 
. 3682 
(1.9830) 
. 3392 
(1.7972) 
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Et-3 . 4054 . 4040 . 3656 
(2.6901) (2.7009) (2.4639) 
UDt . 3276 . 3207 . 3227 
(2.2685) (2.3170) (2.2965) 
SAt -. 5955 -. 5974 -. 5543 
(-4.0590) (-4.2597) (-3.8734) 
R2 . 5185 . 4847 . 4697 
R2 . 4022 . 4203 . 4035 
F 4.4605 7.5243 7.0871 
SER . 8070 . 7947 . 8062 
DW 2.0878 2.1915 2.1498 
LM F . 1202 . 4702 . 3312 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.2. Model 2 SA 
Equations 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Period 1952-88 
Pt -. 0443 
(-. 2288) 
Pt-1 -. 2598 
(-1.4451) 
Rt . 2244 . 1746 . 3315 
(1.1574) (1.2185) (1.8826) 
Et . 1265 
(. 8751) 
Et-1 . 0737 
(. 5235) 
Et-2 -. 1919 
(-1.3763) 
Et-3 . 4577 . 4226 . 4814 
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(3.0998) (3.0093) (3.3423) 
SADt . 2338 . 2169 . 2214 
(1.5018) (1.5012) (1.5569) 
BIFUt -. 6092 -. 5676 -. 6177 
(-4.2326) (-4.2140) (-4.5092) 
R2 . 4805 . 4163 . 4521 
R2 . 3551 . 3633 . 3836 
F 3.8313 7.8460 6.6006 
SER . 8025 . 7974 . 7845 
DW 1.2617 1.2434 1.4797 
LM F 4.5251 5.5853 2.3527 
t statistics in parentheses. 
297 
The results of Bifu models are fairly similar to those of 
trade union growth in the industry in Chapter 4. Generally, 
business-cycle variables are insignificant or only marginally 
significant and organisational factors appear as crucial 
determinants. The price inflation variable shows a minus 
effect, but none of them are statistically significant at a 
conventional 5 per cent level. A certain correlation between 
remuneration and union growth seems to be observable in the 
1950s, but it is not so obvious thereafter. This is a commonly 
observed feature of the equations at the industry level, which 
makes a marked contrast with the aggregate studies. As in 
Chapter 4, at least two explanations may be given; disturbance 
of the effects by organisational factors and historical 
instability of the causal relationship. However, it may be 
because the theory, which has often been criticised as ad hoc, _ 
is inaccurately specified and the significant impact of price 
inflation may derive from different causalities. Each 
explanation seems to require further consideration - what are 
the organisational factors and, if there is an evidence of 
structural shift, how did it come about? Or isn't it natural to 
assume that the function of organisational factors reflect 
economic conditions? Why do these variables appear significant 
in the aggregate studies? 
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As for the remuneration variable, observation in the last 
chapter found that duration and severity in relative decline in 
pay often caused wide spread dissatisfaction, which provided a 
cause of short-run union growth. The term 'dissatisfaction' was 
used to denote this specific process, as the assumed causality 
is the other way round from Bain's assumption of a 'threat' 
effect. However, this was a feature of union growth in the 
formative era of the industrial relations system and it seems 
to be reasonable to assume that such a relationship changes 
over a period; a problem, for instance, may be resolved by 
effective bargaining or an arbitration by a third party or by 
industrial action. 
As for the employment variables, only the three years lagged 
variable was statistically significant throughout the period 
under consideration, indicating that an increase in employment 
in a certain year can, but not necessarily, lead to union 
growth. This pattern is common to SA growth. Union density term 
without a lag structure is statistically significant and, 
against the assumption paused by the 'saturation' effect, it 
shows a positive effect. 
The most important single determinant of Bifu growth is the 
strategic union variable. The effect of the 1967 national 
strike was overwhelming, but more recent less successful 
industrial action also seems to have had a positive short-run 
effect. It should be noticed that the variable captures the 
effect of successful recruitment campaigns and industrial 
actions, and such actions require popular support if they are 
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Table 6.2.3. Model 2 Bifu 
Equations 123 
Method OLS 
Dependent Variable BIFU BIFU. M* 
Period 1952-88 1954-88 
Constant -. 1747 -. 2045 -. 1752 
(-3.6224) (-4.1902) (-3.6292) 
Pt -. 3013 -. 1985 
(-1.5731) (-1.1367) 
Rt . 3757 . 3404 
(2.5808) (2.6694) 
Et . 0856 
(. 2845) 
Et-1 . 3912 
(1.2891) 
. 4171 
(1.4979) 
Et-2 
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Et-3 . 7213 . 9755 . 7517 
(2.2517) (4.4990) (2.8655) 
UDt . 0025 . 0027 . 0028 
(3.9949) (4.4990) (4.2730) 
SAt -. 8402 -. 8538 -. 9408 
(-3.2095) (-3.5532) (-4.2134) 
STRU . 1530 . 1507 . 1356 
(7.3521) (7.7980) (7.9979) 
R2 . 7948 . 8327 . 8488 
R2 . 7538 . 7923 . 8165 
F 19.3681 20.6241 26.2064 
SER . 0486 . 0447 . 0391 
DW 1.9700 1.9221 1.7625 
LM F . 1740 . 0743 . 1116 
* Employment, union density and rivalry variables include the 
estimated data in Midland Bank. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.4. Model 2 SA 
Equation 1234 
Method OLS 
Dependent Variable SA SA. M* 
Period 1952-88 1954-88 
Constant -. 0977 -. 0701 -. 0551 -. 0539 
(1.6989) (-1.4638) (-1.2458) (-1.7412) 
Pt . 0054 
(. 0450) 
Rt . 1005 . 0777 
(1.1146) (1.2695) 
Et . 1166 . 2198 . 1711 
(. 6586) (1.4652) (1.1560) 
Et-2 -. 2824 
(-1.6287) 
Et-3 . 6684 . 4640 . 4193 
(2.0894) (2.8276) (2.6631) 
. 2895 
(1.9442) 
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SADt . 0014 . 0010 . 0008 . 
0011 
(2.0894) (1.6900) (1.5042) (2.4926) 
BIFUt -. 2363 -. 1984 -. 1977 -. 2195 
(-4.5939) (-4.5688) (-4.5222) (-4.8233) 
STRSA . 0643 . 0506 . 0497 . 
0509 
(2.1822) (1.9922) (1.9459) (2.1351) 
ORG . 0377 . 0421 . 0301 
(3.2291) (3.6128) (2.8128) 
R2 . 5584 . 6396 . 6348 . 5958 
R2 . 4112 . 5527 . 5467 . 5261 
F 3.7939 7.3538 7.2015 8.5498 
SER . 0268 . 0234 . 0235 . 0225 
DW 1.3397 1.7155 1.5489 1.6265 
LM F 2.9247 . 2230 1.0164 . 4751 
* Employment, union density and rivalry variables include the 
estimated data in Midland Bank. 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.5. Model 2 Bifu 
Equations 1234 
Method OLS Normalised 
Dependent Variable BIFU BIFU. M 
Period 1952-88 1954-88 
P -. 1735 -. 1179 
(-1.5973) (-1.1558) 
Pt-1 
. 0468 
(. 4392) 
Rt 
. 3084 . 2881 . 2679 
(2.8026) (2.6174) (2.6966) 
Et . 0468 
(. 4637) 
Et-1 
. 1219 
(1.3527) 
. 1213 
(1.5187) 
Et-2 
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Et-3 . 2061 . 2890 . 2806 . 2259 
(2.2381) (3.2227) (3.1926) (2.9041) 
UDt 
. 3656 . 3620 . 3749 . 3534 
(3.8835) (4.4150) (4.5613) (4.3258) 
SAt -. 3143 -. 3490 -. 3186 -. 3371 
(-3.2231) (-3.9283) (-3.6072) (-4.2801) 
STRU . 6561 . 6329 . 6402 . 5924 
(7.3261) (7.7815) (7.8977) (8.0893) 
R2 . 7951 . 8255 . 8317 . 8475 
R2 . 7541 . 7974 . 7981 . 8212 
F 19,4063 29.3322 24.7118 32.2418 
SER . 5176 . 4699 . 4691 . 4230 
DW 1.9234 1.8959 1.9088 1.7462 
LM F . 0687 . 0336 . 0373 . 1844 
t statistics in parentheses 
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I 
Table 6.2.6. Model 2 SA 
Equation 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Dependent Variable SA 
Period 1952-88 
Pt 
. 0085 
(. 0462) 
REMt . 2066 . 1599 
(1.1346) (1.4385) 
Et . 0916 . 1727 . 1344 
(. 6706) (1.4901) (1.1756) 
Et-1 . 0910 . 1296 
(. 6870) (1.1167) 
Et-2 -. 2178 
(-1.6582) 
Et-3 . 5156 . 3579 . 3234 
(3.6569) (2.8754) (2.7081) 
4 
SA. M 
1954-88 
. 2433 
(1.9773) 
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SADt 
. 3221 . 2266 . 1938 . 3185 
(2.1272) (1.7184) (1.5295) (2.5350) 
BIFUt -. 6337 -. 5322 -. 5340 -. 6142 
(-4.6771) (-4.6460) (-4.5987) (-4.9054) 
STRSA 
. 3020 . 2378 . 2335 . 2556 
(2.2219) (2.0260) (1.9788) (2.1708) 
ORG . 3919 . 4374 . 3357 
(3.2843) (3.6745) (2.8600) 
R2 . 5583 . 6396 . 6348 . 5957 
R2 . 4321 . 5675 . 5617 . 5418 
F 4.4246 8.8729 8.6893 11.0527 
SER . 7530 . 6527 . 6616 . 6777 
DW 1.3392 1.7151 1.5486 1.6261 
LM F 3.0534 . 2383 1.0695 . 5021 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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to succeed. Thus, although mobilisation of resources does 
depend upon a decision of the union leadership, a situation 
that make such an action legitimate in the eyes of those who 
are mobilised is often indispensable. The empirical problem is 
to specify such conditions. A related problem is the classical 
one in labour history and industrial relations - which comes 
first, union growth or an industrial action? The problem is to 
assess the relative role of commonly held dissatisfaction, 
demonstration of organisational resources and the actual 
returns that such actions can bring about. A strong rivalry 
effect is also observed. A one percent increase in SA 
membership would drop Bifu membership by approximately 1.2 per 
cent. 
A problem of SA growth models is that, although the 
business-cycle models explain about 40 to 60 per cent of its 
growth, unlike Bifu models, the model performance cannot be 
improved much by an inclusion of the strategy variable, as 
historically moderate staff associations and unions have 
avoided such actions until quite recently. Relatively poor 
performance of the SA models may partly derive from the fact 
that the SA series is an aggregate series; membership data in 
the several organisations were added up, each of which is 
susceptible to different institutional factors. Inclusion of 
the organisational variable ( ORG ), which measures the effect 
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of 'natural increase' as a consequence of landslide shift of 
membership, improved model performance. 
However, despite this problem, it is interesting to see that 
determinants of combined SA growth are somehow similar to that 
of Bifu. The retail price index variable generally shows a 
negative effect but is not statistically significant and no 
constructive statement seems to be made upon it. The same can 
be said about the remuneration variable which has a positive 
sign. 
The three years lagged employment variable has a strong 
positive effect just as in the case of Bifu, but some of the 
less significant employment variables have a wrong sign. 
Although some of the density terms are not determined well, it 
may have facilitated union growth. The effect of inter-union 
competition is more prominent amongst staff associations and 
unions than in Bifu, indicating that one per cent increase in 
Bifu membership decreased the SA membership approximately by .2 
per cent. An industrial action in 1987 also had a positive 
impact upon SA growth. To measure the effect of Bifu action 
upon SA growth, the STRU variable was also tested in the model, 
but its effect was not evident. Before we move on to an 
empirical reasoning of the growth processes, there are four 
technical problems that should be mentioned at this stage; the 
function of the business-cycle variables, simultaneous 
equations bias, serial correlation and historical shifts of 
estimated causal relationships. 
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The results suggest that the statistically observable short- 
run growth is rather determined by organisational variables, 
which is inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions of the 
original business-cycle models. Can the business-cycle models 
claim to detect individual social behaviour in constantly 
changing socio-economic conditions? It has already been 
suggested in Chapter 4 that there may be at least three 
explanations to this. An attempt made first was to control the 
effect of employment growth by using union density as a 
dependent variable, as in the Booth model. 
20 A preliminary 
model was run, but the result was not particularly impressive. 
Bifu density being taken as a dependent variable, the most 
significant explanatory variable was naturally, as in Booth 
model, the lagged Bifu density variable. This result is rather 
obvious as density term does not fluctuate as the rate of 
change of membership variable. The measured effects of price, 
index and remuneration were similarly weak. In short, the early 
results are confirmed; the processes are not governed by the 
business-cycle variables. 
Nevertheless, before drawing a hasty conclusion, 
reconsideration of theoretical implication and analytical 
specification of the processes in which organisational factors 
are functioning and business-cycle factors are interwoven seems 
indispensable and this is done in the rest of this chapter and 
in Chapter 7. 
When one or more explanatory variable is partly determined 
by the dependent variable, the assumption that independent 
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variables in the linear regression model are uncorrelated with 
the error term is violated, and as a consequence, the OLS 
yields biased and inconsistent regression parameters 
estimators. There are two possible causes of this simultaneous 
equations bias; the rivalry variable and the remuneration 
variable. 
The possible simultaneous determination of union growth and 
remuneration is not an immediate aim of this research and left 
open. Furthermore, as for Bifu growth, the effect of Bifu upon 
pay determination was essentially indirect in nature up until 
the establishment of the national machinery in 1968 and most of 
the remuneration variable in the SA models are not anyway 
significant. It is also observed that the correlation between 
Pt and Rt increases from . 4118 between 1949-67 ( 
before the 
establishment of the machinery ) to . 5832 between 1968-88 
( after the machinery ), but causes of such an aggregate 
statistical relationship is difficult to identify, as there can 
be plural factors such as the government incomes policy as well 
as the result of the collective bargaining which has often been 
carried out in relation to price inflation of the previous year 
or the beginning of the year. 
One solution to the problem of simultaneous bias without 
constructing a simultaneous equations model is to use an 
instrumental variable approach ( IV ), and this is tried to 
detect a possible simultaneity between the rivalry variable 
using the Bifu growth model where an instrument is readily 
available. Table 6.2.7 shows the results of instrumental 
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variable estimation. A dependent variable is BIFU and a lagged 
SA variable was used as an instrument, although such a variable 
is truly independent from the disturbance term may still be 
questioned. The results are fairly similar to those obtained by 
the OLS. 
At the final stage, models with correction for serial 
correlation were also run. This is due to the fact that some 
equations' D. W. statistic ( both Bifu and SA models ) was in an 
indeterminate region and the F values of the Lagrange 
Multiplier test was low. Note that although D. W. statistic was 
originally developed to detect the first-order serial 
correlation, it has been found that it is also robust to other 
types of autoregressive errors. The method used here is the 
Newton-Raphson iterative method, which was developed from the 
Hildruth-Lu method. The results are shown in the note. 
21 
Historical Changes in Short-run Growth Patterns 
The last problem concerns the structural stability of 
regression coefficients. The regression equations calculated 
here assume that the estimated coefficients are historically 
stable; in other words, overall patterns of causalities 
estimated by the models are consistent over the sample period. 
In fact, this is one of the points upon which maJor*time-series 
growth models including that of Bain and Elsheikh have been 
criticized, as a structural shift in the pattern of union 
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growth can significantly undermine a predictive ability of the 
model. 22 
Concerns in historical sociology naturally differs from 
those of the econometricians, as the problem here is not to 
construct a better model in terms of predictive ability but to 
specify causal processes, which are probably somewhat unstable. 
As has been seen in the previous section, if such a 
breakthrough is to exist in the industrial relations system in 
the banking industry, the most probable hypothetical turning 
point would be 1968, when the JNC was established in the major 
London Clearing banks, which gave N. U. B. E. a national 
negotiation right. To test the structural stability of 
regression coefficients, both Bifu and SA models were split at 
this point and the Chow test was applied. The results suggest 
that some models of BIFU growth may suffer from the structural 
break, but none of the models of SA growth. 
23 Note that what 
the Chow test indicates is that two equations in each sub- 
period differ statistically, and it does not specify the cause 
of it. 
Following the assumption that there had been a structural 
shift, and to specify the pattern of it, separate models for 
each sub-period ( 1949-67 and 1968-88 ) were also estimated 
for Bifu growth, and then SA growth. Despite the fact that this 
is the method often used in a similar type of research to 
capture short-run changes of behavioural pattern in the 
historical context, much shortened sample periods will probably 
not allow to make a clear statement about the results and 
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TABLE 6.2.7 Model 2 
Equations 12 
Method IV Normalised 
D. V. BIFU 
Period 1952-88 
Pt -. 1543 
(-1.3133) 
Pt-1 -. 2070 
(-1.8827) 
REMt . 2990 . 3231 
(2.5374) (2.8182) 
Et . 0596 
(. 6613) 
ET-1 . 1132 
(1.3157) 
Et-2 -. 0381 
(-. 3880) 
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Et-3 . 3257 . 3191 
(2.9936) (3.0265) 
UD . 3741 . 3555 
(4.1450) (4.2327) 
SA -. 4599 -. 4342 
(-2.4230) (-2.4731) 
STRU . 5884 . 6049 
(5.5037) (6.2835) 
R2 . 8222 . 8203 
R2 . 7714 . 7914 
F 16.1864 28.3082 
SER . 4990 . 4768 
DW 1.7771 1.8765 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.8. Model 2 
Equation 
Method 
D. V. 
Period 
Pt 
123 
OLS Normalised 
BIFU SA 
1952-67 1950-67 1952-67 
-. 1789 
(-1.1980) 
. 2838 
(1.5320) 
4 
Rt -. 1879 -. 4165 
(-1.2909) (-2.4764) 
Et 
. 0974 
(. 6167) 
. 2398 . 3043 
(1.7797) (1.6552) 
Et-1 . 6322 . 1882 . 5654 
(3.9763) (1.1243) (2.8245) 
Et-2 -. 8435 -1.1614 
(-3.7678). (-4.9235) 
Et-3 . 2795 . 5323 
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. 0852 
rv 
(1.4751) 
UD/SADt 
. 3820 
(2.3480) 
SA/BIFU -. 4994 
(-2.1185) 
STRU/SA . 5442 . 8610 
(3.2822) (7.6920) 
(3.9304) (. 4781) 
-. 7410 -. 5017 
(-8.7202) (-4.4425) 
R2 . 9345 . 8370 . 9057 . 6244 
R2 . 9015 . 8020 . 8428 . 5305 
F 28.4559 23.9577 14.4063 6.6495 
SER . 4307 . 5799 . 3515 . 6075 
DW 2.1415 1.6466 2.2948 1.7240 
LM F . 2065 . 3470 . 3299 . 0002 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.9. Model 2 
Equations 1234 
Method OLS Normalised 
D. V. BIFU 
Period 1968-1989 
Pt -. 1426 -. 2752 -. 2384 -. 2381 
(-2.1370) (-2.5006) (-2.9075) (-3.0241) 
Rt . 1374 . 1893 . 1864 
(1.0140) (1.7880) (1.9232) 
Et 
Et-1 
Et-2 
. 1753 . 1752 
(2.5476) (1.9474) 
. 2068 . 1567 
(2.9875) (1.7159) 
. 0061 
(. 0888) 
. 1866 . 1853 
(2.7752) (2.9319) 
. 1823 . 1808 
(2.6290) (2.7904) 
Et-3 . 3855 . 4143 . 4386 . 4374 
(5.1274) (3.9760) (5.6139) (5.9154) 
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UDt . 2116 . 2100 . 2410 . 2393 
(2.9403) (2.1974) (3.3125) (3.5479) 
SAt -. 2785 -. 2511 -. 3034 -. 3027 
(-3.8661) (-2.7023) (-4.3159) (-4.5079) 
STRU . 4264 . 2476 . 4510 . 4501 
(4.1376) (2.1962) (4.5332) (4.7303) 
R2 . 8246 . 7289 . 8635 . 8634 
R2 . 7494 . 5830 . 7725 . 7899 
F 10.9672 4.9938 9.4903 11.7409 
SER . 3071 . 3961 . 2925 . 2812 
DW 2.3460 1.9704 2.1452 2.1448 
LM. F . 7985 . 0000 . 1487 . 1658 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 6.2.10. Model 2 
Equation 123 
Method OLS/N 
D. V. SA 
Period 1968-1988 
Pt -. 3019 -. 2909 
(-1.0988) (-1.1745) 
REMt . 3038 . 3086 
(1.0157) (1.1656) 
Et . 0005 
(. 0026) 
Et-1 . 2817 . 2666 . 2319 
(1.2705) (1.4397) (1.5658) 
Et-2 . 0376 
(. 1685) 
Et-3 . 8562 . 8383 . 5559 
(3.2763) (3.7775) (3.1863) 
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SAD 
BIFU 
STRSA 
ORG 
. 4812 . 4769 . 2175 
(1.9575) (2.1647) (1.0712) 
-1.3508 -1.3139 -. 8670 
(-3.0130) (-3.6216) (-3.0285) 
. 3464 . 3472 . 2975 
(2.1709) (2.3922) (2.3952) 
. 3586 
(2.6253) 
R2 . 6204 . 6195 . 7089 
R2 . 3673 . 4564 . 6119 
F 2.4515 3.7983 7.3059 
SER . 8582 . 7955 . 6722 
DW 1.7544 1.7097 1.7899 
LM. F . 1347 . 2226 . 0081 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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should be regarded as representing merely an approximate 
tendency. 
There is a minor change in the explanatory variable. 
Institutional remuneration series are available after 1968 for 
all major English clearing banks under study, and this was 
replaced with the original series which relies upon the New 
Earnings Survey to improve the consistency of the estimation 
and especially to examine the effect of economic factors upon 
he growth pattern. The strategy variable now captures the 
effects of only successful industrial actions. 
The results are shown in Tables 6.2.8. - 6.2.10. Although 
these two models run over different sample periods cannot be 
compared directly, it seems that the explanatory power of the 
estimated equations drops in the latter sub-period. The 
employment of re-formulated strategy variable improved the 
performance of Bifu equations, whereas the adaptation of re- 
formulated remuneration series dropped it in the Bifu models 
and slightly improved the SA models. The SA models also 
improved its performance when the potential membership variable 
was adopted for the employment and Bifu variables. The graphs 
of post-JNC union growth show that, although models roughly 
simulate the actual growth paths, they largely fail in certain 
years such as the 1980s for Bifu and 1972-73,1982 and 1986 for 
the associations. 
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The general pattern of the structural shift in Bifu growth 
may be roughly summarised as follows. It is generally observed 
that, 
1) Two business-cycle variables are generally unstable, 
although it had a minus sign in the latter sub-period. The 
back-up model using the re-formulated remuneration series fails 
to detect a statistically significant effect of price 
inflation. 
2) In both periods, lagged employment underlies union growth. 
3) Density variable functions in the latter sub-period, but 
again, the variable fails to achieve a statistically 
significant level in the back-up model. 
4) The rivalry variable ( SA ) shows a stronger negative 
effect in the former sub-period. 
5) An effect of the STR variable is more prominent in the 
former sub-period, but it is still one of the most significant 
variables in the latter sub-period, too. 
The general pattern of the change in the nature of SA growth 
may be summarised as follows. 
1) Two business-cycle variables, namely price and salary 
inflation, had little effect upon SA growth. 
2) The rivalry effect is the most prominent determinant in both 
sub-periods. 
3) An industrial action by two staff unions had a positive 
membership effect. 
4) A significant function of organisation variables is 
detected. 
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Table 6.2.11. shows the average growth rates and their 
correlation of Bifu and SA in the major English clearing banks. 
Bifu's growth rate of over 5 per cent before the establishment 
of machinery plunges into around 1 per cent after the 
machinery, from which it has not recovered fully. Although SA 
has performed substantially better than Bifu in the major 
English clearing banks, their average annual growth rate also 
drops to 2.4 per cent between 1978-88. 
An interesting feature can be found in the behaviour of the 
correlation between Bifu and SA growth. A strong negative 
correlation before the 1970s turned into a positive correlation 
of . 35 thereafter. Perhaps the most probable hypothesis to 
explain this is that, before the JNC when SA was less active, 
N. U. B. E. 's action often attracted much attention, thus directly 
affecting SA growth, whereas an increasingly similar policy 
adopted by more 'unionate' SA came to blur this pattern, 
consequently making the choice between two genres of 
organisations more arbitrary for the majority of the staff. 
This relates to another problem of the strategy variable. 
Bifu as well as SA have gradually become more unionate 
historically. In the 1950s, N. U. B. E. had no industrial actions. 
In the 1960s, it had more than two institutional industrial 
actions and a national strike. In the 1970s, there were two 
institutional actions, and in the 1980s, it undertook at least 
seven institutional and two national industrial actions. 
Probably this alone may be enough to explain a strong rivalry 
effect observed in the SA growth models. 
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Table 6.2.11. Employment and Bifu/SA Growth Rates 
Employment Bifu Bifum SA SAm Correlation 
1949-67 5.57 5.84 2.35 3.11* -. 6984 
1968-77 . 90 1.28 4.64 3.32** -. 6027 
1978-88 -. 49 1.00 2.42 1.98** . 3542 
1949-88 2.74 2.94 -. 4671 
Notes; Major English clearing banks. Bifum and SAm include the 
figures of both organizations in Midland Bank. 
* 1954-67 
** Figures include the estimates of SA/MSF membership in 
Midland banks. Figures of correlation exclude these. 
3. New Era of Industrial Relations 
In this section, we turn to an empirical analysis of union 
growth over the post-war period. This serves two purposes; 
verification of the previous analyses and assessment and 
refinement of the theory. Despite the merits that the 
quantitative analysis has, it is still crude, largely leaving 
the factors that are episodic or irregular, or that are not 
325 
quantifiable. It has also been pointed out in the course of the 
research that the way business-cycle variables function is 
somewhat problematic. An empirical analysis may rectify this by 
specifying such factors. 
Because of the historically complex patterns of the 
development of the industrial relations system in the industry, 
the growth of Bifu ( N. U. B. E. ) and that of the staff 
associations and unions .( 
SA/ SU ) are dealt with separately to 
comply with the analytical approach in the previous section. 
Information for the empirical analysis comes from several 
sources including union records, papers and industry-based 
journals, but by far the most convenient sources to follow the 
events within the industry is union journals. Although 
information about Bifu is abundant and relatively easily 
accessible, the empirical analysis of associations and unions 
is hampered in this respect. The small scale of house unions 
often mean a lack of systematic preservation of union records 
and recent decentralisation of SA/SU headquarters outside 
London made it inefficient to collect the necessary data at 
least for this type research. 
In fact, it was only Barclays Group Staff Union ( B. G. S. U. ), 
the largest amongst the three associations and unions, which 
had a complete series of the union journal since the 1940s, and 
naturally a significant space is spared for this union. NatWest 
Staff Association ( N. W. S. A. ) has journals after the merger in 
1969, but Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union ( L. B. G. S. U. ) has only 
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those published in the 1970s and 1980s. A complete run of the 
Clearing Bank Union ( C. B. U. ) journal is also available. 
N. U. B. E. before the Machinery 
The post-war period may be divided into three sub-periods in 
terms of different phases in the economy. The first period, a 
few years after the Second World War, is a transitional period 
from the war to the peace economy. The second period stretches 
from 1948 or 1949 to around 1967. It was a period of rapid 
economic growth with some cyclical fluctuation. On the economic 
policy side, Keynesian demand management was developed and 
refined, vastly eliminating unemployment. 
Then came the distabilization of the economy which was 
characterized by inflation, a rise in unemployment and the 
stagnation in manufacturing output. The governments, being 
inspired by increasingly powerful monetarists, largely replaced 
the Keynsian technique with a stringent monetary policy to 
eliminate inflation, insisting that long-run stability of the 
economy could only be achieved through proper functioning of 
the market and by the creation of competitive industries. 24 
During the 1950s, N. U. B. E. had two upswings in its 
membership. One was in 1951 and 52, and another in 1955. The 
former peak was more modest and had some variation in different 
banks. In both cases, there was successful campaigns organised 
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by N. U. B. E., behind which there seems to have existed the 
staff's general dissatisfaction over the conditions of 
employment. It was at the 1948 A. D. M. when N. U. B. E. decided to 
launch the National Minimum Salary Scale Campaign. It was 
backed up by a very successful petition in 1950 to remedy the 
'economic position caused by inadequate salaries and wages at 
present paid', which gathered 53,167 signatures, exceeding the 
union membership by nearly 20,000. 
Although the lack of accurate remuneration data makes it 
difficult to assess the cause of this successful campaign 
accurately, Blackburn seems to be right in attributing it to a 
considerable frustration amongst staff over pay. 
25 This may be 
seen from the actual relationship between institutional-union 
growth and remuneration. N. U. B. E. increased its membership by 
23 per cent in National Provincial, Westminster and District 
Banks, and 11 per cent in Barclays and Martins Banks, but it 
could not halt a decline in Lloyds ( -4.4 per cent ) where 
remuneration increased substantially. However, it should also 
be mentioned that this campaign was carried out with high price 
inflation in its back ground and that Bain's assumption of 
'threat' effect may still hold. In fact, R. P. I. of over 9 per 
cent in 1951 makes a peak throughout the period of economic 
development in 1950s and 1960s. 
Although the British Bankers Association refused to accept 
the petition, new salary scales were introduced in 1952.1951 
was also the year when the Midland Bank Staff Association 
4 
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dissolved and this caused a influx of membership into N. U. B. E. 
which increased its membership in the bank by 64 per cent. 
Soon after this petition, N. U. B. E. launched another campaign 
it called 'Programme for Progress', which was originally 
formulated by the executive members of the union who were 
'unsatisfied with the 1952 consolidation' for a purpose of 
negotiation. It was also claimed to be the union's first 
attempt to reorganize salary structure especially to cope with 
the rapidly growing number of junior female staff. The union's 
demand was rather a case of comprehensive pay increases, which 
ranged from the demand for better pay for juniors on routine or 
semi-skilled work, 'responsibility pay' for unappointed 
specialists and minor supervisors, to the demand of 
'maintenance of a sizeable differentials for appointed staff'. 
A claim of pay adjustment reflecting the retail price index was 
also put forward, probably following the experiences in 1951 
and 52, and publicized through numerous leaflets. 
This 'Programme for Progress' was successful. In fact, it 
was more successful than anticipated by union officials. 
"Hundreds, unable to find seats, stood for an hour to listen to 
Union speakers as they outlined Programme for Progress in 
Westminster. .. This unexpected turn-out of bank workers 
estimated by the Daily Mail_ and Manchester Guardian I was ) 
6,500. "26 
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The campaign consequently attracted some 10,000 staff into 
N. U. B. E. in only four months between January and April and 
total membership growth in this year reached well over 30 per 
cent. An increase in membership was observed in almost all the 
major banks, headed by an increase of 67 per cent in the three 
banks which constituted the National Westminster Bank. It also 
succeeded in halting a long-run decline in union membership in 
Lloyds which had been almost continuous after the war, most 
probably as a result of an increasingly effective functioning 
of its staff association. Staff associations generally suffered 
from a rivalry effect and, as a total, recorded a minus growth 
for the first time since the war, although N. U. B. E. attracted 
more members from the non-organised section of the workforce. 
What was behind this extremely successful campaign? Models 
do predict an increase in membership in this year without a 
dummy, but the interpretation of the result has to be cautious 
because this is the year when two different remuneration series 
were connected and, even if remuneration did increase, it could 
be a result of this action rather than a cause of it that the 
assumption of 'credit effect' suggests. 
General economic conditions in this year does not seem to 
have had a strong impact upon staff directly or indirectly 
through the union organization as the inflation rate was less 
than 5 per cent. The increase in employment was approximately 
3.3 per cent in the major English clearing banks, or just above 
the average annual increase. However, the back-up series of 
Lloyds do suggest that the controversial 1954 cash payment was 
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low; approximately 653 p. a. or an increase of 2.6 per cent. 
This exceeded the price inflation but was the lowest rate in 
the 1950s bar 1951, and may have been the original cause of the 
mass dissatisfaction. 27 And, in fact, close examination of 
time-series data suggests that, during the 1950s and the 1960s, 
rapid union growth often follows a stagnation in remuneration 
rather than a change in price inflation, as has already been 
shown in the results of the models. 
If a 'dissatisfaction' or 'threat' effect of a remuneration 
factor did induce a successful mobilization, why did not 
severer employment conditions in 1951, for example, lead to 
more successful union growth than in 1955? This fact may be 
explained by a strategic side of the 'Programme'; it targeted 
the female workforce which rapidly increased its proportion in 
banking at the end of the 1940s, and thereafter largely 
remained unorganized. This can be seen from another feature of 
a pattern in the recruitment. Through the campaign, the union 
increased its male membership by 29 per cent, but an increase 
in female membership far exceeded it, reaching over 44 per 
cent. 
Apart from these exceptional years, it seems safe to 
conclude that N. U. B. E. growth in the 1950s was fundamentally 
constrained by employment factors, as shown in the models. Its 
relative decline in 1953 and 54, and in 1958, for instance, 
coincides with ( lagged ) fluctuation in employment. 
During the 1960s, N. U. B. E. had two major upswings in its 
membership; one in 1961 and another in 1967, and a sudden 
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decrease in 1964. Growth models underestimate its membership in 
1961 and overestimate it around in 1964. Most of the equations 
included the strategic union variable ( STR ) to capture the 
effect of an industrial action in 1967 as a dummy variable. The 
first upswing in 1961, may be explained by the natural 'push- 
up' effect caused by an increase in employment, which it shared 
with the staff associations. In the beginning of the 1960s, 
employment in the major English clearing banks increased at the 
highest rate throughout the 1960s, reaching 8.3 per cent. 
Active recruitment brought about a net increase of 8,799 and 
6,655 in 1960 and 1961 respectively, whereas the union 
increased its membership by 1,200 ( 3.1% ) and 3,162 ( 7.9% 
and staff associations increased their membership by 3,266 
6.8% ) and 1,274 ( 2.5% ) in these two years. The only 
difference seems to be the existence of a lag in N. U. B. E. 
growth. Growth models may fail to capture this effect, because 
they captured the general significance of the employment 
variables with lag structure. 
Except this 'push-up' effect, there are a few other factors 
which may have affected the growth pattern; a series of 
industrial actions in the Trustee Savings Banks, a change in 
employers' attitude and a recruitment campaign. None of them 
are included in the model. 
Although the processes of the industrial action in the 
T. S. B. in 1960 and 1963 were dealt with by other writers in the 
field, it may be necessary to overview the issues disputed 
briefly. Prior to the events, a substantial alteration in the 
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union's constitution was made in the May A. D. M. of 1960, which 
made strike action a realistic weapon. Although a previous 
clause could authorize such an action only by a ballot of the 
whole membership showing five-eighths in favour, the new clause 
allowed a sectional strike supported by a simple majority of 
those concerned. 
In 1960, N. U. B. E. experienced its first industrial action 
including an overtime ban and a ban of balance work in the 
Derby T. S. B. over pay and a lack of a clear salary scale for 
some 14 Grade B managers in the bank. The unclear demarcation 
of the power between the T. S. B. Employers Council and 
individual constituent banks posed a further problem upon a 
negotiation, and the action started in mid-November. An 
agreement between the bank and the union was reached in 
December, after which a new salary scale was introduced. 
28 In 
this dispute, a manager expressed a view, saying, 'we did not 
relish marching through the town, but we are prepared to do 
what any railwayman or miner would do for their rights', 
although such a view may not have been a majority opinion. 
29 
Following the Derby events, a series of talks were held 
between the Employers' Council and the union on ways to improve 
the procedural agreement. An introduction of an arbitration 
clause naturally became a focus. Such an agreement had already 
been established between major clearing banks and their 
respective staff associations from the beginning of the 1950s 
although they had not been executed till 1961 when L. B. S. A. 
referred a failure of pay negotiation to an industrial 
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tribunal, which was soon followed by similar moves from the 
Westminster Bank Guild and Midland Staff Association. However 
an agreement could not be reached as the Employers' Council 
insisted that the reference of a dispute to arbitration should 
be made by mutual agreement whereas the union persisted in the 
unilateral reference. 
Then in the 1962 pay negotiation, a deadlock was reached 
over branch managers' salaries, and clerical and over-clerical 
salaries below branch managership. The union suggested the 
matter should be adjudicated upon by an independent arbitrator, 
but the Employers' Council refused this and implemented new 
salary scales. However, the union's call for national 
industrial action failed to get enough support in this year. 
The dispute in 1963 also related to pay, but in the core, 
the issue contested was the 'virtual refusal' of pay 
negotiation with the union by the Employers' Council and the 
unilateral introduction of a revised salary scale of 3.5 per 
cent in July, which N. U. B. E. claimed to be in defiance of the 
1947 procedural agreement. Strike ballots were conducted in 
four banks where N. U. B. E. had high density, namely Manchester, 
Thames Valley, South Wales and Falkirk in Scotland. The strong 
support shown by the staff in this year may reflect not only 
the clarity of the issue and dissatisfaction over pay, but an 
increasing workload that a planned introduction of a cheque- 
book scheme into the T. S. B. could bring about. A series of 
strikes, which were the first stoppages in the history of 
British banking, were held on Saturdays in September, and as a 
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result, the Employers' Council agreed with the inclusion of the 
arbitration agreement, which ensured that matters affecting 
remuneration, hours of work and holidays may be referred to 
arbitration by either side and the awards to be binding on both 
parties. 
How did these series of events affected N. U. B. E. growth? It 
did increase its membership in the T. S. B. Its growth rates were 
approximately 9 and 15 per cent in 1960 and 1961, and it 
increased its membership by 15.7 per cent in 1963, far 
exceeding the average rate of 6.67 per cent in the T. S. B. 
movement in the 1960s. However, despite its wide coverage by 
mass media, there is little evidence that these events in the 
T. S. B. affected its growth outside the banks, indicating a 
limited nature of the effects of external events again. 
The second possible factor which may have caused a deviation 
from equilibrium growth is a change in an employers' attitude. 
In 1960, N. U. B. E. started a comprehensive approach to the 
T. U. C. under the I. L. O. Convention 98 in order to obtain 
recognition in the major English clearing banks. The T. U. C. 
arranged an interview with the Ministry of Labour, who then had 
a meeting with Sir Oliver Franks, a chairman of the Committee 
of London Clearing Bankers and Lloyds Bank. He addressed in a 
letter to the Ministry that, 
"the staff of the Banks are completely free to join the 
National Union of Bank Employers or a Staff association if they 
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wish to do so, and that the Banks did not seek to influence the 
position of their staff in any way. ""30 
This statement was immediately circulated to all branches of 
Lloyds Bank by the union. Although the immediate response of 
the staff cannot be followed through the journals, it was in 
Lloyds Bank that the union increased its membership by 14 per 
cent in 1961, twice as much as the overall growth rate of the 
union in this year. L. B. S. A. decreased its membership in this 
year. There was also a membership recruitment campaigns in 
1961 and 1962, but the scale of them may not be very different 
from those carried out almost constantly and perhaps their 
effect will not be over-emphasized. 
Probably the more significant is the membership decrease in 
1964, when N. U. B. E. declined in membership by over 11 per cent 
in the clearing banks in the midst of its 'President's 
membership campaign', although it did increase in the T. S. B. 
where a successful arbitration brought about a pay increase. 
The decrease was marked in National Provincial, Westminster and 
District banks, where it decreased by 14.5 per cent, which was 
followed by Lloyds and Midland. The reason for this is a little 
difficult to identify. The factor may not be economic as the 
models tend to overestimate this years' growth rate. In fact, 
economic conditions were not so unfavourable in this year. 
Price inflation was under 4 per cent, a lower figure than the 
salary inflation in the financial sector. Average remuneration 
per staff in Lloyds, for example, increased by 7 per cent in 
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1964, which was the highest nominal increase throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. At the same time, employment in the major 
clearing banks increased approximately by 5 per cent. 
Some hypothesis can be made for this rather eventless year; 
a rivalry effect caused by an effective functioning of the 
staff associations, a change in employers attitude, the 
negative effect of the T. S. B. strike in the previous year and 
an increase in subscription. The first point will be 
reconsidered when the growth patterns of staff associations are 
dealt with. This explanation is possible, although it does not 
fully account for the decline of the union. Most of the staff 
associations increased their membership in the mid-1960s and 
the growth rate of the largest nine reached 7 per cent in this 
year. This is a net increase of 4,700 which accounts for 
approximately 95 per cent of this year's employment growth, 
indicating a flow of membership from N. U. B. E. to the staff 
associations. 
There also seems to be some ground to argue that the decline 
originates in the unchanged employers' attitude. After the 
publication of the Cameron Report in November 1963, union 
executives headed by an able general secretary, Brooks, 
continued pressing the banks towards the establishment of 
national negotiating machinery. However, despite recommendation 
of the Report to the four banks, namely District, Martins, 
National Provincial and Yorkshire Banks, to accept the oral 
representation from the union, they firmly rejected it. 
N. U. B. E. intended a substantial increase in its membership to 
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press the banks and the 'President's Campaign' was arranged at 
the Area Councils' level of the union. A series of union 
fortnights were held in the areas of high potential, which was 
helped by visits of union organisers. Then, towards the end of 
the year, the 'National Petition for the Five Day Week in 
British Banking' was launched, which claimed to have gathered 
over 80,000 signatures, or 20,000 more than total union 
membership. But membership itself failed to increase. 
Can a successful industrial action bring about a negative 
effect upon union growth? Provided the utilitarian commitment 
of the staff to the union in terms of the maximization of 
material gain and protection of the position, certain 
'unionate' actions may be against the general preference of the 
staff, as they endanger it rather than achieve it. 
Unfortunately, no evidence to support such a hypothesis can be 
found in 1964. But such cases have been observed from time to 
time, for example, when N. U. B. E. established a closed shop 
agreement with the Co-operative Bank in 1976, which superseded 
the then operative agency shop agreement, or when Bifu 
undertook industrial action in 1981, although overall balance 
of the membership seems to have been positive in both cases. 
The last plausible factor is an increase in the 
subscriptions that the union undertook to resolve the financial 
crisis that the Cameron Inquiry, the T. S. B. disputes and a 
strike in the Habib Bank brought about. A separate effect of 
such a factor cannot be measured, although a pre-war experience 
suggests it can be minimal. If there is anything which supports 
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this hypothesis, it is the extent of the increases, that more 
than doubled the subscriptions of women. 
On the other hand, the effect of 'Action 67', through which 
N. U. B. E. succeeded in obtaining national recognition in the 
major English clearing banks and establishing the Joint 
Negotiating Council for Banking, is overwhelming throughout 
the history of the union. In most of the models, this effect is 
captured by a dummy variable. N. U. B. E. 's total growth rate was 
over 30 per cent in 1967. There are some variations in the 
banks, and again, the increase in the three banks that merged 
to form National Westminster Bank in 1969 was the most 
prominent, reaching over 55 per cent, which was followed by 
Lloyds, Barclays and Martins and Midland Banks. Employment in 
major clearing banks increased approximately 3.6 per cent or 
5,500 in this year whereas some 2,600 staff left the staff 
associations in total. Hence even if all the net decrease of 
staff associations was absorbed by N. U. B. E., it can be assumed 
that almost a half of those N. U. B. E. gained in this year were 
not members of either the union or the associations. 
Most of the staff associations suffered from a 'rivalry' 
effect, but the effect was minimal amongst Lloyd's and 
Barclay's associations' and in fact, the Midland's association 
slightly increased its membership. Again the marginal 
propensity to unionize was the strongest in the constituent 
banks of National Westminster, where Westminster Bank Guild, 
National Provincial Bank Staff Association, National Provincial 
Bank Ladies' Guild and District Bank Staff Associations 
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decreased their membership by well over 10 per cent. The 
problem is this - how was this extremely successful campaign 
organized? Why has it not been repeated since? What sort of 
relationship can be observed between the industrial action and 
union growth? How can it be generalized? It is necessary to 
follow the process of the event in more detail to get an 
insight into these problems. 
The real issue contested in this campaign was the 
acquisition of recognition and the establishment of the 
machinery, but it was successfully linked with some other 
controversial issues of pay, opening hours and the five day 
week, which enabled N. U. B. E. to mobilize a substantial 
proportion of the staff into the campaign. As described in the 
first section of this chapter, the union officials started an 
effort to carry the recommendation of the Cameron Report a 
stage further immediately after the publication of the Report 
in 1963. After a series of meetings between the banks, N. U. B. E. 
and the C. C. B. S. A., a working party was set up, which succeeded 
in producing a draft constitution for the national negotiating 
machinery at the beginning of 1967. Only the Midland Bank and 
its staff association dissociated themselves from the working 
party. 
N. U. B. E. 's A. D. M. approved entry into the machinery with 
only a handful of dissentients, and the majority of the banks 
were also prepared to accept it, provided their respective 
staff associations did. However, only the staff associations in 
Barclays and District Banks did so unreservedly. The situation 
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changed in June when the staff associations in National 
Provincial and Westminster Banks came out against the 
machinery, which terminated the talks. Banking Information 
Service released a press communique in the next month, stating 
that inadequate support had been found for those proposals 
among the staff associations and that the banks had concluded 
that effective machinery could not be established at this 
stage. After this, the union embarked upon an attempt to 
obtain recognition by its own actions. 
This move was, in fact, helped by an unsatisfactory pay 
consolidation. Incomes policies had been successively adopted 
to control recurrent inflation since 1965, both by the 
Conservative and the Labour governments. 31 The 'Report on 
Salaries of Midland Bank Staff', which was published in 
November 1965 by the National Board for Prices and Incomes 
( P. I. B. ), had already made a restrictive recommendation upon 
the pay increase in the London clearing banks. N. U. B. E. as well 
as C. C. B. S. A. had opposed this, with the exception of Barclay's 
Association which took a 'realistic' approach to it. Especially 
N. U. B. E. expressed strong anxiety and insisted that only a 
national organization can combat the pressure being exerted 
from outside banking, in the form of incomes policy. 
Then in July 1966, the government imposed a statutory 
control on incomes for the first time, started with a six-month 
freeze on prices and incomes followed by another six-months of 
severe restraint. This rapidly increased labour unrest in 
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Britain and the T. U. C. formally expressed its opposition to the 
Prices and Incomes Act in March 1967. 
Although N. U. B. E. lodged with a 10 per cent pay claim in 
July when the restraint ended, the pay awards that followed a 
two-years freeze of bank salaries were 2.5/3.5 per cent, which 
aroused a strong resentment amongst the staff. In August, 
N. U. B. E. started an 'extensive programme of education' to 
mobilize opinion and to explore the possibility of industrial 
action, which came to be called 'Action 67'. Open meetings 
'held in a month not normally conductive to good attendances' 
were reported to be very successful. 
This staff dissatisfaction was further stirred by the 
postponement of Saturday closure and the announcement by the 
Committee of the London Clearing Bankers of a new proposal on 
opening hours, which provided for a package of early closure 
and late night opening in some selected areas, generally 
increasing banking hours. The Bank Officer reported that, 
"This hostile reception to the proposals has produced a 
spontaneous reaction unprecedented in the history of banking. 
Total rejections have been received from all over the country 
and the numbers of new members recruited in October alone could 
well exceed six thousands, "32 
compared with 1,040 who joined the union in August. 
It was to back up this membership increase that N. U. B. E. 
embarked upon an attempt to obtain recognition, which was 
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effectively connected with the claims of a 10 per cent pay rise 
and Saturday closure. Banks soon moved to head off a possible 
industrial action by abandoning the plan to experiment with 
late opening once a week in some selected areas, which 
constituted a part of a "package deal" with the staff 
associations. However, the support of members as shown in the 
strike ballot was strong and a series of two-day strikes on 
Fridays and Saturdays were held in Wales at the end of November 
and then in the North, including Blackpool, Bolton, Doncaster 
and Nottingham in the beginning of December, where union 
representation and militancy was strongest. It was reported 
that a total of 2,800 and 1,410 union members were brought into 
the first strike action in the major clearing banks. 
Immediately after the first strike, William's and Deacon's 
Bank ( merged later to form William's & Glyn's, and then the 
Royal Bank of Scotland ) announced its willingness to recognize 
the union, and later, two of the 'Hawks', National Provincial 
and Westminster Banks agreed to take part in the talks with the 
union and the C. C. B. S. A. on the national machinery, including 
such items as hours, holidays and overtime, which were 
previously non-negotiable. Midland Bank also announced its 
entry into the machinery in April, and the Joint Negotiating 
Council For Banking, based upon the collapsed July proposal, 
was formally established in May 1968. 
There is some evidence to argue for the immediate effect of 
recognition upon union growth. A manager of a clearing bank, 
for example, describing the changes that the establishment of 
343 
the national machinery brought about, said that the atmosphere 
in the bank, 
"changed out of all recognition. When I came into the Bank, The 
Bank Officer's Guild, as it then was, was a very minor 
struggling little association which was not popular except with 
a few fringe area types of staff. The staff association was 
that or nothing. There was disinterest and that's changed out 
of all recognition. ""33 
The reason for institutional differences in union growth is 
difficult to identify because of a lack of necessary 
information. It is quite possible to argue that a series of 
merger talks, beginning with the financial integration of 
District Bank into National Provincial Bank in 1962, created a 
strong threat effect, but it should be noted that it was not 
before the 26th January 1968 that the merger between 
Westminster and National Provincial Banks was officially 
announced. The banks also gave assurances to both N. U. B. E. and 
the staff associations that no redundancy would be made in 
relation to the merger. 34 
It can be seen that this extremely successful campaign was a 
result of several factors. One crucial factor was a long freeze 
in pay imposed by the Prices and Incomes Policy, which caused 
wide-spread staff dissatisfaction. However, a direct trigger of 
union growth was the announcement of the extension of the 
opening hours, and union growth during or after the industrial 
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action is not very prominent; little evidence can be found to 
support a 'credit' effect or a 'demonstration' effect in 
relation to the strategy variable and the major causal path 
seems to be associated with a concept of 'dissatisfaction' or 
'threat'. 
Bifu After the Machinery 
As has been shown earlier, the average growth rate of Bifu in 
the major English clearing banks dropped to just above 1 per 
cent over the post-JNC period, in comparison with 5.84 per cent 
between 1949 and 1967, consequently pulling down union density 
from 29.1 per cent in 1955, one of the peak years, to 26.7 per 
cent in 1989. However, a marked development of Bifu in other 
financial institutions made it the 19th biggest union in 
Britain by 1980 and the 16th by 1988. At the same time, it was 
observed that the pattern of growth itself had changed as 
explained in the second section of this chapter. 
Consequently, there are deviations from an equilibrium 
growth path assumed and calculated in terms of the business- 
cycle or organisation models. They do not explain a crucial 
failure of the union in the clearing banks in 1973 and 74, and 
a long-run decline and stagnation in union membership between 
1978 and 1982, nor an unstable pattern of union growth after 
1983. Some of them may derive from long-term factors that were 
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continuously present. There may be qualitative factors or 
quantitative trend factors, both of which are difficult to 
incorporate into the models because of the nature of the 
variables, leaving a certain proportion of the variance in the 
dependent variable unexplained. The task of this empirical 
section is to identify the causes of such deviation and find an 
appropriate explanation. 
After the growth that the dissatisfaction which lead to 
'Action 67' brought about, N. U. B. E. maintained an upward trend 
until 1972. The difference in the membership between the union 
and the staff associations became minimal in 1971, or a 
difference of around 8,000 in the largest three banks and much 
less than this in all the clearing banks in the machinery, 
which crucially affected the voting power at the Staff Council 
of the Joint Negotiating Council. Models predict this pattern 
reasonably accurately. 
N. U. B. E. succeeded in maintaining a high growth rate of 
around 10 per cent in major English clearing banks in 1968. 
The cause might be identified from the quarterly growth rates. 
The union increased its membership by 0.07 per cent immediately 
after the industrial action ( 31.12.1967 - 30.4.1968 ). 
And then, 0.32 per cent ( 1. S. 68 - 31.7.68 ), 3.63 per cent 
( 1.8.68 - 31.10.68 ) and 4.85 per cent ( 1.11.68 - 31. 
12.68 ). It can be seen that the industrial action in the end 
of 1967 and a subsequent establishment of -the national 
machinery had little influence upon union, growth, indicating a 
very weak function of a 'demonstration' or a 'credit' effect. 
35 
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Natural push-up by an increase in employment which started in 
the autumn can be a reason, but N. U. B. E. 's growth was twice as 
high as the growth in employment. 
An organizational change and a consequent sense of 
insecurity that the formation of National Westminster Bank 
brought about may be another cause of union growth, as a 
certain swing from the staff associations to the union seems to 
be observed. This shift may be captured by the rivalry 
variable. 1968 was also the year when the first fruits of the 
national machinery took an actual form. The C. L. C. B. announced 
in September that all banking offices would be closed on 
Saturdays from July 1969. However, even if it was, it was only 
in a indirect fashion as the decision was taken solely by the 
Committee, without consultation in the J. N. C. 
Rather, it can also be argued that, as in 1967, government 
intervention inspired a certain degree of dissatisfaction. The 
first pay claim by the Banking Staff Council produced a 
satisfactory result of an overall increase of 7 per cent in 
September, with a higher percentage for women. However, when 
this settlement was referred to the Department of Employment 
and Productivity later in the year, a procedure that the then 
operational Prices and Incomes Policy required, a degrading 
interim increase of flat a 3.5 per cent was decided. The 
C. B. S. A. accepted this shortly afterwards. Against this, 
N. U. B. E. planned a ban on Government business and a half-day 
strike on January 1969 to enable the members to take part in a 
mass lobby and a demonstration. Although the proposed 
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industrial action was downgraded to a voluntary strike because 
of insufficient support from the staff, the lobby and the 
demonstration were reported to be successful and through 
strenuous negotiations, succeeded in obtaining a retrospective 
payment in October 1969. 
The fact that a few events took place almost simultaneously 
and the lack of the quarterly membership data from 1969 make it 
difficult to disentangle the key factor behind union growth. 
However, a higher growth rate towards the end of 1968, and a 
high growth rate of 9.74 per cent in 1968 compared with 5.26 
per cent in 1969, seems to suggest that staff joined the union 
as a response to an unfavourable condition of employment 
imposed successively by the government, supporting the view of 
an institutional economist that trade unions are basically 
'defensive organization'. 
There are some other events in the industry around this 
period; a salary restructuring based upon a new job evaluation 
in the mid-1971, and the establishment of institutional 
negotiating machineries ( Barclays; May 1969, National 
Westminster; June 1970, Lloyds; November 1970, Midland; 
December 1970 ). The agreements with Barclays and National 
Westminster included negotiating rights for managers as well as 
clerical staff and the same rights were granted by Midland in 
1974. 
Is there any evidence to argue that the 'Barber boom', an 
artificial expansion of the British economy at the beginning of 
the 1970s, had a significant impact upon union growth, as 
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business-cycle theories generally assume? The answer is 
probably no. Price inflation was almost reaching a historical 
level of 10 per cent in 1971 and bank profits soared, lead by a 
nominal increase of 48 per cent in Barclays Group in 1971 and 
approximately the same rate in the National Westminster Group 
in the next year. Favourable economic conditions also brought 
about an increase in remuneration of well over 10 per cent in 
nominal terms, slightly pushing up the actual standard of 
living. Consequently, no prominent dissatisfaction was observed 
amongst staff, and both the union and the SA marginally 
increased their membership in the first year of the boom. 
Membership increases in 1967 and 68 pushed N. U. B. E. up right 
behind the C. B. S. A., although the staff associations still had 
superior voting power on the Banking Staff Council. This 
situation was basically unchanged until 1973, when N. U. B. E. 
lost members in most of the English clearing banks by 
approximately 10 per cent for two years running. Business-cycle 
models generally overestimate N. U. B. E. membership in these 
years, indicating that the variables employed provide probably 
only a partial explanation for the loss. Probably, the most 
curious thing about it is that there seems to have been no 
obvious events which could prompt staff disaffiliation. There 
was the resignation of the General Secretary, Brooks, and the 
appointment of Mills, who studied politics, philosophy and 
economics at Balliol and started his career as an industrial 
relations specialist, in July 1972, and N. U. B. E. 's expulsion 
from the T. U. C. in September 1973, which are generally assumed 
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not to affect social behaviour of the employees in any 
significant way. 
Both N. U. B. E. executives as well as SA executives, whose 
organisations were rapidly expanding, seem to have been 
dismayed by this landslide change in the numerical balance of 
the organisations, especially since negotiations on pay and 
other conditions had been carried out as usual and were 
bringing about some favourable results. A pay settlement of 7 
per cent, a little lower than the current inflation rate, 
effective from January 1973 was reached in November 1972, 
although its implementation was deferred until April because of 
the government's attempt to control inflation in terms of 
incomes policy, 'Programme for Controlling Inflation'. 
Following this, the union and the staff associations succeeded 
in obtaining a substantial increase in London and large town 
allowances, effective from November 1973 and August 1974, and 
then an increase in pay in January and in the summer when the 
government's pay restriction was lifted. It was in the midst of 
these negotiations when N. U. B. E. suffered a severe defeat in 
the core of the organization. 
An official of the Barclays Group Staff Association wrote in 
its journal that, surprisingly, many staff were just waiting to 
be asked to join the association by its organisers. N. U. B. E. 
executives, on the other hand, expressed strong apprehension 
and attributed this decline in union membership to the joint 
negotiation with the staff associations, insisting that both 
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domestic and national joint machineries created institutional 
'free riders'. 
"N. U. B. E. does the lion's share of the work involved in such 
machineries and yet some of the staff associations reap the 
membership benefit because of the lower subscription they 
charge. It was because of this that we have considered 
pressing for separate negotiating machinery. ""36 
What were the real factors which brought about this shift in 
the patterns of unionisation? Can the statement of the union 
official be justified, and if so, to what extent? 
One of the features of this unexpected decrease in N. U. B. E. 
membership is its disproportionate pattern amongst the clearing 
banks ( Table 6.3.1. ). In 1973, it lost 18.3 per cent of its 
members in new National Westminster Bank and 11.8 per cent in 
Lloyds, but only 5 per cent in Barclays, and it increased its 
membership by 2.1 per cent in Midland Bank. In 1974, it 
continued losing membership in National Westminster, down a 
further 15.5 per cent, which was followed by losses in Barclays 
and Midland. Although there is no accurate information on the 
sex composition of these lost members, some data suggest that 
more female staff may have defected from the union. 
From this disproportionate nature of N. U. B. E. 's loss and 
from a comparison with N. U. B. E. 's increase in 1967 and 68, we 
can make a hypothesis about the cause of it; a rivalry effect, 
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which can be both short-run and long-term, and a 'natural 
lapse' that followed a rapid expansion at the end of the 1960s, 
and economic and other factors. Models partly explain the 
decline because it captures the latter effect. 
i) Rivalry Effect; This seems particularly applicable in the 
case of Barclays where the staff association was extremely 
successful between 1971 and 1974, reaching the peak growth rate 
of 28 per cent in 1972, consequently pushing up the total SA 
figures used for the model estimation, whereas Lloyds' 
association was hit severely in 1971. However, this did not 
immediately lead to a decline of N. U. B. E. membership, probably 
either because some members maintained dual membership for some 
time, or because those disaffiliated from the union were not 
struck off immediately from the membership record. 
37 
The case seems to be of some theoretical interest as it fits 
the economists' explanation; demand for union services can be 
determined in terms of the costs and benefits of them. 
N. U. B. E. 's subscription had been considerably higher than that 
of the staff associations and financial difficulties had forced 
the executives to increase it further in 1974, which had been 
kept constant since 1971. Consequently, the annual subscription 
for staff 25 years old and over became 9 p. a., a comparable 
figure with A. S. T. M. S. which charged 10, but substantially 
higher than Barclay's Association (4), National Westminster 
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Table 6.3.1. Patterns of Membership Swing 1972-74 
N. U. B. E. S. A. 
1972 Nat. West 886 633 
Barclays -182 5581 
Lloyds 601 1019 
Midland -12 
1973 NW 
B 
L 
M 
-3908 ( -18.3 ) 
-1300 ( -5.0 ) 
-1341 ( -11.8 ) 
225 ( 2.1 ) 
793 ( +3.3 ) 
6177 ( +24.0 ) 
356 ( +2.1 ) 
206 ( +2.0 ) 
1974 NW 
B 
L 
M 
TOTAL NW 
B 
L 
M 
-2714 ( -15.5 ) 
-3513 ( -14.3 ) 
-212 ( -2.1 ) 
-693 ( -6.3 ) 
-5736 
-4995 
-952 
-480 
1404 ( +5.6 ) 
2326 ( +7.3 ) 
845 ( +4.9 ) 
N. D. 
2830 
14084 
2229 
N. D. 
Note: The figures show actual increases and decreases of 
members. Those in the brackets are the annual growth rates. 
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Association ( 3.60 ) and Lloyds Association ( 3.60 ), 
although most of the associations charged managerial staff 
more, and anyway, staff obtained exactly the same benefits from 
the JNC. National Westminster Staff Association, for example, 
publicized this difference, appealing for the cost-performance 
of their organization. Nevertheless, the subscription itself is 
not that much and there seems to be some ground to argue that 
the difference in the services offered had come to appear a 
determinant in the choice situation at around this time. 
ii) Natural Lapse; The growth rate of N. U. B. E. in the National 
Westminster Bank ( i. e. three constituent banks ) was 81.4 per 
cent or a net increase of 7,122 in 1967 and 68, only followed 
by Lloyds. It has often been observed that the marginal 
propensity to unionize seems to be higher in this bank than in 
others, but it is difficult to identify the reason of it 
because of a lack in information at the institutional level. 
Provided the fact that the swing of members from N. U. B. E. to SA 
is not very prominent in these two banks, it seems to be 
natural to- assume that many members simply defected without 
finding the benefits of union membership. 
This phenomenon of natural lapse, which has been observed 
historically and yet has not been incorporated in the growth 
models, may be explained by a historical stability of the 
aggregate preference structure of the employees about a 
collective vis-a-vis individual bargaining and a desirable type 
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of collective bargaining, and hence by a stable pattern in the 
propensity to unionize. Strong dissatisfaction that derives 
from degrading economic conditions at a certain time, for 
instance, may drive the employees to the union, but they 
disaffiliate in the long-run without finding any benefits from 
the affiliation any more. Hence, what caused union growth in 
such a case is a short-run change in the economic and social 
conditions, and as it stabilizes, the union growth path would 
be pulled back towards the long-run equilibrium level. 
If this had been the case, to what extent was N. U. B. E. 's 
growth in the late 1960s caused by a shift from a long-run 
equilibrium path and how did the stabilized membership at the 
beginning of the 1970s differ from that path? We can assume 
that there was no growth associated with 'Action 67' and that 
N. U. B. E. maintained an equilibrium growth in this year. If we 
take the narrowest definition of 'equilibrium' growth, namely 
that of the original business-cycle models without a rivalry 
variable, the estimated growth rate of the union is 4.4 per 
cent in 1967, instead of the actual growth of 38.4 per cent. 
This means the assumed equilibrium membership of 36,400, which 
is about 11,900 less than the actual figure. Assuming other 
things being equal, this figure roughly matches the loss of the 
union between 1971 and 1974, indicating that, the possible 
existence of rivalry effect being considered, the union still 
increased its membership more than the equilibrium level 
through Action 67. 
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Of course, the reality is not as simple as this. There exist 
some other factors. High turnover rate especially amongst the 
female staff in the industry, for instance, means that the 
union has to replace from 15 to 20 per cent of its total 
membership each year, whose value inevitably fluctuates. 
iii) Economic and Other Factors : Are there any direct causal 
relations between this shift and the business-cycle or 
organisation variables? Employment, for example, was 
increasing at the rate of 4.6 per cent and 9.8 per cent in the 
major English clearing banks including Midland Bank in these 
two years, which were above the average expansion of 
approximately 3 per cent a year between 1952 and 1989. 
We can also trace the exact behaviour of price inflation, 
actual average remuneration paid to staff in these years and 
the net profits of the banks to examine their effect upon union 
growth, The latter two series are available for all the major 
clearing banks after 1969. The effect of the oil shock at the 
end of 1973 is clearly observable in the banking industry. The 
clearing banks dropped their net profits from 20 to 55 per cent 
amidst the stagflation in 1974. However, as mentioned earlier, 
this did not directly hit pay negotiations, as it was rather 
subject to incomes policies. The implementation of a pay rise 
in the summer brought about substantial increases of 18 to 30 
per cent when the artificial restriction was lifted. This was 
followed by a boost in London and large town allowances. 
Consequently, 1974 saw one of the highest increases in 
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remuneration in the decade; real pay in the largest three banks 
and their associated companies increased by nearly 10 per cent, 
excluding the possible function of a dissatisfaction or a 
threat effect. As has been seen, the impact of the credit 
effect is dubious and it seems to be reasonable to assume that 
this shift was mainly caused by the organisational factors 
mentioned above.. 
Another organisational factor that may have affected union 
growth during this period is the merger of Midland's 
Association into A. S. T. M. S. in 1974. This event proved to be 
rather beneficial to N. U. B. E., as staff seems to have avoided 
the more militant A. S. T. M. S. and began joining N. U. B. E., 
although it was after 1976 when the members of Midland Bank 
Section started to transfer to N. U. B. E. 
N. U. B. E. moved swiftly to halt the decline in the clearing 
banks, although the measures they took may have depended upon 
their understanding of the cause of the loss. As short-run 
policies, it launched a national recruiting campaign with a 
particular emphasis upon the major clearing banks in 1975 and 
76, which succeeded in just halting further loss, and decided 
to ask ACAS for an enquiry into industrial relations in some 
clearing banks. As a long-run policy, it pressed for merger 
talks which it had started in 1971, being prompted by the move 
of A. S. T. M. S. As the talks reached a deadlock over the problem 
of centralization of the proposed merged union, it began 
looking into the possibility of winding-up the Council and 
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establishing separate negotiating machinery without the staff 
associations. 
It was only in 1976 when N. U. B. E. recovered temporarily from 
this defeat in the English clearing banks. Models generally 
underestimate union growth in this year. N. U. B. E. 's growth rate 
was approximately 6.5 per cent in the 'big four', exceeding the 
SA growth rate of 3.14 per cent in the largest three banks or 
just under 2 per cent including the estimated figure in Midland 
Bank. Between 1976 and 78 there was a slight recovery in the 
economy from the 1975 slump. Employment in the three banks 
increased some 2,200 in 1976. Since N. U. B. E. gained a net 
increase of 2,405 and staff associations 2,585, they seem to 
have recruited more from the non-organised section of the 
labour force, although union density itself was decreasing 
slowly in the long-run. 
Prices and incomes policies were still operational till they 
were completely abandoned and replaced by monetary policies in 
1979. Despite this, price inflation was prominent, possibly 
enhancing a general expectation of the staff upon a desirable 
rate of rise, and if dissatisfaction effect is to be observed 
in the 1970s, it would most probably be in 1976 or in 1977, 
when the standard of living deteriorated. Although it is 
difficult to confirm it empirically, it might have provided one 
of the reasons for union and SA growth in these years. 
Following the recruitment campaign in 1975, N. U. B. E. 
launched another campaign in the next year with a particular 
emphasis upon the English clearing banks, which it called 
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'Campaign 76'. In this campaign, an emphasis was put upon 
redundancies. In its background, there was rapidly increasing 
unemployment in the British economy, although it was still only 
5.8 per cent in 1977. In the banking industry, the problem 
first arose in some secondary banks. However, it also became a 
focus in the clearing banks when Midland Bank carried out a re- 
location of bank departments to Sheffield and a branch network 
review in the mid-1970s. Branches were leafleted, mass meetings 
were organised and some 26 temporary recruiters were deployed 
along side union organisers. 
Perhaps the result of the campaign should be said to have 
been modest in comparison with its scale and the increase in 
employment in the year. It did increase its membership by 11 
per cent in the Midland, but the growth rate in Barclays was 
merely 3 per cent, indicating a continuous function of 
organisational factors. 
The 1980s started with a slump which was carried over from 
1979. Business performance of the clearing banks was also 
relatively poor in the first half of the 1980s, the only 
exception being 1982 when the major banks increased their real 
profits by around 4 per cent. This situation was basically 
unchanged until 1985, although deregulation of the finance 
sector in the mid-1980s brought about an increasingly 
competitive product market and unstable patterns of bank 
performance. 
Trade unionism in Britain also underwent an era of winter in 
the 1980s. Total trade union membership started to decline in 
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1980, soon reaching a peak rate of -6.5 per cent in the next 
year, thereafter almost constantly decreasing by a few per cent 
every year. Part of this directly derives from the stagnation 
of the economy, which continuously diminished the size of the 
labour market between 1979 and 1986. Thereafter, employment 
began to increase, but many trade unions have failed to absorb 
the increase in potential membership. 
The experiences of trade unionism in the banking industry 
bear some similarities with as well as differences from this 
general pattern. Bifu, as it is called after 1979, again lost 
members in the English clearing banks continuously between 1977 
and 1982. But this is only partly explained by the rivalry 
effect, as two of the staff association and union, namely the 
NatWest Staff Association and the Lloyds Bank Group Staff 
Union, also stagnated between 1978 and 1982. However, during 
the same period, employment in most clearing banks was 
expanding at annual rates of 1 to 6 per cent, with the only 
exception in 1981. 
After this stagnation, Bifu increased its membership in the 
same category substantially in 1983, which possibly reflects 
dissatisfaction amongst the staff over some conditions of 
employment and the industrial action solely organised by the 
union. Then it again lost members between 1984 and 86, after 
which it succeeded in increasing its membership again. 
Growth models at the early stage of modelling largely failed 
to predict this complex pattern in Bifu growth. They 
substantially overestimated it in 1981,84 and 85, whereas 
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those in 1983 and 88 were underestimated. As will soon be seen, 
much of these deviations from the equilibrium growth derive 
from changes in the conditions of employment and the industrial 
actions taken by the union to remedy them, both of which were 
subtly affected by the rivalry effect. This can also be shown 
quantitatively, as the strategic union variable being properly 
specified, the models trace the behaviour of Bifu growth fairly 
accurately as shown in the previous section. 
It seems natural to assume that N. U. B. E. 's decision to 
withdraw from the J. N. C. in March 1978 derives from the 
membership loss between 1973 and 75 in the English clearing 
banks, although different attitudes towards pay negotiations 
and a lack of co-ordination on the staff side provided the 
executives with the opportunity. N. U. B. E. 's withdrawal was 
immediately followed by that of the Federation, making all 
joint national negotiations inoperable. Domestic negotiations 
were consequently carried out separately between the banks and 
N. U. B. E., and the banks and the staff associations without 
formal procedural agreements for a few years. This major break- 
down in the industrial relations system may have put the staff 
off from trade unionism to some extent. 
N. U. B. E. increased its total membership by approximately 20 
per cent between 1978 and 82, but much of this increase took 
place outside the banking industry, particularly by absorptions 
of staff associations in the insurance sector, and when it 
changed its name to the present Banking, Insurance and Finance 
Union ( Bifu ) in April 1979, about half of its membership were 
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outside the London clearing banks, and some 20 per cent were 
outside the banking industry. 38 The decline between 1978 and 
82 in the clearing banks seems to be explained by two factors; 
a rivalry effect and economic factors, although the presence of 
institutional industrial actions may have affected the general 
pattern. 
The first point can be justified because the decline in Bifu 
membership largely took place in Barclays Bank, where it lost 
5,400 members, or nearly 30 per cent, in the four years with a 
peak in 1979, which largely off-set modest increases at 
National Westminster and Lloyds. During the same period, 
Barclay's association, which became Barclays Group Staff Union 
in August 1980, increased its membership by over 4,000, or 
approximately 11 per cent. However, this explains only a part, 
as the membership loss of N. U. B. E. started in 1977 whereas it 
was only in 1980 when B. G. S. U. 's growth rate exceeded that of 
employment in the group. Hence it seems to be reasonable to 
assume that a long-term rivalry effect had been constantly 
present, but the second business-cycle factor pushed down both 
Bifu and SU growth. This point will be discussed later In the 
chapter. 
The success of Bifu in the Midland Bank shows a marked 
contrast with this, again indicating a crucial function of the 
external organisational factor. Its growth rate in the bank 
reached a peak of just under 20 per cent in 1978,4 years after 
the transfer of the association into A. S. T. M. S., although an 
influx of members seems to have started in the very year of the 
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transfer. This may reflects a general preference of the staff, 
who tend to demarcate themselves from militant manual trade 
unionism. A new procedural agreement, in which the bank dropped 
its previous neutrality and announced its recommendation to 
staff to join one of the recognized trade unions, also came 
into effect in December of this year. 
The second one is the business-cycle factors which may also 
explain the stagnation in SA/SU membership. The presence of 
high inflation especially before 1982, dwindling profits in 
major banks and the existence of a massive number of the 
unemployed which reached over 10 per cent in the beginning of 
the 1980s may have lowered the expectation of the employees 
upon pay as well as collective, bargaining, thus making the 
appearance of general dissatisfaction more improbable. 
However, in 1979, there were two institutional disputes 
between the union and Lloyds, and the union and Midland Banks. 
The dispute in Lloyds was over an extension of opening hours 
for 'in-house' cashpoints, against which an industrial action 
was taken in some branches where experiments with the new 
working practice took place at the beginning of the year. 
Another industrial action was carried out in the Midland Bank 
Computer Centres, a new strategic point of union actions, over 
pay. Under the auspices of ACAS, an improved pay offer was 
obtained in June, which set a standard for other clearing 
banks. However, the effect of both industrial actions upon 
union growth seems to have been rather marginal in comparison 
with organisational factors. 
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In July 1980, Bifu reconstituted its expanding 
organisational structure by setting up the English Clearing 
Bank Section for the purpose of co-ordinating the negotiations 
with the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers. It was 
partly a move set against the launch of the Clearing Bank Union 
which followed a failure of the Johnston merger talks, but 
increasingly complicated structure of the large organisation 
had already caused some drawbacks in comparison with the house 
unions and association. It was the fourth section to be created 
in Bifu. 
1981 saw a major industrial action over pay, which ended in 
failure. The union launched a 20 per cent pay claim towards the 
end of 1980, which it claimed to be necessary for the 
maintenance and an improvement in living standards of the 
members. Similar claims had been submitted by the union for 
successive years, reflecting the high price inflation in the 
midst of the slump between 1979 and 1981, although a slight 
recovery in profits in the clearing banks gave the union 
another ground for their claim. The Federation's final offer of 
a 10 per cent increase was rejected by the union and two stages 
of strikes and overtime bans were held at Lloyds and Barclays 
Computer Centres in March, and then in the High Street branches 
of the clearing banks as well as the Bankers' Automated 
Clearing Services which is used by all the clearing banks for 
direct debits, credits and standing orders, in April and May. 
Bifu claimed that the action was a 'total success', closing 
down 300 branches. 
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Despite the fact that Bifu members are more inclined to 
support 'unionate' actions than those organised into SA/SU, the 
attitudes amongst the SA/SU members showed a marked contrast 
with those held by Bifu members. The C. B. U. ballot' in early 
April indicated that 70 per cent of its members who returned 
the ballot papers expressed an acceptance with a 10 per cent 
offer, upon which C. B. U. announced non-cooperation of the Bifu 
action. Bifu members balloted to accept the offer in May 
against its executives strong recommendation to take further 
industrial action. There seems to have been some objection to 
industrial action in the midst of depression even amongst the 
members. However, the General Secretory, Mills, gave a positive 
comment upon the effect of the action on membership in the same 
month. 
"While a number of members had left the Union because of 
disagreement over the recent industrial action, a far greater 
number had actually joined us. So far this year, the total 
Union membership has increased by almost a net 3,000 and the 
majority of those come from the English clearing banks. "39 
However, the extent of dissatisfaction cannot be over- 
emphasized. In May, for instance, it was only about 15 per cent 
of the organised staff who voted for the recommendation to take 
militant action, probably indicating a discrepancy between the 
intention of union executives and the preference held by the 
majority of the employees. 40 Despite its Autumn Membership 
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Campaign, union growth in this year was negligible, just 
compensating for the loss derived from staff turnover. External 
organisational or structural factors still seems to have been 
prominent, as it did increase its membership in the Midland by 
some 600 or 3.4 per cent, but lost about the same number in 
Barclays. 
Compared with this, the effect of the industrial action over 
the Christmas holiday in 1983 is important. Despite the fact 
that Bifu again failed to force its demand, an increase in 
membership indicates that the action was backed by more wide- 
spread dissatisfaction amongst the staff. In the strike ballot 
held later in 1983,53 per cent of the members voted in favour 
of a half-day strike on December 23rd, and Bifu succeeded in 
attracting some staff though the campaign. 
"At a time when nearly all unions are losing members, there has 
been a massive influx of new members into Bifu. Some thousands 
of clearing bank staff have joined the Union during the past 
four weeks and this trend continues, clearly indicating the 
concern of staff over the loss of their half-day holiday at 
Christmas. ', 41 
Bifu succeeded in obtaining some support from a certain section 
of staff unions and it consequently increased its membership by 
over 8 per cent in this year, whereas SA/SU growth was minimal. 
This effect is captured by a dummy variable in the model. 
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However, there seems to be some grounds to assume that the 
observable dissatisfaction of the employees derives from some 
other factors as well. This is especially so, as a similar 
dispute in 1978 failed to attract much attention of the staff. 
Again, it can be argued for a rather subtle influence of 
economic variables at the aggregate level, as this coincides 
with a general recovery in economy, although it was only in 
Lloyds which substantially improved its performance in this 
year. In addition to this, i) A re-introduction of Saturday 
opening was started in Barclays in mid-1982 using the 
volunteers, which was soon to be followed by other clearing 
banks and ii) A review of staffing and branch network was 
announced or actually started in the Midland, Barclays and the 
Co-op, which caused a threat of redundancy even in the clearing 
banks. This move derives from firms' adapting to the changing 
economic situation and the introduction of new technology. 
42 In 
fact, most of these factors are mentioned by some staff as 
reasons of their dissatisfaction in the union literature and it 
seems to be the cumulative effects of plural factors which made 
the staff back the union action. 43 
There was also a dispute between Midland Bank and Bifu over 
shift patterns of staff who worked at the Heathrow branch which 
started in the end of January when the bank suspended several 
Bifu members for refusing to follow a new working custom. In 
three weeks, the union succeeded in obtaining the reinstatement 
of all members, new shift patterns and some compensation. Some 
increase in union membership was also observed in Williams & 
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Glyn's Bank, which announced a merger with the Royal Bank of 
Scotland. Uncertainties and the threat of redundancy caused the 
staff in the former bank to join Bifu and it achieved a density 
of over 80 per cent in the course of 1983. 
In 1984, Bifu lost its membership approximately by 1.2 per 
cent, most of which took place in the major clearing banks and 
international banks, although growth of SA/SU was also minimal. 
Bifu's loss in the clearing banks was the third severest in its 
post-war history, following 1973 and 74, and 1964. The General 
Secretary referred to this as 'number of deletions from the 
membership records made at the beginning of the year. '44 This 
year was far from uneventful. National Westminster, Lloyds and 
Midland, for instance, announced Saturday re-opening using 
voluntary staff in autumn and winter. From the fact that an 
increase in Bifu membership took place in the latter half of 
this year, it seems reasonable to assume a negative effect of 
an industrial action which took place within Bifu, which a 
journalist referred to as 'one of the longest and most 
embarrassing industrial disputes'. 45 
Bifu's senior officials provoked a strike in the beginning 
of March 1984 when the union management committee refused to 
negotiate over its plan to make a data control manager at 
Bifu's Wimbledon headquarters compulsorily redundant. The 
strike was soon made official by the Association of 
Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff ( APEX ), 
the union that represented the union officials, and joined by 
the area officials as well as some 60 clerical staff. It was 
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speculated that at the core was a belief of Bifu executives 
that its full-time officials were too powerful. 
Although the dispute ended with an interim reinstalment of 
the official in the beginning of April, it directly affected 
this year's pay negotiation as well as the merger talks with 
the C. B. U.. The Federation informally suggested a 0.25 per cent 
increase in addition to the previously offered 5 per cent. 
Bifu's executive accepted this, as the dispute did not allow 
the proper function of Bifu as a trade union. This caused 
complications as C. B. U. had already started balloting its 
member on industrial action over the 5 per cent offer. An 
B. G. S. U. official reported briefly in its journal, Staff 
Matters, in April that, 
"the betrayal of staff by the minority banking union BIFU has 
led to a flood of new members for B. G. S. U. "46 
To what extent can the membership loss of Bifu be attributable 
to this 'embarrassing strike'? A rough estimation by the model 
indicates that the residual for this year is approximately -2 
per cent. As this includes the rivalry effect which derives 
from the dispute, this year's growth rate may have been well 
over 2 per cent higher if it had not been for the strike. 
At least part of Bifu's loss in the clearing banks in the 
next year is nominal, as Williams & Glyn's Bank merged with the 
Royal Bank of Scotland in September, replacing some 5,400 
members' classification within the union. At the same time, the 
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merger between Barclays Plc and Barclays international 
increased Bifu membership of the English Clearing Bank Section 
by some 3,700. Therefore these institutional changes account 
for some 1,600 membership loss in the Section without affecting 
the total Bifu membership. Correcting for this transfer, its 
growth rate is approximately -2 per cent, which is only 
marginally lower than the estimated value. 
Major loss in this year comes from Lloyds and Barclays. This 
probably reflects a short-run as well as a long-term rivalry 
effect. In this year, the C. B. U. 's pay ballot showed a majority 
of 56 per cent for industrial action for the first time, 
rejecting a Federation's final offer of 5.5 per cent, and the 
support amongst B. G. S. U. membership was particularly 
outstanding. Bifu sought arbitration after C. B. U. 's decision to 
accept 6.5 per cent after the ballot without success. 
Structural factors are also present as Bifu continuously lost 
members in Lloyds between 1984 and 1986 and in Barclays almost 
every year after 1972. A strike of maintenance workers over 
proposed job cuts in the National Westminster Bank may also 
have had some membership effect. 
Mid-1980s saw a beginning of a series of institutional 
changes in the industrial relations system in the industry, 
which generally corresponded with a deregulation policy 
favoured by the Conservative government. Midland Bank withdrew 
from the Federation of the London Clearing Bank Employers 
towards the end of 1985. This left only three banks at the 
table of national negotiations, as Williams & Glyns also 
370 
defected when it merged with the Royal Bank of Scotland. The 
'Big Bang', a financial deregulation in 1986 and the Building 
Societies Act effected in January 1987, significantly 
intensified the competition between the commercial banks, 
merchant banks and the building societies. 
General dissatisfaction amongst the staff in the mid-1980s 
seems to reflect the banks' attempt to acquire competitiveness 
to adjust themselves into this change in the product market by 
cutting costs and extending the services they offered. 
47 
Although Bifu executives failed to mobilize its members into 
industrial action in 1986, they were backed by a majority 
voting for an overtime ban when the Federation imposed a5 per 
cent awardin the next year. Although a series of proposed one 
day strikes was rejected in the same ballot, the extent of 
dissatisfaction can also be seen from the fact that over 60 per 
cent of Barclays and Lloyds Staff Unions' members voted for an 
overtime ban, which became the first industrial actions in 
their history. B. G. S. U. 's industrial action was immediately 
followed by that of Bifu and L. B. G. S. U. in June and the same 
action by Bifu started at the end of September in the Midland 
Bank. It was in the midst of this industrial action when the 
National Westminster Bank announced its intention to withdraw 
from the Federation with immediate effect in July, which 
consequently halted all national negotiations in the industry. 
Bifu also took industrial action in the T. S. B. England and 
Wales over staffing levels. 
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The industrial actions were only partly successful. Out of 
the four banks involved, Lloyds and National Westminster 
offered an improved pay award, thus ending the dispute, whereas 
Barclays and Midland refused any compromise. B. G. S. U. stepped 
down from the dispute and Bifu executives' attempt to escalate 
the action gathered only poor support from its members. 
The effects of this dispute upon union growth varies in 
banks. In Barclays, where both Bifu and SU lost, Bifu decreased 
its membership by nearly 4 per cent, or some 600, although 
B. G. S. U. steadily increased by over 4 per cent. In National 
Westminster, where the NatWest Staff Association did not take 
industrial action, Bifu's growth rate reached well over 8 per 
cent, whereas SA also increased its membership by approximately 
4 per cent. In Lloyds, where employment increased by 3,900 in 
this year, Bifu gained only 400 members whereas L. B. G. S. U. grew 
by 10 per cent, attracting some 2,300 employees. In Midland, 
despite the failure of the action, Bifu increased its 
membership by about 5 per cent, which is about the same figure 
as the previous year. 
Here, we can see several factors interacting simultaneously, 
consequently creating the pattern of growth. Rivalry effects 
seem to be present in Barclays and Lloyds, which brought about 
different results for similar industrial actions. However, the 
higher growth rate of SU in Lloyds may indicate an existence of 
a dissatisfaction or credit effect. A short-run effect is 
observable in National Westminster, although steady growth of 
its staff association may indicate the existence of a 
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structural factor, too. Steady growth of Bifu in Midland mainly 
derives from the nonexistence of a rivalry effect in the bank, 
as M. S. F. was gradually losing its control. 
Bifu also renewed publicity activities towards the end of 
the 1980s, which included the modernisation of its journal, 
Bifu Report, and the provision of comprehensive financial 
services to its members including mortgages, travel and car 
insurance and personal loans. It probably requires some time to 
see to what extent such a move will fill the gap between the 
services offered by SA/SU and Bifu. Industrial action taken 
after the collapse of the system of national negotiations are 
inevitably institutional in nature and their effects upon 
overall union growth also seem to be limited. These include an 
overtime ban over extended opening hours in Lloyds in October 
1988, Barclays' DP strike over pay in July 1989 and an overtime 
ban in Lloyds over pay in the same month. 
Associations after the War 
After the reorganisation of the staff associations in Barclays, 
Lloyds, Districts and Martins in order to comply with the 
requirements of the war-time Conditions of Employment and 
National Arbitration Order 1940, staff associations began 
transforming themselves into independent trade unions, although 
early negotiations were more opportunities for consultation, in 
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which employers may or may not show an intention of adopting 
the request put forwarded by the associations. 
The associations not only had no intention or power to 
compel employers but no means to do so. As N. U. B. E. accused 
them later before the Cameron Enquiry, the associations had no 
constitutional power to call for withdrawal of labour, and it 
was only in the beginning of 1953 when Lloyds Bank Staff 
Association signed an institutional arbitration agreement with 
the bank, which was followed by all major clearing banks save 
Barclays. 48 However, it was not until 1961 when the 
association referred its differentials claim to an Arbitration 
Tribunal, which was followed by the same move of Westminster 
Bank Guild in 1963. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to 
argue that the staff associations and the Central Council of 
the Bank Staff Associations had some influence upon pay 
negotiations; one of the earliest examples goes back to the 
acquisition of a6 per cent cash payment in 1942. 
This structural feature of the staff associations supported 
tightly by the banks generally enabled them to maintain stable 
growth in the early years. It was only in Barclays where 
N. U. B. E. was recognized by the management, and the associations 
were in a superior position in terms of the facilities provided 
for, for instance, meetings and distribution of literature. 
Discriminatory attitudes of managements are believed to have 
affected the behaviour of a large number of staff, particularly 
those in the upper-tier of the labour market, who attempted to 
avoid risking career prospects. We can reasonably assume that 
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this may result in equilibrium growth as shown in the earlier 
section of this chapter. 
Despite this, as has been seen in Chapter 4, long-term 
growth of many associations fell short of that of employment, 
consequently decreasing union density in the clearing banks. 
Female density was particularly on the decline, whereas 
N. U. B. E. maintained a relatively small number of employees with 
more commitment. Behind this was also increasing turnover rates 
amongst those employees in the secondary market. 
Short-run losses in membership seem to have had to do with a 
wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst the staff, which was more 
effectively absorbed and mobilised by N. U. B. E. This may not 
have been the case in 1950 when N. U. B. E. organised a national 
petition over its pay claim, but certainly the case in 1955 
when its 'Programme for Progress' attracted substantial support 
from the employees. The staff associations were not inactive 
and some took a similar approach, formulating their own 
proposals of salary structure. But the move came only towards 
the end of the year and was obviously superseded by that of 
N. U. B. E. in their comprehensiveness of the proposal and 
publicity. National Provincial Bank Staff Association was one 
of the severely hit and lost around 4 per cent in this year, 
which was followed by the Westminster Bank Guild. Midland Bank 
Staff Association increased one per cent, but a new staff 
association backed by the management had just been launched in 
1953 and was on course for expansion of a formative era. 
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A sharp increase in SA membership in 1959 and 1960 seems to 
reflect the fastest expansion of the industry throughout the 
1950s and the 1960s. Employment increased by around 6,000, half 
of which was absorbed by the associations. The second wave of 
SA growth in 1963 and 64 was hypothesized in an earlier section 
as a cause of the decrease in N. U. B. E. membership. The upsurge 
in SA membership started in Westminster Bank in 1963. This 
probably reflects dissatisfaction of the staff in the bank over 
pay as well as Westminster Bank Guild's success in obtaining an 
improvement through arbitration in this year. Then in 1964 came 
Barclays Bank Staff Association's campaign for the 'rate for 
the job', through which inferior employment conditions of 
female staff were claimed to have been significantly rectified. 
In 1967 and 68, the staff associations generally lost 
members. There is no doubt that there was a rivalry effect of 
N. U. B. E. 's 'Action 67', but generally stable patterns of 
associations' growth seem to have been shown on this occasion, 
too. B. B. S. A. 's growth rate was 0 per cent, which probably 
reflects the inaccuracy of the data, and that of L. B. S. A. was - 
1.3 per cent whereas N. P. S. A. lost members almost by 10 per 
cent. The smallest District Bank Staff Association was the most 
vulnerable and its growth rate in the year was well under -20 
per cent. This means that membership shift from staff 
associations to N. U. B. E. was basically confined within three 
banks and a substantial part of the vast increase in the union 
membership derives from the non-organised section. 
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Probably the most plausible hypothesis of these marked 
institutional differences in growth rates is the 'threat 
effect' caused by the proposed merger to form the National 
Westminster Bank. Since the house associations are also subject 
to re-organisation, many staff transferred from them to the 
national industrial union for the sake of job security. The 
result was a substantial increase in N. U. B. E. membership in the 
three banks. The merger was carried out in September 1969 but 
it was only after 1971 when the N. W. B. S. A. actually started 
increasing its membership. 
Naturally the merger between Barclays and Martins had a 
different effect upon union growth. Barclays was the largest 
amongst the 'big four' even after the formation of the National 
Westminster, and the transfer of some 3,000 members of Martins 
Bank Staff Association Into Barclays' Association was carried 
out smoothly in December 1969. A threat effect, if there was 
any, seems to have been confined to a small number of 
employees. 
In the 1970s, the image of moderate and ineffective staff 
associations was becoming more and more anachronistic, despite 
the fact that many retained the sense of loyalty to the 
institutions often held by older employees and that it took 
another 20 years for the associations to mobilise the staff 
into a first moderate industrial action. The effectiveness and 
the moderateness had matched with the preference held by the 
majority of the employees, and it seems to have affected growth 
to a certain extent. 
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It was mainly the Barclay's association which significantly 
increased its membership in the first half of the 1970s, 
consequently pushing up the total SA membership from 57,600 in 
1970 to 82,400 in 1975. This makes a contrast with two other 
staff associations in National Westminster and Lloyds Banks. 
National Westminster Bank Staff Association did increase its 
membership after 1971, but its growth rate was moderate, a few 
per cent, which gradually improved towards 1977. Lloyds Bank 
Staff Association's growth generally followed a similar path to 
that of National Westminster's association, indicating the 
existence of similar economic and organisational situations as 
well as actions taken by the associations. 
Growth models largely fail to predict SA growth in this 
period, particularly between 1971 and 1974, through which the 
pre-JNC distribution of the membership pattern re-emerged in 
the industry. However, at least a certain part of it, 
especially that of B. B. S. A., derives from organisational 
changes. Much of a sharp increase in membership of B. B. S. A. in 
1969, for instance, can be explained by an absorption of the 
3,000 strong Martins Bank Staff association in December, which 
followed the merger of the two parent banks. This increase 
being controlled, B. B. S. A. 's growth rate in the year is 
negligible. Similarly, a full integration of Barclays 
Commonwealth Dominion and Overseas into Barclays Bank was 
carried out in 1972, which entailed some re-adjustment of the 
bank's organisational structure and a transfer of staff. 
B. B. S. A. started a recruitment in this N. U. B. E. stronghold, and 
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claimed that a 'large number of the staff of International' had 
joined the association. 
49 In the models, such a transfer is 
generally captured by a shift in the employment variable. 
However, B. B. S. A. 's growth, particularly that between 1972 
and 1974, was much more than these institutional changes 
brought about. What was behind the B. B. S. A. 's exceptional 
performance? Identification of such factors is not an easy 
task. Union officials seem to attribute it to its effective 
function and attractive services in comparison with N. U. B. E. 
This is probably so, but it is also necessary to note the fact 
that B. B. S. A., B. G. S. A. or B. G. S. U. had never achieved, and 
have never achieved, such growth throughout its history, from 
which we can assume that there may have been some changes on 
the demand side, which N. U. B. E. perhaps failed to deal with 
effectively. 
Probably one of the factors of the growth of the association 
was staff re-structuring, which started in the spring of 1971 
and reached the level of appointed staff in domestic branches 
in the autumn of 1973. The transfer of Barclays Foreign Branch 
staff into Barclays Bank International was a part of the 
management's attempt at re-organisation. Many staff were 
actually re-deployed in May 1971. An association's executive 
who toured around the country at this time surprisingly found 
that, 
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"Bank staff are literally waiting to be asked to become members 
of the Association. The wave of members could well become a 
flood in a very short time. ""50 
Economic factors may have had some role, as the profit of 
the bank soared in the short-lived Barber Boom, consequently 
pushing up the expectation of a desirable standard of 
remuneration, whereas it was only in 1972 that pay increased 
significantly in real terms. However, this function of 
business-cycle variables may have been very limited in nature, 
as the economic conditions of the staff of, say, the National 
Westminster Bank were similar to those in Barclays. External 
organisational factors, such as an employer's attitude, does 
not explain this case either, as Barclays' management had been 
one of the most liberal amongst the English clearing banks and 
the majority membership held by N. U. B. E. until 1972 originally 
derives from an early recognition of the union by its 
management in 1941. 
Probably another explanation of this growth lies in 
N. U. B. E. 's difficulty in coping with purely institutional 
matters as effectively as the association. Criticising N. U. B. E. 
policies and its organizational structure, an editor of the 
B. B. S. A. journal, News Letters, wrote in 1972. 
"N. U. B. E. has recently decided to reduce the staff that it 
provides to negotiate for its members in Barclays Bank from 
August 1972. One official is available for well over 20,000 
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N. U. B. E. members. That official also has responsibilities to 
negotiate in another Clearing Bank and at least one Bank 
outside the Clearing System. ... N. U. B. E. proposed that the 
Staff Negotiating Committee should meet twice a month. At the 
present time the Association meets the Bank as often as 
necessary bearing in mind the number of outstanding subjects at 
any given moment. It is rare for there to be less than two 
meetings with the Bank each week and quite often meetings take 
place everyday. "51 
It is difficult to verify such differences in the function of 
two organisations at grass-roots level, but if this was the 
case, the behaviour of union growth fits into the classical 
cost-benefit criteria of economic man, as, quite apart from the 
problem of general preference about a desirable form of 
collective bargaining, staff choose one rather than another 
simply because it offers better services at lower cost. A 
desirable theory probably requires both, namely economic 
maximization and sociological preferences that derive from 
being located in hierarchical organisations. 
Staff associations generally maintained high growth rates 
thereafter, much of which is attributable to National 
Westminster Bank Staff Association and Lloyds Bank Staff 
Association this time., although their expansion was slowed down 
by the recession towards the end of the 1970s. As explained 
earlier, at least some of these increases seem to be 
attributable to a swing-back from N. U. B. E. to the staff 
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associations, although this effect is not prominent in 
B. G. S. A., which had a massive increase in the beginning of the 
1970s. This also reflects some institutional changes. Some of 
the noticeable SA growth in 1977, for instance, was due to the 
National Westminster's Technical and Services Union's vote to 
transfer its engagements to the association, which resulted in 
a net increase of nearly 2,000 in its membership. 
Generally speaking, the associations and unions' performance 
was not particularly outstanding between 1978 and 82, even if 
they superseded that of Bifu. Here, the recession overshadowing 
the industry as well as its industrial relations system may be 
important. There was a gradual recovery in their membership 
towards the end of the decade, often with a short-run cyclical 
fluctuation in alternate years. The average annual growth rate 
of -1.2 per cent amongst the three associations and unions in 
1982 improved approximately to 5.9 per cent in 1987. 
The only exception to this general pattern can be found in 
1980. This is due to a rapid increase in B. G. S. A. ( B. G. S. U. 
after August 1980 ) membership in this year. There is not 
enough evidence to assume a significant function for 
institutional changes, such as the launch of the Clearing Bank 
Union in the beginning of August. The same is true of the 
business-cycle variables, as employment growth was very 
limited. Probably a more plausible factor is rivalry effect, as 
Bifu severely decreased its membership in Barclays between 1979 
and 1982, the severest loss occurring in 1979 and 1980. The 
cause of this outflow now looks more structural, and the growth 
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pattern of Bifu in the major English clearing banks suggests 
that the establishment of the English Clearing Bank Section 
within the union did not alter the basic situation. There seems 
to be an enough ground to assume that such a tendency can 
continue in so far as the structural factors will not be 
eliminated. 
Models fail to predict a down turn of SA membership in 1981 
and, especially, that in 1982. The loss in 1981 was caused by 
Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union and that in 1982 by NatWest Staff 
Association as well as B. G. S. U. whose membership almost stood 
still. A major cause of a decrease in L. B. G. S. U. seems to be a 
decrease in employment itself, which diminished by 2.5 per cent 
in this year, although this is not the case of N. W. S. A. 
There is also some grounds to argue that the stagnation in 
the staff associations and unions' membership in the beginning 
of the 1980s also reflects the recession. Most of the clearing 
banks recorded minus growth in their profits between 1980 and 
1984, and unemployment was a realistic threat even to the 
workers in banking, the labour aristocrats in the service 
industries, which probably reduced a general preference among 
them for unionate actions as well as for collective bargaining. 
The results of the early ballots conducted by the C. B. U. 
probably reflect this as well as the mental attitude of the 
majority of the employees to refrain from unionate actions 
adopted by manual unions. 
In a sense, the fact that the C. B. U. started balloting its 
members on industrial action itself is a major departure from 
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the previous policies that the constituent associations used to 
take. This move may have derived from two factors. One is a 
long-run shift in the character of the associations and unions 
themselves, which probably reflects a historical shift in the 
general preference of the employees to a certain extent. 'In the 
terms of Blackburn et al, they were becoming more and more 
unionate. Another is an institutional change that the breakdown 
of the national and domestic machineries brought about. The 
associations and unions failed to obtain an employers' 
concession to include an unilateral arbitration clause in the 
post-machinery procedural agreements which were mostly signed 
in the beginning of the 1980s. Conciliation by ACAS was as far 
as the employers were prepared to go under the dual system of 
collective bargaining divided into Bifu and the associations 
and unions. 52 
When Bifu took industrial action to improve the 10 per cent 
final offer of the Federation in 1981 without success, the 
C. B. U. also conducted a pay ballot as its joint clerical and T 
&S negotiating teams also rejected the offer. Although members 
showed substantial concern about the pay issue and 
approximately 70 per cent of the 48,000 issued paper was 
returned to the newly organised union, the support for 
industrial action in the midst of the recession was low and it 
was only 26 per cent of those who voted who expressed approval 
of the action. 53 
Then in August 1982, Barclays Bank started piloting Saturday 
re-opening at its 34 branches, which was soon extended to other 
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branches. B. G. S. U. 's attitude survey conducted at that time 
showed that employees were generally concerned that the Bank 
would transform a voluntary attendance system into a compulsory 
one and, in fact, two out of three were against it regardless 
of the terms offered to volunteers. 54 Despite this, staff 
dissatisfaction did not materialise. B. G. S. U. conducted a 
ballot on taking limited industrial action in the summer when 
the bank refused to negotiate on provision for time off in lieu 
for Saturday opening, but the General Committee's 
recommendation was roundly rejected; only 45 per cent of the 
members expressed any views, amongst whom some 25 per cent 
supported the action. 55 
It was not until towards the end of 1983 when general 
dissatisfaction among employees was observed. This led to a 
recovery in the associations and unions' membership as well as 
that of Bifu. In this year, Bifu's acceptance of a5 per cent 
offer came in the spring as it failed to mobilise its members 
for strike action, a two to one majority voting against it. 
C. B. U. executives' attempt to improve this through arbitration 
also failed, as the Federation refused on the grounds of Bifu's 
acceptance and the union's recommendation to suspend unpaid 
overtime was largely ignored by its members. 56 
Then towards the mid-1980s, many staff came to accept more 
unionate actions to force their demands, which eventually 
resulted in the first industrial action by two of the staff 
unions in 1987. Behind this, there seems to be the cumulative 
effects of a series of institutional changes by the banks to 
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make them more competitive, by extending the services they 
offer and by cutting operational costs; Saturday openings, 
abolition of early closing on Christmas Eve, a branch network 
review and the integration of international banks were planned. 
Saturday re-opening started in Barclays in 1982 and was 
extended to other English clearing banks in 1985. Barclays' 
branch network review was curried out spending 5 years in the 
mid-1980s, which accompanied a number of branch closures and 
downgradings. At about the same time, Lloyds Bank introduced 
Activity Value Analysis into Head Office Departments, which 
L. B. G. S. U. described as the 'biggest cost-cutting operation 
Lloyds Bank had ever introduced'. Then two mergers of 
international banks were carried out in January 1985 and 
January 1986; Barclays Bank and Barclays Bank International, 
and Lloyds Bank and Lloyds Bank International. 
A pay ballot conducted by B. G. S. U. in the spring of 1984 
showed that, amongst 60 per cent of members who actually voted, 
86 per cent of the clerical staff considered a5 per cent offer 
by the Federation unfair, and 54 per cent were ready to take 
industrial action. Less enthusiastic support for industrial 
action in the same ballot taken by NatWest Staff Association, 
in which 61 per cent voted and 32 per cent voted for an 
industrial action, may reflect a relative lack of common 
concerns of staff in the bank. 57 Then, in the 1985 pay ballot 
in April, 56 per cent among those voted ( 57 per cent of 
total ) expressed their support for an overtime ban rather than 
accepting an employers' final offer of 5.5 per cent. Staff were 
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particularly militant in Barclays and its staff union claimed 
that a 'huge majority' was in favour of industrial action. 
58 
Bifu also rejected the offer, which consequently resulted in an 
improvement to 6.5 per cent. 
In the course of a membership campaign in the summer of 
1984, an B. G. S. U. organiser mentioned a possible function of 
the saturation effect in its journal. 
"As B. G. S. U. membership continues to climb, recruitment can 
become more difficult because of the 'hard-core' non-member 
element. " 
In fact, dual membership and pensioner members being 
disregarded, total union density was nearly 80 per cent in 
1985. However, despite the historical shift in membership 
composition between Bifu and B. G. S. U., density itself had not 
changed markedly. Total nominal union density in the bank was 
75.4 per cent in 1970 and 72.4 per cent in 1980, which may be a 
standard at which the 'saturation effect' can be expected. 
Density has been continuously high sometimes showing decreases. 
Certainly an historically unique pattern of development of 
trade unionism in the industry influenced such patterns. At the 
same time, changing composition of the labour force, such as 
the increasing number of female as well as part-time employees, 
also affected this. 
1987 saw a first industrial action conducted by two of the 
staff unions, namely B. G. S. U. and L. B. G. S. U., which followed 
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the imposition of 5 per cent by the Federation at the ACAS 
conciliation meeting in April. Although members' reaction to 
the B. G. S. U. 's industrial action ballot in May was negative, 
only 40 per cent returning the ballot paper, 60 per cent voted 
for an overtime ban and non-cooperation with the introduction 
of new debit cards. The support was particularly strong in the 
North and the London area. 59 Ballot of L. B. G. S. U. also 
exceeded its requirement of 60 per cent for such an action, but 
only 53 per cent of the members of NatWest Staff Association 
voted for industrial action, whereas the association still 
maintained a tighter constitution, in which a vote of at least 
75 per cent of those voting is required to authorise an action. 
The dissolution of the Federation in July 1987, which ceased 
national negotiations in the industry, inevitably brought about 
the problem concerning the functions of the C. B. U. Following 
the L. B. G. S. U. 's decision to withdraw, the C. B. U. finally voted 
to dissolve itself in November with effect from 30th April 
1988. This, of course, did not affect membership patterns 
much, and the association and unions maintained growth rates of 
3 to 8 per cent in this year. 
4. Summary 
The result of the empirical research generally reaffirms the 
results of quantitative analysis. Unlike the previous aggregate 
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study where the business-cycle variables appeared as the 
crucial determinants of short-run growth, union growth, 
particularly at the industry level, is rather generated by 
organisation variables, which may or may not relate to the 
utilitarian construction of the original theory. 
As also suggested and shown in the models in Chapter 4, this 
mainly derives from qualitative differences and structural 
changes of the causal processes; the part that the business- 
cycle variables played in the aggregate study is replaced by 
organisational factors, which have probably become 
intermittently but increasingly significant determinants. The 
estimated order of significance of such determinants in growth 
models shown in Chapter 4 were strategy variable, lagged 
employment and density, and the effect of an organisational 
shift. This pattern is roughly applicable to both the Bifu and 
SA models in this chapter, indicating that despite the presence 
of fierce inter-union competition, the logic of growth of the 
two organizations is somewhat similar. 
In the Bifu model, the effect of the strategy variable is 
overwhelming, which is followed by the density, rivalry and 
lagged employment factors. Thus, it can be argued that the 
increasingly powerful function of the union enabled it to 
control its own strategic behaviour as a new, dominant 
determinant of its own growth. In the SA model, on the other 
hand, the rivalry variable that the state regulation of labour 
relations in 1940 brought about appears as the most significant 
short-run determinant, followed by the effect of a historically 
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specific swing in union-association membership composition, 
lagged employment, a strategic factor and density. 
The theoretical implications of these- results requires 
consideration. The examination of the most effective industrial 
action in 1967 suggests that' union growth was largely achieved 
prior to the industrial action, as a reaction of staff to 
coercive policies taken by management and the government, from 
which a 'prototype pattern' of short-run union growth could be 
derived. Without the existence of an effective process of 
collective bargaining, certain conditions of employment imposed 
by the management can cause wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst 
staff. In the absence of effective staff associations, this 
dissatisfaction could be largely absorbed and mobilized by 
N. U. B. E. This process is the same as that observed in pre-war 
B. O. G. growth. 
Such dissatisfaction can often be found in relation to pay, 
other conditions of employment and employment stability. These 
factors not only often co-exist, but their effects are 
intensified by organizational mobilization, and probably 
provided the background for union growth in such years as 1951 
and 52,55,67,76,83 and 87. Thus, the business-cycle 
variables can be expected to capture a partial effect of the 
changes in economic conditions. 
The term 'dissatisfaction' or 'threat' was used to signify 
the causal process between the pay factor and union growth, 
which can be understood in terms of at least two dimensions; 
severity and duration. The relation is not necessarily 
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straightforward. An assumption' that employees would not be 
responsive to a minor change in remuneration could not be 
statistically proved. 60 Reliability of the 'remuneration 
series at the industry level and a simultaneous function of 
plural factors make assessment difficult. It was also seen that 
certain structural factors such as changing structure of the 
composition of the labour force can also bring about a 
deviation from the equilibrium growth path. 
The most plausible hypothesis about the immediate function 
of retail price inflation is, as a profit series, its influence 
upon the aggregate expectation of the rate of change in 
remuneration and a tendency of price inflation to bring down 
the standard of living. This may be especially so where no 
effective system of collective bargaining is established. 
Such an inference leads to a hypothetical, nevertheless 
reasonably plausible, answer about the effect of this variable 
in the aggregate study. The variable may be significant as it 
correlates with most of the quantifiable and qualitative 
variables. It is needless to say about the remuneration and 
employment variables, which some models of aggregate union 
growth do not incorporate. The same case seems to be applicable 
to such episodic factors as industrial action, employment 
stability and organisational changes whose irregular effects 
would be eliminated in the process of aggregation. 
Nevertheless, as has just been seen, the effect, or the nature 
of the effect, is never static but constantly changing as the 
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economic conditions of the employees, institutional 
arrangements and people's attitudes change. 
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17. Thus, an example of the form of a general model is, 
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BIFUt =d Pt-i + REMt +d Et-i + SAt +d UDt-i + STR + vt 
i_o id 
18. The results of model 3 is shown here. 
Table 6N. 1 Model 3 
Equations 1234 
Method OLS Normalised 
D. V. BIFU. A SA. A 
Period 1949-88 
Pt . 6110 . 5475 . 4371 . 2225 
(2.5782) (2.3292) (1.5787) (1.5331) 
Rt -. 6726 -. 4908 -. 2168 
(-2.5302) (-2.0739) (-. 6998) 
Et . 2342 . 3127 . 2974 
(1.4971) (1.8896) (1.9976) 
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Et-1 . 2608 . 2383 . 2028 
(1.6883) (1.5502) (1.3847) 
Et-2 -. 1718 -. 3411 -. 3591 
(-1.1061) (-2.3261) (-2.5153) 
Et-3 . 1903 . 2185 
(1.2677) (1,5351) 
SA/BIFU -. 3598 
(-2.2060) 
-. 3177 -. 2557 
(-1.9629) (-1.7432) 
PH . 5089 
(3.6143) 
R2 . 2893 . 3455 . 3476 . 3274 
R2 . 1848 . 3102 . 2049 . 2284 
F 2.7681 9.7673 2.4356 3.3093 
SER . 9033 . 8309 . 8923 . 8790 
DW 2.1761 2.0491 1.3434 1.2455 
LM F . 4020 . 0639 3.3844 4.4856 
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19. The results of model 3 are shown here. 
Table 6N. 2. Model 3 
Equation 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
D. V. BIFU. A SA. A 
Period 1949-88 
Pt . 7948 
(3.6180) 
. 6730 
(3.4647) 
. 2210 
(1.5801) 
REMt -. 8092 -. 6003 
(-3.6492) (-3.0783) 
Et . 1854 . 2421 
(1.4345) (1.5848) 
Et-1 . 2683 . 1793 
(2.1113) (1.2216) 
Et-2 -. 3220 
(-2.2346) 
Et-3 . 2297 
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(1.6281) 
SA/BIFU -. 2670 
(-2.0951) 
PMD . 4786 
(4.1512) 
-. 2361 
(-1.6220) 
STRU/SA . 5059 . 4849 . 1959 
(4.1546) (4.4018) (1.3091) 
R2 . 5118 . 5745 . 3606 
R2 . 4400 . 5391 . 2443 
F 7.1285 16.2040 3.1012 
SER . 7486 . 6792 . 8699 
DW 2.2202 2.1322 1.3873 
LM F . 6021 . 2985 2.4945 
20. Booth, A. 1983. op. cit. A basic unrestricted version of the Booth model takes the form, 
nnnn 
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Zt =d aiZt-1 +d 'ilpt-i +d gilwt-i +d eiUt-i + vt 
1=1 i=0 i=0 1: 0 
D 
where Zt -[ In -"--- ] 
D-1 
IP : Price Inflation 
Iv : Wage Inflation 
U: Unemployment 
A logistic transformation of density term is used to restrict the variable to lie in the 
interval ( 0,1 j for a purpose of prediction and to capture a 'saturation effect'. 
21. The results are as follows. 
Table 6N. 3 Model 2 
Equations 1234 
Method Exact AR1 Newton-Raphson Iterative Method/N 
D. V. BIFU BIFU. M SA SA. M 
Period 1952-88 1954-88 
Pt -. 1683 . 1427 
(-1.4730) (. 6989) 
Pt-1 -. 2512 . 1598 
(-2.0640) (. 8399) 
397 
REMt . 2956 . 3807 
(2.5195) (3.0114) 
. 0357 -. 0801 
(. 2601) (-. 6614) 
Et . 0458 . 1080 
(. 5227) (. 7817) 
Et-1 . 1159 . 0559 
(1.3649) (. 3952) 
Et-2 -. 0062 -. 2971 -. 1632 -. 3087 
(-. 0693) (-3.0913) (-3.0973) (-2.5628) 
Et-3 . 2178 . 3528 . 4068 . 2888 
(2.9808) (3.4838) (2.7344) (2.1555) 
UD/SADt . 3821 . 3993 . 3166 . 3661 
(4.4325) (4.1195) (1.4227) (1.8967) 
SA/BIFU . 3210 -. 4688 -. 4476 -. 5333 
(-3.4222) '(-4.5054) (-3.4862) (-4.8025) 
STRU/SA . 6319 . 5372 . 2222 . 2069 
(7.1393) (5.3930) (1.9941) (2.0482) 
R2 . 8338 . 7742 . 6169 . 6586 
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R2 . 7184 . 7047 . 4695 . 5536 
F 15.0467 11.1404 4.1859 6.2699 
SER . 4914 . 5431 . 7278 . 6690 
DW 1.8460 2.0166 1.9511 1.9272 
22. Sheflin, N. et al. 1981. op. cit. 
23. F-values of the Chow test are as follows. The computed F value of exceeds the critical 
F value at 5 per cent level in the Equation 7.3.4.1, indicating that the hypothesis that 
the two regressions are the same is rejected. 
Equation 6.2.5.1 F(9,19) 3.7626 
2 (7,23)=1.9248 
3 (7,23)=1.3615 
Equation 6.2.6.1 F(9,19) = 1.2649 
2(7,23) = . 8029* 
3(7,23) = 1.5008* 
* One of the dummy variables (ORG ) Is excluded for a calculation of F values of the Chow 
test because of the problem of multicollinearity. 
24. Cairncross, A. 'The Postwar Years, 1945-77'. Floud, R. and D. McClosky ed., The Economic 
History of Britain Since 1700. vol. 2,370. 
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25. Blackburn, R. M. op. cit. 166. 
26. The Bank Officer. March 1955. 
27. Lloyds Bank, Chief Accountant and Staff Department materials. 
28. The Bank Officer. January 1961. 
29. The Times. November 14,1960. 
30. The Bank Officer. November 1961. 
31. The first attempt to control the level of wages in terms of incomes policy was made by 
a Labour government in 1948, which was followed and developed by a Conservative government 
in 1962. 
32. The Bank Officer. 1967. 
33. Lloyds Bank, Winton file. 
34. X. M. E. claimed that only a strong national union can effectively represent the 
Interest of the staff in the new situation that concentration in the Industry brings about. 
35. N. U. B. E. News. No data available thereafter. 
36. Ibid. 
31. It was also claimed that a faster rate of strike off of members who left banking was 
Introduced at this time. Previously, those staff were maintained on membership records for 
nine months. 
38. Major mergers in this time include T. S. B. Trust Co., Guardian Royal Exchange, Phoenix 
Staff Union and Eagle Star Staff Association. 
39. Bifu Report, June 1981. 
40.21,902 voted for the industrial action, whereas the union and the SA/SU had around 
160,000 members in the major English clearing banks. 
41. Bifu Report. January 1984. L. B. G. S. U. Advance. September 1983. 
42. The Co-operative Bank and Bifu signed Job Security and Mobility of Labour Agreement in 
November 1983, which aimed to avoid compulsory redundancy and mobility caused by re- 
organisation. 
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43. Bifu Report. October 1983. 
44. Ibid. March 1985. 
45. The Times. April 3,1984. 
46. B. G. S. U., Staff Matters. April 1984. 
47. A circular of Barclays' management at this time reads, 
'Times have never been more competitive and this cannot be the moment to risk our future, 
it forms the case for continued overtime and a smooth launch on Wednesday of the bank's 
Connect direct debit card. ... Consider carefully the possible consequences of industrial 
action. ( Financial Times. June 1,1987 )' 
48. A tripartite arbitration agreement was signed in May 1969 between Barclays Bank, 
N. U. B. E. and B. B. S. A. This derives from the merger of Martins Bank whose staff association 
had a similar agreement with the parent bank. 
49. B. B. S. A., Essay News. August 1972. 
50. B. B. S. A., News Letters. June 1971. 
51. B. B. S. A., Essay News. August 1972. 
52. L. B. G. S. U. sought for a so-called 'flip-flop' arbitration arrangement after the bank 
terminated the agreement in February 1982 to encourage the parties to submit realistic 
offers and demands. 
53. C. B. D., Interest. 1981. 
54. B. G. S. U., Staff Matters. July 1982. 
55. N. W. S. A., Counterpoint. September 1982. 
56. B. G. S. U., Staff Matters. May 1983. L. B. G. S. U., Advance. July 1983. 
57. B. G. S. U., Staff Matters. April 1984. N. W. S. A., Counterpoint. May 1984. 
58. C. B. U., Interest. June 1985. B. G. S. U., Staff Matters. May 1985. 
59. Staff Matters. May 1987. 
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60. The hypothesis is that the relationship takes a quadratic form rather than a linear 
form. 
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Graph 6.2.2. Bifu and SA Growth 
Plot of Actual and Fitted Values 
, 3$77 
, 1939 
, 0008 
-. 8553 
-, 1105 
ji 
it 
, ... 
ýr'' 
.,.,,... "" 
)'' 
. 
1\. 
" 1, 
r« ý' `" 
"4 1ý/i 
IM 1961 1970 
DBIFU Fitted ..................... 
. 13361 
. 0618 
1979 198 
Plot of Actual and Fitted Values 
. 0880 ,. 
-. 8250 
-. 8508 1952 1961 
DSA 
1970 1979 
Fitted ..................... 
1988 
7. Supplementary Analyses 
Unlike historical societies where individual actions are 
immediately knitted into a generalised, stable structure, many 
elements in contemporary societies are subject to constant 
transformation, underlying which is the movement of the 
economy. So are the organisations. The aim of this chapter is 
to re-consider the changing function of the business-cycle 
factors and the processes of union growth. 
Most of the arguments have already been stated in the 
previous chapters. Statistically, it has been confirmed that at 
the levels of both the financial sector and the industry, 
economic variables mostly appeared insignificant, which makes a 
contrast with previous aggregate studies. But at the firm 
level, price inflation variable detected a positive effect upon 
union growth and the remuneration variable a negative effect. 
Empirically, it has been observed that a freeze in 
remuneration, mediated by the effect of price inflation, often 
caused dissatisfaction amongst employees which has been 
exploited by union actions, thus causing short-run expansion in 
organisations. 
Obviously, the process might be situationally and 
historically specific. The first section of this chapter deals 
with aspects of structural shifts. This is done upon an 
assumption that 1968, the year when the national machinery was 
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established and N. U. B. E. was given national recognition by the 
major clearing banks, was a turning point in the system of 
short-run union growth. Following this, the effects of 
business-cycle variables upon union growth are re-examined. The 
last section focuses upon social behaviour in two labour market 
segments within the industry. 
1. The Industrial Relations System and Structural Shift 
We now turn to the last problem raised in the previous section; 
to what extent are the causalities that have produced union 
growth stable historically? And if they have changed, how? As 
has already been mentioned, the historical stability of 
regression coefficients often causes technical problems in a 
time-series study, as overall patterns of causalities estimated 
by the models often change over a sample period. In fact, this 
is one of the points upon which growth models including that of 
Bain and Elsheikh have been criticized, as such a shift may 
significantly undermine the predictive ability of a model. It 
has also been mentioned that the concerns of historical 
sociology naturally differ from those of econometricians, as it 
is the specification of the historical processes themselves 
that primarily matters. As mentioned earlier, looking back into 
the historical events in the industry, one episodic event 
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appears as a source of such systematic changes; the 
establishment of the Joint Negotiating Council in 1968. 
Modelling Procedures 
The models in this chapter are estimated at the industry and 
institutional levels and most of the series are the same as 
those used in Chapter 4. The period after the war was split 
into two and separate equations were estimated. This would 
probably make the sample period too short for plausible 
estimation, but would be sufficient for the aim to assess an 
approximate general tendency observed in the industry. There is 
a possibility that recognition may have changed the growth 
patterns of Bifu in particular. The models that account for two 
genres of organizations had already been estimated in the 
previous chapter. 
Modelling procedures are also the same as before. Non- 
normalised models were estimated first and then, transformed 
into normalised equations based upon their respective sample 
periods. A minor change is made on the remuneration variable of 
Model 2 over the latter sub-period. Institutional remuneration 
series are available after 1968 in the 'Annual Report and 
Accounts' of all the major clearing banks and this was replaced 
with the original series, which relies upon the New Earnings 
Survey, to improve the consistency. This is shown as NRt. The 
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correlation coefficient between this series and the previous 
one is a little under . 60 in the rate of change form over the 
sample period. 
Industrial Relations System and Structural Shift 
The results are shown in Tables 7.1.1. and 7.1.2.1 Much 
shortened sample periods pose a problem upon the reliability of 
the estimated equations and a hasty interpretation of the 
results should be avoided. The results cannot be compared 
directly, either. 
The models explain around 60 to 70 per cent of the variance 
in the dependent variables both at the industry and institution 
levels. Some of the lagged employment variables, which may not 
be shown here, were also significant. General patterns of 
structural shifts might be found in the weakening function of 
the business-cycle variables. Particularly, price inflation 
appears as a significant determinant at the industry level, 
whereas most of the business-cycle variables are insignificant 
during the second sub-period. In the institution-level model, 
too, the remuneration variable is no longer statistically 
significant in the latter period. Similarly, the relative 
effect of the strategy variable is more prominent in the first 
sub-period. 
406 
Table 7.1.1. Model 2 
Equations 1234 
Method OLS 
Dependent Variable T 
Period 1949-67 1968-88 
Constant -. 1140 -. 1183 -. 0948 -. 1198 
(-1.2937) (-1.4678) (-1.6312) (-1.8743) 
Pt . 4316 . 4495 -. 0810 
(1.8775) (2.3608) (-1.0530) 
Rt . 0183 
(. 1523) 
RNt 
Et . 5046 . 5125 . 1916 
(2.4822) (2.7029) (1.3139) 
Et-1 
. 3011 . 2421 
(2.3846) (1.6376) 
Et-2 
. 2437 . 2840 
407 
(1.8886) (1.9699) 
Et-3 
. 5770 . 6674 
(4.2877) (4.3968) 
Dt . 0012 . 0013 . 0009 . 0014 
(1.2677) (1.4320) (1.3251) (1.7189) 
STR . 0460 . 0462 . 0439 . 0452 
(5.2859) (5.5511) (3.6481) (3.1014) 
ORG . 0308 
(2.1851) 
R2 . 7580 . 7576 . 8027 . 7240 
R2 . 6649 . 6883 . 6964 . 6056 
F 8.1432 10.9363 7.5541 6.1192 
SER . 0181 . 0175 . 0149 . 0176 
D. W. 2.5187 2.5209 1.8943 2.0475 
LM. F. 1.0861 1.0960 . 0000 . 1395 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7.1.2. Model 3 
Equations 12 
Method OLS 
D. V. TU. A 
Period 1949-67 1968-88 
Constant -. 0029 -. 0290 
(-. 2672) (-1.4580) 
Pt . 6491 . 4698 
(3.6164) (2.0615) 
Rt -. 2932 -. 3162 
(-2.1732) (-1.5936) 
Et . 3011 . 3449 
(1.7660) (1.7137) 
Et-1 
. 6409 
(3.1353) 
Et-2 
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Et-3 
STR . 0353 
(4.6904) 
. 5088 
(2.1042) 
. 0488 
(2.0066) 
ORG . 0621 
(2.0058) 
R2 . 7685 . 7297 
R2 . 7023 . 5842 
F 11.6175 5.0138 
SER . 0156 . 
0291 
D. W. 2.4657 ' 2.2253 
LM. F. 1.7446 . 3365 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7.1.3. Model 2 
Equations 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Dependent Variable T 
Period 1952-67 1968-1988 
Pt . 2595 -. 2909 
(1.9614) (-1.1745) 
Rt . 0245 . 3086 
(. 1538) (1.1656) 
Et . 3622 
(2.5654) 
Et-1 . 2666 . 2319 
(1.4397) (1.5658) 
Et-2 
Et-3 . 8383 . 5559 
(3.7775) (3.1863) 
Dt . 1611 . 4769 . 2175 
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(1.2993) (2.1647) (1.0712) 
STR . 7503 . 3472 . 2975 
(5.4747) (2.3922) (2.3952) 
ORG . 3586 
(2.6253) 
R2 . 7573 . 6195 . 7089 
R2 . 6880 . 4564 . 6119 
F 10.9217 3.7983 7.3059 
SER . 5255 . 7955 . 6722 
DW 2.5230 1.7097 1.7899 
LM. F 1.1876 . 2226 . 0081 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 7.1.4. Model 3 
Equations 123 
Method OLS Normalised 
Dependent Variables TU. A 
Period 1949-67 1968-88 
Pt . 5152 . 5795 . 5929 
(3.7433) (2.0660) (2.0103) 
Rt -. 3434 -. 4223 -. 4422 
(-2.2495) (-1.5803) (-1.5404) 
Et . 2569 . 2638 . 2598 
(1.8280) (1.7375) (1.6449) 
Et-1 . 4711 . 4756 
(3.1834) (3.0849) 
Et-2 . 0466 
(. 2589) 
Et-3 . 3541 . 3633 
(2.1986) (2.1312) 
STR . 6196 . 3277 . 3519 
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(4.8550) (2.0591) (1.8591) 
ORG . 0814 . 0802 
(1.9240) (1.8229) 
R2 . 7685 . 
7201 . 7215 
R2 . 7222 . 
6001 . 5716 
F 16.5964 6.0022 4.8115 
SER . 5279 . 6321 . 
6543 
DW 2.4657 2.1266 2.1496 
LM F 1.8786 . 1783 . 
2032 
t statistics in parentheses. 
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To what extent can these historical patterns be explained in 
relation to the changing system of industrial relations? The 
empirical survey as well as the business-cycle theory seems to 
be able to provide some hypotheses on this point. As for the 
decreasing effects of the economic variables, firstly, the 
establishment of the machinery may have directly changed the 
behaviour of salary inflation vis-a-vis price inflation, as it 
came to regulate the possible discrepancy between the two 
factors through more effective collective bargaining, thus 
decreasing the probability of the emergence of the 
dissatisfaction or threat effect. 
This process is also numerically observable. Correlation 
coefficients between price inflation and salary ( total 
remuneration ) inflation was . 4238 between 1949 and 1967 in the 
institutional series, whereas this figure increased to . 7919 
between 1968 and 1988. A similar tendency can be observed at 
the industry-level, whose correlation coefficients became . 8169 
between 1969 and 1988, although there might have been some 
other factors, such as incomes policy, which brought about this 
relationship. 
Secondly, as has been argued in the last section, 
stagflation may have also contributed to alter the pattern 
through which the economic variables function. The 'threat' 
effect of both price inflation and remuneration factors may 
still be possible, but the effect of expectancy that the 
economists have long advocated may be less prominent, 
415 
consequently shifting the mechanism of union growth away from 
the economic to organisational variables. In fact, the much 
more prominent effect of strategy variable in the first sub- 
period in all the models may also be argued in relation to 
this. Historically observed prominent dissatisfaction amongst 
employees sometimes had in its background- a lack of effective 
bargaining processes through which employees demands can be 
reflected upon labour management. The emergence of the 
machinery evidently institutionalised this process, -thus 
averting the intense outburst of dissatisfaction. 
Union Growth and the Business-cycle 
A fairly commonly observed feature of the function of the 
business-cycle factors in the industry was characterised by 
'dissatisfaction' or 'threat'. Price inflation may have a 
positive effect, as such a situation often occurs on a 
background of inflationary economy. It has also been observed 
that supply side conditions have often had an influence in 
these cases and, in the same way, organizational actions 
lacking a context often failed, partly because the trade unions 
generally lacked the institutional dominance that some in the 
manual sectors enjoyed. 
It is probably of some interest to investigate the 
influences of market factors in detail. We might hypothesize 
416 
that the effect of the business-cycle variables can be regarded 
as a function of four factors; severity, duration, relative 
severity of economic degradation and accompanying events and 
situation. Then, as Ashenfelter and Pencavel did, the first two 
may be captured by price inflation and salary inflation in 
nominal or real terms and the second by the unemployment rate. 
2 
Table 7.1.5. shows the values of these factors in selected 
years when such an effect was observed. 3 The years in the 
table are the peak years of fluctuation, which often appears 
Table 7.1.5. Economic Factors and Union Growth 
peak years 1951 1955 1967 1972 
1.3 o. Grovth 0.681 0.91 7.61 1.97 
P 2.82 3.20 9.31 9.13 
A -1.25 6.88 2.25 13.92 
RR -4.07 3.68 -7.06 4.79 
D (DI) 1.6 1.5 1.2 2.1 
4.05 5.37 0.14 9.64 -6.55 6.06 
1.80 4.42 3.87 2.41 9.40 7.20 
2.62 3.31 3.44 1.15 13.73 10.86 
0.82 -1.12 -0.43 -1.26 4.33 3.64 
1.5 1.2 1.6 2.5 3.1 3.7 
1.2 O. Groitb 1.58 1.32 4.90 5.55 10.08 1.94 . 16 10.61 4.33 7.23 
Bt 2.84 1.10 6.83 9.21 -6.97 21.74 9.51 -0.90 12.13 11.24 
AAS 0.00 -2.10 -2.48 0.00 "8.77 17.31 5.63 -3.36 2.13 4.02 
Events. t c. iiniina salary scale c. scale a. recognition Barber bona 
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pay 
hours 
stability 
incomes policy 
peat years 1915 1983 1981 
1.3 O. Crowth 10.01 6.05 7.89 0.69 6.07 7.71 7.43 
t 24.24 16.48 15.91 8.60 4.63 4.03 4.91 
R 26.31 17.54 15.91 8.30 8.43 12.28 5.18 
ýR 2.07 1.06 -8.68 -0.29 3.80 8.25 0.26 
0 3.9 5.3 5.7 9.9 10.4 10.3 8.3 
1.2 O. Groxth 
U8 
1.81 3.81 5.34 
29.14 16.20 9.72 
4.89 -. 28 -6.20 
". 85 5.92 5.04 
9.63 7.68 15.45 9.92 
1.03 3.05 11.42 5.00 
Events c. redandancy 
inccses policy 
a. boliday a. pay 
weekend 
network rev. 
1; price inflation, 1; remuneration, RR; real remuneration in the rate of change. 
t Estimated figures between 1916 and 1968. !tc. denotes campaigns and a. denotes 
industrial actions. 
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with a cycle of a few years. These seven cycles cover most of 
the prominent short-run movements. 
As has just been shown in the statistical analyses, 
particularly at the institution level before the machinery, 
peak years in union growth are often characterised by severe 
economic conditions, although it is by no means the sole 
determinant of actual growth. By comparing the two series, a 
certain deficiency of the industry-level series can also be 
noticed, particularly in such years as 1955 and 1966.4 
In the same way, the relationship is less conspicuous after 
the establishment of the national machinery. The problem here 
is the process. The increase in 1975, for example, seems to be 
generated by an increase in employment in the previous year 
which reached 9.93 per cent. The case in 1983 was the compound 
effects of at least a few factors; disputes over the Christmas 
holiday, re-introduction of Saturday opening and a review of 
staffing and the branch network. Hence, although the economic 
variables have little immediate effects, this case fit fairly 
well into the orthodox framework. The industrial action in 
1987, which started against 5 per cent imposition by the banks, 
ended with partial success including that in Lloyds. Thus, this 
provides another example when the dynamics of industrial 
relations changed the causal process itself. 
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2. Labour Markets and Social Action 
It has long been argued by many sociologists that systematic 
differences in socio-economic situations often generate 
observable, different patterns of consciousness and thus, 
social action amongst certain categories of individuals and 
that such 'stratification' factors as the manual/ non-manual 
division, structure of labour market and gender are of 
particular importance. Economists, on the other hand, have 
traditionally considered that people behave in the way that 
would maximize their individual utility. Nevertheless, the 
application of the labour market segmentation theory in this 
context yields an assumption that the discrete situations of 
the people might produce certain tendencies in behaviour as the 
obtainable benefits accordingly vary. This section attempts to 
identify differences in short-run behavioural patterns in a 
long-term sociological framework of the dual labour market 
theory. 
Modelling Procedure 
The estimation is done by splitting the Bifu series as well as 
the employment data into male and female series and by running 
two separate models on the assumption that the gender 
difference represents labour market segregation. The intention 
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is to identify the effects of the business-cycle and 
organisational factors upon the aggregate behaviour of the 
employees in different segments. 
There are a few versions of such models that can be run with 
the data that have already been used. These include an 
institutional 8ifu model between 1949 and 1968, a model of 
staff associations and unions growth between 1949 and 1989, and 
a model of union growth between 1949 and 1989. After some 
preliminary research, the first option, which is by far the 
most modest, was chosen. This is solely due to the availability 
of data, particularly the consistency of the membership, 
remuneration and employment series. The lack of male/ female 
breakdown of the 81fu series after 1969 at the institutional 
level at the time of modelling naturally excludes some options. 
Thus, some explanatory variables, namely the employment and 
the rivalry variables, splitted into the two categories and 
density terms were re-specified accordingly. Other variables 
are the same as those in Model 3. Two problems remain. One is 
whether male/ female breakdown can be used as a reasonable 
approximation of employees in different labour market segments. 
Another is whether the changes in remuneration have followed a 
similar path in the two categories. 
The adequacy of adopting the male/ female distinction as an 
approximation of labour market segments has already been 
discussed in Chapter 2. The point is that, at least during the 
sample period under consideration, most of the female employees 
belonged to the secondary sector, but male series may also 
421 
include a substantial number of employees who are allocated in 
the same sector, although their proportion may be much less 
than it is now. The remuneration series represents the actual 
amount of salary and other pecuniary rewards paid to the 
employees, consequently ignoring the possible discrepancy 
between the rate of change of remuneration paid to the 
employees in the primary and secondary sectors. This problem 
may be by-passed by excluding this series from the estimation 
altogether, as Ashenfelter and Pencavel did. 
Labour Markets and Social Behaviour 
The results are shown in Tables 7.2.1. All the equations are 
normalised according to the sample period. Models explain 80 to 
90 percent of union growth in different labour market segments. 
Relative significance of the economic variables suggest that 
male employees may be more responsive to the changes in the 
conditions of employment than those who belong to the secondary 
segment, although the deficiency of the series does not allow a 
hasty interpretation. However, it is nevertheless possible to 
argue that this may reflect a stronger labour market commitment 
usually held by the former. Although the relative significance 
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Table 7.2.1 Segmentation Model 
Equations 1234 
Method OLS Normalised 
D. V. Bifu Male Bifu Female 
Period 1949-68 
Pt 
. 4580 . 4252 . 1043 . 1089 
(4.5443) (4.2576) (1.0308) (1.1599) 
Rt -. 0792 -. 1016 -. 2447 -. 2607 
(-. 8484) (-1.0821) (-1.7320) (-2.7106) 
LM/LFt . 5336 . 3617 . 0185 
(3.3388) (3.9031) (. 1600) 
LM/LFt-1 -. 2252 . 2860 . 2930 
(-1.3054) (2.5957) (3.0023) 
SAM/SAF -. 5020 -. 4067 -. 2017 -. 1986 
(-4.1995) (-4.1986) (-2.0547) (-2.1343) 
STR 
. 5821 . 6169 . 8498 . 8511 
(6.4378) (6.9788) (9.2771) (9.6476) 
R2 
. 9103 . 8994 . 9080 . 9085 
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R2 . 8783 . 8726 . 8760 . 8841 
F 28.4237 33.5297 27.8497 37.2238 
SER . 3487 . 3568 . 3522 . 3405 
D. W. 1.9113 1.8615 1.6906 1.6799 
LM. F . 0124 . 0298 . 1559 . 1850 
t statistics in parentheses. 
of the push-up or pull-down effects seems to be more or less 
similar in the two categories, the rivalry effect is 
prominently observed amongst male employees and industrial 
actions seems to have attracted more from the secondary sector. 
The limited nature of the sample does not allow a 
generalisation, but this seems to be fairly consistent with the 
logical inference. 
Despite the fact that none of the density term with or 
without lag structure was statistically significant, union 
density was higher amongst male than female employees during 
this period and union growth was significantly circumscribed by 
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the potential membership itself, particularly in the former 
category. This may mean that the behaviour of staff association 
membership can directly affect N. U. B. E. growth, although the 
possibility of simultaneous equations bias cannot be excluded. 
Strategic actions particularly affected those in the 
secondary sector. There seems to be at least two explanations 
for this. One is a larger potential membership in the latter 
category and another is the short-run effect of the long-term 
structural factor. Given an historically relatively stable 
propensity to unionise, it might be possible to argue that 
those who belong to the secondary market were under- 
represented. Furthermore, the union actions, the first of which 
had as its target the rapidly increasing female labour force, 
may have succeeded in mobilising the potentially available 
section of the employees. 
1. Some examples of Bifu models at the institutional level are shown here. 
Table 7N. 1 Model 3 
Equations 123 
Mwthod OLS Normalised 
D. V. BIFU. A 
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Period 1949-61 1968-88 
Pt . 3259 . 5303 . 5993 
(4.3424) (1.8658) (2.4904) 
REMt -. 3130 -. 2479 -. 3097 
(-2.9926) (-. 8861) (-1.2723) 
Et . 2237 . 2339 . 2572 
(2.0091) (1.3481) (1.5845) 
Et-1 . 1208 . 2911 . 3269 
(. 9460) (1.7983) (2.3228) 
UDt . 1602 . 6168 . 5855 
(2.2551) (3.5146) (3.6776) 
SAt -. 2438 . 0976 
(-2.3884) (. 4940) 
STRU . 6850 . 3054 . 3275 
(8.4258) (1.8761) (2.1501) 
ORG . 1058 . 1098 
(2.4786) (2.6918) 
R2 . 9537 . 7509 . 7462 
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R2 . 9306 . 6167 . 6374 
F 41.2327 5.5975 6.8602 
SER . 2635 . 6194 . 6025 
D. W. 2.2216 2,0040 1.9709 
LM. F 1.9157 1.0095 . 5251 
t statistics in parentheses. 
2. Ashenfelter, 0 and J. H. Pencavel. 1969. op. cit. 
3. T, P and R figures are the same as those used In-the models. The unemployment figures 
derive from London and Cambridge Economic Service, The British Economy Key Statistics, 
1900-1970. and Economic Trends. 
4. In 1966, for instance, the government imposed a statutory control on incomes. 
427 
8. Conclusion 
Research in the social sciences requires reciprocal processes 
between theory and empirical investigations. In this respect, 
there have been three basic contentions in this work. Firstly, 
to treat the theories of union growth as the theories of social 
or rational action. Secondly, to separate and examine the 
short-run processes from the trend process. Thirdly, to 
identify the definitive causation in the sphere of the 
empirical research. Perhaps some have been attained but others 
obviously remain to be developed further. 
Analyses of short-run union growth and empirical surveys 
were done in Chapters 4 to 7. The results may be compared with 
the aggregate analysis of Bain and Elsheikh reviewed in Chapter 
2 together with other models, in which a priori effects of the 
business-cycle variables are hypothesized and price inflation, 
wage inflation, density and unemployment appeared in the 
empirical models as significant determinants of union growth. 
The actual historical processes seem to be far richer and 
dynamic than their reasoning allows for and, in some respects, 
the adequacy of their theory may be contested. 
There are three points that should be mentioned here; 
causation and the effects of the business-cycle variables, 
causation and the effects of the internal and external 
organisation variables, and changes in the estimated causality. 
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Firstly, it has been observed that downturn in the conditions 
of employment, notably that of remuneration, has often emerged 
as a commonly experienced threat and consequent dissatisfaction 
amongst the employees has often lead to union growth. In the 
same way, betterment of conditions that is not the result of 
this process seems to have had an opposite effect. Price 
inflation has most possibly been associated with' lagging 
remuneration, in which case the effect is the same as that of 
the remuneration, or with their expectation of a change in 
remuneration. Short-run fluctuation in unions and associations' 
membership in such years as 1951,1955,1967,1971 and 1987, 
and in the mid-1970s when the incomes policy was still 
operational, seems to have this causation at the core. 
Thus, these results and empirical research suggest that, in 
an ideal situation, the degree of the effect may be captured by 
three factors; severity, duration and relative severity of the 
downturn in economic conditions. In reality, such formulation 
of the functional form may not necessarily improve the fit of 
the models because of at least three reasons. Firstly, the 
conditions of employment obviously include business-cycle 
factors, but nevertheless are not confined to them. 
Historically, a threat to employment stability that has 
accompanied mergers of enterprises or re-organisation of the 
industry was often associated with the most prominent union 
growth and, in fact, the very start of trade unionism in the 
industry derives from the amalgamation movement. There is also 
more recent evidence to suggest that other factors such as 
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hours, a holiday arrangement and reorganization of a branch 
network may initiate, or at least amplify, the process, making 
it observable at the two levels of aggregation covered in this 
work. 
Secondly, these situations or events have often co-existed 
and union growth appeared as a function of them. An obvious 
implication of this is that the business-cycle variables would 
represent a core, nevertheless partial, explanation. Of course, 
it is possible to argue that most of the conditions of union 
growth mentioned here do not function at random but, through 
different causal processes, essentially relating to the 
business-cycle. But the original theory does not pay heed to 
such processes. Thirdly, even allowing for the effects of 
variables other than business-cycle ones, growth models would 
not simulate many sharp fluctuation in union membership at this 
level of aggregation; the effect of organisational resource 
mobilization has to be assessed. This was particularly notable 
in 1967 when a demand by the union to establish the machinery 
lead to a vigorous campaign. In this respect, the business- 
cycle variables also detect accompanying effects that do not 
necessarily relate to individual actions taken under certain 
economic conditions. 
The effects of the business-cycle variables are somewhat 
unstable at these levels of aggregation, which leads to the 
third point of the structural shift. Although a deficiency in 
the remuneration data does not allow us to draw a solid 
conclusion, models at the industry level generally failed to 
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detect significant function of the business-cycle factors. The 
only exceptions are those run between a limited period before 
the establishment of the national machinery, in which price 
inflation had a positive effect. In the models at the 
institutional level, which were estimated with consistent data, 
two variables were statistically significant over the whole 
sample period. However, the period being split into two, the 
remuneration variable was no longer significant in the latter 
sub-period. 
Different causal processes detected between the banking 
industry and probably wider financial industries on the one 
hand and the institutional level on the other are something 
that could not be explored fully. There are certain conditions 
that a possible explication has to satisfy; similar behaviour 
of correlation between price inflation and union growth, and 
salary inflation and union growth over the sub-periods in both 
models, and prediction failure at the industry level around 
1960. A tentative explanation is that a series of institutional 
changes took place in the industry brought about episodic 
patterns of union growth upon which the models were estimated. 
There is enough ground to argue that early patterns may have 
been generated by business-cycle factors, which estimated 
models failed to predict. 
What seems to be certain is that both price inflation and 
salary inflation variables have historically lost their 
explanatory power. In a sense, this result is obvious, as there 
have been changes in economic policy, economy and the 
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industrial relations system. A notable example is an incomes 
policy which was operational for well over a decade in the 
1960s and 1970s. An effective function of the unions and the 
industrial relations system in the industry also emerged as a 
new regulator of a pay standard. The events in 1987 symbolises 
the function of this process; a restrictive increase in 
remuneration caused a dissatisfaction or threat effect, but the 
consequent industrial actions at least partly succeeded in 
improving the final offer within the year. One economic 
consequence of these changes is that salary inflation highly 
correlates with price inflation in the latter sub-period. 
Organisational factors that the conventional business-cycle 
models have not incorporated are highly significant at the 
level of aggregation in this work, which also indicates that 
the overall effects of these-factors may be detected in the 
aggregate models by the business-cycle variables. By far the 
most significant internal organisational factor is the effects 
of successful campaigns and industrial actions. The example of 
strike action in 1967 is outstanding, but more recent, less 
successful industrial actions seem to have had a positive 
effect upon union growth. However, interpretation of the 
causation of this factor requires caution. It has often been 
the case that the process largely simulates that which relates 
to. salary inflation; in 1967, for instance, the presence of the 
incomes policy meant that a severe, prolonged, economy-wide 
freeze in remuneration was to be commonly experienced, which 
was followed by a further decline in conditions in the 
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industry. The consequence is that a substantial proportion of 
members were in the union prior to the industrial action. An 
aspect of resource mobilization cannot be denied; nevertheless, 
as Bain suggested, union officers often act as catalysts in the 
recruitment processes. 
Changes in employment are an obvious example of an external 
variable, but the effect is not always straight forward and is 
often accompanied by a certain time lag. It has also been shown 
in Chapter 5 that some long-term factors like feminization can 
have a short-run effect, and intimidation actually curbed union 
growth before the second world war. Establishment of the 
national machinery also caused an industry-wide shift in 
membership from one union to others, whose process was analysed 
in Chapter 6. 
Economists like Gary Becker have claimed that the theory 
based upon the maximization framework provides a systematic, 
formal account of Zweckrational, or end rational, action and 
that changes in aggregate behaviour do not have to be explained 
by ad hoc changes in preferences and attitudes any more. 
Despite the alleged difficulty in framing a micro-underpinning 
in the time-series analyses, many economists have at least 
nominally adapted the cost-benefit criterion to account for the 
short-run fluctuation in membership. Nevertheless, its 
applicability to, and its meaning in, the studies of social 
behaviour remains controversial. 
There are at least a few reasons to consider that the theory 
approximates aggregate behaviour in the short-run context. 
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Firstly, most of the business-cycle related variables and, in 
fact, most of the variables in the models could be regarded 
more or less to influence the utility of union services. This 
is particularly so in the case of the variables that account 
for strategic action and the organisational shift. Ashenfelter 
and Pencavel also argued that changes in employment could 
entail a change in the conditions on the supply side. Secondly, 
it is reasonable to assume that aggregate foundations of a 
Wertrational, or value rational, action would not fluctuate in 
short intervals. Thirdly, empirical surveys suggest that, in so 
far as trade unionism is concerned, actual actions are largely 
taken upon a pragmatic rather than a normative ground. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that it would leave 
certain qualitatively important elements in the social action 
outside analysis. As has been mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4, 
ideology, particularly one's political socialisation, can 
significantly affect a probability of union membership and this 
process can occupy a significant part in the analysis of cross- 
sectional union growth or individual membership. 
The same can be said about the analysis of long-term trend 
growth, which was dealt with in Chapter 4. Although lack of 
some essential information does not allow a full exploration, a 
basic causal process seems to have been generated by growth in 
employment, that in the secondary market, and a change in the 
industrial relations system, which brought about a shift in the 
social custom. Automation and degradation of work are generally 
accompanied by expansion of the secondary sector, the 
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consequence of which has been a decrease in overall density. 
There are at least two factors involved. Firstly, secondary 
sector employment has largely been held by young female 
employees whose temporary attachment to the a labour market 
systematically reduces utility of union services for them. 
Secondly, particularly owing to automatic membership of some 
staff associations before the second world war, union density 
had already been at saturation point. 
The current situation is characterised by equilibrium, or a 
slight decline, in density. This means a balance between influx 
and efflux. Such a situation may cast a blight on the numerical 
expansion of white-collar unionism not only because overall 
density would automatically decrease in the long-term but the 
banking industry seems to provide a developed example in the 
private service sector. Thus, causal processes described here 
may be currently atypical in the experiences of white-collar 
unionism as a whole. Nevertheless, for that reason, it is also 
useful to consider some problems modern social theory has. At 
least certain versions of the stratification approach, which do 
not formulate a logic of individual action in a societal 
context, seem to require modification and it is only by doing 
so that sociological, or social scientific, analyses of 
contemporary societies can be developed around this important 
concept of stratification. 
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Appendix 1. A Note on the Quantitative Analysis 
Use of basic quantitative analysis as in this work can now 
often be found in sociology or industrial relations and may not 
require any explication. Nevertheless, this research was 
happened to be carried out in a history department and a brief 
summary of its property may be of some use. In this appendix, 
properties of the regression analysis are briefly described 
according to the following order; Regression Analysis, 
Assumptions and Properties, Summary Statistics, Statistical 
Testing and References. 
Regression Analysis 
We assume that the fluctuation of one variable Y can be 
explained theoretically by another variable X. Supposing a 
linear relationship between Y( the dependent variable ) and X 
( the explanatory or independent variable ) we can write the 
causal relationship as an equation, 
Yt =a+ bXt 1.1 
where Yt is the estimate of the t th observation on the 
variable Y, Xt is the t th observation on the variable X. 
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The unknown parameters a( intercept ) and b( slope ) are 
estimated so that the sum of squares of vertical distances from 
the points to the line is minimum ( fig. l. l ). This least- 
square criterion can be restated formally as, 
N 
Minimize d( Yt - Yt )2 1.2 
t=1 
where N is the number of observations. 
The least-square criterion is achieved by solving the normal 
equations, 
dYt = Na + bdXt 1.3 
dXtYt = adXt + bd%t2 
Alternatively, 
NdXtYt - dXtdYt 
b= ------------------ 1.4 
NdXt2 - (dXt)2 
dYt dXt 
a= ----- -b ----- =Y- bX 
NN 
where X and Y are the sample means of X and Y respectively. 
A multiple regression model that contains two or more 
explanatory variables can be regarded as an arithmatic 
extension of this two-variable model. 
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Assumptions and Properties 
a. Assumptions and Properties; Formally, we write a two- 
variable linear regression model with a random error or 
disturbance term n as, 
Yt ='+ aXt + nt 2.1 
The error term n is included to allow for the non-exact 
relationship between the two variables, X and Y. This error may 
arise from such factors as omitted variables, namely existence 
of the factors which are not or cannot be incorporated in the 
model, or measurement and collection error of the data. This 
model can be extended to the multiple regression model, 
assuming that the dependent variable Y is a linear function of 
a series of explanatory variables X1, X2, .. Xk. 
Yt = aO + alit + a2X2t +... + akXkt + nt 2.2 
In this model, the coefficient a2, for example, measures the 
change in Y caused by an unit change in the variable X2 on the 
assumption that all other values for the remaining explanatory 
variables are held constant. The regression model makes a 
number of assumptions. 
i. The model specification is given by the above equations. 
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ii. The Xs are nonstochastic or fixed variables. In the 
multiple regression model, no exact linear relationship exists 
between two or more explanatory variables. 
iii a. ( zero mean/ constant variance ) The erro term has zero 
expected value and constant variance for all observations; E( 
nt )= fn = 0, E( nt - fn )2 = E( nt2 )= en2 
iii b. ( independence ) The random error term n corresponding 
to different observations are not correlated each other. 
iii c. ( normality ) The error term is normally distributed. 
Given the assumptions i, ii, iii a, and iii b, the estimators 
and a are the best linear unbiased estimators ( BLUE ) in the 
sense that they have the minimum variance ( efficiency ) and 
they are not biased ( E( a)=a). 
i. First of all, note that the specified causal relationship is 
from X to Y, rather than the other way round. 
ii. The second assumption on the nonstochastic explanatory 
variable X is rather unrealistic, as it implies that the 
researcher can select the values of X and then observe the 
corresponding values of Y. However, this assumption can be 
relaxed under certain conditions. The perfect correlation 
between two or more explanatory variables in the multiple 
regression model is called collinearity and the high 
correlation is termed multicollinearity. In the former case, 
the computer cannot carry out the calculation. In the latter 
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case, the model can be used with all its variables, but as the 
regression coefficients are supposed to measure the change in Y 
due to a change in the variable in question, other things being 
equal, we cannot place the reliance on the values of the 
estimated coefficients. One of the ways to establish the 
existence of multicollinearity is to drop one or more variables 
from the equation and see if the standard errors of the 
remaining variables become lower. 
iii a. The assumption that the error term has zero expected 
value simply indicates that the mean value of Y equals ('+ 
aX ). However, even if the error term does not have a mean of 
zero, the regression model will be equivalent to the one that 
complies this assumption but an intercept and the error term. 
As the intercept term is not of central concern, this 
assumption is not usually considered seriously. The case that 
the error term has not a constant variance is called 
heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedesticity, or unequal variances of 
the error term, does not usually occur in time series studies, 
as changes in the dependent variable and changes in one or more 
of the independent variables often increase at a similar rate. 
When heteroscedesticity is present, ordinary least-squares 
estimation places more weight on the observations with large 
error variances and, although parameter estimates are unbiased 
and consistent, they are not efficient; they do not have the 
minimum variances. 
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iii b. When the errors corresponding to different observations 
are correlated, we call it serial correlation or 
autocorrelation. Generally, autocorrelation does not affect the 
unbiasedness or consistency of the estimators, but 'it does 
affect their efficiency and the standard error of the 
regression SER will be biased downward. ( see the DW test ) 
iii c. In the classical normal linear regression model, we add 
the assumption that the error term is normally distributed. 
This is to specify the probability distribution of the error 
term in order to perform statistical tests of the model. 
b. Beta Coefficients; Beta coefficients are used to compare the 
relative importance of the explanatory variables in a model. 
To do this, a regression model is run with normalized variables 
by subtracting their means and dividing by their standard 
deviations. This procedure standardizes the units and viriances 
of variables. 
Summmary Statistics 
a. the coefficient of determination R2; The coefficient of 
determination R2 is often used as a measure of goodness-of-fit 
of regression models. OsR2sl, and if R2=1, all data points fit 
the regression line, and if R2=0, there is no relationship 
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indicated statistically between the dependent and explanatory 
variables. To measure the goodness-of-fit of a regression model 
( we consider the two-variable model for a simplicity ), we 
take the sample mean of Y, Y, as the predicted value of Yt 
regardless of the value of Xt and calculate how much the value 
estimated by the model, Yt, is closer to the actual value, Yt, 
than this value, Y. The model with k variables is written as 
Yt = aO + al%lt + a2X2t +... + akXkt + nt 3.1 
Now we break down the difference between Yt and the mean value 
Y as follows, 
( Yt -Y) = total deviation of Yt from the sample mean 
( Yt -Y) = 'explained' deviation of Yt from Y 
( Yt - Yt )= 'unexplained' deviation of Yt from Y 
( Yt -Y)_( Yt - Yt )+( Yt -Y)3.2 
Squaring both sides and summing over all observations, 
d( Yt -Y )2 = d( Yt - Yt )2 + d( Yt -Y )2 3.3 
TSS = ESS + RSS 
Total Sum of Error Regression Sum of 
Squares ( Residual ) Squares 
Sum of Squares 
We define, 
RSS d( Yt -Y )2 
R2 = ----- = -------------- 
TSS d( Yt -Y )2 
ESS dnt2 
=1- ----- =1- ------------- 3.4 
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TSS d( Yt -Y )2 
Hence R2 measures the proportion of the variation in Y which is 
explained by the regression model. If R2=. 65, we say that the 
model can explain 65 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. 
b. Corrected R2, R2; This formula of R2 is also applicable to 
the multiple regression model, but its value is sensitive to 
the number of explanatory variables included in the model, 
whether or not those additional variables are relevant. For a 
solution, we define, 
ESS /(n-p) 
R2 =1- ----------------- 3.5 
TSS /(n-1) 
where n is the sample size and p is the number of regression 
coefficients. Note that the R} statistic is often used 
informally to compare the performance of different models, but 
such a comparison does not have a formal theoretical basis as 
the properties of this test, such as type 1 and type 2 errors, 
are not known. 
c. Standard Error of the Regression, SER; The square root of 
the residual variance is called the standard error of the 
regression and given by 
{ ESS { d( Yt - Yt )2 
SER = --------- - ------------------ 3.6 
{n-k{n-k 
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where n is the number of observations and k is the number of 
regression coefficients. It is clear from the definition that 
the smaller value of the SER indicates the better fit of the 
regression model. 
Statistical Testing 
It is a standard procedure in quantitative analysis to examine 
the constructed model carefully using the test statistics. 
a. t test, testing the regression coefficient; The t 
distribution is usually used for the statistical testing of the 
regression coefficients, as a sample estimate of the error 
variance is used rather than its population variance. Taking 
the two-variable model as an example, we start from overlooking 
some properties of the regression coefficients. 
E(a)=a4.1 
a is an unbiased estimator of a. 
' e2 
Var (a)_ ------ 4.2 
dXt2 
The variance of a depends on the error variance, the variance 
of Xs, and the number of observations. 
e2 
aN(a, ------ ) 4.3 
dXt2 
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Given the normality of n, the Ys are normally distributed and 
the estimator a is also normally distributed. Even if the Ys 
are not normally distributed, the distribution of a can be 
regarded as normal for large samples ( say, n> 30 ) according 
to the central-limit theorem. As the true population variance e2 
is not known, we use the sample estimate s2. 
dnt2 d( Yt - Yt )2 
s2 = e2 = ------- - --------------- 4.4 
N-2N-2 
Note that ESS is divided by N-2 degrees of freedom. This is 
because the estimation of two parameters ' and a puts two 
constraints on the data and only N-2 data are used to estimate 
the residual variance. Hence the sample estimate of the 
variance of a becomes, 
s2 
sa) = ------ 4.5 
d%t2 
Now we construct a confidence interval so that, 
P(z<a< y) _ . 95 4.6 
namely the probability that the interval includes a is 95 
percent. Standardizing the estimated coefficient a, 
a-a0 a-a0 
Z= --------- _ ------------ 4.7 
N-2 sa s/{ dXt2 
where aO is a hypothesized true value of a, sa is the standard 
error of a, and the standardized variable Z will follow the t 
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distribution with N-2 degrees of freedom. Now we select an 
appropriate critical value, tc, which assumes that 2. percent 
of the t distribution lies in each of its tails. The value of 
tc depends on the degree of freedom, but will equal 1.96 when 
the sample number is large. 
a-a0 
P( -tc < ------------ < tc . 95 4.8 
s/{ d%t2 
SS 
P(a- tc -------- < aO <a+ tc -------- ) 4.9 
{ dXt2 { dXt2 
We obtain a 95 percent confidence interval for a, 
S 
aq tc -------- 4.10 
{ dxt2 
We test the hypothesis, 
Ho : a=0 
H1 :aX0 
From the null hypothesis Ho, the test statistic becomes, 
a 
------------ =t( the t value of a)4.11 
s/{ dXt2 
3a3 
If 3------------ 3s3 tc 3 4.12 
3s/{ dXt2 3 
we reject Ho :a=0. Alternatively, we can construct the 95 
percent confidence interval for a, and if a=0 lies outside 
the interval, we reject the null hypothesis. Note that this 
hypothesis testing deals only with the probability of the type 
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1 error, namely rejecting Ho :a=0 when it is true, which is, 
in this case, less than 5 percent. 
t test can also be applied to test the regression 
coefficients of the multiple regression model. The estimated 
regression parameters standardized by subtracting the mean and 
dividing by the estimated standard error follow the t 
distribution with N-k degrees of freedom. 
aj - aj 
--------- tj=1,2, ... k4.12 
sa N-k 
b. F test, testing the regression equation; The F statistic is 
used to test the significance of the R} statistic, or, more 
accurately, to test the joint hypothesis, 
Ho : a2 = a3 =... =ak=0 4.13 
R2 N-k 
F= -------- ------- 4.14 
k-1, N-k 1- R2 k- 1 
where subscripts are the number of degree of freedom in the 
numerator and denominator. The F statistic follow the F 
distribution and if, 
F> Fc 4.15 
k-1, N-k 
we reject the null hypothesis; HO :F=0. Fc denotes critical 
value of F. 
447 
c. DW test, testing the autocorrelation; The Durbin-Watson test 
is used to test the presence of the autocorrelation. 
T' 
d( nt - nt-1 )2 
t=2 
DW = ------------------ 4.16 
T" 
d nt2 
t=1 
When the succesive values of nt are close each other, the DW 
statistic will be low, indicating the presence of positive 
autocorrelation. O<DW<4 and a value near 2 indicates no first- 
order serial correlation, in which errors in one time period 
are correlated directly with errors in the ensuing time period. 
Positive serial correlation is shown by DWvalues below 2, and 
negative serial correlation by values above 2. 
d. Durbin h test ; Note that the DW statitic cannot be used 
when the explanatory variables include a lagged dependent 
variable, as in the Carruth-Disney model. Durbin h test is an 
alternative usually taken. When the error term n is 
nt = ent-1 + ut 4.17 
the null hypothesis, e=0, is tested. Test statistic is, 
d{N 
h=(1- --- ) --------- 4.18 
211- Ns2 
where d denotes the DW tatistic and s2 is the estimated 
variance of the regression coefficient with the lagged 
variable. h follows standard normal distribution and a test for 
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positive serial correlation at the five percent significant 
level takes h>1.645 as the critical region. 
e. Lagrange Multiplier test ( F-version ); This is another 
version of a test of residual serial correlation, and is 
applicable to models with and without lagged dependent 
variables. The LM statistic is defined as, 
N-k R2 
LM F= ------- ------- 4.19 
k-1 1-R2 
The critical region is based on an F distribution with (k-1, 
N-k) degrees of freedom. 
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Appendix 2. Statistical Data 
Some of the membership data are required to be treated as 
confidencial and are not shown in this appendix. 
1. Bifu membership ( 31st Dec. ) 
YEAR MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1919 15000 
20 27000 
21 29592 
22 27368 2769 30137 
23 25825 2263 28088 
24 23160 1806 24966 
25 22749 1639 24388 
26 21886 1433 23319 
27 20094 1233 21327 
28 18790 1092 19882 
29 18333 1060 19393 
1930 19105 1321 20426 
31 19653 1615 21268 
32 19623 1850 21473 
33 18881 1927 20808 
34 18722 2098 20820 
35 18403 2223 20626 
36 17432 2154 19586 
37 16773 2137 18910 
38 16000 2086 18086 
39 15552 2094 17646 
1940 17368 3698 21066 
41 20155 5696 25851 
42 21444 7872 29316 
43 21175 7655 28830 
44 20645 7264 27909 
45 20625 6532 27157 
46 20352 5300 25352 
47 20329 5497 25826 
48 22072 6511 28583 
49 22248 6810 29058 
1950 22504 7118 29622 
51 25874 8600 34474 
52 27223 9656 36879 
53 26789 9877 36666 
54 25842 9680 35522 
55 33288 13989 47277 
56 33978 14669 48647 
450 
57 34678 15469 50147 
58 34264 15791 50055 
59 34382 15949 50333 
1960 35600 17187 52787 
61 36936 19522 56458 
62 37921 21213 59134 
63 38582 22876 61458 
64 36261 19963 56224 
SOURCE: Blackburn, R. M. 1967. Appendix B. 
NOTE: The first two years are estimates, and from 1945 Scotish 
membership is included. 
2. Bifu Membership ( Con't ) 
MALE FEALE TOTAL 
65 37035 21409 58444 
66 36101 21761 57862 
67 42794 32719 75513 
68 45138 37233 82371 
69 45932 41111 87043 
1970 47044 42100 89144 
71 47603 45000 92603 
72 48314 55000 103314 
73 45000 55102 100102 
74 55838 44390 100228 
75 55206 46216 101422 
76 59292 51717 111009 
77 61336 55403 116739 
78 65627/66200 59622/60143 125249/126343 
79 67169/67726 63522/64048 130691/131774 
1980 71399/71930 68601/69112 140000/141042 
81 75110/75708 71509/72287 146619/147995 
82 75970/76520 74675/75465 150645/151985 
83 76584/77164 78490/79312 155074/156476 
84 75282/75814 77913/78765 153195/154579 
85 75126/75649 80986/81819 156112/157468 
86 74232/74914 83044/83832 157276/158746 
87 76006/76753 88020/89086 164026/165839 
SOURCES: The Department of Employment records maintained at 
the Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick ( 
thereafter I. R. R. U. ) and the data provided by the 
Certification Office. 
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NOTE: The figures on the right hand side after 1978 are total 
membership including the members in branches in abroad ( from 
1978 ) and Northern Ireland ( from 1981 ). 
Bifu mebership in Northern Ireland is still small, and 331, 
0.2% of total mebership. 
3. Bifu Membership in the former London Clearing Banks 
1948 17479 4908 22387 
49 17738 5195 22933 
50 17636 5341 22977 
51 20728 6667 27395 
52 21775 7473 29248 
53 21346 7543 28889 
54 20459 7263 27722 
55 25991 10719 36710 
56 26390 11207 37597 
57 26869 11745 38614 
58 26535 11995 38530 
59 26333 12042 38375 
1960 27091 13004 40095 
61 28078 15113 43191 
62 28801 16596 45397 
63 28979 17448 46427 
64 26964 14796 41760 
65 27664 16057 43721 
66 26998 16147 43135 
67 32800 25978 58778 
68 34771 29722 64493 
69 35229 32620 67849 
1970 68749 
SOURCES : 1948-1969 Heritage, J. 1977. Appendix 1. 
4. National Westminster Bank, Bifu/ NatWest Staff Association 
Membership 
4A. National Provincial Bank 
BIFU S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1948 1440 238 1678 5546 1891 7437 
49 1488 248 1736 5605 1840 7445 
1950 1309 189 1498 5548 1823 7371 
51 1611 281 1892 5379 1937 7316 
52 1689 322 2011 5575 2051 7626 
53 1608 312 1920 5648 2132 7780 
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54 1522 308 1830 5836 2233 8069 
55 2363 596 2959 5405 2315 7720 
56 2421 697 3118 5446 2437 7883 
57 2459 742 3201 5384 2421 7805 
58 2368 743 3111 5447 2387 7834 
59 2363 779 3142 5447 2674 8121 
1960 2497 846 3343 5975 2746 8721 
61 2560 925 3485 6042 3127 9169 
62 2555 1023 3578 6235 3256 9491 
63 2510 1134 3644 6483 3748 10231 
64 2185 861 3046 6693 3865 10558 
65 2211 897 3108 6767 3964 10731 
66 2080 897 2977 6731 3889 10620 
67 2855 1831 4686 6271 3290 9561 
68 3086 2352 5438 5970 3308 9278 
SOURCE : Heritage, J. 1977. 
4B. Westminster Bank 
BIFU S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1948 1305 328 1633 7085 2621 9760 
49 1260 294 1554 7352 2719 10071 
1950 1289 313 1602 7629 2822 10451 
51 1462 389 1851 7752 2867 10619 
52 1467 403 1870 8058 2980 11038 
53 1392 411 1803 7996 2957 10953 
54 1361 400 1761 7982 2952 10913 
55 2280 789 3069 7720 2855 10575 
56 2347 846 3193 7939 2936 10875 
57 2372 894 3266 8337 2704 11041 
58 2301 924 3225 7992 2956 10948 
59 2349 936 3285 8434 2983 11417 
1960 2601 1199 3800 8598 3471 12067 
61 2759 1384 4143 8741 3746 12487 
62 3080 1676 4756 8662 3040 11702 
63 3214 1857 5071 8932 4299 13231 
64 2990 1338 4328 9466 5003, 14469 
65 3076 1262 4338 9771 5378 15149 
66 3039 1269 4308 9931 5246 15177 
67 4093 2411 6504 9270 4420 13672 
68 4534 3214 7748 8833 3872 12705 
SOURCE: Ibid. 
4C. District Bank 
S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1948 857 350 1207 
49 748 282 1030 
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1950 877 324 1201 
51 864 319 1183 
52 898 385 1283 
53 939 422 1361 
54 1072 448 1520 
55 1001 437 1438 
56 984 366 1350 
57 1003 377 1380 
58 1001 391 1392 
59 1039 416 1455 
1960 1203 551 1754 
61 1247 683 1930 
62 1182 856 2038 
63 1306 949 2255 
64 1342 1116 2458 
65 1376 1237 2613 
66 1485 1092 2577 
67 1254 854 2108 
68 1298 673 1971 
SOURCE: Department of Employment records maintained at I. R. R. U. 
NOTE: District Bank Staff Association amalgamated with National 
Provincial Bank Staff Association, National Provincial Bank 
Ladies Guild and Westminster Bank Guild to form National 
Westminster Staff Association in September 1969. 
4D. National Westminster Bank ( Con't ) 
BIFU S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1969 17494 15629 7873 23502 
1970 18824 15189 8132 23321 
71 19576 15538 8141 23679 
72 20502 15802 8510 24312 
73 16703 16695 8414 25109 
74 13999 17183 9330 26513 
75 13328 17729 10971 28700 
76 14156 17987 11924 29911 
77 14090 20373 13531 33904 
78 13887 19947 13679 33626 
79 14421 18815 14782 33597 
1980 16080 18792 14765 33557 
81 16332 18483 15425 33908 
82 16857 17719 14644 32363 
83 18739 17628 15672 33300 
84 17864 17436 16430 33866 
85 17391 17632 17330 34962 
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86 17431 17977 35408 
87 17672 19292 36964 
88 18460 21058 39518 
SOURCE: 1969-1970 TOTAL Heritage, J. 1977 
1971-1985 BIFU TOTAL Morris, T. 1987 
1971-1980 S. A. Department of Employment Records maintained at 
I. R. R. U. 
1981-1988 S. A. Certification Office 
NOTE: The Certification Office figures include small number of 
members in branches outside Great Britain, however, the 
original data does not seem to be accurate on this point and it 
is difficult to estimate the figures in Great Britain. The 
NatWest Staff Association seems to have had around 200 members, 
0.5%, somewhere abroad in 1988. This is the membership at the 
end of September. 
5 Barclays Bank, Bifu/ Barclays Group Staff Union ( 31st Dec. ) 
5A. Barclays Bank 
BIFU 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1948 6353 1713 8066 
49 6407 1881 8288 
1950 6250 1962 8222 
51 6768 2354 9122 
52 7198 2705 9903 
53 7170 2838 10008 
54 7023 2775 9798 
55 8455 3832 12287 
56 8503 3905 12408 
57 8671 4083 12754 
58 8628 4144 12772 
59 8582 4185 12767 
1960 8777 4548 13325 
61 9078 5446 14524 
62 9233 6116 15349 
63 9175 6500 15675 
64 8707 5924 14631 
65 9034 6862 15896 
S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
4723 1217 5940 
4927 1310 6228 
4956 1334 6290 
4936 1344 6280 
5161 1513 6674 
5414 1702 7116 
5727 1858 7585 
5790 1793 7583 
5735 1713 7448 
5803 1881 7684 
6005 1904 7909 
6027 2365 8392 
6355 2976 9331 
6420 3233 9635 
6602 3415 10017 
6730 3516 10246 
7342 4024 11366 
7558 4737 12295 
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66 8902 6929 15831 7821 5053 12874 
67 10352 10232 20584 7821 5053 12874 
68 10715 11153 21868 7680 4961 12641 
69 10654 12033 22687 9676 5920 15596 
1970 25513 9898 5976 15874 
71 24971 13046 6910 19956 
72 24826 16998 8555 25553 
73 23417 18210 13520 31730 
74 20024 20206 13850 34056 
75 18301 18446 15607 34053 
76 18797 18823 15382 34205 
77 18638 18831 16184 35015 
78 18556 18882 16477 35359 
79 16061 18900 16737 35637 
1980 15381 20968 17737 38705 
81 14874 20810 18418 39228 
82 14176 20429 18908 39400 
83 15418 20871 20362 41233 
84 14312 21015 21324 42339 
85 15346 21227 23775 45002 
86 21364 25683 47047 
87 22222 27126 49348 
SOURCE: 1948-1970 Heritage, J. 1977. 
1971-1985 BIFU TOTAL Morris, T. 1987. 
1971-1980 S. A. Department of Employment records maintained at 
I. R. R. U. 
1981-1987 S. A. Certification Office 
5B. MARTINS BANK 
S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1948 1279 392 1671 
49 1286 406 1692 
1950 1284 417 1701 
51 1373 420 1793 
52 1336 411 1747 
53 1322 479 1801 
54 1289 534 1823 
55 1287 596 1883 
56 1344 597 1941 
57 1442 725 2167 
58 1504 753 2257 
59 1834 903 2737 
1960 1996 990 2986 
61 2111 1040 3151 
62 2113 1041 3154 
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63 1944 958 2902 
64 1779 876 2655 
65 1869 920 2789 
66 1837 959 2796 
67 2058 918 2976 
68 1996 959 2955 
SOURCE: Department of Employment records maintained at I. R. R. U. 
NOTE: Martins Bank Staff Association joined Barclays Bank Staff 
Association in December 1969. 
6. Lloyds Bank, Bifu/ Lloyds Bank Group Staff Union ( 31st 
Dec. ) 
BIFU 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1921 5406 
22 5570 
23 5646 
24 5334 
25 5087 
26 4844 
27 4449 
28 4097 
29 4206 
1930 4669 
31 5013 
32 5016 
33 4259 476 4735 
34 4338 557° 4895 
35 4284 583 4867 
36 3954 513 4467 
37 3703 465 4168 
38 3471 446 3917 
39 3297 436 3733 
1940 3668 734 4402 
41 4098 1188 5286 
42 4373 1699 6072 
43 4265 1611 5876 
44 4126 1450 5576 
45 3914 1249 5163 
46 3605 969 4574 
47 3335 949 4284 
BIFU S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
48 3490 1173 4663 7227 4429 11654 
49 3343 1209 4552 7363 4513 11876 
1950 3122 1229 4351 7581 4646 12227 
51 3077 1221 4914 8017 4914 12931 
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52 3012 1228 4240 8653 5303 13956 
53 2796 1103 3899 8695 5329 14024 
54 2594 1028 3622 9316 5710 15026 
55 3235 1504 4775 9191 5683 14874 
56 3278 1654 4932 9479 5809 15288 
57 3483 1827 5310 9301 5808 15109 
58 3367 1805 5172 9418 5817 15235 
59 3257 1813 5070 9633 6042 15675 
1960 3339 1940 5279 9978 6215 16193 
61 3635 2393 6028 9890 6061 15951 
62 3928 2711 6639 9913 6075 15988 
63 4073 2732 6805 9858 6042 15900 
64 3811 2120 5931 10141 6216 16357 
65 3858 2111 5969 10533 6456 16989 
66 3821 2145 5957 10647 6525 17172 
67 4779 3634 8413 10506 6440 16946 
68 5342 4242 9584 10308 6318 16626 
69 10397 11091 6120 17211 
1970 10787 12338 5461 17799 
71 10308 10806 5136 15942 
72 10854 11053 5908 16961 
73 9640 11171 6146 17317 
74 9247 11369 6793 18162 
75 10537 11670 8006 19676 
76 11658 11957 8941 20898 
77 12786 12421 10162 22583 
78 15257 11973 9233 21206 
79 15558 12181 8659 20840 
1980 16088 12235 8678 20913 
81 15985 11968 8226 20194 
82 16057 12226 8210 20436 
83 17661 12309 8731 21040 
84 16150 12581 8633 21214 
85 13340 12312 9887 22199 
86 12820 10468 23288 
87 13516 12141 25657 
SOURCE: 1921-1947 Union data maintained by Lloyds Bank 1948- 
1968 Heritage, J. 1977. 
1969-1980 S. A. Department of Employment Records maintained at 
the Industrial Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick 
1971-1987 BIFU T. Morris, 1987 
1981-1987 S. A. Certification Office 
8. Midland Bank, Bifu/ Midland Bank Staff Association 
BIFU S. A. 
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1948 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
1960 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
1970 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
1980 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
MALE 
2687 
2773 
3149 
5061 
5540 
5503 
5115 
6032 
5976 
5999 
5999 
5874 
5883 
6020 
5995 
5906 
5385 
5501 
5305 
5967 
6105 
FEMALE 
637 
632 
665 
1204 
1436 
1467 
1383 
1917 
1988 
2069 
2218 
2193 
2275 
2735 
2851 
2898 
2457 
2748 
2858 
4428 
4860 
TOTA 
3324 
3405 
3814 
6265 
6976 
6970 
6498 
7949 
7964 
8068 
8217 
8067 
8158 
8755 
8846 
8804 
7842 
8249 
8163 
10395 
10965 
10907 
10920 
10192 
10159 
10381 
9717 
10328 
11542 
13031 
16520 
17079 
19828 
20546 
20825 
21722 
21776 
21239 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
2454 534 2988 
3786 890 4676 
3817 911 4728 
4172 1236 5408 
4465 1651 6116 
4869 2052 6921 
5258 2342 7600 
5557 2875 8432 
5710 3026 8736 
6227 3009 9236 
6098 3298 9396 
7108 3867 10975 
7348 4015 11363 
7603 4111 11714 
7862 4278 12140 
7781 4250 12031 
7537 3591 11128 
7355 3435 10790 
7248 3254 10502 
7067 3020 10087 
7150 3143 10157 
SOURCES: 1948-1970 BIFU Heritage, J. 1977. 
1953-1970 S. A. Ibid. 
1971-1985 BIFU TOTAL MORRIS, J. 1987. 
1971-1973 S. A. TOTAL Department of Employment records 
maintained at I. R. R. U. 
NOTE: Midland Bank Staff Association transferred to ASTMS ( now 
MSF ) in 1974 and figures are not available thereafter. 
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9. Former Williams & Glyn's Bank, Bifu/ Williams and Glyns 
Staff Association 
BIFU 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1971 2866 
72 3222 
73 3801 
74 4044 
75 3814 
76 4201 
77 4580 
78 4962 
79 4485 
1980 4650 
81 4874 
82 5215 
83 5484 
84 5603 
S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
375 286 595 
255 195 450 
SOURCE: 1971-84 BIFU Morris, T. 1987. 
1971-72 S. A. Department of Employment records maintained at 
I. R. R. U. 
NOTE: W&GS. A. transferred to NUBE in 1972 as it obtained 
sole bargaining rights. W&G Bank merged with the Royal Bank 
of Scotland in 1985. 
10. Coutts and Co. 
S. A. 
MALE FEMALE TOTAL 
1974 650 400 1050 
75 568 307 875 
76 568 307 875 
SOURCE: Department of Employment Records maintained at I. R. R. U. 
NOTE: Coutts Staff Association joined National Westminster 
Staff Association in October 1977. 
460 
Appendix 3. Statistical Sources 
Model 1. Banking, Insurance and Finance Industries 
a. Trade Union Membership: The data compiled by Bain and his 
associates were kindly provided by Dr. Waddington of Industrial 
Relations Research Unit of the Business School, Warwick 
University ( thereafter I. R. R. U. ). These data are based on 
Bain and Price. 1980. Profiles of Union Growth, but 
substantially modified and up-dated. 
b. Retail Price Index: For 1948-70, Bain and Elsheikh. 1976. 
op. cit. Their data derive from Statistics on Incomes. Prices, 
Employment and Production. No. 29,1969, and data supplied by 
the Department of Employment. For 1971-1986, CSO. 1988. 
Economic Trends, Annual Supplement. 
c. Average Weekly Earnings: Earnings are defined as the 'total 
remuneration which employees receive from their employers in 
the form of money, either as wages or salaries, including 
overtime and other premium payments, bonuses, commission or 
other payments of any kind, and before the deduction of income 
tax or of the employers' contributions to national insurance or 
superannuation funds. ( BLS YB, 1971,6. )' Unfortunately, there 
are no consistant data that cover whole period after the war, 
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although estimated figures are available for the pre-war 
period. Thus, to make the time-series, three different series 
are combined assuming the similarities in their fluctuation. 
Hence some models are always estimated without this series and 
particular caution is required for interpretation of the models 
that include this series. 
For 1948-54, B. R. Mitchell, 1988. 'Indices of Weekly Wage Rates 
in Certain Industry Group, United Kingdom, 1914-80 Public 
Administration and Professional Services'. 
For 1955-60, HMSO. 1971. British labour Statistics, Historical 
Abstract. ( thereafter BLS. HA. ), Table 54 'Average weekly 
earnings of administrative, professional, technical and 
clerical staff combined and clerical staff seperately in the 
public sector and banking and insurance 1955-68'(October 
figures in the U. K. ). This ATC earnings survey, which was 
started in 1955 by the Ministry of Labour and expanded into ATC 
employees in the production industries in 1959, does not follow 
SIC ( see p. 9. ). 
For 1961-70, HMSO. 1970. British Labour Statistics Year Book, 
Table 19. Same series in Great Britain. 
For 1971-76, HMSO. BLS. YB. 'Average weekly earnings, hours, and 
hourly earnings, by industry, April, full-time non-manual men 
aged 21 years and over, and full-time non-manual women aged, -18 
years and over, Great Britain'. Its source is New Earnings 
Survey and follows SIC 1968. NES provides detailed information 
about earnings in non-manual occupations in April each year 
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from 1970, and `on the assumption that, in the earlier years, 
average earnings of all non-manual employees moved in line with 
the average earnings of those covered by the October enquiries, 
the new index may be linked on to the previous series to give a 
continuous series from 1959 ( BLS. YB. 1971 318 )'. 
For 1972-82, New Earnings Survey. Part C, Analysis by Industry. 
Average gross weekly earnings. 
Adjustment is as follows. For 1955-82, average weekly earnings 
were calculated using current weights from the data which were 
originally compiled seperately for male and female. For 1955- 
59, April figures were estimated using average weekly earnings 
of manual men and women in all industries ( BLS. HA. Table 41 ) 
assuming that average earnings in banking and insurance 
industries moved in line with this data. For 1960-70, April 
figures were estimated using the indices of average weekly 
earnings of all non-manual employees. See the Gazette, May 1972 
or BLS. YB. 1971, Appendix I, Table 3. 
d. Potential Union Membership: Consistant series is available 
as union membership data was supplied from the same source. 
Potential union membership is defined as the 'labour force, 
including the registered unemployed, but excluding employers, 
the self-employed, and members of the armed forces'. Employment 
series was calculated from this series by subtracting the 
unemployed. 
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e. Unemployment Rate: Fairly consistant industry-level data are 
available since the beginning of the century, although the 
Department of Employment discontinued the series in 1982. 
For 1948-74: Bain and Elsheikh, 1981, An Industrial Analysis of 
Union Growth in Britain, the Data Base ( I. R. R. U. Discussion 
Paper ) Their unemployment figures derive from the Gazette, 
and the labour force data come from BLS and the Gaette. They 
followed SIC 1958. 
For 1975-82: the Employment Gaette and CSO, Annual Abstract of 
Statistics. Figures are fairly consistant with those of Bain 
and Elsheikh. 
f. Political Variable: Percentage of Labour MPs in the House of 
Commons was calculated from the data in Butler, D. and 
G. Butler. 1986. British Political Facts 1902-1985_ Macmillan: 
Basingstoke. For the last election, see Wood, A. H. ed. 1987. 
The Times Guide to the House of Commons. London: Times Books. 
Model 2. English Clearing Banks 
a. Trade Union Membership: For Bifu, union data compiled 'for 
individual firms were added up. These data, rather than the one 
published somewhere else, were preferred because of their 
consistency and reliability. The figures include union 
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membership in the following banks, which are roughly the same 
as the former London clearing banks; National Westminster Bank 
PLC and those merged into this bank, 1948-88. Barclays Bank 
PLC, including previous Martins Bank and Barclays Bank 
International ( 1984-88 ). Lloyds Bank Plc, including previous 
Lloyds Bank International. Former Williams and Glyn's Bank, 
1948-84. Note that Midland Bank is excluded from the main 
series because of the discontinuity of its staff association 
series, 1948-52 and 1974-88. Coutts and Co. is also excluded 
because of lack of some union data. 
For staff associations and staff unions, membership of the 
following bodies were added up. Most of the data derives from 
the I. R. R. U. and respective organisations are also shown in 
Appendix. 2. 
National Provincial Bank Staff Association, including National 
Provincial Ladies Guild, 1948-68. 
District Bank Staff Association, 1948-68. 
Westminster Guild, 1948-68. They amalgamated in September 1969 
to form National Westminster Bank Staff Association ( now 
NatWest Staff Association ). 
Barclays Bank Staff Association ( now Barclays Group Staff 
Union ), 1948-87. 
Martins Bank Staff Association, which joined the above 
association in December 1969. 
Lloyds Bank Staff Association ( now Lloyds Bank Group Staff 
Union ), 1948-87. 
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Williams and Glyns Staff Association, 1948-72. This association 
ceased to exist as NUBE gained sole bargaining rights in 1973. 
Midland Bank Staff Association ( now MSF Midland Bank Section 
1953-88. Note that the figures from 1974 to 1988 are 
estimates by intertrapolation and those data for estimation 
come from the Times and BIFU Report. This series is excluded 
from major estimation. 
b. Employment: Generally, the data are consistant each other. 
1971 figure is an estimate. For main series, employment data 
are compiled by subtracting the number of staff employed by 
Midland Bank, whose figures were provided by Group Personnel. 
Barclays Bank International figures are included after 1985 and 
Lloyds bank International after 1986. 
For 1948-70, Heritage, J. 1977. 
For 1972-84: Committee of London Clearing Bankers, Abstract of 
Banking Statistics, vol. 2,1985. 
For 1985-88: Committee of London and Scottish Bankers. 1989. 
Abstract of Banking Statistics. vol. 6. Figures include part- 
time and those staff of certain subsidiaries who are paid 
directly by the parent bank. 
c. Average Weekly Earnings: This series is compiled from New 
Earnings Survey on the same basis as in model 1 and extended. 
For SIC 1980, see Employment Gazette, Mar. 1983,118-122. 
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Model 3. Firm-level 
a. Trade Union Membership: Following data are used. For Staff 
Union, data and its source are shown in Appendix. 2. 
For Bifu 1921-47, data maintained at Lloyds Bank. 
For 1948-68: J. Heritage. 1977. 
For 1969-88: Union Data. 
b. Average Remuneration: Consistant data are available over the 
sample period, 1918-1989. 
For 1918-70, data maintained at Lloyds Bank, which was 
originally compiled by Chief Accountant and Staff Department of 
the Bank. Directors' fees are excluded and messengers fees are 
included. 
For 1971-86: Lloyds Bank plc, Report and Accounts ( annual ). 
Average figures were calculated by dividing the total 
remuneration ( except pension contributions and employers 
insurance contribution ) by the number of staff employed each 
year. This series is consistant with the above data. 
c. Employment: Consistant data are available over the sample 
period, 1922-89. 
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For 1922-76, Bank data originally compiled by Staff and 
Administration Department. Messengers and staff on active 
service with H. M. Forces during the previous war years are 
excluded. Figures are at the end of each year. 
For 1977-88: Data provided by Personnel Department of the Bank. 
This series is consistant with above data. Female employment 
also comes from these serieses. 
d. Net Profit: Net Profit is defined as gross profit minus bad 
debts, income tax and other adjustments where gross profit is 
difference between total earnings and total outgoings. 
For 1918-70, Bank data compiled by a Chief Accountant. 
For 1971-86, Lloyds Bank plc, Report and Accounts ( annual ). 
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